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Abstract 
The law of contractual receivership has evolved quietly over a period of one hundred 
and fifty years or so. The institution of receivership started out as a mortgagee's 
remedy, but has proved remarkably adaptable to the commercial needs of large 
financial organisations, so much so that it has enjoyed ascendancy as a method of 
debt enforcement for the latter half of the twentieth century. This thesis attempts to 
chart the developmental process of receivership law, and to evaluate both judicial 
and legislative responses to the particular issues of policy it raises. In particular, it 
investigates the impact of receivership, both in legal and practical terms, on the 
various parties interested, in their various capacities, in the corporate entity. The 
main body of the thesis addresses this question from a number of perspectives. 
Corporate insolvency affects a wide variety of constituents. Receivership, as an 
insolvency regime, is frequently criticised as overly biased in favour of powerful 
financial institutions at the expense of both the corporation itself and its other 
stakeholders. By affording a contractually appointed receiver dominion over the 
entirety of the company's property, and by sanctioning the proposition that his 
decisions be informed exclusively by his appointor's interests, this censure of the law 
might appear justified. Alternatively, proponents of receivership have promoted the 
institution as a 'rescue' mechanism, a means by which viable companies, or viable 
sectors of their businesses, may be nurtured back to productivity and profitability. 
These two conflicting views will be examined in the final Chapter, in the light of 
recent reform initiatives which appear to envisage at least some minor modification 
to the existing 'balance of power'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Preface: What is receivership? ' 
1. The perception of contractual receivership 
Even the uninitiated have some (albeit perhaps imperfect) understanding of the 
phrase 'the receivers have been called in', and this information is usually imparted in 
the kind of hushed tones that accompany the news that a medical prognosis is less 
than promising. Indeed, the analogy may not be inappropriate 2. Receivership of a 
company generally signals the fact that all is not well with that company. Whilst the 
precise nature of the problem may not be transparent, it is commonly assumed to be 
serious, so serious as, in the majority of cases, to be terminal. It is not fanciful to 
suggest that the most widely held perception of receivership is a pessimistic one. Far 
from being seen as company doctors, or trouble-shooters on a mission to rescue an 
ailing enterprise, receivers are viewed as harbingers of its ultimate demise, 
descending upon it only to administer the last rites. 
Of course, the perceived wisdom will not always reflect the reality and an 
inauspicious reputation may be undeserved. This is, to some extent, the case where 
receivership is concerned. There exists something of an early nineties 'hangover' 
which still taints it as an institution in the eyes of the public, and it is the misfortune 
of receivers that much of the negativity attaching to their position emanates from an 
era of unsettled economic conditions and unprecedented corporate failure. 
Recessions do not make for spectacular rescues, but that truism has been overlooked, 
and the most visible candidate for hostility in this regard is usually the receiver. His 
1 This introductory section is intended, firstly, to provide a skeleton description of receivership 
and, secondly, to sketch out the aims, scope and emphases of the thesis as a whole. For the sake 
of brevity footnotes are kept to a minimum, and certain assertions made which will be amplified 
upon and supported in the main body of the work. 
2 Nor, indeed, original. 
I 
is the classic case of shooting the messenger. 
Furthermore, as many would vigorously assert, the beneficial aspects of receivership 
have been woefully under-publicised. The demise of a company is not necessarily 
accompanied by the demise of the enterprise carried on by it, nor are its employees 
inevitably rendered jobless. The timely intervention of a receiver may be 
instrumental in salvaging worthwhile sections of the corporation that might 
otherwise have been jeopardised by ongoing incompetence on the part of 
management. The appointment of a receiver may 'stop the rot', as it were, in that 
directors who might have continued to incur liabilities are divested of their control of 
the enterprise. The receiver, in such circumstances, acts as a buffer between the 
company and those who, but for his appointment, would have found themselves to be 
3 
unsecured creditors 
. 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that the institution of receivership continues to 
engender suspicion, and even hostility. This is hardly surprising, given that bad news 
reaches the public more speedily and frequently than good news. Further, those with 
grievances will often find themselves with an opportunity to air them, whereas 
receivers themselves appear unwilling to engage in validation exercises. This is 
particularly noticeable at the local level, where some receiverships become front- 
page news 4. Folklore, then, is perpetuated at the expense of a genuine understanding 
of what it is that receivers actually do, why they do it, on whose behalf, and under 
3 Receivership is not the only mechanism to achieve this result. Liquidation and administration 
provide a direct bar to management incurring further debt, and the prospect of wrongful trading zn 
proceedings under s 214 Insolvency Act 1986 acts as an indirect (perhaps psychological) bar. Cý 
4 At the time of writing there are frequent reports in local newspapers concerning the 
receivership of a Speedway club. The members of the club express disappointment at the refusal 
of the receivers to lease the grounds to them so that racing can continue in the short term. The 
reason for this refusal is said to be the receivers' determination to sell the land with planning 
permission and vacant possession. The receivers, perhaps understandably, have remained tight- 
lipped. 
2 
what factual and legal constraints. The question is whether, by exploring popular 
myths, it becomes possible to explode thein. 
2. Receivershi12 as a debt enforcement mechanism: an overview 
As a starting point, it is important to identify the fiinction of a contractual receiver. 
Notwithstanding that certain 'rescue-orientated' roles have been claimed for 
receivers, it remains the case that receivership began as, and continues to be, 
primarily a method of enforcing a secured debt. Advancing credit to a company 
necessarily entails acceptance of the risk that the advance will not be repaid. Such 
risk can be diminished by the taking of security, the means of which are manifold, 
but in the present context usually comprise the making of the loan conditional upon 
the creditor obtaining a proprietary right in the present and future assets of the 
company. If the company cannot repay, the creditor has recourse to its property, 
which can be sold and the proceeds used to discharge-the debt. 
The taking of security is only the first step in reducing the risk of furnishing credit 
facilities. If the worst happens, and the company defaults, it then becomes necessary 
to enforce the security, to sell the collateral and apply the proceeds as described 
above. This process not straightforward, either in legal or practical terms. At one 
time a creditor taking enforcement steps found himself under considerable legal 
disabilities 5, and, as will be seen, receivership provided a way around these. The 
practical problems of enforcing security remained, however. The value to the creditor 
of having security cannot be measured solely by the monetary value of the collateral, 
for this takes no account of the costs of taking possession and selling that collateral. 
To the extent that enforcement requires a creditor to expend time and money, the 
5 Specifically, the equitable rules relating to mortgagees in possession; see Chapter 1. 
3 
value of having security is reduced. The interposition of a receiver between debtor 
and creditor provides a supremely effective solution to this dilemma. 
How does receivership work to achieve this benefit? This is probably best illustrated 
by example 6. Suppose Company X has an overdraft with Bank y7 of E100,000 and 
has repeatedly failed to respond to the bank's request to reduce the amount 
outstanding. Bank Y reaches the conclusion that Company X will not, in the future, 
be in a position to discharge the debt. Bank Y has, however, a fixed charge over 
Company X's land, plant, book debts and goodwill, and a floating charge over its 
stock and work-in-progress. It estimates the value of these assets at E30,000 on a 
forced sale basis and f120,000 if the business can be sold as a going concern. 
Theoretically, therefore, the bank's security should protect it from loss, but only if it 
can be enforced at little or no cost. 
Leaving aside the legal position, Bank Y would be ill-equipped to carry out the 
enforcement task. The situation demands expert intervention in sitzi: someone must 
be moved into the company's premises to safeguard the assets and assess how best to 
proceed, and this is not what bankers do. Outside intervention is called for, but such 
is likely to be expensive. The net result is that what appears to be perfectly adequate 
security is found wanting, unless a quick, cheap and effective method of enforcement 
is available. Receivership is that method. 
Receivers can be appointed with the minimum of ceremony: once a valid demand for 
repayment has been made and not met, the appointment can follow without delay 8. 
6 The example is basic in the extreme and does not purport to typify the course of a receivership. 
7 Receivers are usually appointed by banks, although it is technically possible for any creditor to 
contract for the right to make an appointment. This right will be dependent upon the creditor 
having some forrn of proprietary interest in some, or all, of the company's property, since the 
receiver enforces the debt by recourse to that property. For the sake of convenience, references 
to 'the bank', 'the secured creditor', 'the debenture-holder' and 'the appointor' will be used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
8 Bank ofBaroda v Panessar [19871 Ch 335; Lloyds Bankplc v Lampert [ 19991 BCC 507. 
4 
The receiver's professional fees, as well as any costs he incurs during the 
receivership, will invariably be met by the defaulting company. Further, the bank can 
rest assured that its appointee has the expertise to perform his task efficiently. This is 
particularly so in light of the fact that the Insolvency Act 1986 now prescribes 
minimum qualifications for those acting as insolvency practitioner in relation to a 
cornpany9. These factors combine to create a potent enforcement mechanism, almost 
tailor-made to meet the needs of the bank, and it is little wonder that receivership has 
proved so popular over time, The bank can, in effect, simply make its appointment 
and await payment in due course. 
As an added bonus, the bank's legal position is made more favourable by the use of a 
receiver. The spectre of extensive liability as mortgagee in possession is exorcised by 
10 the simple ploy of deeming the receiver to be agent of the mortgagor/company 
. 
This sleight of hand shields the bank from responsibility for its receiver's actions, 
without prejudicing its interests, since the receiver's main focus throughout his time 
in office will be those very interests. 
Debt enforcement, therefore, is the primary concern and function of receivership, and 
its extraordinary success in this regard is demonstrated by the fact that for over a 
century loan contracts have, as a matter of course, made provision for the 
appointment of a receiver. However, the above description is incomplete as to the 
nature and significance of receivership, and an analysis of the institution would be 
inadequate without an examination of its impact outside the debtor/creditor 
relationship of company and bank. The next stage of the enquiry, therefore, is to 
9 Section 390(2) Insolvency Act 1986. The definition of 'insolvency practitioner' includes an 
administrative receiver. 
10 This strategy is further investigated in Chapter 1. 
5 
identify other 'corporate stakeholders' who have an immediate interest in the 
workings and outcomes of receivership. 
3. The process of receivership: implications 
As a method of debt enforcement, receivership functions by removing control of 
secured assets from the company's management and placing it in the hands of the 
receiver. He' 1 then makes certain deployment decisions in respect of those assets, 
with a view to discharging the outstanding debt. The process appears deceptively 
simple: the receiver sells whatever he can for the best price he can get. The reality is 
infinitely more complex, influenced by variables which will rarely be predictable or, 
indeed, predicted. It is, however, possible to identify a few common features of 
corporate insolvency that may inform the receiver's eventual deployment decisions. 
Contemporaneously one can see how such decisions bear upon the interests of those 
outside the tripartite debtor/creditor/receiver relationship. 
It is trite to state that receivers are appointed over companies in crisis. It follows that 
the likelihood of the appointor being the only major creditor of the company is 
infinitesimal, and there will invariably be a variety of other parties seeking payment. 
2 These may include those who have supplied goods or services to the company, 
, 
various organs of the State 13 
, 
customers who have ordered goods from the company 
and paid for them in advance, and, not least, the company's employees, who may be 
owed wages or other benefits. In the vast majority of cases, the assets of the company 
being finite, they will not be sufficient to meet all outstanding claims. 
Perhaps the first incident of the appointment of a receiver is that it amounts to a 
" In tirne honoured fashion, 'he' will be employed throughout to denote 'he/she'. 
12 Usually designated 'trade creditors'. 
" Most notably the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. 
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reference point from which priorities are determined. At the moment of appointment 
it becomes possible to line creditors up into the sequence in which they will be paid. 
This sequence may be contractually preordained, so that those who have bargained 
for proprietary rights will be towards the top of the list, or prescribed by statute 14 
. 
Whilst the priority position remains static throughout receivership 15 
, 
the value of 
assets may not, in that the actions of the receiver may enhance, or even diminish that 
value, thus altering the actual amount each creditor eventually receives. 
How does this occur? Given the company's likely parlous financial circumstances at 
the onset of receivership, it will often be the case that a break-up sale of assets will 
not realise sufficient to discharge the debt owed to the bank, let alone the claims of 
other creditors. If, however, the underlying business of the company is potentially 
sound, then prospects improve, as it is a truism to state that the value of any 
enterprise is multiplied considerably if it can be sold as a going concern. Even if the 
business is unsaleable, it will usually make sense to continue operations in order to 
complete work-in-progress and to fill existing orders, for the value of the goods 
produced will invariably exceed that of their component parts in their raw state. 
Thus, even by the simple expedient of continuing production on a short-term basis, a 
receiver can generate more cash than he started with. 
Where it is deemed appropriate, a receiver will seek to sell the company, or its 
business, as a going concern. Any sale will usually be preceded by a period of 
trading, as the receiver seeks to stabilise the enterprise and assess its strengths and 
weaknesses. This can be a subtle process. The company's 'business' may consist of 
several 'projects', each distinct and identifiable, each attaining different degrees of 
See, e. g., s 40(l) Insolvency Act 1986. 
Subject to the possibility of proceedings for non-registration of a registrable charge (see s 
395(l) Companies Act 1985) or an avoidance action under s 245(2) Insolvency Act 1986. 
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profitability, and each a potential candidate for sale in its own right. The receiver 
must decide which parts of the company are most viable, whether or not these can be 
packaged and marketed, and in what form they are to be presented to potential 
purchasers. 
The company will also have entered into contracts prior to the appointment, and it 
falls to the receiver to choose whether or not these should be performed' 6. The 
possibility of obtaining supplies more cheaply elsewhere, or selling finished products 
at a better price, will be assessed and the appropriate steps taken. The company's 
workforce will also be an issue. Initially, a receiver will have to decide how many, 
and which staff to retain in order to achieve his short- and long-term aims. It may 
also transpire that a sale of the whole or part of the business will entail a concurrent 
17 transfer of some employees' contracts of employment 
The above 'pocket' version of receivership aims to illustrate how decisions made, or 
stratagems determined upon, will have multiple effects. A receiver's initial aim is to 
raise sufficient cash to satisfy the claims of the appointor, but each means to this end 
may have a 'knock-on' effect for those standing outside the core relationship. The 
decision to complete a particular contract means that the other contracting party gets 
what he has bargained for (and probably paid for), and saves him from the 
unenviable status of unsecured creditor. It also promises a period of further 
employment for certain of the workforce. On the other hand, the decision to 
repudiate a contract leaves the other party with an empty damages remedy against the 
company. 
Thejettisoning of an unprofitable sector of the company's business will have adverse 
effects on those employed in that sector, whilst the successful sale of another may 
'6 See Chapter 3. 
17 See Chapter 4. 
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preserve employment. If the receiver need only sell fixed charge assets to discharge 
the secured debt, then those who would have been paid as preferential creditors in the 
event of a sale of floating charge assets have only their remedy against the company, 
and, if liquidation follows, the monetary value of their claim will also be altered. 
In pursuit of a specific goal, the repayment of a secured debt, a receiver has 
significant power to enhance or to jeopardise the future prospects, economic or 
otherwise, of a whole range of interest groups who had no involvement in his 
appointment and who appear to have little control over his actions. A favourable 
outcome for the appointing bank may have, as a spin-off, an equally favourable 
outcome for some stakeholders, but may contemporaneously consign others to a 
worse position. This process might therefore be accused of being arbitrary, although 
it is to some extent caused by the fact of insolvency, rather than receivership. In the 
words of one eminent member of the judiciary: 
"Of course it is true that insolvency always causes loss and that perfect fairness is 
unattainable. "" 
Stating the obvious, though, is cold comfort to those prejudiced by receivership, and, 
in any event, they might reasonably enquire why an inevitable loss had to fall their 
way. Some might even question the presumption that there will inevitably be a loss: 
after all, if a receiver can improve the company's position sufficiently to pay one 
creditor, does not justice require that his endeavours be more evenly directed? If 
receivership, with its present narrow focus, is capable of producing beneficial 
incidents, could these not be augmented by a broadening of the focus? The question 
conveniently introduces the next theme. 
18 Neste Oyv Lloj, ds BankpIc [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 658,666, per Bingham 
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4. Receivership as a facilitator of corporate rescue: a shift in emphasis? 
In recent years the concept of corporate rescue has gained ground as a worthy 
aspiration. Much attention has been paid to the adverse consequences of the complete 
failure of a company 19 
, 
such as the attendant job losses, the waste of enterprise and 
resources, the devastation it may cause to a local community, and the economic 
hardship suffered by its creditors. The perceived wisdom is that, where feasible, 
some attempt should be made to achieve at the very least a partial rescue. 
Precisely where receivership slots into this ideology is difficult to depict. Some 
considerable thought has, in the past, been given to the idea of receivership as a 
'rescue mechanism', most visibly by the Review Committee into Insolvency Law 
and Practice chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, a body charged by the then Conservative 
Government with investigating insolvency law (both individual and corporate) and 
recommending reforms. The Cork Committee embraced the philosophy of corporate 
rescue enthusiastically, asserting that one of the basic objectives of insolvency law 
should be: 
"... to provide means for tile preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable of 
making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country... "'O 
Furthermore, receivership was identified as one means of achieving this aim; indeed, 
the fact that it facilitated the appointment of a receiver and manager was advanced as 
one of the saving graces of the much maligned floating charge: 
"Such receivers and managers are normally given extensive powers to manage and carry 
on the business of the company. In some cases, they have been able to restore an ailing 
enterprise to profitability, and return it to its former owners. In others, they have been 
able to dispose of the whole or part of the business as a going concern. In either case, 
'9 Le., its liquidation. 
20 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (hereinafter the Cork Report), 
Cmnd. 8558 (1982: HMSO: London), para. 197. 
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tile preservation of the profitable parts of the enterprise has been of advantage to the 
employees, tile commercial community, and the general public. "" 
Rehabilitation was unmistakably perceived as a possible i-esult of receivership, even 
though it may not be the aim behind it, in as much as the appointor's chief interest 
(perhaps only interest) would be the discharge of the debt, and the receiver's focus 
would be raising enough cash to procure that discharge. That the company in 
receivership might emerge at least partly intact might be fortuitous, but that 
possibility impressed the Cork Committee, so much so that it decided upon 
receivership as the prototype for its more overt rescue mechanism, the administration 
order. 
The idea of receivership as a rescue mechanism is important, in that it goes some 
way towards answering the criticism that the process 'is excessively one-sided, 
favouring the appointor to the unwarranted detriment of other interested parties. 
Deliverance of the company, or of the enterprise that it carries on, even if entirely 
incidental, can be seen as a pay-off for the monopoly enjoyed by the appointor in the 
area of debt enforcement. This, however, assumes that receivership in its current 
form does indeed attain positive outcomes: that it saves worthwhile projects and jobs, 
that it maximises returns in an even-handed manner and that it promotes an overall 
constructive consequence. How far such a proposition can be supported is open to 
dispute. A close examination of the legal regime underpinning receivership might 
equally lead to the conclusion that the institution is, at best, rescue-neutral, at worst 
counter-productive to this objective. If this is the case, the most urgent enquiry must 
concern the appropriate legal response. 
21 The Cork Report, supra 1120, para. 495. 
II 
The Objectives and Scope of the Thesis 
1. The law of receivership: a focused analysis 
The process and impact of receivership are briefly outlined above. It would be 
astonishing to discover that such a regime, with its capacity to affect a wide array of 
interests, was not subject to some form of 'public' regulation, notwithstanding its 
private' origins. There is, of course, a body of law specifically concerned with 
receivership. It is comprised in a raft of provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986, but 
the underlying common law continues to inform in this area, and to a meaningful 
degree. 
Law does not evolve in a vacuum. It should, and does, take account of the driving 
policy of the age, and as one travels along the continuum one discerns how policies, 
and, as a corollary, law, change to accommodate the mutable demands of society. In 
the context of receivership this process of development is discernible from an 
examination of both common law and statutory innovations. For law to accurately 
reflect a given ideology, however, presupposes that such has been clearly enunciated. 
The progress of the law of contractual receivership has been bedevilled by a dearth 
of transparent debate into its function. Given receivership's fluid history, this is not 
surprising. Its origins are firmly fixed in the law of mortgages, but its success in that 
area led to it being transplanted in toto into more general commercial debtor/creditor 
relationships. This development, in turn, has allowed 'receivership law' to be 
permeated by a variety of influences, the result being that it sometimes 
uncomfortably straddles such areas as contract, company and insolvency law, with a 
22 
seasoning of equity and agency for good measure 
22 See also to this effect, in the context of appointment validity considerations, Doyle, 
Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice (1995 : FT Law and Tax : London), 1, where the 
author aptly describes administrative receivership as "a true legal inaelsirbin". 
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There now exists a distinct branch of law dealing with receivership. No attempt will 
be made to comprehensively describe it. Rather, this thesis takes as its focal point the 
theme of relationships. The receiver finds himself in a number of different 
relationships during the course of his office. The obvious one is that which exists 
between himself and the company over whose assets he is appointed, closely 
followed by that of receiver/appointor. But there are others, perhaps less instantly 
recognisable but no less important. To the extent that the receiver has power to 
affect, directly or indirectly, the interests of any given group it is suggested that he 
has some form of relationship with that group. In this regard, the thesis will 
investigate the impact of receivership upon such diverse stakeholders as the directors 
of the receivership company, its owners, its employees, and its preferential and 
unsecured creditors. 
This relational nexus presents, it is submitted, the law's first major dilemma. Each 
group confronting the receiver will have an interest in the manner in which he 
performs his functions. These interests will, almost inevitably, conflict, and such 
conflicts represent a further theme Of the thesis. The prioritisation of one group's 
welfare will often be potentially injurious to that of another, so how is a receiver to 
choose between competing interests? More specifically, how does the law intervene 
to inform his choice, and on what basis? 
A consideration of relationships, and the conflicts arising therefrom, serves as the 
foundation of the thesis. It attempts to discern and evaluate the prevailing legal 
response to both, to chart the manner in which the law prescribes the resolution of 
conflicts and the prioritisation of certain relationships, and to examine the extent to 
which the receiver's freedom of action is enhanced or restricted by this edict. This 
enables an extrapolation of certain value judgments inherent in the law's responses, 
13 
and the extent to which these are valid rejoinders to the underlying legislative 
framework. 
Finally, the legislative framework itself warrants some comment. Is it specific 
enough to enable those called upon to implement it to do so properly? Is the policy 
behind legislation openly identifiable, or does it offer some interpretative leeway? If 
the latter, how are the arbiters to fill the gaps in a manner which accords with the 
causal aim? The thesis, therefore, looks very much to the law's responses to a series 
of difficult contests which will inescapably impinge on the rights and interests of a 
variety of corporate stakeholders. If such rejoinders are unequal to the particular 
issues raised by receivership, and reform of the law necessary, the substance of such 
reforms is also a fertile source of enquiry, and one which the final Chapter of the 
thesis addresses in some detail. 
Finally, whilst legal rules have a significant bearing on how receivership operates, 
they provide little more than guidelines, and an examination of the Law Reports 
alone cannot hope to inform as to the practical nature of the institution. In this regard 
the thesis, wherever possible, attempts to identify and to illustrate those extra-legal 
concerns that may in some way influence the course of a receivership. In particular, 
the final Chapter makes substantial reference to anecdotal evidence gleaned from 
insolvency practitioners with considerable experience of insolvency regimes, 
including, of course, receivership. Their views as to the effectiveness of the law, and, 
indeed, the practical constraints which confront receivers on a day-to-day basis, are 
valuable in that they allow a rather more holistic analysis of receivership law, and, as 
a corollary, contribute to the critical question of whether reform is either necessary or 
desirable. 
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CHAPTERI 
THE AGENCY OF THE RECEIVER 
Introduction 
An exploration of relationships in the context of receivership necessitates an initial 
intimation of what that term connotes. It was proposed earlierl to treat any party 
upon whom the receiver's actions or decisions will have some impact as being in a 
relationshil-) with the receiver. Law has a tendency to pigeonhole. It 
compartmentalises in order to treat like in like manner, to establish general 
principles that will apply to given situations, transactions and relationships that 
display a sufficient degree of similarity. This means that the particular designation 
afforded a relationship has legal consequences for the parties to it. 
When an individual assumes a certain status in relation to another, the mere 
invocation of that status can, to a certain extent, amplify the rights and duties 
transferred and undertaken without further enquiry. The labelling of a relationship 
becomes convenient legal shorthand; the label reflects expectations, how each party 
is required to behave within the relationship. Labels will only infrequently define 
rights and duties comprehensively, but if the parties have failed to precisely specify 
what sort of performance is called for, they may operate to fill gaps. 
An example of a status entailing legal incidents is that of agent. As a rule, those 
identified as agents are subject to a legal regime which ordains a standard of 
conduct as far as dealings with the principal, the other party to the relationship, are 
concerned, and the agent is expected to act according to this template 2. Contractual 
' See Introduction. 
2 The universality of this proposition is tested later in the Chapter. 
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receivers are agents, and they are almost invariably agents of the company over 
whose assets they are appointed 3. This is because the parties to a contract have 
decreed in that contract that this shall be so. One might therefore expect that the 
receiver's status as agent will be instrumental in determining the manner in which 
he is to act, or, more correctly, the interests he is to prefer in so acting. Reality, 
however, departs dramatically from expectation in this regard, with unique results 
for the parties concerned. This Chapter attempts to negotiate the convolutions of the 
receiver's agency in order to conclude, first, whether it can properly be designated 
an agency at all, and, secondly, to assess its practical effects. 
Ap, ency and Receivership: Some Preliminary Observations 
1. A brief history of the agency of receivers 
Receivership has long been established as d mortgagee's remedy. The institution 
itself predates the modern practice of appointing a receiver as agent of the 
mortgagor4 by a couple of centuries at least, that strategy arising out of the 
prejudicial incidents of another mortgagee's remedy, that of taking possession of 
the mortgaged property. The right to possession was usually exercised so as to 
intercept any profits generated by the mortgaged property or as a preliminary to its 
sale. It was not uncommon for a mortgagee faced with a defaulting mortgagor to 
appoint an agent to receive any profits or to arrange a sale, simply as a matter of 
convenience. Whether the mortgagee exercised his entitlement to possession 
personally or vicariously, he faced the considerable disadvantage of having his 
3 Although a contractual oversight may result in the receiver being the agent of his appointor; 
see In i-e Vimbos Ltd[ 1900] 1 Ch 470. 
' In the present context, the company. The terms will be used interchangeably when appropriate. 
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conduct whilst in possession subjected to the scrutiny of equity. Specifically, he 
might find himself liable to the mortgagor on thefooting of 144ýful default. 
Liability to account for wilful default is of ancient origin 5, arising out of the 
account jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity. On a suit for redemption a Chancery 
Master took an account, whereby the mortgagee's principal, interest and costs were 
set against the amount received from the mortgaged property. Where the mortgagee 
had previously taken possession, this last item included not only what had been 
received, but what might have been received butfOr his ivilful defaUll 6. The kind of 
conduct attracting such liability included the refusal to accept tenants 7, the 
8 disadvantageous letting of the property 
, 
and failing to receive the purchase price 
on a sale of the property 9. 
The remedy of possession was, therefore, fraught with pitfalls. A means of avoiding 
these was concocted early in the 19th century, and it has served mortgagees 
remarkably well ever since. It had long been the practice to insert in the mortgage 
deed a clause entitling the mortgagee to appoint a receiver to take possession of the 
mortgaged property: by the simple expedient of appointing that receiver as agent of 
the mortgagor, the hazard of wilful default liability was neutralised. An 
incomparable account of this development is to be found in the judgment of Rigby 
10 LJ in Gaskell v Gosling 
, 
and it is not proposed to examine it further here. It 
suffices to note from the outset that the agency status of contractually appointed 
receivers arose simply as a protective device, and in an era in which land was the 
5 See Frisby, Making a Silk Purse out ofa Pig's Ear, (2000) 63 MLR 413,416. 
6 See, e. g., Harnard v Webster (1725) Cas. Temp. King 53; Beare v Prior (1843) 6 Beav. 183. 
7 Anonymous (1682) 1 Vern. 45; Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves Jun 493; Brandon v Brandon 
(1862) 10 WR 287. 
1 Shepard v Jones (1882) 21 Ch D 469; While v City ofLondon Brewery (1889) 42 Ch D 237. 
9 Mayer v Murray (1878) 8 Ch D 424. For a fuller treatment of the substance of wilful default 
liability see Frisby, supra n 5; Stannard, Wiýful Default, [1979] Conv. 345. 
10 [ 1896] 1 QB 669,692. 
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only realistic candidate for mortgage collateral. Whilst mortgage transactions in 
relation to land remain widespread, the practice of financing commercial 
enterprises via agreements that are, essentially, mortgages, is similarly extensive. It 
is perhaps surprising that a manufactured agency convenient and appropriate to the 
social conditions of an earlier epoch should survive to the present day. The 
following sections examine how this ostensible anomaly came about. 
2. A descril2tion of agency 
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whorn 
expressly or irnpliedly consents that the other should act on his behalf so as to affect his 
relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly consents o to act or so 
acts. "" 
The above conveys a basic idea of what agency involves. It is a facilitative 
relationship, the employment of an agent reflecting the fact that individuals can 
rarely attend to all their affairs at once, so that circumstances demand that another 
person be charged with the performance of some task, or related tasks. This 
performance may involve the agent in the creation of a legal relationship between 
his principal and a third party 12 
, 
and it frequently entails the principal ceding 
control of his property to the agent, albeit with instructions on how that property is 
to be dealt with. 
Agents can enter into contracts on behalf of their principals, and while it is the 
agent who does the 'contracting' it is the principal who is bound by the contract. 
The agent acts as a conduit between the contracting parties almost as though he has 
11 Bowslead and Reynolds on Agency, 16th ed (hereinafter Bowstead), (1996 : Sweet & 
Maxwell : London), 1-001. 
12 Fridman emphasises the ability of an agent to affect his principal's legal position in relation to 
third parties as fundamental to agency: Fridman, Law of Agency, 7th ed (1996 : Butterworths 
London), 11. 
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no legal identity of his own. The ability of an agent to bind his principal and third 
parties contractually is commonly referred to as the extei-nal dimension of agency. 
The internal dimension signifies the typical incidents of the relationship between 
agent and principal. This Chapter is primarily concerned with the manner in which 
the receiver's agency parts company with the orthodox understanding of the 
consequences of both. 
3. Judicial and academic explanations: troubled waters? 
Courts and commentators alike have struggled with the nature of the contractual 
receiver's agency throughout its history. A perusal of the case law reveals some 
adjectival prestidigitation in an attempt to explain how the standard incidents of 
agency are avoided when the agent in question is a receiver. Thus, to select a few 
examples, the receiver has been described as "a peculiar sort of agent, but 
nevertheless an agent" 13 
, 
or as "occupying a very special position" 14 
, 
and even as 
"wearing two hats"15. The agency itself is dubbed "not an ordinary one" 16, "rather 
17 
,18 unusual" 
, 
or "little more than an administrative convenience' 
. 
On a wider view, 
this aspect of the law is acknowledged as "somewhat anomalous"19, and giving rise 
to some "logical di ff-ICUItY3920. 
3 Siniths Ltd v Middleton [1979] 3 All ER 842,846, per Blackett-Ord VC. The epithet of 
peculiar but real' is popular amongst thejudiciary: see Woolsion v Ross [1900] 1 Ch 788,791, 
per Cozens-Hardy J; Raýfbrdv Northaven District Council [1987] QB 357,372, per Slade LJ; 
Rhodes v Allied Dunbar (Pension) Services [ 1989] 1 WLR 800,807, per Nicholls U. 
" Visbord v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 68 CLR 354,382 per Williams J. 15 Peat Marwick Ltd v Consuiner's Gas Co. (1981) 113 DLR 3d 754,762, per Houlden JA, 
16 Re Sobain BV (In Receivership) [1996] 1 BCLC 446,452, per Arden J. "Not ordinary" cornes 
a close second to "peculiar": see Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (1989) 5 
BCC 27,29 per Fox U. 
17 Telemetrix plc v Modern Engineers of Bristol (Holdings) plc [1985] BCLC 213,217, per 
Peter Gibson J. 
" Re Aveling Batford Ltd [1989] BCLC 122,127, per Hoffmann J. 
'9 Gaskell v Gosling [1896] 1 QB 669,678, per Lord Esher MR. 
20 Sowman v David Samuel Trust Ltd [1978) 1 WLR 22,28, per Goulding J. 
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Academics have been rather more aesthetic in their terminology. Goode compares 
the administrative receiver with "the Roman God Janus" and describes him as a 
"protean character"21 
. 
O'Donovan remarks upon the receiver's "schizophrenic 
status" and points out that the law governing his duties and liabilities "ignores the 
biblical dictum that a man cannot serve two masters... "22 
. 
Stewart dubs the agency 
"somewhat artificial"23 
, 
whilst Milman and Rushworth advert to "a fiction of 
agency"24 
. 
There is, then, a consensus roughly to the effect that the receiver's agency is non- 
conformist. Whilst accepting the status of agent, he is able to escape the full 
application of canons of agency law. This is uncontroversial, in the sense that it is 
widely acknowledged, but leads to practical uncertainty and conceptual difficulty. 
That an expressly appointed agent is not subject to a body of law designed to 
regulate his conduct appears anomalous, and to dismiss the . anomaly by asserting 
that his situation is 'peculiar' smacks of sweeping the problem under the carpet. 
Admittedly, the fact that the law in this area has developed in a piecemeal fashion 
compounds the obscurity. 
The next sections attempt, firstly, to compare and contrast "pure" agents 25 with 
receiver/agents, which primarily involves identifying those rules generally applying 
to the former and examining whether they apply to the latter. This exercise has 
already been proficiently performed by Milman 26 
, 
but bears repetition if only to 
reflect the impact or otherwise of the Insolvency Act 1986 and subsequent case law 
21 Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 2nd ed (1997 : Sweet & Maxwell: London), 216. 
22 (1979) 12 MULR 52,52 
23 Administrative Receivers and Administrators, (1987 : CCH Editions : London), T 402. 
24 Receivers and Receiverships, (1987 : Jordans : Bristol), 19. 
25 A term used by Peter Gibson J in the Telemetrix case, supra n 17, and gratefully adopted 
hereafter in relation to agents other than receivers. 
2'Receivers as Agents (1981) 44 MLR 658. 
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developments. Once any points of departure have been identified, legal 
explanations as to how such divergences are accomplished can be sought. If none 
present themselves, extra-legal clarification must be located. 
Contractual Duties of Agents 
1. A preliminary stumbling block: finding the contract 
Agency is commonly contractual in origin, and the scope and content of an agent's 
duties will therefore be found in the terms of the contract between agent and 
principal. Immediately, one encounters difficulties where receivers are concerned, 
as locating the contract creating the agency relationship between receiver and 
company is hardly straightforward. The documentary basis of the receiver's 
appointment is the debenture agreement between company and debenture-holder. 
The power to appoint, the tenns upon which an appointment can be made, and the 
powers of the appointee are all contained in a contract to which the receiver himself 
is not a party. The document of appointment, to which the receiver must respond 
before an appointment is valid 27, is usually aýI brief article, making no mention of the 
purpose of the appointment or the powers of the appointee, except by reference to 
the debenture 28 
. 
Moreover, the appointment is made by the debenture-holder rather 
than the company. Where, then, is any contract between receiver and company? 
The key to this question is found in the debenture, which will invariably contain an 
irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the debenture-holder. This, in effect, 
allows it to act as the company's agent when making An ap'pointment29 
. 
As the 
appointor acts as agent for the company in this regard, in accordance with basic 
" Insolvency Act 1986 s 33 (hereinafter 'IA'). 
28 See Lingard, Bank Security Documents, 3rd ed (1993 : Butterworths : London), 11.11 
29 Ibid. 8.0 1. See also Gaskell v Gosling [1896] 1 QB 669,692. 
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principles of agency law, he is able to establish privity of contract between the 
company, his principal, and the receiver. Thus it is, in law, the company that 
appoints the receiver as its own agent, and on all those terms contained in the 
debenture. 
It is worth noting that this represents an interesting deviation from the normal 
understanding of how an agency relationship is created. Agency is thought of as 
consensual30, suggesting a degree of autonomy on the part of both principal and 
agent. The relationship cannot be forced upon either party except, perhaps, by 
operation of law 31 
. 
As far as receivers are concerned this tenet holds true. Before 
his appointment takes effect he must accept it, otherwise no agency relationship 
arises. The company/principal, on the other hand, has no input into the appointment 
exercise 32 
, 
and the decision to appoint the agent, the time of appointment and the 
identity of the agent are matters for the bank to determine. The company finds itself 
thrust into the agency relationship, and the notion of consent is dispensed with. 
That there is an element of coercion here is indisputable, and this is not a routine 
characteristic of agency. From the outset, therefore, there is a dichotomy between 
pure agency and the agency of receivers. 
'0 See, e. g., Bowstead's description of agency, supra 18; Seavey, The Rationale of Agency 
(1920) 29 Yale U 859,868; Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v HMF Faure and Fairclough Ltd [ 1967] 2 
All ER 353,358. 
3' Fridman discusses this process, and the distinction between consensual agency and that 
arising from estoppel in some detail: see Law ofAgency, supra n, 12,15. 
32 Its directors may request the bank to appoint a receiver, but in general the appointment 
decision is exclusively the preserve of the debenture-holder. 
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2. The next hurdle: findinQ the duties 
Debentures are lengthy documents, but notably terse as far as the duties of any 
receiver are concerned. They will usually contain an express term that the receiver 
shall be agent of the company, and an expansive list of powers that he may 
exercise 33 
, 
but are strangely silent as to the nature of his performance. Indeed, 
debentures do not in terms specify what the receiver's task is; it appears that the 
fact that he is to deal with the secured assets in order to discharge the company's 
indebtedness to the bank is left to be implied from his status as receiver 34 
. 
In order 
to perform this function the receiver is endowed with an array of discretionary 
powers, but given no guidance as to how he is to exercise them. As regards 
iternising the receiver's duties the contract is deficient35. 
As noted earlier, this'need not be problematic if regard can be'had to the status of 
the receiver in order to define his duties and the manner of his performance. In 
other words, once a task is identified, the status or capacity in which the actor 
carries out that task should resolve questions of'how he is to perform it: whose 
interests he is to prioritise in the event of a conflict, which of alternative courses he 
should take towards the fulfilment of the task, and so on. The choice of status in 
this regard saves the parties from engaging in an expensive and time-consuming 
drafting exercise, there being no need to exhaustively detail every incident of the 
relationship created because the status does this implicitly. In the context of 
receivership, the proposition that the receiver is to deploy the secured assets so as to 
33 Debentures are deemed to include the equally comprehensive list of powers specified in 
Schedule I IA, unless such are inconsistent with the provisions of the debenture; IA s 42(l). 
34 The courts generally acknowledge that the purpose of the appointment is the satisfaction of 
the appointee's claim; see, e. g., Bank of New Zealand v Essington [1991] ACLC 1039; 
Downsview Nominees Lid v First City Corporation [ 1993] AC 295. 
35 Certain duties are prescribed by statute, but these are generally concerned with matters other 
than the principal/agent relationship between receiver and company. They will be examined 
later. 
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discharge the company's debt, and that he is to do so as agent of the company, 
ought to direct his modus operandi. What follows attempts to illustrate that this is 
hardly ever the case. 
Performing the Task: Pure Agents and Receivers Compared 36 
1. Obedience 
Pure agents are invariably subject to a duty of obedience. If a principal issues 
instructions that are lawful and reasonable then the agent must comply with them, 
or be liable for breach of Contract. Bowstead describes this proposition as "almost 
self-evident"37 
. 
It is not so where the agent is a receiver 38 
. 
Firstly, it is arguable that, on the appointment of a receiver, the principal/company 
loses its capacity to issue instructions to any of its agents, let alone to the receiver. 
Companies can only instruct through those empowered to do so, and it is usually 
the board of directors who are so empowered. It now seems well established that 
the management powers of the board cease, or are at least suspended, whilst the 
receiver is in office 39 
. 
This is not an unqualified statement, in that the board may 
retain residual management powers, or, indeed, may be authorised by the receiver 
to act on behalf of the companY40 
. 
As a general proposition, however, it is correct to 
assert that the power of the company to command, via its board, enters a period of 
cold storage on the receiver's appointment, so that that principal's usual 
instructional organ is disabled from operating. 
3" The following does not describe the minutiae of a receiver's duties, these being considered in 
later Chapters. 
37 Supra n 11,6-00 8. 
39 See Milman, supra n 26,660. 
39 Moss Steamship Co. Lid v Whinney [1912] AC 254,263, per Lord Atkinson; Hawkesbury 
Development Co. Ltd v Landmark Finance Pty Ltd [ 1969] 2 NSWR 782,790, per Street J. 
40 The impact of receivership on the internal management of the company is considered in detail 
in the next Chapter. 
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Should the board presume to give orders to the receiver he is under no duty to obey, 
and suggestions to the contrary have been robustly dismissed by the courts: 
"... [the receiver] was appointed, not to receive directions from the directors, but to give 
directions 
... 
It may, indeed, be said with accuracy, I think, that he took the place of the 
directors and was responsible in their stead for the management of the affairs and 
,, 41 business of the company... 
The position is, therefore, that the company/principal, far from being entitled to 
expect obedience, may find itself dancing to its agent's tune. 
2. Reasonable Dispatch 
Bowstead observes agents are typically obliged to perform with reasonable 
dispatch, and that such a duty exists as an implied term of the agency contract 42 
. 
As 
regards receivers, the position has yet to be tested in the courts, but a few 
observations can be made. 
What would amount to reasonable dispatch in this context is difficult to quantify. 
The receiver's core assignment is to discharge the secured debt by deploying the 
secured assets, and this could be achieved in a number of ways, including trading 
on, selling the assets, and selling the business. It is the receiver who has the entire 
conduct of this exercise, and it would be a remarkably assured court that would 
attempt to assess whether or not he was acting with due expedition 43 
. 
Secondly, this 
may be one duty the company would rather was not owed to it. Depending upon 
how much is owed to the bank, it may be that the quickest way to complete the task 
41 Afeigh v Wickenden [ 1942] 2 KB 160,166, per Viscount Caldecote. 
42 Supra n H, 6-012. 
43 Protracted receiverships are not unknown. The Handley Page receivership has lasted some 
fifteen years, and that seen in Re Joshua Shaw & Sons Lid (1989) 5 BCC 188 took nine years to 
complete. 
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is to sell the assets on a break-up basis 44 
. 
Reasonable dispatch, in such 
circumstances, would be fatal to the company. 
Without the benefit of judicial authority it is difficult to determine whether or not a 
duty to act promptly is owed, although it is tentatively submitted that were a court 
to be presented with incontrovertible evidence of inertia on the part of a receiver, it 
might well consider this a breach of duty 45 
. 
In practice, however, such a scenario is 
implausible, as receivers work with half an eye to their appointor banks, who would 
not appreciate dilatoriness. The practical result is that receivers are generally not 
known for sitting on their hands 46 
3. Skill, care and difivence 
3.1 Pure agencv: the iurisprudential basis of the duty 
"Every agent acting for reward is bound to exercise such skill, care and diligence in 
the performance of his undertaking as is usual or necessary in or for the ordinary or 
proper conduct of the profession orbusiness inwhich he is employed, or is reasonably 
necessary for the proper performance of the duties undertaken by him. 947 
Failure by an agent to exercise skill, care and diligence in the performance of his 
functions will be a breach of an implied term of the agency contract. Where the 
agent is in a position to exercise discretion, again, proper care and skill must be 
exercised. If the breach amounts to negligence it is established that the principal 
44 Whether a receiver could legitimately follow such a course is examined throughout the thesis. 
45 Such conduct might be a breach of the equitable duty of skill and care, to be examined in 
detail in the next Chapter. 
46 On the contrary, those detailing the practical side of receivership emphasise that speed is of 
the essence: see Samwell, Corporate Receiverships (1981 : ICAEW : London), Chapter 7; 
Stewart, supra n 23, ý 501. 
47 Bowstead, supra n 11,6-015. 
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may sue in torO8. As well as concurrent tortious and contractual duties, it now 
appears that those who stand in a fiduciary position to another will owe an 
49 
equitable duty of skill and care 
. 
As agents are almost universally acknowledged 
as fiduciariesso this rule will apply to them. As to how the principal chooses to 
frame his action, the courts have recently displayed a tendency to assimilate the 
potential outcomes, so that there will be no advantage in suing in negligence over 
contract, or in eschewing both in order to sue in equity 51 
Where what is alleged is the breach of the equitable duty of skill and care, it has 
been stated authoritatively that such does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty 
and, although it might attract an award of equitable compensation, such an award: 
"... resembles common law damages in that it is awarded by way of compensation to 
the plaintiff for his loss. There is no reason in principle wily common law rules of 
causation, remoteness of damage and measure of damages should not be applied by 
,, 52 analogy in such a case. 
It would therefore appear that at least one avenue to fiduciary forum shopping has 
been effectively barred. 
1.1 The standard of care 
The degree of skill and care expected of an agent will vary from case to case. 
Bowstead notes that it is "similar in principle to the normal duty of care in 
53 
negligence" 
. 
Where the agent in question is a professional, the level of skill 
48 Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd v Hell, Stubhs and Kemp [1979] Ch '384; Central Trust Co. v 
Rafuse (1987) 31 DLR (4th) 48 1; Hendersen v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [ 1994] 3 WLR 76 1. See 
also Fridman, supra n 12,160, and cases there noted. 
49 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [ 1996] 4 All ER 698,70 1, per Millett U. 
50 See infra 36 
51 Except, perhaps, where limitation periods are concerned. 
52 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew, supra n 49,711, per Millett U. 
53 Supra n 11,6-017. 
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expected will be higher, and will normally conform to that which a reasonable 
54 
professional acting in the same area would display 
. 
Where the agent holds himself 
out as having special skills or expertise he will be expected to exercise that level of 
55 
competence, and will be liable if he does not 
3.2 Skill and care: receivers 
This is a vexed question and will be examined exhaustively in following Chapters. 
For comparison purposes the law can be stated briefly as follows. First, no action 
lies against a receiver in the tort of negligence 56 
. 
Secondly, the receiver's agency 
does not appear to give rise to an implied contractual duty to exercise skill and care. 
Earlier cases suggested otherwise. In Nelson Bros. Ltd v Nagle 57 Myers CJ based 
his conclusion that a receiver owed a duty of skill and care squarely upon the 
footing that the receiver was expressed to be agent of the company and that such a 
duty was a normal incident of agency. There are echoes of this approach in 
Standard Chartered Bank v Walker 58 
, 
where Lord Denning MR adverted to the 
receiver's agency as a source of duty 59 
, 
although whether this was in order to 
establish sufficient proximity to ground liability in tort, rather than to identify a 
contractual duty is unclear. Certainly his Lordship framed much of his speech in the 
language of negligence, and to this extent the decision can no longer stand in the 
light of Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation 60 
. 
5' Lamphier v Phipos (1838) 8C&P 475,479. 
55 See, e. g., Duchess ofArgyll v Beuselinck [ 1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 172,183. 
56 DownsviewNominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] AC 295; Medforth v Blake [19991 
3 All ER 97. 
5' [ 19401 GLR 507. 
5' [ 198213 All ER 938. 
59 Ibid., 942. 
60 Supra n 56 (hereinafter Downsview). Nor presumably, can American Express International 
Banking Corporation v Hurley [ 198513 All ER 564, Knight v Lawrence [ 1993] BCLC 215. 
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Indeed, Downsview has rather muddied the waters as far as any contractual duties 
of skill and care are concerned. Lord Templeman, in that case, wholly ignored the 
receiver's position as agent, instead equating his duties with those of a mortgagee 
and stating them as comprising a duty to act in good faith and for proper purposes, 
which, in turn, incorporates an obligation to take reasonable steps to obtain a proper 
price on a sale of the mortgaged property. It is therefore difficult to sustain an 
argument that a receiver is contractually bound to exercise skill and care. 
The equitable position is, perhaps, even more opaque. As noted above, those in 
fiduciary positions owe an equitahle -duty of skill and care, but Downsview, by 
assimilating the positions of mortgagee and receiver, vetoes any attribution of a 
fiduciary character to a receiver simply because the general law does not view 
mortgagees as fiduciaries 61 
. 
It is now unequivocally established, however, that 
receivers, in exercising their powers of sale and management do indeed owe an 
equitable duty of skill and care, which arises not so much out of any fiduciary 
status, but rather because of their status as receiver 62 
. 
The position as regards 
fiduciary law is both fascinating and perplexing, and will be discussed shortly. For 
the present it suffices to note that whilst a receiver owes an equitable duty, its 
source is not his agency position, nor contractual. 
61 At least not in English law: see Chapter 2. The position may be different in the United States: 
see Murphy v Financial Development Corporation 495 A. 2d 1245,1985 (Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire. 
62 Medforth v Blake, supra n 56 (hereinafter Medforth). This enigma will be examined at length 
in the next Chapter. 
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3.2.1 The standard of care 
Following the Medforth case it appears that that standard of care expected of a 
receiver is that which a reasonably competent receiver would exercise. This 
requires some amplification, not least because receivership has, for some time, been 
the exclusive domain of the professional. Since 1986 only qualified insolvency 
practitioners may act as an administrative receiver in relation to a companY63 
, 
and 
even before this enactment the practice of appointing banks was to select 
appointees from the ranks of chartered accountants 64 
. 
Even where an appointee is a 
non-administrative receiver there will be a duty incumbent upon the bank not to 
appoint an incompetent 65 
. 
These requirements reflect the acknowledgement of the 
legislature and the courts that receivership is a demanding office and should not be 
left to happy amateurs 66 
An interesting question is whether the 'professional isation' of insolvency practice 
raises the appropriate standard of care to be expected from receivers. In particular, 
do administrative re6eivers'hold themselves out as possessing as. pecial skill or 
expertise, simply by reason of their qualification? Certainly, the law of negligence 
demands a greater level of skill from those engaging in specialised activitieS67 
, 
and 
has recognised that those holding themselves out as experts must exercise an 
expert's skil 168. Perhaps more pertinently, the standard of care required of a 
company director has been held to be that prescribed in s 214 of the Insolvency Act 
63 ]A s 390(2). 
6' And Chartered Surveyors if the nature of the security so demanded. 
65 Shanýi v Johnson Malthey Bankers Co. Ltd [1991] BCLC 36,42, per Oliver LJ, affirming the 
statement to this effect made at first instance by Hoffmann J, [1986] BCLC 278,283. 
66 See the comments of the Cork Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the 
Review Committee, Cmnd. 8558 (1982: HMSO : London), para. 105. 
67 See, e. g., Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
69 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1986) 3 All ER 801. 
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1986 69 
. 
This states, first, that a director should conform to the standard of a 
reasonably diligent person occupying his position in relation to the company 70 
, 
and, 
secondly, that he should exercise any special skills and experience that he actually 
has 71 
. 
Given that a receiver will take over most of the functions of the company's 
board, it might be considered suitable that the s 214 standard of care be applicable. 
In this regard, further amplification of the Medforth duty is awaited. 
4. Duty to keep the principal informed 
This duty is again an implied term of agency contracts, Bowstead giving the 
example of a solicitor who must inform his client of any overtures made 72. It is 
heavily qualified in receivership. Pure agents must proffer any information that is 
of legitimate concern to the principal voluntarily, the duty being a positive one and 
calling for action on the part of the agent. Receivers, by contrast, need not 
periodically report to the company about the progress of the receivership 73 
, 
and if 
the board requires information it must make the initial approach itself. 
Furthermore, if a request is made, the receiver is under no duty to comply with it, 
and may withhold anything the revelation of which might be damaging to the 
debenture-holder 74 
. 
It is the receiver's judgment which prevails in assessing this 
matter. Finally, there is a positive onus on the board to show that the information 
requested is in some way 'necessary' for it to perform a particular function or make 
a particular decision. Mere curiosity will not suffice, and the circumstances in 
69 Norman v Theodore Goddard [ 199 1] BCLC 1028; Re DJan of London Ltd [ 1994] 1 BCLC 
561. 
70 Tile objective standard: s 214(4)(a). 
71 The subjective standard: s 214(4)(b). 
72 Supra n 11,6-019. 
73 Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Homan [ 1986] 3 All ER 94. 
74 ibid. 
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75 
which production will be forthcoming are likely to be limited in practice 
. 
One is, 
therefore, confronted with the extraordinary prospect of a supplicant principal 
begging his agent's indulgence, and this example serves to reiterate the impotence 
of the company/principal as against its receiver/agent. 
5. Contractual duties: some final thoughts 
5.1 Explaining the receiver's contractual position 
The above compendium of pure agency duties is contractual in origin. They exist as 
implied terms of an agency contract and will operate to the extent that they are not 
expressly excluded. That they can. be excluded is unquestionable. The receiver's 
agency contract does not, however, expressly exclude them, which leads to the 
enquiry as to whether such terms can be, or are, impliedly excluded. At this stage 
the position becomes cryptic: the question 'can an implied term be impliedly 
excluded' assumes a certain unreality, and does not sit easily within the framework 
of implied term theory of contract law. 
An agent's contractual duties appear to exist as terms implied in law, in that they 
apply as "a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual relationship ýiU 
. 
Such terms will only be implied by the courts in narrowly defined circumstances, 
and will be "as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires, no more, no less: 
a test, in other words, of necesSity,, 77. It appears that there is a general acceptance 
that duties of obedience, dispatch, skill and care, and the imparting of information 
are all 'necessary and appropriate' to the'ageni/principal relationship. If they are to 
75 See, for example, Roulestone v Minories Finance [1997] BCC 180, which applies a 'need to 
know' test. 
76 Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [ 1992] 1 AC 294,307, per Lord Bridge 
of Harwich. 
77 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239,254, per Lord Wilberforce. 
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be impliedly excluded it can only be because they are not 'necessary and 
appropriate' to the relationship at all. 
The solution to this conundrum is self-evident. The receiver's agency relationship 
with the company is different, so different that an entire catalogue of terms 
necessary to a typical agency contract is routinely disapplied, not merely because 
they are unnecessary but because they would be counter-productive to the operation 
of receivership. The contract creating an agency relationship between receiver and 
company falls to be construed in a manner which will facilitate the proper working 
of that relationship, which in turn is determined by the task the receiver is to 
perform. In other words, the courts have moved from the general (agency) to the 
particular (receivership). There is no need to impliedly exclude the normal duties 
implied into agency contracts because they never arise. 
The courts, instead, look to the context, and imply terms appropriate to that context. 
In this regard, the case of Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Homan 78 is of interest, in 
that it provides an express endorsement of this approach. Hoffmann J overtly 
acknowledges that the receiver's agency is of only marginal consequence to a 
determination of his duties: 
"... his status as agent provides a starting point for the inquiry rather than its solution. 
It cannot simply be assumed that his obligations are the same as those of an ordinary 
agent who owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his principal. They must depend on the 41, 
express or implied terins of the bargain between the debenture-holder and the 
company under which he was appointed. In this case we are really concerned with 
79 implied lerIns... " 
In other words, while implication takes place, it does so on the basis that the 
78 [ 1986] 3 All ER 94. 
79 ]bid. 98 (italics added). 
33 
contract in question relates to receivership rather than agency, and that any terms 
implied will be those necessary for the receivership, rather than the agency, to be 
effective. 
5.2 The nature of implied terms 
Are such terms implied 'in law' or 'in fact' 80? It is tempting to suggest the former, 
although no case has expressly stated as much, and the conclusion is one of 
impression only. An examination of the case law suggests that the courts look to the 
commercial purpose of the relationship between receiver and company, that being 
to realise the security for the benefit of the secured creditor. Such a purpose will be 
characteristic of all appointments, and to the extent that a term of, say, 
independence of action is necessary to one receivership it will be necessary to all. It 
has, however, been observed that "any implication on loan documentation will be 
an implication of fact: not law, as a loan contract is a commercial contract to be 
construed according to its terms"81 
. 
This statement is concerned with implied terms 
affecting the debtor/creditor relationship, and so may be taken as inapplicable to 
that part of the loan contract which creates the receiver/company agency 
relationship. 
The question may be of more than academic interest, in that terms implied in law 
may be subject to a slightly more lenient test than those implied in fact, although it 
has been emphasised that the test is not one of reasonableness 82 
. 
Nonetheless, it 
'0 The possibility that they might be implied by custom is examined later. 
81 Parker Hood, Lender Liability Under English Law, in Banks, Liability and Risk, Cranston, 
2nd ed (1995: LLP: London). The case of Williams and Glyn's Bank Ltd v Barnes [1981] Com. 
LR 205 is cited in support. 
92 Liverpool City Council v Irwin, supra n 77; Scally v Southern Health and Social Services 
Board, supra n 76; Reid v Rush & Tompkins Group plc [ 1990] 1 WLR 212. 
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appears that the implication of a term in law may be based on wider considerations 
than the unspoken intentions of the parties, which form the basis of terms implied 
in fact 83 
. 
Certainly there are difficulties with the notion that the contract between 
receiver and company contains terms implied in fact, not least that implied terms 
such as 'no duty to obey' are inconsistent with the express agency status, which 
imports a duty of obedience 84 
. 
It is submitted that the better view is that the courts view the debenture contract as 
having the potential to create a particular relationship, the purpose of which dictates 
those terms that are to be incorporated into it as a matter of law. Thus the 
receiver/company relationship is treated, for the purposes of implied terms, 
85 86 
similarly to that of, for instance, employer/employee or landlord/tenant 
, 
and 
terms can be implied in law in order that the -receiver cat! better perform his 
functions. 
If the above analysis is accurate, what purpose does it serve? The courts' 
observations on the unusual nature of the receiver's agency were observed earlier, 
and a casual observer might conclude that this 'oddness' is inherent in the agency 
contract itself. In fact it is the result of a process of implication embarked upon by 
the courts, with a view to facilitating the achievement of a certain end. If the 
receiver's agency is unusual it is because the courts themselves have cultivated this 
outcome. The peculiarity is of their own making, and stems from their decisions to 
disapply terms habitually implied into contracts of agency. This may be entirely 
legitimate, but the courts' insistence that the agency is a 'real' one begins to ring 
83 TheMoorcock(1889) 14 PD 64; Shirlawv Southern Foundries Ltd[] 939]2 KB206. 
84 Attempts to imply such inconsistent terms have uniformly failed: see, e. g., Duke of 
Westminster v Guild [ 1995] QB 688. 
"'Lister v Romfiordke & ColdStorageLtd[1957]AC555. 
86 Liverpool City Council v Irwin, supra n 77. 
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hollow. This impression is compounded by an examination of a further typical 
feature of agency law which appears extensively modified in the context of the 
receiver's agency, so much so that the courts' avowal as to its authenticity appears 
almost spurious. 
The Fiduciary Dimension 
1. Avents as fiduciaries 
"An agent owes to his principal fiduciary duties (duties of loyalty), 87 t, 
That agents act towards their principals in a fiduciary capacity is widely 
recognised". The proposition has, however, been the subject of some judicial 
reservation and its indiscriminate application to agency questioned by the courts, so 
that it might be asked whether all agents are, as a matter of law, fiduciaries. It is 
submitted that, for the most part, the assertion holds true, but the following section 
suggests that the proposition is not wholly unqualified. 
1.1 Incursions into the fiduciarv pri! Igiple of agency? 
Whereas the general fiduciary character of the agency status is incontrovertible, 
there may be occasions when its full implications are somehow modified. The Privy 
Council decision of Kelly v Cooper 89 (hereinafter Kelly) is important in this regard, 
and merits detailed consideration, both at this point and later, for several reasons. 
First, it may mark the advent of a fiduciary 'backlash' on the part of the judiciary 
87 Bowstead, supra n 11,6-032. See also Fridman, supra n 12 
" Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp. (1984-1985) 156 CLR 41; LAC 
Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14; Arlifiakts Design 
Group Ltd vNP Rigg Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 197; Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co. of 
Europe Ltdv Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd [1995] QB 174. This selection 
of authorities reflects recent acceptance of the proposition, and its universality across the 
Commonwealth. 
'9 [1993] AC 205. 
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similar to that witnessed in relation to the expansive use of the 'duty of care' 
concept in the tort of negligence9o. The imprecision of fiduciary doctrines has 
stimulated their invocation in aid of some rather dubious causes, and the Kelly case, 
amongst others 91 
, 
suggests that the courts are now prepared to apply the brakes. 
Secondly, the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Kelly reasserts the primacy of 
contract in determining rights and duties, at the expense of customary, but 
inconsistent fiduciary duties. Thirdly, and perhaps most germane, is the deference 
of the Privy Council to the perceived purpose of the agency in question, evidenced 
by a willingness to reject fiduciary obligations which would obstruct that purpose. 
The main thrust of Kelly is encapsulated in the following extract from the judgment 
of Lord Browne-Wilkinson: 
"... first 
... 
agency is a contract made between principal and agent; second, like every 
other contract, the rights and duties of the principal and agent are dependent upon the 
terms of the contract between them, whether express or implied. It is not possible to 
say that all agents owe the same duties to their principals; it is always necessary to 
have regard to the express or implied terms of the contract. 9)92 
The facts involved estate agents accepting commissions for sale from two vendors. 
In the event, both properties were sold to the same purchaser, giving rise to an 
allegation of breach of fiduciary duty, that breach consisting of acting for two 
principals with potentially conflicting interests without obtaining the fully informed 
consent of both. In essence, the complaint was of non-disclosure, an archetypal 
breach of an agent's fiduciary dutY93. In construing the relevant contract Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson noted: 
90 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908; Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman [ 1989] 1 All ER 568. 
91 See, especially, Hospital Products Ltd v United'States Surgical Corp, supra n 88. 
92 [1993] AC 205,213-214. 
93 Fullwood v Hurley [ 192811 KB 499,502, per Scrutton U. 
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"in a case where a principal instructs as sellin agent for his property or goods a 9ý 
person who to his knowledge acts or intends to act for other principals selling property 
or goods of the same description, the terrns to be implied into such agency contract 
must differ from those to be implied where an agent is not carrying on such general 
agency business 
... 
estate agents must be free to act for several competing principals 
otherwise they will be unable to perform 1heirfinction. , 94 
It would seem, then, that his Lordship was not concerned with a particular contract, 
but rather with contracts of a particular type. This much is emphasised by his 
conclusion that: 
"Accordingly in such cases there must be an implied term of the contract with such an 
agent that he is entitled to act for other principals selling competing properties and to I- Zý tP 
keep confidential the information obtained from each of his principals. "95 
If the matter had rested there it could, bQ confidently stated that the case merely 
carves out a single instance of agency, estate agency, from the whole and, because 
of its commercial purpose, as recognised and accepted by both parties, applies an 
atypical rule, or, rather, disapplies a typical rule. However, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson went on to address the fiduciary duties of agents in general terms: 
"Similar considerations apply to the fiduciary duties of agents. The existence and 
scope of these duties depends upon the terms on which they are actin g. i, 96 
In support of this assertion he cited dictum of Mason J in Hospital Products Ltd v 
United States Surgical Corps: 
"... it is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that 
regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it 
is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is 
consistent with, and conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be 
94 [ 19931 AC 205,214 (italics added). 
93 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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superirnposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the 
contract was intended to have according to its true construction. '07 
The implication is unmistakable: to the extent that an agency contract envisages 
performance to which a fiduciary obligation would be anathema, then none 
attaches. The express or implied terms of the contract dictate the manner of 
performance, and if they do not admit of the importation of fiduciary duties then 
such do not arise. Kelly clearly intimates that the status of agent may no longer be 
coterminous with that of fiduciary. 
The decision is not uncontroversial. It has been pointed out that not all agency 
98 
relationships are contractual 
. 
Moreover: 
"Even where the relationship is contractual (as it normally will be), the matter is too 
important to be left entirely to the agreement of the parties and the interpretation of 
that agreement. This is an area where the unequal standing of the contracting parties t, 4ý 
has for more than a century been recognised as requiring relief. The relief is 
1199 principally given by the application of fiduciary duties... 
The predominant objection to the decision has been its preoccupation with 
contractual terms at the expense of fiduciary duties. it represents an attack on the 
previous wisdom that the acceptance of agency status entails a concomitant 
acceptance of the fiduciary standard of performance. In exchange for the potent 
capacity to affect his principal's legal and practical position, the agent is burdened 
with an obligation to exercise his powers in a manner designed to enhance that 
position. The contract of agency dictates what the agent is to do, but the manner of 
performance is determined by criteria independent of that contract. Kelly potentially 
97 (1984-1985) 156 CLR 41,87. 
98 Brown notes that at the time of the alleged breach in Kelly, vendor and estate agent would not 
have been parties to any contract, so that the Privy Council implied a term into a non-existent 
contract: Divided Loyalties in the Law ofAgency (1993) 109 LQR, 206. 
99 Bowstead, supra n 11,6-034. 
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undermines the reflexive imposition of the fiduciary standard upon agents and 
concentrates instead upon contract as the primary source of the substance of the 
obligation. As Brown graphically puts it: 
"Tile Privy Council's hypothesis appears to let tile tail of contract wag tile dog of 
duty. """ 
The importance of the Kelly case to the present enquiry will be further examined 
later. It suffices to note here that it may be indicative that to attribute fiduciary 
duties to all agents may be premature, and that a detailed scrutiny of the contractual 
basis of the relationship may be appropriate. Reynolds has strongly advocated that 
101 the decision should be confined to its especial facts 
, 
although it is interesting to 
note that the High Court of Australia has at least partially followed Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson's lead: 
"Nevertheless, even here [where the status in question would normally bring about 
fiduciary duties] to say that the appellants stood as fiduciaries to the respondents calls 
for ascertainment of the particular obligations owed to the respondents and a 
consideration of what acts or omissions amounted to a failure to discharge those 
obligations. "'O' 
This may be symptomatic of a growing reluctance on the part of the courts to affix 
the fiduciary label as a matter of course, or to treat every obligation owed as 
fiduciary in character 103 
. 
For present purposes, however, it is proposed to treat 
agency as prima facie giving rise to fiduciary duties. This has been accepted 
practice for too long to be overturned wholesale by recent decisions which appear 
to kick against the traces. 
1('0 Divided Loyalties in the Law ofAgency, supra n 98,100 
10 1 Fiduciaty Duties of Estate Agents [ 1994] JBL, 147,149. 
102 Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449,464. The case involved a solicitor/client 
relationship, the alleged breach of duty comprising the grant of a mortgage to the client by the 
solicitor without disclosure of the latter's interest. 
103 See, for example, Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, supra n 49. 
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2. The Content and Scol3e of an Avent's Fiduciary Duties 104 
"If a person is a status-based fiduciary it would appear that his fiduciary obligations 
apply to all activities that occur within the scope of that relationship, and any 
opportunities that arise as a result of that relationship. " 1 05 
Since agents are, customarily, fiduciaries, it is relatively simple to identify what 
that status entails. The essence of the fiduciary ideal is loyalty: the agent must at all 
times have regard to the principal's interests over and above his own or, indeed, any 
other party's 106 
. 
This extensive expression has been refined by the courts into a 
series of specific rules which cumulatively encompass the central idea. It is 
proposed to here adopt the approach of the Law Commission in identifying four 
paramount themes which compress the fiduciary norm into a digestible form. These 
are: 
"(i) the "no conflict" rule 
-A fiduciary must not place himself in a position where his 
own interest conflicts with that of his [principal]. There must be a "real sensible 
possibility of conflict"; 
(ii) the "no prolit" rule 
-A fiduciary must not profit from his position at the expense 
of his [principal]; 
(iii) the undivided loyalty rule 
-A fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to his [principal], 
and therefore must not place himself in a position where his duty towards one [party] 
conflicts with the duty he owes to his [principal]. A consequence of this duty is that a 
fiduciary must make available to [the principal] all information that is relevant to [the 
principal's] affairs; 
104 This section presents no more than an outline, with brief illustrations, of the basic substance 
of the fiduciary relationship between principal and agent so that a comparison with the agency 
of receivers can be drawn. For a fuller treatment the reader is referred to specialist agency 
works, such as Bowstead, supra n 11, and Fridman, supra n 12. 
105 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 124: FiduciarY Duties and Regulatory Rules (1992 
: HMSO : London) para. 2.4.9. 
106 See Bowstead, supra n 11,6-03 8. 
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(iv) tile duty of confidentiality 
-A fiduciary must use information obtained in 
confidence from his [principal] for the benefit of [the principal] and must not use it for 
his own advantage or for the benefit of any other person. 007 
To these might be added that an agent may not delegate the performance of his 
I 
duties or the exercise of his discretion unless his principal expressly or impliedly 
consents to such'". Whilst the maxim delegalus non polest delegare might also be 
classified as of conti-actual origin, it is suggested that because it applies as between 
principal and agent because of the confidential nature of that relationship, it sits 
appropriately amongst the agent's fiduciary obligations. There is, further, a 
fiduciary duty to account for the conduct of the agency 109 
. 
The application of the above rules is best illustrated by the kind of conduct they 
proscribe. An agent who purchases his principal's property is potentially in breach 
of the "no conflict" rule, since his own interest dictates that he acquires the property 
at the lowest possible price, whereas that of his principal requires the highest to be 
obtained"O. The same could be said of an agent selling his own property to his 
principal: again a conflict arises"'. The para . digm violation of the "no profit" rule is 
the making of a secret profit through the agency position' 12 
, 
which may include the 
taking of a secret commission or a bribe. 
The undivided loyalty rule prevents an agent from acting for two parties with 
conflicting interests, as he may find himself in the position of being unable to fulfil 
his duty to one principal without breaching that owed to the other 113 
. 
The 
107 Law Commission, supra n 105, para. 2.4.9. 
... De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286. 
109 Bowstead, supra n 11,6-088; Chedworth v Edwards (1802) 8 Ves. 46. 
110 See, e. g., Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq. 524; Lowther v Lowther (1806) 13 Ves. 95. 
111 Telley v Shand (1872) 25 LT 658; Massey v Davies (1794) 2 Ves. Jun. 317. 112 Boston v Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch D 339; Parker v McKenna (1874) LR 10 Ch 96. 
"' Fullwood v Hurley f 1928] 1 KB 499; Moody v Cox and Hatt [ 191712 Ch 7 1. 
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confidentiality rule is most conspicuous in cases of directors taking advantage of 
information gained through their position to further their own ends, rather than 
114 115 
those of their companies 
, 
although the principle is of general application 
. 
The above illustrations are subject to one overriding qualification. The conduct is 
only proscribed in the absence of the principal's fully informed consent. Thus an 
agent may act contrary to any of the above rules provided that he has disclosed all 
material facts to his principal, and his principal has consented to the act which 
116 
would otherwise be a'breach of duty 
. 
As to precisely what must be disclosed, the 
courts have preferred not to lay down precise formulae, having regard instead to the 
circumstances of each case. It is, however, clear that the mere divulgence of a 
second commission will not suffice, so that an agent acting in a "double-agency" 
position must: 
"... rnake the fullest disclosure on the second contract of all the benefit he is getting 
out of it... " 
117 
The circumstances may even demand that the fiduciary recommend that 
independent advice be taken, and any consent given will be defective if no such 
recommendation is made 
118 
Before moving on to a survey of the fiduciary duties of receivers, some final points 
concerning the fiduciary position should be made. As noted earlier, agents will find 
themselves subject to fiduciary duties almost as a matter of course because of their 
114 Regal (Hastings) Lid v Gulliver [ 196712 AC 134; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v 
Cooley [ 1972] 1 WLR 443. A particular transaction may fall outside the scope of the director's 
fiduciary duties: Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [ 1986] BCLC 460; Queensland Mines 
Lid v Hudson [ 1978] ALR 1; Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper (1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1; Balston 
Lid v Headline Filters Lid [1990] FSR 385. 
115 See, e. g., Phipps v Boardman [ 1967] 2 AC 46 (solicitor acting as agent for trust). 
116 Authority for this proposition can be found in the cases in nn II 1- 115 above. 
117 Fullwood v Hurley, supra n 110,503, per Scrutton U. See also Dunne v English, supra n 
116,536per Jessell MR; agent must make "full disclosure of all he knows". 
1 18 Farrington v Rowe McBride & Partners [19851 1 NZLR 83; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Smith (1991) 102 ALR 453. 
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status. The status attracts the obligation, and once it is accepted the obligation 
attaches to any actions performed. The Law Commission put the matter thus: 
"If a person is a status-based fiduciary it would appear that his fiduciary obligations 
apply to all activities that occur within the scope of the relationship, and any 
opportunities that arise as a result of that relationship. "119 
Examples of status-based fiduciary relationships include trustee and beneficiary, 
partner and partner, director and company, solicitor and client, doctor and patient, 
and, of course, agent and principal. 
Other relationships may be of fiduciary character, giving rise to a category of 'fact- 
based' fiduciaries. Because the attribution of the fiduciary standard imposes 
onerous burdens the courts have been cautious in declaring a relationship fiduciary 
when such responsibility has not been expressly accepted by the assumption of a 
particular status. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the categories of fiduciary 
relationship are not closed 120 
, 
and a careful examination of the circumstances of a 
relationship, its purpose, and the reasonable expectations of the parties to it as to the 
manner in which obligations are to be performed may result in it being 
characterised as fiduciary, notwithstanding the absence of a particular status. In this 
regard the courts abandon the general in favour of the particular, and sweeping 
statements of principle are shunned, to be replaced by a microscopic analysis of a 
single transaction. 
So, whilst a receiver might be expected to owe fiduciary duties to a company 
because he is its agent, such could 'also arise out of the nature of the 
receiver/company relationship, without reference to agency at all. Moreover, and 
especially in the case of fact-based fiduciaries, only certain aspects of the 
119 Supra n 105, para. 2.4.2. 
120 See, e. g., LAC Minerals Lid v International Corona Resources Ltd, supra n 88. 
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relationship may attract fiduciary consequences. Put simply, a relationship may be 
fiduciary in part 121 
, 
and this should be borne in mind when examining the fiduciary 
composition of receivership. 
3. Receivers as fiduciaries 
3.1 The various views 
A survey of the cases and commentary in this area discloses a certain ambivalence 
towards the question of whether receivers stand in a fiduciary post in relation to the 
company. Some statements are unequivocal, describing the receiver's agency as: 
"... the only genuinely non-fiduciary agency" 122 
Lingard, on the other hand, asserts that " the receiver is in a fiduciary relationship 
to the company and owes it duties similar to those owed by a mortgagee. " 123 
receiver was described as occupying a fiduciary position in Visbord v The Federal 
Coinmission of Taxation 124 
, 
and the Cork Committee stated that: 
"Under the present law a receiver owes fiduciary duties to the debenture-holder for 
whom he holds and manages the property charged, and to the company debtor for 
whoin he is almost always deemed to be acting as agenL 025 
Others are more circumspect. Picarda suggests that: 
121 New Zealand Netherlands Society 'Oranje' Inc. v Kuys [ 1973 ]2 All ER 1222. See also the 
conclusion of Mason J in Hospital Products, supra n 95, that specific activities can be isolated 
within a non-fiduciary relationship to which fiduciary consequences attach. 
122 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1992 : Butterworths 
=1 Sydney), [28451. See also Ostrander v Niagara Helicopters Lid (1974) 40 DLR (3d) 161. 
123 Bank Security Documents, 3rd ed (1993 : Butterworths : London), para. 11.23. This 
statement should perhaps be handled with care. It would seem that if a receiver is indeed a 
fiduciary, the duties owed to the company should be pitched at a much higher level than those 
owed by a mortgagee. 
124 (1943) 68 CLR 354,389, per Starke J. 
125 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee, (hereinafter the Cork 
Report), Cmnd 8558 (1982 : HMSO: London), para. 444 (italics added). 
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"The middle way is to concede a fiduciary element in soine of the duties, but to reject 
any all-pervading fiduciary element. " 126 
Milman notes that "the full range of fiduciary duties normally expected to be 
fulfilled by an agent does not apply" 
127 
, 
whilst Stevenson suggests that fiduciary 
duties "are not therefore lightly to be read into this relationship between receiver 
128 
and company" 
. 
O'Donovan also counsels wariness: 
"With respect, it seems preferable to discard this much abused [fiduciary] label and to 
concentrate upon the duties which attend the office. While it is true that a private 
appointee is subject to fiduciary obligations in some contexts it is misleading to 
classify him as a fiduciary lest it be thought that all the usual fiduciary obligations 
apply to him. """ 
Three possibilities present themselves: the receiver may be a non-fiduciary actor, he 
may be a fiduciary, or he may owe fiduciary duties in relation to the performance of 
some of his functions, but not all. If the second or third are accurate, one might 
expect fiduciary duties to stem from the receiver's agency position. The next 
sections examine to what extent the receiver is subject to the normal range of 
fiduciary duties owed by agents to principals. It is, however, salutary to note that a 
particular duty may bear a close resemblance to its fiduciary counterpart, without 
actually being fiduciary in origin. 
126 The Law Relating to Receivers, Managers and Administrators, 2nd ed (1990 : Butterw'orths 
London), 86. 
127 Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice, 2nd ed (1999 : Sweet & Maxwell : London), para. 
4.45. See also Milman and Rushworth, Receivers and Receiverships, supra n 24,21-22. 128 (1973) 47 AU 438,441 
129 The Duties and Liabilities of a Receiver and Manager Appointed out of Court (1979) 12 
MULR 52,53, n 4. 
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3.2 Receivers and the It no-conflict " rule 
This rule prevents agents selling to, or purchasing from, their principals without 
first having obtained fully informed consent. Given the circumstances of 
receivership, purchase from the company is a more likely occurrence. Receivers are 
in an unusually favourable position here, in that they have control of any sale that 
might take place. Can a receiver, therefore, purchase for himself.? 
There is no case directly in point 130, but three deal with a related matter, and are of 
considerable interest. In Ostrander v Niagara Helicopters Ltd, 31a privately 
appointed receiver sought a buyer for the shares of the company over whose assets 
he had been appointed. Whilst acting as receiver, he purchased 2% ($20,000 worth) 
of the total issued shares of a second company, and eventually sold the debtor 
company's shares to that company. The former had not been informed of the 
receiver's interest in the latter, let alone consented to the sale. Starke J expressed 
reservations as to the propriety of this conduct, but refused to rule the sale void or 
132 to award damages, stating that the receiver was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
There are certain difficulties with this case. It is not at all clear in what capacity the 
receiver had been appointed, but the learned judge throughout treated him as agent 
for the appointor rather than the company, and, indeed, appeared to consider that 
this was the typical status of a contractually appointed receiver. The decision is 
therefore explicable on the basis that an agent of a mortgagee in possession made 
the sale, and the rules relating to sales by mortgagees to companies in which they 
have an interest applied. Those rules allow such a sale if the mortgagee can show 
130 In l-e Magadi Soda Co. Lid (1925) 94 U Ch 217 deals with the case of a receiver appointed 
by trustees for debenture-holders purchasing those debentures from their holders, and so does 
not concern the particular point, a purchase from the company, in issue here. 
131 (1974) 40 DLR (3d) 16 1. 
132 Ibid. 167. 
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that lie acted bona fi(le and obtained a proper price for the property 133 
. 
The 
particular status of this receiver might also explain Starke J's remark that lie Nvas 
not a fiduciary, but, again, confusion arises from tile learned judge's failure to 
differentiate between receivers as agents of debenture-holders and as agents of 
companies. 
In Royal Bank of Canacla v Fh-sl Pioneei- hmesiments 134 the receiver was in all even 
more invidious position. A debenture-liolder company (of which lie was vice- 
president and director) appointed him over tile assets of a second company (of 
which lie was, again, vice-president and director). He proceeded to sell the assets of 
135 the second company to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the debenture-liolder 
. 
Again, it is not clear whether the receiver was appointed as agent of the debenture- 
holder or the company, although Parker ACJFIC, like Starke J in Osu-alulcl-, 
appeared to regard nothing as turning oil this point. He observed: 
"In tile instant case, it appears on the evidence that [the receiver] sold [the company's] 
assets for what lie believed to be a fair price and exercised his power as receiver- 
manager in a fair and proper manner. Indeed, tile debenture-holder voiced no 
Complaints 136 
... 
Furthermore, there is no evidence before the Court that the value of 
[the company's] franchises or office equipment Nvas greater than the amount received. 
Even if selling assets to a related company amounted to suspicious circumstances 
... 
which I do not find to be the case, the defendant has, by virtue of tile above noted 
facts, satisfied the ontis of then proving that [its receiver] acted in good filith and 
without fraud. "' 17 
133 Farl-ar v Farrars Lfil (1888) 40 Ch D 395; Tve Kivoikg Lam v Wong ChilSen [ 19831 1 WLR 
1349. The onus is oil the mortgagee to prove these two requirements satisfied. 
'" (1980) 106 DLR (3d) 330. 
1`5 Whether lie Nvas vice-president and director of the subsidiary is not revealed in the report. 
1.16 Give,, tile circumstances, why oil carth should it? 
1-17 (1980) 106 DLR (3d) 330,333-334. 
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Again, this appears to be an application of the 'mortgagee in possession' standard 
of conduct. Parker ACJHC followed Starke J in Ostrander in holding that the 
transaction could stand providing that it had been entered into in good faith and that 
a proper price had been obtained. The question of any conflict of interest was given 
short shrift, to the extent that it was dealt with at all, and these two cases are 
therefore of little assistance in determining whether the "no conflict" rule applies to 
receivers. 
Perhaps the most illuminating case in this area is Watts v Midland Bank 138. The 
allegation was that a sale by a receiver was tainted by the fact that it was made to a 
solicitor acting for him. Whilst this claim was rejected on the evidence, Peter 
Gibson J had this to say: 
"A fiduciary who sells to a person in which he is interested comes within the fair 
dealing rule, and the sale is liable to be set aside at the suit of the beneficiary unless 
the fiduciary can discharge the onus on him of showing that the sale was made in good 
faith and that the fiduciary took reasonable precautions to obtain the best price 
reasonably obtainable at that time 
... 
Counsel for the receivers very properly accepted 
that a mortgagee or receiver selling to a solicitor acting for him would come within 
the fair dealing rule. So too in my judgment would a sale by a receiver to a purchaser 
in which the solicitor acting for the receiver was financially interested. "'" 
At first glance, the learned judge appears to treat receivers as fiduciaries in applying 
the "fair-dealing" rule to them. With respect, this is misleading. To begin with, he 
treats the content of the rule as requiring a receiver to demonstrate good faith and 
the taking of reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price. This does not equate 
to what is required of fiduciaries if they are to escape the consequences of the 
131 [19861 BCLC 15. 
131 Ib id. 2 1. 
fair dealing rule. A fiduciary must obtain the fully informed consent of his 
beneficiary, and it has consistently been held that the bonafides of a transaction of 
this nature are irrelevant if no consent has been obtained 140 
. 
Bowstead suggests that a sale by an agent to a company in which he is interested 
may be a breach of his fiduciary duty, and that only fully informed consent of the 
principal will neutralise the breach 141 
, 
and this is the case where the sale is by a 
trustee to a company in which he is interested 142 
. 
Furthermore, company directors, 
who are classically fiduciaries and, indeed, agents of their companies, remain 
subject to a disclosure onus in cases where they have an interest in a contract of the 
143 
company 
Peter Gibson J cited Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen 144 in support of his 
application of a "fair-dealing" rule. Certainly this case is authority for the 
proposition that a mortgagee exercising a power of sale in favour of a company in 
which he is interested must show that he acted in good faith and took precautions to 
obtain a proper price, but the source of this obligation is far from fiduciary. On the 
contrary, in Farrar v Farrars Ltd 145 
,a case extensively cited in Tse Kwong Lam, 
Lindley LJ was at pains to point out that a mortgagee is in a different position to a 
trustee as far as an exercise of a power of sale is concerned 146 
. 
Both these decisions appear to be based upon a rule exclusive to the 
140 E. g., Exparle James (1803) 8 Ves. 337,344, per Lord Eldon; but cf Holder v Holder [ 1968] 
Ch 353. 
141 Supra n 11,6-056,6-057. 
142 Tilo V Waddell (No 2) [197713 All ER 129; Silkslone & Haigh Moor Coal Co v Edey [ 1900] 
1 Ch 167. 
143 In this context the fiduciary standard is watered down. Fully infortned consent of the 
principal is not required, but disclosure must be made to the board; see Companies Act 1985 s 
317; Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985,. S1 1985/805, Table A regulation 85. 144 Supra n 13 3. 
145 Supra n 133. 
146 Ibid. 4 10. 
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mortgagor/mortgagee relationship, which, whilst it arises in equity, differs from 
that pertaining to relationships of a fiduciary character. It is aimed at conduct which 
is similarly proscribed in relation to fiduciaries, but its content and operation are 
entirely novel. Fully informed consent enables an agent to purchase his principal's 
property. A mortgagee need not obtain fully informed consent, but need only show 
good faith. What was applied in PVatts v Midland Bank was not the fair-dealing rule 
relating to agents but, at most, a version of it associated with mortgagees, and the 
use of fiduciary language was therefore unnecessary and deceptive. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that as far as receivers are concerned the "no-conflict" 
rule does not apply to them in any meaningful sense, notwithstanding their agency 
relationship with the company. The only three cases remotely in point implement a 
cognate but discrete principle, which has its origin in a relationship that is not 
fiduciary and so not subject to fiduciary standards. 
Finally, in this regard, it is interesting to consider the Guide to Professional 
147 Conduct and Ethics 
, 
which states: 
"Save in circumstances which clearly do not impair his or her objectivity, a member 
appointed to an insolvency appointment in relation to a company or debtor should not 
himself or herself acquire directly or indirectly any of the assets of the company or 
debtor nor knowingly permit any principal or employee of his or her practice 
... 
directly or indirectly to do so. " 148 
How far this reproduces the legal rule relating to fiduciaries is difficult to ascertain. 
The first sentence may refer to a situation where something akin to fully informed 
consent has been obtained, or it may emphasise the necessity of paying a fair price 
for assets purchased. It appears implicit that an acquisition of this nature is not to be 
147 Produced by the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (now the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals) (1993) and distributed to insolvency practitioners. 148 ibid. 
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taken lightly 149 
. 
However, to the extent that this guideline reflects the "no-conflict" 
rule at all, it remains a self-imposed standard rather than a legal one, and it is with 
the latter that this section is concerned. 
3.3 Receivers and the "no-profit " rule 
No case law on this question exists, but Milman suggests that the rule applies to 
receivers. He adds, however: 
"... where such a secret profit is made [a receiver] would have to account for it either 
to the debenture-holders, if the company's assets had proved insufficient to satisfy 
them, or alternatively to the company, his principal. "'50 
This departs from the usual agency position, in that the principal'S entitlement to 
demand any profit is relegated to that of the debenture-holder. This raises the 
question of to whom, if anyone, is 'no-profit' duty owed? Milman's explanation for 
the debenture-holder's superior position is that the right to sue the receiver is a 
post-crystallisation asset of the company vested in the debenture-holder under its 
charge 151 
. 
Therefore the duty is owed to the company, but its fruits devolve upon 
the debenture-holder by operation of property law, the company being a residuary 
beneficiary. 
A different construction is that no such duty owed is owed to the company, but it is 
owed solely and directly to the debenture-holder, because the receiver stands in a 
152 fiduciary position to him 
. 
If this is correct, the company would be unable to 
claim any secret profit made by a receiver, notwithstanding that he is its agent. 
149 Although see Insolvent Abuse: Regulating the Insolvency Industry, Cousins, Mitchell, Sikka, 
Cooper and Arnold (2000 : Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs : Basildon), 
Chapter 5. 
150 Receivers as Agents, supra n 26,662. 
151 Ibid. 662, n 33. 
152 See Chapter 2. 
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In either event, the debenture-holder would have a priority claim to any illegitimate 
profit made by a receiver, so it might be questioned why the location of the duty is 
significant. It will be recalled that it is not the making of a profit that is prohibited, 
53 but rather the making of a secret profit' 
, 
and that fully informed consent negatives 
the breach. The question of the recipient of the duty therefore assumes importance 
for all three parties to the arrangement. The receiver will need to know from whom 
to seek consent in the (admittedly unlikely) event that he wishes to profit, other 
than via remuneration, from his position. 
There remains the possibility that the duty is owed to both company and debenture- 
holder, and in the absence of authority the position is obscure. If regard were to be 
had to the agency status of the reCeiver, the natural assumption would be that the 
company could claim any secret piofit made by him, if such were likely to prove 
surplus to the claim of the debenture-holder. The courts, however, have thus far had 
little regard for that status in other contexts, so to take it at face value in this regard 
would represent something of a change of approach. 
3.4 The receiver and undivided lovaltv 
This pure agency rule has no application to receivers. To the extent that the rule 
requires an agent to prefer the interests of his principal to those of other parties, a 
receiver is under no such duty, and, indeed, is under a positive duty to prioritise the 
interests of his appointor. This proposition appears to hold true in relation to the 
entirety of the receiver's actions. Whether he is selling property of the company or 
managing its business, the welfare of the company informs his decisions only to a 
'53 Such conduct would almost certainly breach ethical guidelines and, it is submitted, a duty of 
good faith (see Chapter 2). 
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limited extent. 
The first case to address this question in detail was Re B Johnson & Co. (Builders) 
Ltd 154 
. 
The case makes interesting reading, not least because of the pains the 
members of the Court of Appeal took to emphasise where the receiver's duties lay, 
especially when this was not necessary for the disposal of the case. Evershed MR 
noted that: 
"... it is quite plain that a person appointed as receiver and manager is concerned, not 
for the benefit of the company but to realise the security for the benefit of the 
,, 
155 
mortgagee bank; that is the whole purpose oftis appointment... 
The result of this was, according to the learned judge, that the receiver owed no 
duty to preserve the goodwill or business of the company. Jenkins LJ was of similar 
mind: 
"The primary duty of the receiver is to the debenture-holders and not to the company 
... 
the whole purpose of the receiver and manager's appointment would obviously be 
stultified if the company could claim that a receiver and manager owed it any duty 
comparable to the duty owed to a company by its directors and managers. " 156 
No authority was cited in support of these views, which appear inspired by the 
Court of Appeal's conception of the purpose of the appointment as contemplated by 
both bank and company. 
Other cases display some ambiguity as to whom any duty is owed. In Rv Board of 
Trade, ex parte St Martins Preserving Co. Ltd 157 Phillimore J hinted quite strongly 
at an obligation to have regard to the interests of the company 158 and in Lawson 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hosemaster Co. Ltd 159 Danckwerts U considered the 
154 [ 195511 Ch 634 (hereinafter Re B Johnson). 
155 Ibid. 644-645 (italics added). 
156 Ibid. 661 (italics added). 
"' [ 1965] 1 QB 603. 
138 Ibid., 613-614. Note though, that Winn J did not agree. 
159 [1966] 1 WLR 1300. 
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receiver's mission to be to act "to the best advantage of the company, and, 
therefore, the debenture-holders. " 160 
. 
This reverses the orthodox position that the 
incidental beneficiary of the receiver's efforts is the company. Further, Edmund 
Davies U has suggested that a receiver's duty in carrying on the business of the 
161 
company is to preserve its goodwill 
Contemporary courts have not followed these dicta, and the orthodoxy of Re B 
Johnson has been strongly asserted of late. Some judges have advanced a form of 
two-tier, or hierarchical duty system, albeit without much amplification as to how 
such operates in practice. In Lathia v Dronsfield Bros. Ltd 162 Sir Neil Lawson noted 
that the primary duty is owed to the bank, but that a duty is also owed, as agent, to 
the company, this latter being characterised as one of good faith 163 An Gomba 
Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd it was stated that: 
"Whilst the receiver is the agent of the mortgagor lie is the appointee of the debenture- 
holder and, in practical terms, has a close association with him. Moreover, he owes 
,, 
164 fiduciary duties to the debenture-holder... 
The 'dual duty' hypothesis was noted and approved, but without exegesis as to its 
effect. 
Downsvieu, Nominees v First City Corporation Ltd 165 provides some enlightenment 
as to the nature of the receiver's duties to the company. They are, according to Lord 
Templeman, to exercise his powers in good faith and for proper purposes. They do 
not include the preference of the company's welfare: 
160 [ 196611 WLR 1300,1315. 
16 1 George Barker (Transport) Ltd v Eynon [ 1974] 1 All ER 900,905. 
162 [1987] BCLC 321. 
163 Ibid., 324,326. 
164 (1989) 5 BCC 27,29, per Fox LJ 
. 165 [ 19931 AC 295. 
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"The decisions of the receiver and manager whether to continue the business or close 4-ý 
down the business and sell assets chosen by him cannot be impeached if those 
decisions are taken in good faith while protecting the interests of the debenture-holder 
in recovering the moneys due under the. debenture, even though the decisions of the 
receiver and manager may be disadvantageousfor the company. , 166 
This surely dispels any doubts as to whether the receiver owes the fiduciary duty of 
undivided loyalty to the company. He patently does not. He is at liberty, and, 
indeed, constrained to act at all times in the interests of the appointing debenture- 
holder. If even more recent corroboration of this is required it can be found in the 
High Court of Australia and the bald statement of Brennan CJ: 
"The receiver is appointed not for the benefit of the company but for the benefit of the 
mortgagee. " 
167 
Technically, a receiver in these circumstances is not in a situation of 'double 
agency'. On the contrary, his agency relationship with the company is intended to 
counteract any allegation that he acts in that character for the appointor. Rather he 
is, in fiduciary language, placed in a position of conflict of duty and duty. 
Terminology aside, however, it remains the case that a pure agent, in preferring the 
interests of another party to whom he owes a duty to those of his principal will 
breach his fiduciary duty to the latter, whether or not his relationship with the other 
party is one of agency. The core of the duty is the advancement of the principal's 
position, and unless the principal consents, with full knowledge, to his agent acting 
in the interests of a third party, then the duty is breached. 
166 [19931 AC 295,312-313. The effect on this proposition of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97 will be examined in Chapter 2. 
16 Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Ply Lid (1997) 71 AUR 1223,1227. See also the 
statements of Dawson, Gaudron and Gummow JJ at 1234,1236. 
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Contrast this with the receiver's position, as described by the courts. Not only is he 
entitled to prefer the interests of his appointor, he is compelled to do so. If, in the 
performance of his functions, he favours the company over the appointor he will be 
in breach of his duty to the latter 168 
. 
Moreover, if Downsview is correct and the 
receiver's duty to the company is breached by an improper use of his powers, one 
might come to the extraordinary conclusion that, in prioritising the company's 
interests, he is in breach of his duty to the company. 
Does the company's consent to this ostensible breach of the duty of loyalty explain 
this anomalous position? It might be argued that implied consent could be inferred 
from the debenture itself, in that the company expressly grants a number of powers 
to the receiver and impliedly consents to their use primarily in the interests of the 
debenture-holder. Such an approach is reminiscent of that of the Privy Council in 
Kelly v Cooper 169 
, 
and, as will be discussed further on, is probably the most feasible 
explanation of the receiver's remarkable position. Nevertheless, it sits 
uncomfortably with the usual understanding of what constitutes fully informed 
consent for the purposes of agency law. As far as trustees are concerned, it has been 
held that advance notice of a breach of trust, coupled with inertia by the 
beneficiary, does not relieve the errant trustee from liability 170 
, 
and that effective 
consent requires full information regarding all material facts and circumstances. 
Implied consent to future breaches of the duty of loyalty, therefore, is hardly a 
satisfactory response to the receiver's apparent ability to breach this duty with 
impunity, at least as far as his agency status it taken at face value. 
16' This issue is considered at length in the next Chapter. 
169 Supra n 89, and see the discussion at 62 infra. 
170 Life Association ofScolland v Siddal (1861) 3 De G. F. & J. 58. 
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3.5 Receivers and the dutv of confldentialif 
This duty might be breached in a number of ways. First, a receiver might use the 
company's confidential information to advance his own interests, in which case the 
discussion above as to the making of a secret profit is relevant. Secondly, he might 
divulge such information to his appointor, although it will usually be the case that 
the bank, under the debenture agreement, is contractually entitled to it171 
. 
Thirdly, 
the receiver might divulge it to a third party, and it appears that he is entitled to do 
so in certain circumstances. 
In Re Neon Signs (Australasia) Ltd 172 a receiver proposed to reveal the terms of a 
company's forward contracts to its only competitor. He was negotiating a sale of 
the company's business to that- competitor, and the company sought an injunction 
preventing disclosure of customer lists and contracts. Adams J refused to grant an 
injunction, notwithstanding that if the sale did not go ahead the competitor would 
be in a position to use the information to the detriment of the company. He said 
this: 
"it follows that save in exceptional cases the court will not interfere with the exercise 
by debenture-holders or their trustees or receivers acting on their behalf and with their 
authority of such powers as are given to them by a company as incident to their 
security. That the company or its unsecured creditors or shareholders may be 
prejudiced because the debenture-holders or those acting on their behalf and with their 
authority choose in their discretion to exercise their undoubted powers in a manner 
which may be less favourable to them than some other is not to the point. " 173 
... See Lingard, supra n 123, para. 4.02(b). 
... [ 1965] VR 125. 
173 Ihid. 127. 
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The power in question was that of realising the company's property, and the 
disclosure of the confidential information in the exercise of that power was 
therefore not an abuse of it. 
This is not to say that the making of indiscriminate disclosures would not amount 
to a breach of duty, although whether it would be a breach of the agency duty of 
confidentiality or the Downsview duty of good faith is debatable. Where, however, 
information is disclosed in the pursuit of the appointor's well being, no breach of 
duty is committed. Another agency-related fiduciary duty is therefore ruled out of 
the range of duties owed by a receiver. 
3.6 Receivers and non-delezati6n 
This point can be dealt with shortly. Receivers do delegate their functions, both to 
members of their own staff and, in certain cases, to directors or employees of the 
company, and such delegation is usually expressly authorised in standard form 
debentures 174 
. 
Moreover, administrative receivers are empowered to appoint agents 
175 to do business on their behalf pursuant to Schedule I of the Insolvency Act 1986 
. 
3.7 Receivers and the duty to account 
Receivers are under a statutory duty to deliver accounts to the Registrar of 
Companies, these comprising an abstract of receipts and payments over each 
twelve-month period in office 176 
. 
Further, under the Insolvency Rules 1986, an 
abstract of receipts and payments over the same period is to be delivered to the 
Registrar, the company, the appointor and to members of any creditors' 
174 See Lingard, supra n 123, para. 7.01 (g). 
175 Power no. 11. 
176 IA s 38. 
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committee 177 
. 
In Stniths Ltd v Middleton 178 Blackett-Ord VC held that the similar 
statutory duty under a previous enactment 179 was not exhaustive of the receiver's 
accounting obligation. His conclusion was prompted by two factors, the first being 
the receiver's agency relationship with the company: 
"... he is tile mortgagor's agent, a peculiar sort of agent of course, but nevertheless an 
"Igo agent, and an agent is primafacie an accountable party... 
The learned judge also bad regard to s 109 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which 
requires a receiver to pay any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of other 
matters to the person entitled, in this case the mortgagorigi. Accounts were 
therefore required in order that the receiver be able to demonstrate the amount of 
the surplus. 
The case provides a rare example of a pure agency duty being held to apply, 
seemingly without qualification,. to a receiver as a result of the latter's agency 
position' 82 
. 
The duty only arises once the receivership, and so the agency, has come 
to an end and so does not impose anything resembling a duty to keep the 
principal/company informed. The decision is also faintly reminiscent, albeit 
obliquely, of certain comments of Williams J in Visbord v The Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation in which he suggested that a receiver occupies a 
fiduciary position 183 
. 
This was noted and explained in Expo International Pty Ltd v 
Chant, where Needham J considered the fiduciary obligation attached to a receiver 
merely in his capacity as fundholder: 
177S, 1986/1925, Rule 3.32. 
178 [1979] 3 All ER 842. 
179 Companies Act 1948 s 372(2). 
"" [1979] 3 All ER 842,846. 
"" The case involved a company, "unusually" in the words of Blackett-Ord VC, surviving 
receivership. 182 C. f the decision of Slade J in JP Filhol Ltd v Haigh (unreported, 8 December 1977). 
183 (1943) 68 CLR 3 54,3 84. 
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"Of course, once the mortgagee has sold, lie holds surplus money in trust for 
subsequent encumbrancers and, ultimately, for the mortgagor. It appears to me that 
Williams J [in Visbord] is equating with that situation the case of a receiver who has 
acquired money either by sale of the mortgaged assets or receipt of income 
, 084 thereon. 
This is in accord with the alternative ground for the decision in Smiths Ltd v 
Middleton, although its basis is equitable rather than statutory. 
One should enquire how far Blackett-Ord VC's judgment survives Downsview, 
which seems to abjure any duties on a receiver originating from his agency status. 
Indeed, Lord Templeman equated the position of a receiver with that of a 
mortgagee. This approach would not disturb the actual duty to account, since a 
mortgagee, with whom the receiver's position is said to correspond, is an 
accounting party'85. Downsview does, however, cast doubt on the attribution of the 
duty to the receiver's agency status, and its fiduciary origin. The mortgagee's duty 
to account is not fiduciary, but stems from his particular relationship with the 
mortgagor and the assertion of his strict legal rights in the taking of possession of 
186 
the mortgagor's property 
. 
Whilst Smiths Ltd v Middleton remains accurate in 
identifying a duty, it is at least arguable that Downsview relocates its source from 
agency to mortgage law. 
184 [ 1979] 2 NSWLR 820,830. 
"' Quarrell v Beckford (1816) 1 Madd. 269. 
186 Parkinson v Hanbury (1876) L. R. 2 H. L. 1,1, per Lord Westbury. 
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4. The non-applicability of fiduciary duties: a contractual explanation? 
The above survey indicates that the usual fiduciary incidents of pure agency have 
no application to receivers. It does not necessarily follow that this is because the 
receiver's agency is counterfeit, and it remains to be considered whether those 
duties which would normally arise from the status of agent have in some way been 
excluded. The fully informed consent of a principal to what would otherwise be a 
breach of duty negatives that breach, but this does not explain the apparent 
subjugation of any fiduciary duties that a receiver might owe. Fully informed 
87 
consent, in this regard, would require at least consent of the company's board' 
, 
or 
even an ordinary resolution of the company in general meeting, and this patently 
does not occur. There are, however, other means by which fiduciary duties may be 
sidestepped. 
4.1 Exclusion bv contrac 
The avoidance of fiduciary duties might be achieved in two ways. Firstly, they 
might be excluded in the contract creating the ostensibly fiduciary relationship. 
Secondly, that contract might contain provisions which define the extent of any 
duty owed, and, if this is the case, such provision will be conclusive. This is 
because fiduciary duties "cannot be prayed in aid to enlarge the scope of 
contractual duties. " 188 The decision in Kelly v Cooper 189 gives credence to the 
proposal that regard should be had to the express and implied terms of the contract 
in order to ascertain the extent of any fiduciary duties. The question remains, 
however, how far these decisions can be taken as conferring carte blanche on 
187 As in the Companies Act 1985 s 317. 
118 Clark Boyce v Mouat [ 1994] 1 AC 428,437, per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle. 
"9 Supra n 89. 
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contracting parties to configure a status-based relationsbip so as to exclude its usual 
consequences. It has been argued that Kelly, as a matter of policy, represents a 
retrograde step in sanctioning the contractual veto of fiduciary duties, in that it 
ignores the crucial rationale behind their imposition and fails to distinguish between 
190 
contractual duties and those imposed by law 
.A differently constituted Privy 
Council has acknowledged that such a distinction exists since Kelly was decided: 
"... the essence of a fiduciary relationship is that it creates obligations of a different 
character from those deriving from the contract itself 
..... 
A broad reading of Kelly, however, would allow the courts to have regard to the 
particular function the agent is to perform and to imply a term negating a fiduciary 
repercussion which would impede that performance. 
There is no express exclusion of the fiduciary agency duties in the debenture 
agreement which constitutes the contract between receiver and company. Standard 
form debentures exonerate receivers from the liability for default which would 
attach to a mortgagee in possession 192 
, 
but are silent on the question of liability for 
breach of duty as agent for the company. If the nature of the receiver's agency 
duties is to be established by recourse to the contract, it can only be through implied 
terms that such a determination can be made. Following Kelly, the receiver's 
function, the enforcement of his appointor's security, informs his duties in relation 
to the company, and not his agency status. Thus, where fiduciary duties would be 
inimical to the accomplishment of this function, a term is implied to the effect that 
such do not apply. 
90 See supra 40. 
91 Re Goldcorp Exchange Lid [199412 All ER 806,82 1, per Lord Mustill. 
192 See, e. g., Lingard, supra. n 123. 
63 
This is entirely consonant with the approach of Hoffmann J in Gomba Holdings 
(UK) Ltd v Homan 193 in relation to the receiver's purely contractual duties 194 
. 
The 
receiver does not owe the usual fiduciary duties of an agent because they would 
inevitably detract from his performance as debt-enforcer. If, for example, he was to 
owe a duty of undivided loyalty to the company the interests of the appointor would 
be subjugated. Such a construction is not conducive to enforcement (albeit that it is 
entirely conducive to agency), and the courts have chosen to suppress it. In the 
Kelly sense, they have implied a term to the effect that no fiduciary duties shall be 
owed by receiver to company. 
Does the Kelly 'principle' provide a satisfactory solution to the perplexity of the 
receiver's agency? There are two objections to such a proposition. First, the 
decision does not necessarily allow an implication of a blanket exclusion of those 
fiduciary duties which would normally attach to a particular status. Such goes far 
beyond the parameters of Kelly, and would appear to rob an express status of any 
internal legal effect. The choice of status must have some connotation, for both 
parties, and to emasculate it in such a manner would be unprecedented and, it is 
submitted, unprincipled. 
Secondly, no court has yet explained the oddities of the receiver's agency in these 
terms. Hoffmann J, in Gomba Holdings, comes close to identifying implied terms 
as the source of the receiver's duties, but his comments were directed to contractual 
rather than fiduciary duties, and he does not explain in any detail why the normal 
incidents of agency do not apply. That they might impede the function of 
: 93 Supra n 73. 
94 See the discussion at 33 supra. 
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receivership is, at best, tacit in his judgment. 
The 'contractual implication' explanation is therefore found wanting. It fails to 
elucidate how, rather than why, the receiver escapes liability for breaches of his 
agency duties, and does not address the question of whether it is in law possible to 
constitute an agency relationship to which no agency duties attach. 
4.2. Exclusion as a matter of custom 
Contracts of a certain type may be subject to terms implied by custom, or usage. It 
is well established that 'incorporation by custom' may modify or alter the nature of 
one or both parties' performance. For a custom to be incorporated into a contract it 
must be proved that it exists, that it is certain and uniform, that it is notorious and 
that it is considered to be of a legally binding nature. These are all questions of fact. 
There is a further requirement that the custom be reasonable, and this is a question 
of law 195 
. 
The fact that a receiver does not owe those fiduciary duties usually ascribed to 
agents might therefore be explicable by reference to custom. Again, though, there 
are problems with this hypothesis. Whilst such a custom could be described as 
notorious it does not satisfy the requirement of certainty and uniformity. A brief 
survey of some of the customs recognised by the courts demonstrates that they are 
usually extremely precise: they involve a specific action or pattern of conduct 
which is described in exact terms. Thus, recognised customs have included: the 
right of a buyer to elect to take timber in bond 196; the taking of crops on land at 
195 See Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 124, supra n 105, para. 3.2.3. 
196 Clark v SinalUteld (1861) 4 LT 405. 
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valuation by incoming tenants 197 ; that "1000" in relation to rabbits in Sussex means 
"1200" 198; the entitlement of a domestic servant to a certain period of notice 199 ; that 
a c. i. f. seller may validly appropriate a cargo by passing on a copy of the original 
shipper's appropriation without delay, notwithstanding that the cargo is already 
lose0o. A custom along the lines of 'no fiduciary duties shall be owed' or 'a 
receiver owes no duty of loyalty' seems altogether too nebulous to be described as 
certain and uniform. 
A more fundamental drawback to the trade custom approach is the fact that the 
courts have consistently held that customs which purport to modify fiduciary duties 
are, as a matter of law, unreasonable. Of particular significance is the decision of 
Megaw J in Anglo-African Merchants Ltd v Bayley 201 
, 
in which a custom allowing 
an agent to act for both assured and insurer was held to be unreasonable. Megaw J 
stated that: 
"... a custom will not be upheld by the'courts of this country if it contradicts the vital 
principle that an agent may not at the same time serve two masters 
- 
two principals 
- 
,, 
202 in actual or potential opposition to one another... 
Even if, therefore, it were accepted that a custom allowing a receiver to prefer the 
interests of his appointor to those of the company/principal existed the above case, 
and others, suggest that it would be held to be unreasonable. In any event, this 
explanation has never formed the basis of any decision on receivers' duties. 
197 Wilkins v Wood (1848) 17 LJQB 319. 
198 Smith v Wilson (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 728. 
199 Hoult v Halliday [ 189811 QB 125. 
200 Produce Brokers Co. Ltd v Olympia Oil and Cake Co. Ltd [ 191612 KB 296. 
201 [1970] 1 QB 311. 
202 Ibid., 324. See also North and South Trust Co. v Berkeley [ 197 1]I WLR 470; Robinson v 
Mollett (1874) LR 7 HL 802. 
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5. The receiver's agency and the fiduciary dimension 
- 
an overview 
The above sections illustrate that receivers, whilst they might owe duties to the 
company, do not owe those fiduciary duties typically associated with the 
agent/principal relationship. Their absence from the receiver/company nexus is not 
explained by reference to those rules which may allow for their modification or 
exclusion in the agency context. The traditional duties are not merely tempered in 
precisely defined circumstances, as was the case in Kelly. They are not adapted by 
trade custom or usage, and a receiver may act in a manner which would constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty without obtaining fully informed consent. 
In short, as was seen in the case of contractual duties, the receiver's status as agent 
does not act as a determinant of his duties. The effect of the various decisions 
203 
considered above is to renounce its relevance to the question of duties owed 
. 
This 
is so even though that status is the contract's only express device for measuring 
what a receiver's duties might actually comprise. We appear, therefore, to be 
presented with a process of implication that flies in the face of the express terms of 
the contract. Such an approach is not readily squared with the courts' insistence on 
the authenticity of the receiver's agency. 
203 Smiths Lid v Middleton, supra n 178, is the exception, but must now be reconsidered in the 
light of Downsview 
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The Company's Side of the Barjjain: Duties as Principal 
1. Riphts of aRents 
The foregoing sections have focused on one side of the agency relationship, that 
concerned with the agent's contractual and fiduciary duties. It is a well-established 
feature of agency law that the principal owes certain duties to his agent or, to put it 
another way, agents have rights as against their principals. It therefore falls to be 
determined whether this aspect of agency law applies in the case of receivership. 
The most fundamental of an agent's entitlements is that of remuneration. Such will 
usually be express in the agency contract but in its absence the courts have readily 
implied terms conferring a right to reasonable remuneration, what is reasonable 
being determined by reference to all the circumstances of the case. Where the agent 
is a professional, there is a presumption that remuneration was intended 204 
, 
and the 
fact that the principal does not actually benefit from the agent's performance does 
not detract from the latter's entitlement 205 
. 
This right is not unqualified. Where an 
agent acts outside his authority, or in serious breach of duty, his principal may be 
able to repudiate any liability to pay remuncration206. 
An agent may also claim reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of 
his duties from his principal, again as a result of an express or implied term of the 
agency contract. He will also be entitled to an indemnity against losses or 
liabilities 207 
, 
such right usually being implied. This right is subject to the agent 
acting within his authority, and reimbursement and indemnity cannot be claimed 
where the expense or liability is incurred as a result of the agent's own default. 
204 Miller v Beale (1879) 27 WR 403). 
205 Fisher v Drewell (1878) 48 LJ QB 32. 
206 See Bowstead, supra n 11, para. 7-047. 
207 Ibid., para. 7-056. See also Fridman, supra n 12,2 10. 
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2. The receiver's rights as against the company 
2.1 Remuneration 
The receiver's right to remuneration is not, strictly speaking, conferred as a result 
of his agency, but rather originates from an express term of the debenture 
agreement. Such terms are standard 208 
, 
providing that the level of remuneration is to 
be fixed by reference to the charging practices of the receiver's firm. The company 
therefore has no control over how much its agent earns. In the unlikely event that 
no provision for remuneration is made, recourse to the Law of Property Act 1925 
may be had. By s 109(6) a receiver will be entitled to retain a commission not 
exceeding 5% of gross realisations to satisfy his costs, charges and expenses. He is 
entitled to such as of right, and need only apply to court of he wishes to receive a 
commission in excess of 5%209. Where no express provision for remuneration is 
made, and where s 109(6) does not apply, it is likely that the courts would imply 
both the entitlement to be paid, and the rate at which payment should be made, in a 
manner similar to that applicable to pure agents 210 
. 
Thus far, the receiver's right to remuneration appears akin to that of a pure agent, in 
that it will usually be express, and that otherwise the courts will imply such a right. 
A variance from the usual position is that the level of remuneration may, in the 
receiver's case, be fixed by the court at the behest of a liquidator under Insolvency 
Act 1986, s 36. Any order made by the court may have retrospective effect 211 
, 
so as 
to require the receiver to account for remuneration already paid. However, it has 
208 See Lingard, supra n 123, para. 7-04. 
209 Marshall v Cottingham [ 1982] Ch 82. 
210 See, to this effect, Picarda, supra n 126,240-24 1. 
211 In re Potters Oils Ltd [ 1986) 1 WLR 2 10, in relation to Companies Act 1948, s 37 1 (1) (the 
predecessor to s 36 IA). No retrospective effect existed in relation to Companies 1929, s 309; In 
re Greycaine Ltd [ 1946] Ch 269. 
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been held that the court will only exploit this strong power in a case where the level 
of remuneration as fixed by the debenture is plainly excessive 212 
, 
and there is no 
reported case in which a court has so interfered. 
Nor have the courts had occasion to address the question of disentitlement to 
remuneration. Such deprivation may result from the negligent performance of an 
agent's functions, but the case law on receivers has focused rather more on the 
question of whether the company can claim dainages in such circumstances. The 
question of the forfeiture of remuneration has, therefore, been neglected. Given that 
the decision in Medforth v Blake 213 establishes that an equitable duty of skill and 
care is owed by a receiver, there is, in principle, no reason why the agency rule 
should not apply, and Picarda. assumes that a receiver acting for improper purposes 
or in bad faith would fall within its ambit 214 
. 
2.2 IndetfiniLE. ýnd rýimhursemMt 
Much of what has been stated above in relation to remuneration applies miltatis 
mutandi to the question of indemnity and reimbursement. The debenture agreement 
usually compels the company to indemnify a receiver and to reimburse expenses 
incurred in the performance of his task. In the absence of express provision, such 
entitlement would almost certainly be implied, although whether such might be 
forfeit for breach of duty remains unclear. Section 36 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
appears to have no application to the matters of indemnity and reimbursement. 
A feature which sets the receiver's agency apart from that of a pure agent is the 
priority position he enjoys in relation to his remuneration, and any reimbursement 
212 In Re Potters Oils Ltd f 1986) 1 WLR 2 10. 
213 [ 1999] 3 All ER 97. 
214 Supra n 126,243-244. 
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of expenses. To the extent that realisations are insufficient to satisfy all claims 
against the company, a receiver may discharge his remuneration, expenses and 
indemnity ahead of any amount owing to his appointor under s 45(3) Insolvency 
Act 1986. These claims are similarly prioritised over those of preferential creditors 
and, apriori, unsecured creditorS215 
3. The internal position: a conclusion 
The company's position as principal is remarkably similar to that of a traditional 
principal. It is contractually bound to provide remuneration and to indemnify and 
reimburse its agent, the receiver. The only question mark in this area is the extent to 
which the company can impeach the receiver's contractual entitlements in the event 
of his breach of duty. 
As far as the internal consequences of this particular agency are concerned, 
therefore, a singular picture emerges. The receiver's agency, in terms of mutual 
rights and duties, appears wholly one-sided. The company/principal must perform 
in the manner expected of atraditional principal. The receiver/agent may render a 
performance entirely unconstrained by the usual incidents of that status. In essence, 
the company is subject to all the burdens of the agent/principal relationship without 
being able to claim any of the benefits. This is not merely unusual, it is entirely 
unprecedented, and provokes the enquiry as to whether this departure from the 
norm is so profound as to invalidate the designation of the relationship absolutely. 
Before responding, though, a further aspect of agency law, and the conformity of 
the receiver's agency with it, should be examined. 
215 Re Glyncorrwg Colliery Co. [ 1926] Ch 95 1. 
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The External Conseguences of the Receiver's Alzency 
1. The agent's authority 
It is customary to speak of the parameters within which an agent may act as his 
authority. As Bowstead notes: 
"An agent who is appointed by contract is bound to act in accordance with the tenris 
of that contract and not to exceed his authority.,, 216 
Authority simply refers to whatever it is that the principal has directed his agent to 
do. To take a simple example, if an agent is directed to purchase timber on his 
principal's behalf he will exceed his authority by buying coal. As far as the internal 
aspect of the agency relationship is concerned, an agent acting outside the scope of 
his authority is liable in damages to his principal for breach of contract. 
The extent of the agent's authority has external ramifications. Third parties dealing 
with agents will not know whether authority to enter into the transaction in question 
has been conferred, and in order to protect them the law has devised a number of 
categories of authority. To the extent that the agent acts within these categories he 
will bind his principa1217. 
Actual authority is self-explanatory. It comprises those actions that the principal has 
in fact authorised the agent to carry out, and, further, any actions incidental to the 
18 
activity expressly authorised2 
. 
Usual or implied authority is that stemming from 
the particular position occupied by the agent. The 'office' to which he is appointed 
may be one which usually carries with it authority to perform certain actions, so 
that the agent is "impliedly authorised to do what is usual in his trade, profession or 
216 Supra n 11,6-002. 
217 What follows does not purport to explain the intricacies of the concept of authority. For a 
more detailed exposition the reader is referred to the specialist works on agency referred to 
throughout the Chapter. 
218 Referred to as incidental authority by Bowstead, supra n 11,3 
-003. 
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business for the purpose of carrying out his authority... "219 
. 
Apparent or ostensible 
authority is that which derives from a representation by the principal that the agent 
has authority to do a certain thing. If a third party relies on that representation when 
contracting with the agent, then the principal is bound. Apparent authority and 
220 implied authority are based upon appearances 
, 
so that a principal, having 
expressly or impliedly represented that his agent has authority in certain areas, 
cannot then deny that authority once it has been exercised 221 
1,1. Agents of companies 
Whilst companies have their own corporate personality, they can only contract by 
writing under common seal or via agents 222 
. 
Where it is the directors of a company 
who enter into contracts on its behalf their authority to do so is typically found in 
the company's articles of association. These may contain restrictions on the 
authority of the board, but such will not affect a third party dealing with the 
company in good faith, by virtue of s 35A Companies Act 1985. Whilst the 
provision has no bearing on the ability if the company's members to restrain an 
unauthorised aCt223 it protects a third party dealing with the company via its board 
where that board exceeded its authority. The common law rules as to usual and 
apparent authority remain relevant where, say, a single member of the board 
transacts without authority, or the third party deals with some other person 
219 Fridman, supra n 12,69. 
220 See Morse, Partnership Law, 4th ed (1998 : Blackstone Press : London), 87. 
22 1 Fridman uses the language of estoppel in this regard, supra n 12,111. 
222 Companies Act 1985 s 36. 
223 Except to the extent that such act has already rendered the company subject to a legal 
obligation; ibid. s 35A(4). 
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purporting to act for the company but without authority to do so. 
2. The receiver's authority 
Actual authority will be found in the debenture agreement. A receiver will have 
actual authority to exercise any of the powers contained in the debenture, and if he 
is an administrative receiver, these will be deemed to include those listed in 
Schedule I to the Insolvency Act 1986, to the extent that they are not inconsistent 
with the debenture 224 
. 
It is at least arguable that the Schedule 1 powers constitute 
the administrative receiver's usual authority also. Whilst debentures will not 
usually curtail the operation of s 42(l), if they did a third party would be unaware 
of this fact, and might successfully argue that a receiver exercising powers 
contained in Schedule 1, but excluded by the debenture, is acting within his usual 
authority. In any event, such a third party would be protected by s 42(3) Insolvency 
Act 1986, which provides: 
"A person dealing with an administrative receiver in good faith and for value is not 
concerned to inquire whether the receiver is acting within his powers. " 
This is roughly equivalent to s 35B Companies Act 1985, which relieves a party to 
a transaction with the company from enquiring into the capacity of the company, or 
the authority of its board. 
The position of receivers other than administrative receivers is different. Section 42 
has no application to them, and so the combined protection of the importation of the 
Schedule I powers and the relief offered by s 42(3) is unavailable. In practice, 
however, it is more than likely that the actual authority of such a receiver conferred 
224 IA s 42(l). 
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by the debenture will be ample to validate any transaction entered into by him 225 
. 
Even where it does not, it may be possible for a contracting party to invoke the 
concept of usual authority, especially if the unauthorised act would be authorised 
were the receiver an administrative receiver. Under s 39 Insolvency Act 1986 every 
invoice, order for goods, or business letter issued by or on behalf of the company or 
its receiver must state that a receiver has been appointed. There is no requirement 
that such statement specify the type of receiver. Even where a non-administrative 
receiver is in office, and even where his actual authority would not allow entry into 
the contract in question, it is therefore conceivable that the other party might point 
to the s 39 statement as conferring usual authority on the receiver, consisting of the 
Schedule I powers. There is no case law on this matter, but if the common law 
agency rules on authority apply, and there is no reason to suppose that they do not, 
such a result is plausible. 
How far the concept of apparent authority applies in receivership is difficult to 
gauge. It seems that the requisite representation must be made by an agent of the 
company with the relevant authority 226 and since the powers of the board of 
directors are abridged in receivership, they appear to have no authority to make a 
representation as to the receiver's authority. On the other hand, the obligatory s 39 
statement might be taken as a representation of authority, but such will generally be 
issued by the receiver, and the usual rule is that the other party is unable to rely 
upon a representation made by the agent himself227 
. 
These queries have never come 
before a court, and in practice are unlikely to, since third parties will virtually 
225 See, to this effect, Milman, supra n 26,664. 
226 Bank of the Middle East v Sun Life Assurance of Canada (UK) Ltd [1983] BCLC 78. 
227 See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [ 1964] 2 QB 4 80; Hely- 
Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd[ 1968] 1 QB 549. 
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always have the blanket protection offered by any receiver's actual authority. 
In conclusion, this appears to be one area in which the agency of the receiver 
closely resembles that of pure agents. A couple of final points are, however, worth 
making. First, regardless of the position of third parties, it appears that, compatible 
with 'ordinary' agency law, a receiver acting outside his authority will be liable to 
the company for any damage that his actions cause 228 
. 
The basis of this liability, 
however, has been stated to be 'abuse of power', a wide-ranging doctrine which 
applies outside the field of agency IaW229. Secondly, it may be that a receiver acting 
outside his authority would be liable to a third party for breach of warranty of 
authority, if the principle in Collen v Wrighý30 could be extended to encompass 
such circumstances. 
3. Liability on contracts: a departure from convention 
3.1 Pure agents and liaLLty 
"There is no doubt whatever as to the general rule as regards an agent, that where a 
person contracts as agent for a principal, the contract is the contract of the principal 
and not that of the agent; and, pritnafacie, -at common law the only person who may 
sue is the principal and the only person who can be sued is the principal. , 231 
This is a general rule, and admits of exceptions. It is open to the parties to provide 
that an agent shall be personally liable on any contract he enters into on behalf of 
his principal, or to decree that an agent shall be jointly and severally liable with the 
principal. However, there exists something in the nature of a presumption that an 
228 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] AC 295. 
229 lbid. This topic is examined in the next Chapter. 
230 (1857) 8 El. & B1.647. 
231 Montgomerie v UK Mutual S. S. Association Ltd [1891] 1 QB 370,371, per Wright J. 
76 
agent contracting for his principal assumes no liability; he is simply the means by 
which the contract is effected. 
3.2 The receiver's position 
Prior to 1948 a receiver was in the same position as a pure agent. In entering into 
contracts for the company he incurred no personal liability, except to the extent that 
the contract could be construed as providing otherwise 232 : the liability remained 
that of the company. That such liability was unlikely to be met gave the legislature 
pause for thought. The Cohen Committee noted: 
"A receiver appointed out of Court is as a rule the agent of the company and 
... 
is not 
personally liable unless he pledges his own credit. In sonic cases receivers appointed 
out of Court have ordered goods and have not paid for them but the proceeds of 
realisation have been applied for the benefit of the debenture-holders, the seller of 
goods being left to sue the company which has no assets. We consider that a receiver, 
however appointed, should be made personally liable (without prejudice to his right to 
an indernnity out of the assets) on any contracts entered into by him subsequent to his 
appointment, except where the contract expressly excludes him from personal 
liab ility.,, 233 
This recommendation was enacted in s 369(2) Companies Act 1948. Its effect is 
reproduced ss 37(l)(a) and 44(l)(b) Insolvency Act 1986 234 
. 
These enactments 
reverse the presumption of non-liability that attaches to pure agents. If the receiver 
wishes to avoid personal liability he must actively provide for such in any contract 
into which he enters, otherwise it will be an automatic result. It is clear that such 
liability can be excluded, and it seems equally likely that, notwithstanding s 
232 Telsen Electric Co Ltd vJ J. Eastick& Sons [193613 All ER266. 
23' Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmnd. 6659 (1945 : HMSO 
London), para. 68. 
234 In relation to non-administrative and administrative receivers respectively. 
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44(l)(b), the company, as principal, will also be liable on any contract entered into 
on its behalf by its receiver, although this is not spelt out in the legislation 235 
. 
Thus, 
a fundamental principle of agency law is statutorily excluded in receivership. 
4. Miscellaneous fragments of agency law and their application to receivers 
4.1 Tortious liability of ggent and princýpa 
An agent will be personally liable for torts committed by him whether acting within 
236 
or without authority 
, 
although his principal may be held jointly and severally 
liable for tortious acts committed with authority237 
. 
The position of a receiver is 
similar, although this is subject to the question of whether the receiver's liability to 
third parties can be excluded in the debenture. The one qualification to this 
proposition is the position in relation to the tort of inducement of a breach of 
contract, for which receivers are not liable 238 
, 
and which is considered in detail in 
Chapter 3 
4.2 AKents'actions causing a principal to commit a criminal or similar offence 
As with tortious liability, there will be circumstances where a principal may incur 
criminal liability through his agent's actions. This is the case even where the 
principal in question is a company, although it should be noted that, under 'alter- 
ego' or 'attribution' theory, a company principal may be directly, rather than 
vicariously liable 
239 
. 
235 The company's liability will be valueless to the contracting party. Common sense dictates 
that he will pursue the receiver. 
236 Bowstead, supra n 11, para. 9-109. 
237 Fridman, supra n 12,315. 
238 Welsh Development Agency Lid v Export Finance Co. [ 1992] BCC 270. 
239 This is a complex subject and confines of space do not allow for a full treatment. The reader 
is directed to the useful discussion in Charlesworth and Morse, Company Law, 16th ed (1999: 
Sweet & Maxwell: London), 21-23. 
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This principle has been applied equally to receivers. It has been held that a receiver 
may, by his actions, cause the company to commit a criminal offence 240 
, 
or render 
it in contempt of cour t241 
. 
This is so even though the company has no control over 
its receiver's actions. In this respect, the courts have displayed a degree of 
sympathy, and have usually managed to avoid the detrimental consequences to the 
company. In the John Willment case, for example, Brightman J, whilst 
acknowledging that a receiver might have a discretion as to whether to pay over 
VAT collected for the company, ruled that that discretion could only be exercised 
in favour of the Customs and Excise Commissioners, thus saving the company from 
criminal liability 242 
. 
Similarly, in the MacLeod case 243 
,a 
decree of specific 
performance against the company was refused for fear that its receiver would 
ignore it and thus place the company in contempt of court. These cases give full 
effect to the receiver's agency position, but assuage its potentially harsh 
consequences. 
A different approach can be seen in Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltdý 44 
Here the question was whether a payment made by the receiver to a contracting 
party of the company could amount to a preference for the purposes of s 122 of the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and s 565(l) Corporations Law. By a bare majority it 
was held that the agency of the receiver did not mean that the payment was effected 
by the company. The majority 245 
, 
having noted the unusual nature of the receiver's 
agency, stated: 
240 Re John Willment (Ashford) Ltd [ 1980] 1 WLR 73. 
241 Macleod v Alexander Sutherland Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 44. 242 Supra n 240. See also Sargent v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [ 1995] 2 BCLC 34. 
243 Supra n 24 1. 
244 (1997) 71 AUR 123. 
245 Dawson, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. 
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"Reliance, in this question of characterisation, by the liquidator of TOC upon the 
particular agency created by the Debenture as a step to controverting what would 
otherwise be the legal nature and practical effects of the steps involved, extends that 
notion of agency beyond its true character. ' 246 
It remains to be seen whether this technique would be followed by an English 
court247. It clearly departs from earlier English authorities, and, indeed, from the 
usual position under agency law, but whether this amounts to an attempt to protect 
the company, as in John Willnient and Macleod, or to facilitate the progress of the 
receivership is debatable. 
The Agency of the Receiver: Some Conclusions 
1. Is the apency 'real'? 
This perhaps begs the question of what a 'real' agency amounts to. Certainly, some 
principles of agency law have relevance to the receiver's position, most notably the 
obligation of the company/principal to remunerate and indemnify the 
receiver/agent. It also appears that the legislature has chosen a form of protection 
for third parties dealing with receivers similar to that seen in relation to company 
agents acting outside their authority. But do these contractual and statutory 
interventions give the receiver's agency the stamp of authenticity? 
It was noted at the beginning of this Chapter that agency is essentially a mutually 
beneficial arrangement. Thus, agency can be characterised as a bilateral exchange 
of rights and duties, those of each party being circumscribed by law in order that 
the integrity of the relationship be maintained. One of the hallmarks of agency law 
246 (1997) 71 AJLR 1231,1236. 
247 It was not where the question of whether a sale of company assets to a connected party of 
one of its directors fell within s 320 Companies Act 1985: Demite Lid v Prolec Health Ltd 
[1998] BCC 638. See Frisby, Receivers and the Companies Act 1985, s 320: A Vely Real 
Agency [1999] CFILR 143. 
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is, therefore, the construction of a series of checks and balances, in the form of 
rights and duties, inspired by a desire to safeguard a valuable and serviceable 
arrangement. These rights and duties represent a concatenation of components that, 
when viewed as a whole, amount to a discrete and unmistakable association. The 
question arises as to how many of these constituent parts can be removed before the 
alliance ceases to be aptly demarcated as agency and becomes something else. This 
is at the heart of the interrogation in hand. 
What emerges from the case law can be surnmarised as follows. As far as the 
internal aspects of the receiver's agency are concerned, it is entirely one-sided. The 
company/principal appears subject to the usual range of obligations imposed upon 
principals, but does not benefit from the concomitant duties owed by agents. Those 
duties that are owed are atypical: they are not informed by the receiver's agency 
status, but owe their existence to his position as a kind of surrogate mortgagee in 
possession. The skeleton upon which the courts have fleshed out the receiver's 
obligations is hisfunction as debt enforcer, and the courts have concluded that such 
necessarily excludes virtually the entire compass of a pure agent's duties. 
The external dimension of the agency is also robbed of certain of its idiosyncratic 
features. Most notably, the receiver is fixed with personal liability which would not, 
under agency law, arise. What remains is the receiver's ability to commit the 
company to legal obligations, and this is, admittedly, entirely consonant with pure 
agency. 
In the final analysis, the 'reality' of the agency comes down to a matter of 
impression. It is submitted that one feasible analysis of the receiver's position is 
that it lacks so many of the characteristics of agency as to be undeserving of that 
label. The reality is that the performance of the receiver's function, and the manner 
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of that performance, lends itself more appropriately to the conclusion that he is 
acting in the manner of agent for the appointor rather than the company 248 
. 
That 
this is the substance of the arrangement is irrefutable. Consider the position where 
the agency clause is inadvertently omitted. In such circumstances it has consistently 
been held that the receiver acts as agent for the debenture-holder, with all the 
consequences that entails 249 
. 
This is, having regard to the agreement as comprised 
in the debenture, the natural conclusion. What the receiver does, and his focus in 
doing it, leads inexorably to that verdict. And yet it is smoothly circumvented by 
the cosmetic device of the agency clause, a clause which adds nothing to what is 
actually to be done and does not affect the manner of performance, even vestigially. 
That such a technicality should be afforded credence merits further comment. 
2. A triumph of form over substance? 
The artificiality of the receiver's agency position has been expressly adverted to by 
the courts, but has gone virtually unchallenged. Whilst acknowledging its 'oddness' 
they have been prepared to take it at face value, bul only to the extent that it 
facilitates the performance of the debt collection service and protects the appointor 
from liability. Commentators have noted this phenomenon and drawn their own 
conclusions. Lord Millet, writing extra-judicially, remarks: 
"The true principal appears to be that the so-called "agency" of the receiver is not a 
true agency, but merely a formula for making the company, rather than the debenture- 
holders, liable for his aCtS...,, 250 
248 See Ziegel, Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency 
Law, Ziegel ed (1994 : Clarendon Press : Oxford), 457. 
249 See Re Vimbos Ltd f 1900] 1 Ch 123; Robinson Printing Co. Ltd v Chic [ 1905] 2 Ch 123; 
Deyes v Wood[ 1911 ]I KB 806. 
250 The Conveyancing Powers ofReceivers After Liquidation (1977) 41 Conv. 83,88. 
82 
Ziegel refers to a "fictitious use of agency concepts"251 
. 
The Law Commission, in 
what appears to be its only excursion into the area of receivership, has commented 
as follows: 
"A notable example of the artificiality of mortgage law is the agency of a receiver. , 252 Zý 
It is clear that the true beneficiary of this device is the debenture-holder. The 
agency relieves him from the consequences of being a mortgagee in possession, it 
protects him from liability to third parties, and it affords the utmost efficacy to the 
recovery of his claim against the company. For all intents and purposes the receiver 
acts on his behalf, and, in substance, as his agent. Yet the form of the agreement 
prevails emphatically. The intention, as evinced by the agency clause, is that the 
receiver is to be the agent of the company, and the deference of the courts to 
contractually expressed intentions, is an accepted feature of interpretative 
techniques. 
However, across a whole range of legal areas, the courts have been alert to the use 
of labels to disguise the true effect of transactions. The detection of illusory 
designations, where such are employed to give one party an unwarranted 
advantage, has been a feature of the courts' role for centuries. Thus, equity was 
quick to turn its powerful spotlight onto the mortgage transaction and to intervene 
to give effect to its substance: the arrangement was structured as a sale, but in 
substance was a security, and equity would allow it to take effect only as a security. 
This predilection is at the root of the creation of the equity of redemption. Other 
examples are readily available, and a few are noted here to demonstrate the 
universality of the courts' adherence to 'reality'. 
23' Supra n 248,452. 
252 Working Paper No. 99: Land Mortgages (1986 : HMSO : London), para. 3.49. 
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In Ex parte Delhasse 253 the Court of Appeal disregarded the use of loan language in 
an agreement as an attempt to avoid partnership liability. James LJ was trenchant in 
this regard: 
"... the use of the word "loan" and the reference to the Act are, in my opinion, a mere 
sham 
-a mere contrivance to evade the law of partnership. The Loan is a mere 
pretence, its object being to enable the so-called lender to be, not only a dormant 
partner, but the real and substantial owner of the business, for whom and on whose 
behalf it is to be carried on, and yet to provide that lie shall not be liable for loss, in 
,, 
254 
case loss shall be incurred 
... 
the law of England does not allow this to be done... 
To the same effect are the words of Cozens-Hardy MR in Weiner v Harris: 
It is quite plain that by the mere use of a well-known legal phrase you cannot 
,, 
255 
constitute a transaction that which you attempt to describe by that phrase. 
Similarly, the courts have disregarded labels attached to employment-type contracts 
where they do not reflect the reality of the arrangement between the parties 256 
, 
and 
have construed purported liquidated damages clauses as penalties when this is their 
true tenor: 
"It is well settled that, when a court of law finds that the words the parties have used 
in their written agreement are not genuine and are not designed to express the real 
nature of the transaction but for some ulterior motive to disguise it, a court will go 
behind a sham front and get at the reality. 99257 
Finally, and perhaps most prominently, the House of Lords examined the use of 
'labels' in the landlord/tenant domain and unhesitatingly refused to give effect to an 
251 (1877) 7 Ch 511. 
254 Ibid., 526. 
255 [19 10] 1 KB 285,290. 
256 Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1213; Massey v 
Crown Life Insurance Co. [1978] ICR 590; Calder vH Kitson Vickers & Sons (Engineers) Ltd 
[ 1988] ICR 233. 
257 Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 385,402, per Lord Devlin. 
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agreement terming itself a licence where the rights and obligations of the parties 
indicated that a lease had been created. In the words of Lord Templeman: 
"If the agreement satisfied all the requirements of a tenancy, then the agreement 
produced a tenancy and the parties cannot alter the effect of the agreement by insisting 
that they only created a licence. 11258 
The above cases reveal that the use of labels in order to 'steal a march' will be 
given short shrift. Yet the agency label in receivership works in precisely this 
manner for the debenture-holder. He is allowed to appoint a receiver who acts as 
though he were his agent: the nominal principal sustains all the burdens of that 
position, without enjoying the corollary benefits. Full force is given to the 
receiver's agency as far as it protects the appointor, but where such protection is 
jeopardised by virtue of the agency, such as where the company's position ought to 
be given primacy, the legal response has been to deny the agency this effect. 
How to explain this aberration? Much elucidation and evaluation is left to the 
following Chapter, but this much can be presently noted. The courts appear to have 
resolved, at least implicitly, that a fully-fledged agency relationship is inappropriate 
to the status of receivei-. Although there is nothing in the debenture agreement 
creating that arrangement to suggest that it should not operate according to its 
terms, they have construed the position with half an eye to the task that the receiver 
is to perform and structured a duty framework around that task. In doing so, what 
emerges is a relationship that is perhaps sui generis. A new status is created, that of 
receiver, which attracts a bundle of rights and obligations unique and tailored to the 
circumstances. The process is, as yet, incomplete, and whether the last word on this 
abnormal agency has been spoken remains to be seen. The following Chapter 
259 Street v Mounýford [1985] AC 809,819. 
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moves on to consider the ramifications of the courts' approach in this regard, and 
attempts to elucidate further the policy considerations informing their conception of 
the appropriate response to the receiver/company/debenture-holder nexus. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP: RECEIVER, COMPANY AND 
DEBENTURE-HOLDER 
Introduction 
"The appointment of a receiver seems to me to involve an inherent conflict of interest. 
The purpose of the power is to enable the mortgagee to take the management of the 
company's property out of the hands of the directors and entrust it to a person of the 
mortgagee's choice. That power is granted to the mortgagee by the security 
documents in completely unqualified terms. "' 
The above neatly encapsulates receivership. Of all the relationships in which the 
receiver finds himself, two stand out as being particularly important, those which 
exist, on the one hand, between receiver and. company and, on the other, between 
receiver and appointing debenture-holder. Given that the interests of company and 
debenture-holder are likely to diverge sharply during receivership, some means of 
resolving this conflict must be available to the receiver. His position would be 
untenable if, by prioritising the welfare of one party, he became legally accountable 
to the other for the inevitable damage caused to it. 
This Chapter attempts to illustrate the manner in which the law intervenes to ensure 
that the receiver faces no such dilemma. By prescribing a duty-based hierarchy it 
ensures that the irresistible force and the immovable object never actually meet: to 
use fiduciary language, no conflict of duty and duty arises. Such a result could be 
most easily achieved by an 'all or nothing' route, whereby the receiver would be 
legally compelled to have regard to only one set of interests. In fact the law has 
' Shamjiv Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd (1986)2 BCC 98,910 per Oliver J at 98,915 (adopting 
the words of Hoffmann J at first instance). 
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developed in a subtler fashion. Whilst acknowledging the sovereignty of the 
debenture-holder's claims, it has nevertheless asserted, that the well-being of the 
company is not completely irrelevant in informing the receiver's conduct, and in 
doing so has consummated a balance of sorts, if not a reconciliation. Whether or not 
this balance is sensibly or fairly weighted is a recurring theme in this, and other 
Chapters. 
The technique employed by law to regulate the receiver's performance of his 
functions is to attribute duties, which may be owed to either the debenture-holder or 
the company. The twin origins of these duties, as far as the company is concerned, 
are contract and statuS2 
. 
The contract in question is that between the company and 
the debenture-holder, to which the receiver is not a party but which nonetheless 
represents a significant source of power, if not obligation. As for status, the 
previous Chapter suggests that the receiver's identification as agent of the company 
is fictitious, at least as far as it dictates how he must behave towards the company, 
his purported principal. Nevertheless, it will be suggested that the status of receiver 
(as opposed to agent) has some consequence, especially in terms of the relationship 
between the receiver and his appointor. And, according to more recent case law, the 
status of mortgagee is similarly meaningful, in that it is pivotal in determining those 
duties owed by receiver to company'. 
This Chapter will examine the nature of the receiver's duties to the company and to 
the debenture-holder in tandem. This is not because their content or derivation is in 
' Although statutory duties are owed to both debenture-holder and company, as to which see 
infral26. 
' Even though the receiver is not a mortgagee of the company's property. This enigma is 
explored in depth further on. 
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any way similar, indeed, the case law graphically depicts that this is not the case. 
However, an examination of the way in which the courts have developed and 
refined the law in this area suggests that the respective duties are inextricably 
intertwined, the one delineated by the other. As was observed in relation to the 
receiver's agency, at the centre of this construct is the notion of function, with 
primacy afforded to the achievement of the commercial purpose (as perceived by 
the courts) of receivership. This approach acknowledges what the legal structure of 
receivership seeks to avoid, it concedes that for all intents and purposes the nucleus 
of the institution is composed of three, rather than two parties. As Fox LJ puts it: 
"The relationship set up by the debenture, and the appointment of a receiver, however, 
is not simply between mortgagor and receiver. It is tripartite, and it involves the 
mortgagor, the receiver and the debenture-holder. "'t, b 
Thus, although the interposition of the receiver is legally effective to fence off the 
debenture-holder from the company, the relationship between receiver and 
debenture-holder is instrumental in determining the workings of the relationship 
between receiver and company. From the outset, it is the initial contract between 
debenture-holder and company that spawns the subsequent receiver/company 
nexus. What emerges is a minage a trois of considerable intricacy, in that on the 
one hand it endeavours to exclude any such denomination, whilst, on the other, it 
accepts that the rights and duties of each party to it are circumscribed by reference 
to each other. Form and substance branch off again, as they do in relation to the 
agency of the receiver. The tripartite relationship, and the duty configuration within 
it, warrant close attention if the true legal nature of receivership is to be assessed. 
' Gomha Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 27,29. 
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Why Dutics Arise: The Practical Effect of Receivership 
1. Introduction: Receiver and Company 
Before exploring the nature and content of the receiver's duties, the practical 
consequences of the appointment of a receiver over the charged assets of a company 
merit attention. This may help to elucidate why a receiver should owe duties to the 
company at all, and also support the submission that these duties should not 
necessarily owe their existence to somewhat specious comparisons with the law of 
mortgages. Further, a survey of the case law relating to the position of the company 
in receivership reveals, it is submitted, an embryonic endorsement of the 
uniqueness of the situation and an attempt to address that singularity with ad hoc 
solutions. 
2. A transfer of powers 
The appointment of an administrative receiver is, by definition, over the whole or 
substantially the whole of the company's property'. That appointment is 
underpinned by the bestowal upon the receiver of a parcel of powers, deemed to 
emanate from the debentures under which he is appointed, unless inconsistent with 
the provisions of those debentureS6 
. 
Armed with these considerable powers the 
receiver is able to effectively usurp the management of the company from its board, 
and to deploy the charged assets in whatever manner he thinks fit in order to 
achieve his goal of discharging the debt owed to the debenture-holder. Goode has 
classified the Schedule I powers as in rem and personal: 
Insolvency Act s 29(l)(a)(b) (hereinafter 'IA'). 
IA s 42(l) and Schedule 1. 
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"[The receiver's] in rem powers are held in right of the debenture-holder and derive 
from the security created by the debenture. They include the power to collect in the 
assets comprising the security, to possess, control and use those assets and to deal 
with and dispose of them, whether by way of sale, lease, charge or otherwise. His 
personal powers are those vested in him by virtue of his position as deemed agent to 
manage the company's business. "' 
A scrutiny of these powers reveals a compelling likeness to those usually possessed 
by the company's directors, and, en bloc, they comprise an unfettered authority in 
relation to both the assets included in the charge (in rent powers) and the ability to 
commit the company to obligations and to direct its future trading course (personal 
powers). Further, it would appear to be the law that, subject to one interesting and 
difficult exception', the receiver wields these powers exclusively, so that the usual 
managerial functions of the company's board evaporate upon his appointment. As a 
consequence, the company is emasculated as far as its power of self-determination 
is concerned. 
This proposition is not particularly surprising. If directors were able to continue to 
exercise powers commensurate to those of the receiver, and over the same assets, 
the resulting tug of war would lead to chaos, especially for third parties, and the 
achievement of the receiver's purpose gravely undermined. Common sense dictates 
that, for the most part, only one actor can have dominion, and the courts have come 
down almost unconditionally on the side of the receiver. There is nothing express in 
the contract between debenture-holder and company that would have this effect: 
whilst the receiver is given powers, these are not stated to be to the exclusion of the 
'Principles ofCorporate Insolvency Law, 2nd ed (1997: Sweet and Maxwell: London), 237. 
' See infra 99. 
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board's powers, even where concurrent exercise would lead to inconsistencies and 
unworkability. Instead, this conclusion is reached almost as a matter of impression, 
and, in some cases, by recourse to the implied term theory of contract. 
Rigby U, in Gaskell v Goslinglo, hinted as much. In tracing the foundations of the 
peculiarities of the agency of the receiver, and locating them in the contract 
between debtor and creditor, he noted: 
"For valuable consideration he [the mortgagor] has committed the management of his 
property to an attorney whose appointment he cannot interfere with 
Not only is the dismissal of the attorney contractually prohibited, but, it might be 
inferred, so is any interference with his actions or any attempt to pre-empt them by 
the taking of action by the mortgagor. This was confirmed in Woolston v Ross", 
where a disgruntled mortgagor attempted to distrain for unpaid rent, without the 
authority and against the better judgment Of a receiver appointed over the lease in 
question. Cozens-Hardy J asserted: 
"In my opinion, so long as the receivership is in force and the notice to the tenant is 
not withdrawn, no valid distress can be levied except by the receiver or by some 
person, including the mortgagor authorised by him 
... 
It is a fallacy to suggest that the 
mortgagor, as principal, can exercise the statutory power vested in his agent, the 
receiver. "" 
How the statutory power to levy distress came to 'vest' in the receiver was left 
unexplained by the learned judge. Property of the company does not vest in a 
receiver, if a power to dis. train can be described as property. It would perhaps be 
' Nor does the Insolvency Act have this effect. 
" [189611 QB 669. 
Ibid. 692 (italics added). 
[1900] 1 Ch 788. 
Ibid. 791. 
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more accurate to say that the statutory power to levy distress is only exercisable by 
the receiver, in lieu and to the exclusion of the mortgagor landlord. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that he considered that the receiver, having chosen not to exploit this power, 
had debarred the mortgagor from dealing with it inconsistently. Not only is the 
receiver given 'first refusal' on the deployment of an 'asset', his refusal operates to 
sterilise the productive capacity of that asset in the hands of the mortgagor unless he 
so authorises. 
The impotence of the company's managerial organs during receivership was 
proclaimed by Lord Atkinson in Moss Steamship Co. Ltd v Whinney: 
"[The] appointment of a receiver and manager over the assets and business of a 
company does not dissolve or alienate the company, any more than the taking of 
possession by the mortgagee of the fee of land let to tenants alienates the mortgagor. 
Both continue to exist; but it entirely supersedes the company in all the conduct of its 
business, deprives it of all power to enter into contracts in relation to that business, or 
to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of the property put into the possession, or under 
the control of the receiver and manager. Its powers in these respects are entirely in 
abeyance. "" 
One point that is occasionally overlooked about this dictum is that his Lordship was 
dealing with a receiver appointed by the court, and not a privately appointed 
receiver of the kind here under discussion. One of the several differences between 
court appointed and private receivers is that the former is an officer of the court, so 
that any interference with his functions amounts to a contempt of court 15 
. 
This is not 
14 [ 19121 AC 254,263. 
See, for example, Ames v Birkenhead Docks Trustees (1855) 20 Beav. 332 (dispossession of 
property under receiver's control); Langford v Langford (1835) 5U Ch 60 (attempting to collect 
rents); Re Derwent Rolling Mills Co Ltd (1904) 21 TLR 81 (attachment of debts after 
appointment of receiver); Re Sutton's Estate (1863) 8 LT 343 (levying distress after appointment 
of receiver). 
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the case where private receivers are concerned". Furthermore, the powers of a 
court-appointed receiver are entirely a matter of the order under which he is 
appointed, whereas those of the private receiver flow out of the debenture contract, 
so it should not be assumed that the effect of each is identical. If, on the other hand, 
regard to the function of each type of receiver is had, the analogous treatment of 
such effect is not inappropriate. Both are appointed over property with a view to 
managing it for a particular beneficiary or beneficiaries, and both would be severely 
hampered in this task if outside intervention were countenanced". Thus a choice 
has to be made as to who may exercise management powers, In the case of the court 
appointee, the answer is obvious, in the case of the contractual receiver, the same 
result ought to follow as a matter of contract. 
3. How the transfer is effected: the contractual resolution 
As has been noted, debenture agreements do not, in terms, stipulate for a suspension 
of the powers of the company's board, during receivership, but this appears to be 
the effect of any appointment. The Whinney case" establishes that a receiver 
appointed by the court takes over certain of the board's powers and functions, and 
this proposition has been adopted in relation to privately appointed receivers. There 
ought, therefore, to be some contractual basis for this result, and it is submitted that 
" Although it is open to the receiver, under s 35 IA, to obtain injunctive relief against 
interference. His appointor has no such facility; Bose v Harris (1942) SJ 376. 
" Weinrib considers that court and privately appointed receivers are "functionally identical": 
The Fiduciaty Obligation [ 1975] UTLJ 1,7, n 16. 
" Supra n 14. 
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such an analysis is substantially correct, although its niceties have been engulfed by 
rather sweeping statements in the past'9. 
To return to the classification of the receiver's powers as in rem and personal, as far 
as the former are concerned one explanation of his ability to exclude outside 
exercise would run as follows. In the first place, his appointment will crystallise a 
floating charge over the assets of the companY20 
. 
At that point the company's 
freedom to deal with those assets is terminated, and any attempt to dispose of them, 
by whatever means, would require the permission of the chargee". The company, 
by granting the fixed or floating charge, has contractually accepted a shackle on its 
freedom to deal with its assets during receivership which may only be loosened by 
the debenture-holder's sanction, and such sanction is not requested or given. 
Further, and again as a matter of contract, the company has agreed to the debenture- 
holder acting as its agent in the matter of the receiver's appointment. On making 
that appointment, a form of permission to deal is granted, but that licence is 
'vested' in a single agent of the company, viz. the receiver. Its other agents, the 
directors, are disabled from any form of disposition by virtue of the pre-existent 
fixed charge or newly crystallised floating charge, as the company has contractually 
acceded that they should be. 
The proprietary analysis is more difficult to apply where the power in question is 
'personal'. Personal powers may be described as general management powers, and 
" See, e. g., Maigh v Wickenden [1942] 2 KB 160,168; Lawson v Hosemaster Machine Tool Co 
Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1300,1315; Griffiths v Secretary ofStalefor SocialServices [1973] 3 All ER 
1184,1199. All of these state the fact, rather than the legal basis, of the receiver's control. 
" Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318; Evans v Rival 
Granite Quarries Ltd [ 1910] 2 KB 979; George Barker (Transport) Ltd v Eynon [ 1974] 1 WLR 
650. 
" As would a disposal of fixed charge assets whether a receiver was in office or not. 
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whilst they may relate to charged assets, in the sense that the receiver decides how 
to deploy those assets, they may also concern the running of the company without 
reference to its assets". The Schedule I powers include: appointing solicitors or 
accountants; bringing or defending legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of 
the company; appointing other agents or dismissing employees; establishing 
subsidiaries of the company; making arrangements or compromises; proving in 
bankruptcy; bringing or defending a winding up petition, and; changing the 
situation of the company's registered office". These correspond very closely with 
the kind of powers bestowed upon and exercised by the company's board, but they 
have no immediately obvious proprietary base, stemming rather from the agency 
status of the board on the one hand and the receiver on the other. Again, neither the 
debenture contract nor the Insolvency Act expressly exclude the board's exercise of 
those powers which are also possessed by the receiver, and, of course, their 
concurrent exercise by both parties would render receivership impractical. 
This impasse is avoided by the implication of a contractual term to the effect that 
the directors of the company may not exercise managerial powers whilst the 
receiver is in office. This was recognised by Hoffmann J in Goniba Holdings UK 
Ltd v Homan 24 where, having expressly adverted to the importance of implied terms 
in the "bargain between the debenture-holder and the company", he continued: 
"There are, I think, certain principles which can be deduced from what the parties 
may be supposed to have contemplated as the commercial purpose of the power to 
appoint a receiver and manager. The first is that the receiver and manager should 
" Although, as Goode notes, there may be some overlap between in rein and personal powers; 
supra n 7. 
" IA Schedule 1, items 4,5,11,15,18,20,21 and 22 respectively. 
24 [ 1986] 3 All ER 94. 
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have the power to carry on the day-to-day process of realisation and management of 
the company's property without interference from the board. "" 
Interference, it is submitted, must encompass any attempt to exercise management 
powers which have been granted, by the debenture, to the receiver. Further, this 
principle may extend to management powers beyond those directly associated with 
the charged property to any action of a commercially significant nature. in 
Independent Pension Trustees Ltd v L. A. W. Construction Co Ltd-6 it was held that 
the board had no power over assets in the possession or control of the receiver, and 
that assets, in this respect, included rights and powers of the company which were 
of value in the commercial sense". One point of interest is Lord Hamilton's view 
that rights and powers of this nature would be caught by a global floating charge". 
If this is correct, the proprietary analysis described above could be applied to divest 
the board of its powers of management whenever those powers could be described 
as 'commercially significant', a benchmark which is potentially extremely wide and 
could conceivably absorb the majority, if not all, of managerial discretion". If this 
proposition is considered to be too broad, in that it blurs the distinction between in 
rem and personal powers, it remains the case that the courts may have resort to the 
implied contractual term to prevent directors acting in conjunction with the receiver 
and so defeating the commercial purpose of the appointment. 
21[ 1986] 3 All ER 94,98, relying on Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whinney (italics added). 
26 1997 SLT 1105. 
27 The right in question was that of appointing an independent trustee of an occupational pension 
scheme. 
2' i. e., one over the entire undertaking of the company. 
29 1997 SLT 1105,1110. His Lordship envisaged as commercially significant any right or power 
the exercise of which could have some bearing on the value of exploitable assets, including 
goodwill. All-encompassing indeed. 
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3.1 The validitv of 'divestment theorv 
Two modes of divesting directors of their general management powers have been 
suggested, the first based on the proprietary effect of the debenture contract, the 
second on an implied contractual term. Both are entirely orthodox. Whilst the 
courts may, in relation to other aspects of receivership, have used implied term 
theory somewhat inconsistently", in this regard their approach appears both 
doctrinally legitimate and eminently sensible. Such terms may be implied as a 
matter of law or of fact, but, it is generally stated, only as a matter of necessity. In 
these circumstances, and given the courts' deference to the receiver's function, it is 
arguable that such a term is implied in law, but it could equally emerge from a strict 
application of the business efficacy test. Clearly there can be no question but that 
the directors of a company in receivership abdicate their managerial powers to the 
appointee. As Meagher, Gummow and Lehane put it: 
"A receiver obviously could not manage effectively if the directors retained 
concurrent power to manage. Nor, it is suggested, could a receiver effectively deal 
with the property of the company if the directors retained a concurrent power to deal 
with it 
... 
if a receiver is given power to manage, that power must be exclusive of the 
directors' powers; if he is given power to convey the legal title to an asset of the 
company, that power equally must be exclusive of the directors' powers. "" 
This is absolutely appropriate to the commercial purpose of the particular 
relationship in question, and, further, it satisfies the test of necessity proposed in 
Liverpool City Council v Irwin". Whilst a man may not serve two masters, nor may 
See Chapter 1. 
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 2nd ed (1992: Butterworths: Sydney) [28491. 
32 [ 1977] AC 239,266. 
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two masters preside over the affairs of the company in the circumstances envisaged 
by receivership. Such a situation simply would not work, and both parties to the 
debenture contract must be taken to have adverted to thiS33. 
4. The extent of 'divestment theory' 
The above analysis has the attraction of simplicity. Once a receiver is appointed, the 
managerial powers of the company's board are suspended. Commercial certainty, 
on which a premium is placed, is delivered and the receivership can run smoothly 
without niggling impediments. Or so it would seem. In fact it appears that 
'divestment theory' is subject to qualification, and that the unique flavour of 
receivership inspires this inroad. This may be symptomatic of a recognition that 
there should exist a discrete body of receivership law, untrarnmelled by strict 
proprietary or contractual construction and tailored instead to reaching a solution 
that acknowledges the several interests at stake and reconciles them in a measured 
and thoughtful manner. If so, it is to be welcomed. 
4.1 The briazing otproceedings: an exception to divestment theory? 
A receiver has power "... to bring or defend any action or other legal proceedings in 
the name and on behalf of the company"". Outside of receivership, so do the board 
of directors. The question of whether the board, against the wishes of the receiver, 
may sue on behalf of the company has given rise to a cluster of cases at least two of 
which can only be rather contrivedly reconciled. 
" Although the company might suppress the officious bystander not so much with a testy 'Oh, of 
course' as with a resigned 'Oh, well, I suppose so'. 
" IA Schedule 1, item 5. 
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The starting point in the UK is Newhart Developments Ltd v Co-operative 
Commercial Bank Ltd35. In that case the plaintiff company sought to pursue the 
debenture-holder bank, which had already appointed a receiver, for an alleged 
breach of contract. The receiver had chosen to ignore the cause of action", and it 
was argued that the company's writ should be set aside as issued without the 
receiver's consent. In the Court of Appeal, Shaw LJ held that the directors remained 
at liberty to bring proceedings in the name of the company, notwithstanding that a 
similar power could be exercised by the receiver. He pointed out that: 
"... the provisions of the debenture trust deed giving him that power is an enabling 
provision which invests him with the capacity to bring an action in the name of the 
company. It does not divest the directors of the company of their power, as the 
governing body of the company, of instituting proceedings in a situation where doing 
so does not in any way impinge prejudicially upon the position of the debenture- 
holders by threatening or imperilling the assets which are subject to the charge. "" 
The directors in question had agreed to indemnify the company against liability for 
a hostile costs order against it, thus such an award would not have to be met out of 
the charged assets and so those assets would not be 'threatened or imperilled'. 
The decision is of interest for a number of reasons. First, Shaw U noted in passing 
that the appointment of a liquidator has the statutory effect of curtailing the powers 
of the directors, whereas the appointment of a receiver does not. He did not explore 
the possibility that such a result could be achieved contractually or as a matter of 
property law. Secondly, Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whinney" was relied on in 
35 [ 1978] 2 WLR 63 6. 
3' Hardly surprisingly. 
37 [ 197812 WLR 6356,641 (italics added). 
39 Supra n 14. 
100 
support of the proposition that not all of the directors' powers are in abeyance 
during receivership". As suggested earlier, a decision relating to the effects of a 
court-appointed receiver should not automatically be treated as authoritative as far 
as privately appointed receivers are concerned. Thirdly, the fact that the cause of 
action in question would have been caught by the debenture-holder's charge was 
not adverted to. Finally, Shaw LJ acknowledged that the directors were not in a 
position to "dispose of assets within the debenture charge without the assent or 
concurrence of the receiver... "". 
diametrically opposed view of this matter was taken in Imperial Hotel 
(Aberdeen) Lid v Vaux Breweries Ltd" on similar facts, except that the proceedings 
in question were purported to be brought against a third party. Lord Grieve, having 
stated that "in England the directors powers are in abeyance during the 
receivership"", referred to the Floating Charges and Receivers (Scotland) Act 1972 
and continued: 
"It would be quite contrary to the object of the Act if a company, all of whose assets 
were attached to the receiver because all were covered by a floating charge or floating 
charges, could interfere, through its directors, with the exercise by the receiver of his 
discretion by, for instance, raising actions that the receiver did not consider should be 
raised. " 
This dichotomy of approach has been noted by Campbell" and Wilson", the former 
" See also Doyle, Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice (1995 : FT Law & Tax 
London), 262 (hereinafter Doyle). 
" [1978] 2 WLR 636,642. 
41 [1978] SLT 113. 
42 Ibid. 115. 
43 Ibid. 116. 
44 Powers of Directors and Receivers (1979) 129 NLJ 26 1. 
4' Receivers (Scotland) [1979] JBL 61. 
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preferring the thinking of the Court of Appeal: 
"The test of whether the proposed action of the directors could harm the charge 
holders as such in any given case seems to be a fair one. It attaches due importance to 
the security of the charge holder and yet recognises that the board of directors is still 
in existence and still owes duties to the members and other creditors of the 
company. "" 
Newhart has since been preferred in Scotland in Shanks v Central Regional 
CounciP', where Lord Weir noted, as had Shaw LJ, that the company's directors 
continued to owe duties to the company during receivership and that it might 
therefore be "appropriate or even necessary" for them to institute proceedings in 
such circumstances". Further, the 1972 Act did not preclude this conclusion, as had 
been assumed to be the case in Imperial Hotel (Aberdeen) Ltd. Finally, his 
Lordship, whilst accepting that the views expressed by Lord Grieve in that case 
might be "applicable to most situations", was of the opinion that they were not 
universally sound. Instead a more searching enquiry on a case-by-case basis should 
be conducted" 
The Commonwealth courts were some way ahead of their UK counterparts on this 
question, the matter first being addressed in Hawkesbury Development Co Ltd v 
Landmark Finance Pty LOO. Street J was called upon to decide whether the 
directors of the company could bring proceedings to challenge the security under 
which a receiver had been appointed, and had this to say: 
46 (1979) 129 NLJ, 262. 
47 [ 19871 SLT 4 10. 
49 Ibid. 413. 
49 Ibid. 
5' [ 196912 NSWR 782. 
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"[Receivership] does not permeate the company's internal domestic structure. That 
structure continues to exist notwithstanding that the directors no longer have authority tD t, 
to exercise their ordinary business management functions. A valid receivership and 
management will ordinarily supersede, but not destroy, the company's own organs 
through which it conducts its affairs. The capacity of those organs to function bears an :D 
inverse relationship to the validity and scope of the receivership and management. "" 
The emphasis here seems distinct from that seen in Newharl. It concedes that a 
central issue is the validity of the appointment. To the extent that it is valid, and to 
the extent that the receiver is given powers of management, then the directors' 
powers are to some degree suspended, and the fuller the receiver's powers the more 
extensive that suspension. This is entirely in accord with the proprietary/contractual 
analysis set out earlier. Newhart, however, was approved in Paramount Acceptance 
Co Ltd v Souster 52 
, 
where the validity of the debenture contract was relegated to the 
status of "a further consideration"53 
, 
although Davison CJ was clear that: 
"... the company must have the right, independently of the receiver, to take such action 
as it thinks fit on all matters in dispute in respect of the alleged contract with the 
debenture-holder. , 54 
Newhart has since come under overt attack in Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd v 
Citibank NA", the facts of which were on all fours with it, except that no offer was 
made to indemnify the company against costs. Browne-Wilkinson J pointed out that 
the causes of action in issue were caught by the bank's charges, that the receivers 
"[ 196912 NSWR 782,790. 
'2 [1981] 2 NZLR 38. 
53 Ibid. 43. 
" Ibid. (italics added). This seems to go to the validity of the contract in question, rather than its 
purported breach by the debenture-holder, as considered in Newhart. 
55 [1992] Ch 53. 
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had the right to bring proceedings based on those causes of action and, therefore, 
that: 
"... it is 
... 
surprising if the directors 
... 
also have power to bring proceedings to 
enforce such causes of action 
... 
I have substantial doubts whether the Newhart case 
was correctly decided in any event. That may have to be looked at again in the future. 
The decision seems to ignore the difficulty which arises if two different sets of people, 
the directors and the receivers, who may have widely differing views and interests, 
both have power to bring proceedings on the same cause of action. The position is 
exacerbated where, as here, the persons who have been sued by the directors bring a 
counterclaim against the company. Who is to have the conduct of that counterclaim 
which directly attacks the property of the company? "" 
Browne-Wilkinson VC was patently anxious to avoid applying Newhart and 
mustered sufficient distinguishing factors to do just that. His emphasis on the 
absence of any indemnity against costs seems legitimate, and he is clearly correct in 
stating that the indemnity in the Newhart case was a matter which "impressed" the 
Court of Appeal. His observation that the Court was equally impressed by the 
receiver's "invidious" position in having to decide whether or not to sue his 
appointor is less convincing. It merited a brief mention in the judgment of 
Stephenson LP' and appeared not to trouble Shaw U in the slightest. Moreover, it 
overstates the case to suggest that this dilemma is solved by recourse to s 35 
Insolvency Act, since, as Goode points out, the receiver cannot be compelled to 
seek directions from the court" and so may neutralise any potential embarrassment 
by simply ignoring the cause of action". 
" [1992] Ch 53,63 
57 [1978] 2 WLR 636,643-644. 
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, supra n 7,232. 
See also Lascomme Ltd v United Dominions Trust [ 199313 IR 412. 
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The most recent word on this issue comes from the Irish High Court. In Lascomine 
Ltd v United Donfinions Trust" Keane J approved Neivhart and distinguished Tudor 
Grange, once again on the indemnity point. He relied on the unreported decision of 
Wymes v CrowlejP' for the proposition that: 
- 
"... when a receiver is appointed by a debenture-holder under the powers in that behalf 
in the debenture, the powers vested by law in the directors of the company are not 
thereby terminated. They may not, however, be exercised in such a manner as to 
inhibit the receiver in dealing with and disposing of the assets charged by the 
debenture or in a manner which would adversely affect the position of the debenture- 
holder by threatening or imperilling the assets which are subject to the charge. Subject 
to that important qualification, the powers vested by law in the directors remain 
exercisable by them and include the power to maintain and institute proceedings in the 
name of the company where to do so would be in the interests of the company or its 
creditors. "" 
Given the existence of an indemnity, no charged assets would be threatened or 
imperilled. 
The above cases may be technically distinguishable but, it is suggested, reveal a 
fundamental difference of opinion between courts as to the effect of the 
appointment of a receiver on the directors' powers to bring actions in the 
company's name. Commentators, too, disagree. Doyle prefers the Newharl 
approach, and in doing so rejects the notion that the problem is resolved via the 
contractual or proprietary route: 
"... the real question in issue appears not to be whether a right of action is subject to C, 
[ 1993] 3 IR 412. 
High Court, 27 February, 1987. 
62 [ 199313 1R 412,416-417. 
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any particular security interests but, rather, whether that right of action is exercisable I 
by the company with or without the interference or consent of the administrative 
receiver. "" 
The critical factor, he propounds, is prejudice to the charged property should the 
action be brought, and any such threat will usually be offset by the indemnification 
of the company against costs. In answer to Browne Wilkinson VC's rhetorical 
question in the Tudor Grange case as to who would have the conduct of any 
counterclaim, he points out, correctly it is submitted, that this difficulty is less real 
than imagined and that the only practical candidate is the debenture-holder. 
Goode similarly favours this approach, considering that the Newhart decision is 
ý64 
"clearly correct' 
. 
Picarda, writing before the Tudor Grange decision, is more 
cautious, noting that the absence of prejudice to the debenture-holders was "crucial" 
in Newhart and admonishing that the existence of prejudice or otherwise may be a 
matter of contention between receiver and directors". Lightman and Moss, on the 
other hand, advance a more juristically orthodox view, proposing that: 
"... the relevant relationship is not between the directors and the company and the 
receiver and the company, but between the rights of the company and the debenture 
holder respectively or mortgagor and mortgagee of the relevant chose in action. After zn 
the assignment has been effected by the charge, the assignee alone can seek to enforce 
the assigned right. Accordingly in respect of any cause of action charged to the 
debenture-holder, only the debenture-holder can sue. "" 
"Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 39,264; see also The Residual Status 
ofDirectors in Receivership (1996) 17 Co Law 131,136-137. 
Supra n 7,232. 
The Law Relating to Receivers, Managers and Administrators 2nd ed. (1990 : Butterworths. 
London)89. 
66 The Law of Receivers of Companies 2nd ed (1994: Sweet & Maxwell: London), para. 2-08, 
(hereinafter Lightman and Moss). 
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This appears indisputable in strict property law terms, but, it is submitted, it fails to 
acknowledge those considerations which inspired the Court of Appeal in Newhart 
to reach a decision which, whilst not technically impeccable, was legitimate in 
spirit. The following sections consider how far that decision can, and should be 
taken if receivership law in this area is to develop with due regard to its especial 
circumstances. 
4.1.1 The limits of co-extensive power: actions between company and debenture- 
holder 
It is suggested that two different situations should be considered in this regard. 
First, where the company, through its directors, wishes to sue in order to challenge 
the validity of the debenture under which the receiver is appointed, then no question 
as to its ability to do so should arise. To allow the debenture-holder to point to a 
purported equitable assignment of a chose in action that could only take place under 
a valid charge would be permitting him to pull himself up by his own bootstraps. 
Secondly, where, as in Newhart and Tudor Grange, the cause of action is against 
the debenture-holder, again it is suggested that proceedings by the company are 
properly admitted. This is so notwithstanding that the chose in action is caught by 
the charge. To deny the company any redress in such circumstances would foster 
substantial injustice. For instance, the very institution of receivership blocks off one 
potential route to recovery for the company, that of equitable set-off. Precisely 
because the debenture-holder can enforce his security via an appointment, and need 
not sue for the debt, the ability to impeach his claim is lost. This result supervenes, 
it would seem, even with regard to insolvency set-off, which only operates 
"between the company and any creditor of the company proving or claiming to 
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prove for a debt in liquidation"". Again, it seems arguable that the ability to enforce 
the debenture-holder's claim via receivership, and so without having to prove 68 
, 
excludes the operation of a rule that is intended to effect justice between debtor and 
creditor. 
Further, should the directors be unable to pursue any such claim, value which may 
have accrued for the benefit of other creditors will be lost. If liquidation follows 
receivership, and the claim remains an asset of the company, there is no guarantee 
that the liquidator will have the funds or the inclination to exploit it. The scarcity of 
'fighting funds' in liquidation is well documented, and the hazards of litigation 
might dissuade any liquidator from pursuing a potentially successful suit. 
Receivership, then, provides the debenture-holder with not so much a windfall as a 
windbreak, in that he may be able to escape the consequences of a breach of 
contract. The fact that any damages awarded to the company could be claimed by 
the receiver for the benefit of the debenture-holder has been, rightly it is submitted, 
dismissed by the courts as a red herring. The effect of such an award is simply to 
achieve a sort of defacto set-off, so that there is no 'circular' transfer of money, and 
the exercise is far from academic. 
A further advantage of this approach is that it frees the receiver from the impossible 
situation of having to weigh the interests of the company and his appointor in 
deciding whether to exploit a right of action against the latter. This is not a 
judgment the receiver ought to be called upon to make. Whilst his duty is towards 
the debenture-holder qua debenture-holder only, so that, technically, no conflict 
" Insolvency Rules 1986, Rule 4.90 (italics added). 
68 Except to the extent that the security is insufficient to meet the debenture-holder's claim. 
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arises, the reality must be that most receivers would consider the positive 
exploitation of a suit against the very person who appointed them unthinkable. By 
allowing the directors to bring the action in the name of the company, and without 
reference to the receiver's wishes, this dilemma is resolved. 
4.1.2 Actions against third parties 
It is suggested that two separate situations should be considered, the first being 
where the cause of action is against the receiver himself. It was decided in Watts v 
Midland Bank9 that an argument that a derivative action under the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle" would be allowed as against a receiver was misconceived 
- 
the company 
itself was able to sue: 
"... 1 can see no reason in principle why the court should not allow the company to sue 
the receiver in respect of an improper exercise of his powers. "" 
One reason is that identified by Lightman and Moss, namely that the cause of action 
against the receiver will, as after-acquired property, be caught by the debenture- 
holder's fixed or floating charge", and the fact that the action is against the receiver 
ought not to make a difference. Again, were the courts to take a rigidly technical 
view of the matter it would seem that the company in such circumstances would be 
left without a remedy no matter how flagrant the wrong. In Watts, Peter Gibson J 
took a vigorously pragmatic approach and concluded: 
"... [it is] common sense that there must be some redress obtainable by a company in 
receivership against a receiver who acts improperly and in breach of his duties to the 
[19861 BCLC 15. 
(1843) 2 Hare 46 1. 
[1986] BCLC 15,22, per Peter Gibson J. 
N. W. Robbie & Co v Witney Warehouse Co [1963] 3 All ER 6 13 ); Ferrier v Bottomer (1972) 
126 CLR 597. 
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company to the detriment of the company. It is also common ground that the 
liquidator of a company in receivership can sue the receiver. Why should a company 
in receivership have to go into liquidation before the receiver could be sued by the 
company? "" 
Returning to the Newhart question, one might also ask why a company in 
receivership should have to go into liquidation before the appointor could be sued. 
The considerations are the same, and there is no reason to take an overly protective 
attitude to either potential defendant. 
Different factors enter the equation when it is sought to sue third parties other than 
the receiver. Here the fears of Browne Wilkinson VC in Tudor Grange appear 
justified, namely that to admit of a right of action capable of exploitation by parties 
with, potentially, conflicting interests may lead to an indirect disordering of the 
receivership. A receiver may wish to eschew a particular cause of action in order to 
maintain a good trading relationship with the potential defendant. The directors of 
the company might not be so constrained. In these circumstances it is appropriate 
that the receiver's commercial judgment should prevail and that he should be able 
to prevent the directors from pursuing the third party. 
The receiver might, however, choose inactivity for other than purely commercial 
reasons. For example, the debenture-holder might prefer the action not to go ahead 
because of its relationship with the third party, and might prevail upon the receiver 
to remain passive. If this is the case it is arguable that he breaches his duty of good 
faith 74 
. 
Whilst the receiver is entitled, and, indeed, duty bound, to prefer the 
interests of the debenture-holder, this should only hold true to the extent those 
73 [19861 BCLC 15,22. 
7' That duty being discussed fully infra, 158. 
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interests are represented by and relate to the secured assets of the company. In other 
words, the receiver can prioritise the claims of the debenture-holder, but only qua 
debenture-holder. The wider interests of the debenture-holder as, say, banker, are 
outside the scope of the receiver's protectionist role, and to prioritise them by 
preventing the directors from bringing an action in the name of the company would 
confer upon the debenture-holder an unbargained for and unwarranted advantage. 
This is really no more than an echo of the sentiments expressed in Newhart. The 
criterion for assessing whether proceedings may be instituted by the company's 
directors should be the effect upon the security that such a course might have. Thus, 
if there is in place a sufficient indemnity against all costs that might be incurred, the 
secured assets are safe from attack and the directors cannot be said to be speculating 
at the debenture-holder's risk. Where the security might be devalued other than by 
an award of costs, as, for example, where the action would have a detrimental 
outcome on goodwill, it should be open to receiver or debenture-holder to restrain 
proceedings, with the onus being on the directors to show no Potential prejudice to 
the debenture-holder in that capacity. This may involve the courts in a more 
involved investigation than the 'all or nothing' approach advocated by Tudor 
Grange, but, it is submitted, is unlikely to give rise to a plethora of litigious 
directors. The requirement of indemnification should provide an adequate safeguard 
against vexatious proceedings". 
Further, this blueprint is eminently even-handed, upholding the interests of the 
" Although note the views of the Cork Committee that the practice of requiring security to be 
given by directors is overly burdensome and should be replaced by an application to the Court 
for directions as to costs: Insolvency Law and Practice : Report of the Review Committee, Cmnd 
8558 (1982 : HMSO : London), para. 1730 (hereinafter the Cork Report). 
ill 
company (and, perhaps, its other creditors) in those circumstances where the 
ruthless advancement of the debenture-holder would be ungrounded in principle. 
Finally, the benefits in terms of costs should be taken into account. Litigation is 
notoriously expensive, and receivers' time likewise. If the conduct of an action is 
left with the directors at least the latter are saved, and these may have amounted to a 
substantial sum which would have fallen to have been paid ahead of debenture- 
holder, preferential creditors and unsecured creditors. Such a bonus should not be 
dismissed lightly. 
4.2 The position of the directors 
In Newhart Shaw LJ considered directors to be under a positive duty to exploit 
'assets' disregarded by the receiver: 
"Indeed, in my view, it would be incumbent on them to do so, because 
notwithstanding that the debenture-holders have got the right to be satisfied out of the 
assets subject to the charge, other creditors are entitled to expect that those concerned 
with the management of the company should exercise their best efforts to ensure that, 
when the time comes, they too will find themselves in the position that there is a fund 
available to pay them, if not in full, at least something of what they are owed. "" 
This might appear unduly burdensome on directors. Given the conflicting case law 
in this area, they might reasonably take the view that they are effectively disabled 
during receivership, or at best only able to act with the receiver's sanction. To 
expect a proactive stance is somewhat stringent, particularly when the directors will 
know that it is within the receiver's power to dismiss them. 
The courts may, of course, take a realistic view of the impediments under which 
76 [ 1978] 2 WLR 636,642. 
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directors operate during receivership and so not be too hasty in upholding 
allegations of breach of duty. Certainly in Re Joshua Shaw and Sons Ltd Hoffmann 
J had this to say: 
I do not think that it is seriously arguable that in a case in which the management of 
the company's assets has been taken out of the hands of the directors by the 
appointment of a receiver, the directors' -residual powers create a duty on their part to 
the creditors to ensure that a resolution for a winding up is passed in sufficient time to 
prevent the claims of some or all of those creditors from becoming statute-barred. "" 
This case concerned a very precise point, but it is feasible that the approach of the 
learned judge might be adopted in relation to the directors' residual powers over 
those assets of the company that the receiver has chosen not to take advantage of. 
Finally, as far as the directors' statutory duties are concerned, whilst these appear to 
continue in force during receivership and the directors remain under a duty to 
prepare accounts and a directors' report and to lay each before the company, and to 
deliver copies of each to the Registrar of Companies", the provisions in question 
allow of defences against default. Further, the directors may require from the 
receiver the necessary information to enable them to discharge these duties'9. What 
steps the directors need take to avail themselves of the statutory defences is 
obscure, and Doyle propounds a solution similar to that which supervenes on 
administration, namely a computer 'stop' at Companies House on the pursuit of 
defaults'o. 
77 (1989) 5 BCC 188,190. 
78 Companies Act 1985, ss 226,234,241 and 242. 
7' Gomba Holdings v Homan [1986] 1 All ER 94. They cannot demand that he disgorge the 
funds to ensure compliance though. 
" The Residual Status of Directors in Receivership, supra n 70,13 1. See also the Cork Report, 
supra n 75, for an alternative recommendation that was not enacted in the IA. 
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5. The End Result 
- 
Vulnerability 
The above exposition illustrates the extent to which the company is divested of the 
power to manage its own affairs on the appointment of a receiver. The courts have 
consistently emphasised this point: the receiver has been variously described as 
exercising "supervision and control of the way in which the company's business is 
run"81 
, 
and as "the complete master of the affairs of the company"". Thus an entity 
which has previously been governed on a co-operative and delegatory basis by a 
hierarchical command structure is suddenly under the sole direction of a single" 
independent contractor who has assumed this potentate position in order to marshal 
its entire value for the benefit of a single creditor. 
To mechanically repeat the mantra that the company has contractually agreed to this 
upheaval is all very well and good, but it must nonetheless come as a considerable 
trauma to its various stakeholders to discover the factual extent to which the 
company finds itself at the mercy of its receiver. Moreover, there are participants 
standing outside the immediate contractual nexus who are in an equally precarious 
position, and whose welfare is therefore threatened by an approach that is overly- 
solicitous of the debenture-holder's interests. Their position is considered in the 
next Chapter. For the present, further aspects of the tripartite relationship should be 
examined. 
"Griffiths v Secretary ofStatefor Social Services [1973] 3 All ER 1184,1199, per Lawson J. 
" Meigh v Wickenden [1942] 2 KB 160,168, per Viscount Caldecote CJ. 
83 Unless the appointment is ajoint one. 
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Receiver and Debenture-holder 
. 
1. Ensuring Independence of Action 
In assessing the practical effect of receivership on a company, one is struck by the 
impotence of that company once the receiver is in office. To a certain extent the 
same is true of the debenture-holder appointor, although his plight is nowhere near 
as pronounced. Receivership affects the appointor's jurisdiction in relation to the 
assets over which the appointment is made. By making an appointment the 
debenture-holder is, in effect surrendering his own opportunity to gain ascendancy 
over them and trusting a third party to make the best possible use of them, albeit for 
his benefit. This abdication is made complete by s 45 Insolvency Act 1986, which 
alters the pre-existing law in that it removes the debenture-holder's ability to 
remove his appointee". Such an innovation was seen as desirable by the Cork 
Committee: 
"In order to strengthen the independence of the receiver we consider that the present 
rule whereby a receiver may be removed without notice by the holder of the charge 
should be amended. We recommend that such removal should be only by the Court on 
cause shown. "" 
In this respect there is, perhaps ironically, an analogy between company and 
appointor in that both lose their control (although the latter's is inchoate) over the 
charged assets upon receivership. The manner of the receiver's performance of his 
function has some bearing on the economic well-being of the debenture-holder and 
is in many cases decisive of the future of the company. For the debenture-holder, 
" The section only applies to administrative receivers. An LPA receiver may still be dismissed 
by his appointor if provision for such is made in the debenture. 
" Supra n 75, para. 492. 
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though, this loss of control is a satisfactory trade-off for the privileges receivership 
offers. The debenture-holder is cushioned against the (allegedly) apocalyptic 
consequences of being a mortgagee in possession, and may rest assured that the 
estate in question is being administered for his benefit by an individual who has 
undergone rigorous training. Moreover, if his trust turns out to be misplaced, he 
may comfort himself with the knowledge that he has available to him an arsenal of 
remedies disproportionate (in comparison with the position of the company) to the 
degree of autonomy he has relinquished. 
2. The trade-off upheld: Amex v Hurle 
Legally, receivership presents few dangers for the appointor, but a potential pitfall 
was identified inAmerican Express International Banking Corp. v Hurley". In that 
case Mann J, recalling a similar sentiment of Lord Denning in Standard Chartered 
Bank Ltd v Walker", stated the law in the following terms: 
"The mortgagee is not responsible for what a receiver does whilst he is the 
mortgagor's agent, unless the mortgagee directs or interferes with the receiver's 
activities. "" 
The jurisprudential basis of this assertion is a little shadowy. Mann J was entitled to 
follow Lord Denning's dicta, but that judge's declaration was characteristically 
capacious and, on this occasion, unsupported by authority. Earlier case law 
establishes that the receiver may become the- agent of his appointor on the winding 
up of the company. The effect of a winding up is to deprive the company of its 
96 [ 1985] 3 All ER 564. 
87 [1982] 3 All ER 938,942. 
"Supra n 86,5 7 1. 
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capacity to carry on its business, and it is a well-established canon of agency law 
that a principal may not confer a greater authority upon his agent than he himself 
possesses". 
Thus, the receiver's agency for the compqny. ceases upon its winding up, whether 
compulsory" or voluntary9l, although his in rem powers remain operative'. The 
cessation of that agency, however, does not automatically constitute the receiver 
agent for his appointor", and unless the debenture-holder proceeds to treat the 
receiver as his agent then the receiver, to the extent that he continues to exercise 
personal powers, does so as principal". 
It appears that some positive act on the part of the debenture-holder is required in 
order to defeat a seemingly rebuttable presumption that, on winding up, the receiver 
may only continue to exercise personal powers as principal. In Hurley the fact that 
receiver and bank were in constant communication and that the former sought the 
latter's approval before taking action were held to be sufficient to constitute the 
receiver agent of the appointor bank. This is roughly reconcilable with general 
agency law, although it cannot be seriously suggested that the bank held the 
receiver out as its agent. The mere fact of the receiver continuing to act cannot 
constitute a 'holding out', otherwise every winding up would result in an 
appointee/appointor agency relationship, which has been expressly held not to be 
Drew v Nunn (1879) 4 QBD 66 1. 
Gosling v Gaskell [ 1897] AC 575. 
9' Thomas v Todd [ 1926] 2 KB 511. 
" Sowman v David Samuel Trust Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 616. On the effect of winding up 
generally, see Goode, supra n 7,261-263; Doyle, supra n 39,234-235; Lightman and Moss, 
supra n 66, Chapter 11. 
" In Re Wood's Application [1941) Ch 112; American Express v Hurley, supra n 86; Cf In re S 
Brown & Co (General Warehousemen) Ltd[ 1940] 1 Ch. 96 1. 
9' American Express v Hurley, supra n 86,568. 
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the case. Nor does the agency in question arise out of an express contract, so we are 
thrown back onto a process of implication, the hypothesis being that both par-ties 
impliedly consent to the relationship of agency arising between them. This consent 
can only be inferred from something tangible, and here it appears to be the giving 
and taking of instructions, or the entering into of close communication, and such 
might be interpreted as the conferring of an authority on the receiver to act on 
behaýf ofthe debenture-holder. 
Outside of winding up, the proposition in Hurley that a debenture-holder might be 
held responsible for the receiver's activities is on shakier ground, to the extent that 
it is based on an alleged agency relationship between debenture-holder and receiver. 
It might be thought that Mann J was asserting only the narrower conception that 
such responsibility arises outside of any formal relationship, and, indeed, this seems 
to be the position taken by Lord Denning in Standard Chartered Bank v Walker 
when he stated: 
"The debenture-holder, the bank, is not responsible for what the receiver does except 
in so far as it gives him directions or interferes with his conduct of the realisation. If it 
does so, then it too is under a duty to use reasonable care towards the company and 
the guarantor. " 
His Lordship, it is submitted, based this assertion on the burgeoning principles of 
tortious liability prevalent at that time, rather than on an agency relationship 
between debenture-holder and receiver, spawned by 'directions and interference' 
and giving rise to the appointor/principal's vicarious liability for the acts of his 
agent. The relevance of such directions and interference would be to constitute a 
" Supra n 87,942. 
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relationship of proximity between debenture-holder and company (or guarantor), so 
that the liability of the former would be direct rather than vicarious. The 
relationship between debenture-holder and receiver (or non-relationship to be 
precise) remains unaffected. 
Mann J, in Hurley, appeared to prefer the vicarious route to liability: 
I add that when a receiver is in breach of his duty of care to the guarantor whilst 
acting as agent of the mortgagee, then, in so far as the mortgagee is liable to tile 
guarantor and in the absence of any express exclusion in the contract of agency, the 
mortgagee would be entitled to an indemnity from the receiver under an implied term 
of the agency agreement. "" 
That an agent impliedly indemnifies his principal against the consequences of his 
own negligence is a well established principle of agency law and unexceptional. 
What is ipiclear is, whether Mann J was confining his remarks to the post 
liquidation situation or intended them to be of wider application, so that an implied 
agency can arise during the pre-liquidation period by the giving of instructions and 
directions". The tenor of the latter part of his judgment indicates that he considered 
this to be the law, and most commentators have interpreted the case as supportive of 
such a contention. Thus Goode writes that: 
"The debenture-holder is not entitled to instruct the receiver in the performance of his 
duties; indeed, it is dangerous to attempt to do so, for the receiver will then become 
the defacto, agent of the debenture-holder... "" 
96 Supra n 86,571 (italics added). 
" In Hurley liquidation had in fact intervened. Moreover, the appointor had virtually conceded 
that the receiver in question had become its agent. 
Supra n 7,266 (italics added). See, to similar effect, Lightman and Moss, supra n 66, para. 8- 
11. 
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Whilst the creation of such an agency is tenable after winding up, the notion is 
problematic during the subsistence of the receiver's agency with the company. That 
very agency is intended to thwart a similar relationship arising between appointor 
and appointee, and, as noted in the previous Chapter, the courts have been perfectly 
amenable to allowing it that effect. The notion that the bank, in giving instructions 
to its receiver, impliedly consents to him becoming its agent is difficult to sustain in 
the face of the express terms of the contract between bank and company. To put it 
another way, is it conceptually possible for an agent to have concurrently identical 
authority over identical property emanating from two different principals, and, if 
not, who is the genuine principal? Surely that identified contractually? 
This is an instance of the courts having regard to the substance of the tripartite 
relationship, and, it is submitted, represents a rule of receivership law that operates 
independently of the underlying ageney. Hurley personifies a healthy dose of 
realism in that it illustrates that the agency device is not impenetrable and that the 
debenture-holder can take it a step too far. By assuming to control his appointee he 
abuses an advantage which, whilst it will for the most part be upheld, is not 
unassailable and will be closely scrutinised by the courts should the circumstances 
so warrant. 
This seems justifiable on several counts. First, and especially following the Cork 
Report, it is clear that a premium is placed on the independence of receivers, their 
freedom of action and decision being seen as socially desirable. To the extent that 
Hurley facilitates such freedom it anticipates the Insolvency Act itself Secondly, it 
emphatically elevates substance over form. A debenture-holder meddling in the 
conduct of the receivership is a de facto mortgagee in possession and should be 
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treated in law as such. Thirdly it promotes a balance between dcbenture-holder and 
company. One trade-off for the validity of the agency device is control, and should 
that control be reasserted by the simple expediency of treating the receiver as a 
ministerial agent without autonomy then the agency's protective mantle should be 
withdrawn. Baldly stated, the debenture-holder cannot expect to have his cake and 
eat it. 
In policy terms Hurley is a consummate decision, acknowledging the singular 
circumstances of receivership and fashioning a model that does substantial justice 
to all parties to the tripartite relationship. It is, however, unsupported by authority. 
Indeed, authority to the opposite effect exists, as evinced by dictum of Latham CJ, 
in the High Court of Australia in Visbord v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation: 
"In my opinion the fact that the mortgagee assumed to give directions to the receiver 
could not affect the fact that the receiver was the agent of the mortgagor or the legal 
consequences of that fact. "" 
That a contemporary court would prefer the Hurley approach is not a foregone 
conclusion"O, although given the emphasis of the Cork Committee and the 
subsequent Insolvency Act on the value of the receiver's independence such a result 
might be tentatively predicted. Hurley was, however, either overlooked or ignored 
in the Scottish case of Inverness District Council v Highland Universal 
Fabrications Ltd"'. In that case Lord Murray, whilst concluding that the statutory 
agency of a debenture-holder's receiver is rebuttable, did not see fit to hold it 
(1943) 68 CLR 354,370. 
Although see National Bank oý Greece v Pinios [1990] 1 AC 637 which might provide C) implicit support for the Hurley principle (active intervention on the part of the debenture-holder 
might attract liability for a receiver's default, 648 -649, per Lloyd LJ). 
"' 1986 SLT 556. 
121 
rebutted by documentary evidence that the receiver had consistently requested and 
acted upon his appointor's instructions. The issue in question was whether the 
receiver was personally liable for rent due from the company to the plaintiff 
Council, and the potential liability of the debenture-holder was not argued, nor was 
Hurley cited. 
A puzzle raised by Hurley is the precise nature of the inter-meddling said to 
constitute a receiver his debenture-holder's agent. In Hurley itself the fact of 
constant communication between the two parties and the receiver's seeking of 
approval for his actions was held to be sufficient in the face of a concession by the 
debenture-holder. This, however, falls some way short of the giving of directions or 
interference referred to later in the judgment, so some doubt must exist as to when a 
debenture-holder will cross the line between merely taking an interest in the 
receivership's progress and actively encroaching upon the receiver's legitimate 
territory"' 
Too prescriptive an approach in this regard might in fact be damaging to the 
interests of all parties. Consultation between receiver and debenture-holder will in 
some circumstances prove extremely valuable to the company's chances of survival 
(or at least to a more profitable realisation of the assets). Certainly receivers should 
be in a position to approach the latter with a view to obtaining overdraft facilities 
with which to continue trading, and debenture-holders should be able to request and 
receive information without the threat of constituting the receiver their agent. It is a 
fact of commercial life that a close relationship exists between receiver and 
"I Alational Bank of Greece v Pinios, supra n 10 1, supports the view that active intervention is 
necessary. 
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appointor"', and the process of negotiation and discussion that inevitably takes 
place should not be lightly inhibited. Nothing short of an assumption of de facto 
control should be curbed. 
A further flaw in Hurley is that it fails to develop its own theme. What is the precise 
effect of the receiver becoming agent of the debenture-holder and to what extent 
does that agency operate? Does it relate only to those transactions in which the 
debenture-holder has interfered, or does interference per se reverse the presumption 
that the receiver is agent of the company and constitute him agent of the debenture- 
holder for the duration and entirety of the receivership? If, as has been propounded, 
the proper rationale for the Hurley approach is the debenture-holder's usurpation of 
control from the receiver, then it makes no sense to 'penalise' him beyond the ambit 
of his intervention. 
It has been acknowledged that a receiver may act as agent for the debenture-holder 
in relation to a part of the conduct of the receivership"', so there would seem to be 
no conceptual obstacle to treating the receiver as agent of the debenture-holder only 
in relation to those assets or transactions which the latter attempts to control. This 
would seem to be an appropriate response to the particular 'mischief the Hurley 
decision is aimed at. 
The final point concerning Hurley is that the principle may prove of narrow 
"' See, e. g., Iredale and Hughes, Tolley's Receivership Manual, 3rd ed (1987 : Tolleys 
London), 18-19,36 
-37. 
"' See Cretanor Maritime Co Ltd v Irish Marine Management Ltd [197811 WLR 966 (receiver 
could have been authorised to act on behalf of debenture-holder to apply for the lifting of a 
Mareva injunction); see also the approach of Houlden J to this effect in Peat Marwick Ltd v 
Consumers'Gas Co (1981) 113 DLR (3d) 754. 
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practical application from the enforcement point of view. The evidential burden 
being on an aggrieved company, it may be difficult to demonstrate any actual 
interference on the part of the debenture-holder. Whilst it may be the perceived 
wisdom that receiver and debenture-holder fraternise to a greater or lesser extent, 
establishing such conduct to the satisfaction of a court is likely to prove difficult. 
From the debenture-holder's perspective forewarned is forearmed, and he is 
unlikely, after Hurley, to commit any instructions he might wish to give to paper. 
3. The receiver ascendant and the law's response 
From the foregoing discussion it should be apparent that a distinctive feature of 
receivership is that it creates a certain vulnerability in both company and debenture- 
holder. Whilst the incapacity of the former is prodigious in comparison to that of 
the latter, it is submitted that it is this fundamental handicap implicit in receivership 
which elicits a legal response to the enormity of the receiver's practical powers. 
One method of restraining an unwarranted use of power, of illustrious vintage, is 
the imposition of concomitant duties. This is traditionally the response of equity to 
the pragmatism of the common law, and is most conspicuous in relation to the 
institution of the trust. The employment of the fiduciary obligation as a means of 
curbing power operates in a similar manner. 
One might expect to find that the greater the disadvantage engendered, the more 
stringent the duties owed, but in receivership this turns out to be a mistaken 
assumption and, indeed, the converse appears to be true. The following section 
attempts to illustrate how this surprising state of affairs has come about and to 
assess whether the current legal position is justifiable from both a jurisprudential 
and a political perspective. 
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The Duly Configuration Within the Tripartit Rclationship 
1. Introduction: Sources of obliization 
Within any given relationship the duties incumbent upon the parties may derive 
from different roots. They may be contractual, devised by the parties themselves, or 
they may be imposed by law, as, for example, the duty of care in the tort of 
negligence, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, or other duties which transpire from the 
receipt of a specific status. Statute, too, may prescribe a particular duty or 
obligation. Where the receiver is concerned, he is given a task, that of dealing with 
the charged property of the company in order to discharge the debt owed to the 
debenture-holder. He is given powers to facilitate this task, and such powers are 
accompanied by the imposition of duties. 
Whilst there is perfect identity between company and debenture-holder over what 
the receiver is to do (his task) the manner in which he is to carry it out (roughly 
speaking, his duty) diffirs starkly in relation to each. The origins and the content of 
this 'duty' are diverse and individual to both parties, but this is not to say that a 
schism exists. Quite the contrary, the law's scheme has been to consider the 
tripartite relationship and its aim, and to extrapolate from that a composite edifice 
of 'duty' which most effectively promotes that aim. 
By examining separately the various constituents of each affiliation 
(receiver/company and receiver/debenture-holder) this symbiotic process is 
exposed, and its calibre can be evaluated. Most imperatively, one can discern the 
attitude of the courts to the competing and conflicting demands of company and 
debenture-holder on receiver: the congenital strife of the tripartite relationship 
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exacts a response from the law, a determination of which exigency is to be accorded 
priority if, as is frequently the case in receivership, reconciliation proves hopeless. 
2. Statutory obligations 
These are simply and shortly stated. By s 46(l) of the Insolvency Act 1986 an 
administrative receiver 'shall forthwith send to the company a notice of his 
appointment"". By s 48 he must send a report of certain matters, including the 
events leading up to his appointment, his plans for disposals or trading, amounts 
due to the debenture-holder and preferential creditors and the likelihood of any 
surplus, to the company's secured creditors"'. The Insolvency Rules 1986 provide 
that an administrative receiver shall, at certain points during his office, send an 
abstract of receipts and payments to both company and appointor"', that he shall 
give 7 days notice to each of his intention to resign"', and that he shall notify the 
company on his vacation of office"' 
This would seem to be the extent of the receiver's statutory duties to company and 
debenture-holder"O. They are really little more than tasks ancillary to the main goal, 
that of the discharge of the debt. Perhaps the most arresting feature of the 
legislation in this context is its silence on what is arguably the most pressing 
controversy of receivership, viz., the mode of the receiver's performance of his task. 
That is left entirely to other instruments of the legal process. 
There is no such provision in relation to non-administrative receivers. 
The section does not require the report to be sent to the company itself. 
Ru Ie3.32. 
Ru Ie3.33. 
Ru Ic3.35. 
Statutory duties to other parties are considered in the next Chapter. 
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3. The Equitable Dimension: Receiver as FiduciaKy? 
In the previous Chapter it was argued that the receiver's agency status lacks one of 
the most notable features of a pure agency relationship, that of its fiduciary 
character. And yet, as also noted, the cases and commentary continue to assert to a 
greater or lesser degree that the receiver occupies a fiduciary position, the origin 
and scope of which, however, remain perplexing. Two relationships are presently 
considered, and one or the other, although probably not both, might correctly be 
classified as fiduciary. Moreover, attributes or aspects of each relationship might or 
might not attract fiduciary burdens"'. Exactitude has proved to be an elusive goal in 
the fiduciary domain and in the tripartite relationship here in question it is no less 
simple to track down. 
3.1. Characteristics oýfiduciarv relationships 
The following does not attempt to dissect the notion of the fiduciary principle, but 
rather to take uncontroversial elements of it and apply them to the 
receiver/company/debenture-holder association. To this end, it is appropriate to 
start with the 'when' enquiry, that is to say when and in what circumstances have 
fiduciary obligations been held to arise within a particular relationship. The 
methodology of the courts in this respect has been a little haphazard, but one 
approach is to identify a certain quality of the relationship in question which will, 
most commonly in combination with other features, stamp the relationship as a 
fiduciary one. No effort is made here to evaluate the credibility or otherwise of this 
approach. Rather the aim is to take acknowledged aspects of fiduciary relationships 
New Zealand Netherlands Society 'Oranje'Inc. vKuys[197112 All ER 1222. 
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and to assess their prominence and relevance to the tripartite relationship. 
A common theme amongst the cases and literature is that of undertaking. Whenever 
one party undertakes to act in the interests of another he is said to assume a 
fiduciary responsibility towards that other. This is well expressed by Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson in White v Jones: 
"The paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find a fiduciary relationship 
is where one party, A, has assumed to act in relation to the property or affairs of 
another, B. A, having assumed responsibility, pro lanto, for B's affairs, is taken to 
have assumed certain duties in relation to the conduct of those affairs 
... 
thus a trustee 
assumes responsibility for the management of tile property of the beneficiary, a 
company director for the affairs of the company and an agent for those of his 
principal. By so assuming to act in B's affairs, A comes under fiduciary duties to 
B. "' 12 
The 'undertaking' basis for fiduciary responsibility seems a nod in the direction of 
the 'voluntary assumption of responsibility' ground for liability in tort"', but it 
exacts a far more stringent mode of performance. It is also of greater vintage, and 
has been posited as an appropriate basis for a fiduciary finding on a number of 
occasions"'. The undertaking in question need not be express, but may be implied 
... [1995] 2 AC 207,271 (italics added). One might question the extent to which this is at odds 
with the learned judge's statements in Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 (see the discussion in 
Chapter 1). 
... See, e. g., Hedley Byrne & Co v Holler & Partners [1964] AC 465 and, more recently, 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145. 
114 See Nocton v LordAshburton [1914] AC 932 
, 
969, per Lord Shaw; Woods v Martins Bank 
[19591 1 QB 55,72-73, per Salmon J; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp. 
(1984 
- 
1985) 156 CLR 41; Commonwealth Bank ofAusiralia v Smith (1991) 102 ALR 453. See 
also Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 124: Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules 
(1992 : HMSO : London), para. 2.4.6; Scott, The Fiduciary Principle (1949) 37 Calif. L. Rev. 
521,540; Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977: The Law Book Co : Sydney), 9; Sealy: The 
Fiduciary Relationship [ 1962] CLJ 73; Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in a 
Contemporary Common Law World (1994) 110 LQR 238,246 (emphasising also the 
vulnerability of the other party). 
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from the circumstances of the relationship, which suggests that the courts, if of the 
opinion that the justice of the case demands it, may proceed upon the basis that 
since the purported fiduciary ought to have assumed responsibility or given the 
necessary undertaking then, by implication, he did so. 
A second recognised characteristic of the fiduciary relationship is the transfer of 
power or discretion. When one party confers upon the other capacity to affect his 
legal or practical position that other is in possession of a fiduciary power and must 
exercise it accordingly. Again this circumstance has been conspicuous in case law 
and other writings"'. A third is vulnerability, although care must be taken in 
distinguishing between the vulnerability that results from a transfer of power, such 
as that described above, and that which is inherent in the relationship in question 
because of one party's dominion or influence over the other. This characteristic has 
also been widely promoted as a significant factor"'. 
Closely allied to the notions of a transfer of power or discretion and vulnerability is 
that of entrustment of property. The de facto ability to control the property of 
another brands the entrusted party a fiduciary. What constitutes property for this 
purpose remains a hotly debated matter, and the elasticity of the concept is such that 
it could exPlain fiduciary inferences in cases such as Phipps v Boardman... and 
115 Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) Forest J); 
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp, supra n 114; Law Commission, supra n 
114; Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 16th ed (London : Sweet & Maxwell: 1996), 6-034; 
Finn: Contract and the Fiduciary Principal [19891 UNSWLJ 76; Weinrib: The Fiduciary 
Obligation (1975) 25 UTLJ 1; Brown, Franchising 
-A Fiduciary Relationship (1971) 49 Tex. 
L. R. 650; Flannigan: The Fiduciary Obligation (1989) 9 OJLS 3 04. 
116 Lac Minerals, supra n 115 (but see per La Forest J at 40) ; Hospital Products, supra n 114; 
Burns v Kelly Peters & Associates Ltd (1988) 41 DLR (4th) 577; Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 1 
QB 326 (Lord Denning, at 329, focusing on inequality of bargaining power as giving rise to 
vulnerability); Law Commission, supra n 114, para. 2.4.6. 
117 [ 1967] 2 AC 46 (information relating to trust property). 
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those relating to misuse of corporate opportunities' 18 
. 
Further, it has been pressed 
into service to impose a fiduciary obligation on one party to a franchising 
agreement' 19, and achieves prominence in the eyes of Professor Waters"O, as well as 
amongst those analysing the economic implications of the fiduciary principle 121 
.A 
final illustrative feature of the archetypal fiduciary relationship is that it is said to be 
based on trust and confidence, and, once more, there is ample authority to support 
the moment of this trait"' 
There is considerable potential for overlap amongst these various attributes. For 
example, the entrustment of property gives rise to vulnerability, as may an 
undertaking to act in another's interests, in that it causes one party to relax his usual 
self-interested alertness. Further, a relationship of trust and confidence may result in 
the conferral of the capacity to exercise power or discretion, which, in turn, 
occasions vulnerability. Indeed, most fiduciary relationships display an admixture 
of these qualities and attempts to identify one as definitive have been unfruitful. 
One might imagine, however, that more representative features present in a 
particular relationship, the stronger the claim that it should attract fiduciary 
repercussions. Such a 'Pick and mix' approach is somewhat simplistic, but when 
applied to the tripartite relationship it yields a noteworthy outcome. 
"' Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper (1966) 58 
DLR (2d) 1; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [ 1972] 1 WLR 443; Queensland 
Mines Ltd vHudson(1978) 18 ALR I; Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna[1986] BCLC460. 
"' Lac Minerals, supra n 115,16, per Wilson J. 
"'Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nded(1984 : Carswell Co. Ltd: Toronto), 32. 
"' See, e. g., Flannigan, supra n 115,308; Cooter & Freedman: The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, (1991) 66 NYULR 1047. 
112 Lac Minerals, supra n 115; Hospital Products, supra n 114; Lloyds Bank v Bundy, supra n 
117; Flannigan, supra n 115. 
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3.2 Fiduciarv characteristics and the trýpartite relationship 
Consider the position of company and receiver. The very institution of receivership 
renders the company vulnerable, for reasons enumerated above. Further, the entire 
estate of the company (or virtually the whole of it) is entrusted to the receiver, and 
at the same time he obtains competence to exercise power or discretion over it. 
However, it is nonsensical to describe the relationship as one of trust and 
confidence. It is thrust upon the company, frequently against its wishes. The 
company does not select its receiver, and whilst the receiver is a highly qualified 
individual the particular brand of trust and confidence in issue in the fiduciary 
setting, the conviction that one's welfare is uppermost in the trusted party's 
consciousness, is absent. This is because there is no undertaking on the part of the 
receiver to favour the company's cause. To the contrary, his possession of and 
powers over its property are conferred in order that the debenture-holder's claim be 
afforded precedence, and this is implicit in the scheme of the tripartite relationship. 
The company's 'score' in terms of fiduciary pointers, is a respectable if not 
overwhelming three out of five"'. 
The debenture-holder, though, manages a clean sweep. His vulnerability lies in the 
fact that he has ceded representation of his interests in relation to the charged 
property to the receiver. Central to this cession is the entrustment of property, that 
of the company in which the debenture-holder has a superior interest, and 
correspondingly, the grant of power and discretion. Trust and confidence, both in 
the orthodox and fiduciary senses, is a significant feature of the debenture- 
"' As will be illustrated later, equal weight does not attach to each factor. 
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holder/receiver compact, and again this springs out of the receiver's undertaking to 
act in the interests of the debenture-holder. If, as will be argued later, a full-blown 
fiduciary relationship cannot contemporaneously exist between receiver and 
debenture-holder and receiver and company, this simple method of 'tallying' 
suggests that the debenture-holder has the better claim to the onerous standard of 
service that a fiduciary status exacts. Indeed, this clearly represents the current state 
of the law. 
Several points should be made. First, this particular enquiry is unlike that usually 
made in relation to the fiduciary or non-fiduciary status of any given actor. The 
cases cited have all involved bilateral rather than tripartite relationships, the central 
dispute being not so much who has the better right, but whether any right exists at 
all. Further, the attachment of the fiduciary label has most commonly been sought 
in order to gain access to the remedial benefits that accrue from such. Here, the 
parties' stake in a fiduciary finding is more visceral: it settles the crucial matter of 
the competing interests of debenture-holder and company, it determines which is to 
have priority at the expense of the other. The possibility of the receiver according 
supremacy to his own interests is really not in issue, the conflict being between 
(potential) duty and (potential) duty rather than duty and interest. 
Thirdly, the rough and ready method above may produce an accurate account of the 
state of the law, but it fails to acknowledge that the debenture-holder's better score 
results from the fact that the presence of those characteristics within his relationship 
with the receiver that are absent from that between receiver and company is self- 
fulfilling. In other words, the one necessarily excludes the other, and this is due to 
the nature of the characteristics in question. 
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Those features present in both associations, viz., vulnerability, entrustment of 
property and the conferral of powers and discretion, are essentially objective in that 
they exist regardless of the state of mind of 'fiduciary and beneficiary'. Trust and 
confidence and belief in an undertaking, though, are subjective features. Something 
triggers them, and whilst in many circumstances it may be the existence of those 
other objective properties, in the tripartite relationship this cannot be case. What is 
at stake is the location of the core of the fiduciary principle, the duty of loyalty, the 
covenant that a particular interest will be advanced at the expense of all others, 
including, in the orthodox situation, the fiduciary's. As between debenture-holder 
and company, whoever legitimately lays claim to that duty inevitably precludes it 
fastening elsewhere. 
Why, then, does the debenture-holder win? At this stage it is possible to identify the 
one factor that should be accorded the greatest weight in the fiduciary enquiry, that 
of an undertaking"', and if such is present, both objectively"' and subjectively"', 
then there must be a very strong presumption of fiduciary responsibility. 
In the tripartite relationship no such undertaking is explicit, unless it is in the form 
of the receiver's acceptance of the status of agent for the company. Ostensibly the 
company has the stronger petition via the receiver's status, but, as illustrated in the 
previous Chapter, this status can be ignored for the purpose of finding a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty. Even so, discounting it does not settle the question in favour of the 
debenture-holder since it remains the case that he himself cannot point to an express 
"' Because this will give rise to trust and confidence in the fiduciary sense, it may lead to the 
entrustment of property and the conferral of power and discretion and, hence, to vulnerability. 
in the sense that it is actually given. 
in the sense that the recipient is aware of it. 
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undertaking to prefer his interests on the part of the receiver. How, then, is the 
conundrum to be resolved? 
3.3 The policy interpolation 
The solution, it is submitted, lies in an acknowledgement of the fact that, in certain 
relationships, factors extrinsic to the connection itself are determinative. In an 
endeavour to identify a unitary theory of fiduciary responsibility Shepherd offers 
the following: 
"A fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any type on 
condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilise that power in the best interests of 
another, and the recipient of the power uses that power. " 127 
In the context of the tripartite relationship the 'acquisition of power' requirement is 
present from the point of view of both company and debenture-holder, but only one 
may realistically 'encumber' that power with the relevant duty to utilise it in his 
best interests. A further echelon of Shepherd's thesis is a judgment as to when a 
transferred power may be so encumbered, and here is found a cogent clue to the 
reasons behind the destination of fiduciary responsibility within the tripartite 
relationship. Shepherd asserts that: 
"There are a number of considerations in determining whether a duty should exist in 
any given fact situation, all of them rooted in policy 
- 
social, legal and economic. The 
overall force is a policy favouring individual responsibility, the necessary complement 
to the fundamental freedom of individuals to enter into private transactions with each 
other. " 128 
"" Law of Fiduciaries (198 1: Carswell: Toronto), 93. Shepherd designates this the 'transfer of 
encumbered power' theory. 
"' ]bid. 228 (italics added). 
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Thus, the extrinsic here is policy, and policy concludes when the transferor of a 
power is entitled to encumber it with fiduciary incidents. To cite Shepherd again: 
"On tile basis of the theoretical framework, it is clear that policy limits the ability of 
the beneficiary to encumber dejacto powers. Thus, the thrust of the policy analysis 
should be directed at considerations of [the weaker party's] position, and whether his 
purported encumbrance wasfair, reasonable, or necessary. " 129 
This discussion takes place in the context of fiduciary relationships arising from 
situations of inequality of bargaining power, and focuses on when the weaker party 
to a relationship can and should be able to fix the stronger with fiduciary 
responsibility. It is submitted that it can properly apply to the matter in hand. 
Indeed, the policy issues in question enter the equation long before the receiver 
takes the stage, and fall to be considered at the earliest stage of the tripartite 
relationship, namely the initial contract between company and debenture-holder. It 
is at this point that a potential appointment is agreed, and at this point that the 
ramifications of such an appointment, in terms of the prioritising of one party's 
interests, should be conclusively determined by recourse to policy factors. The 
actual appointment brings into play no new policy considerations. In other words, if 
the company is to be able to encumber the receiver's powers with a fiduciary 
standard, it must be politically expedient for it to so do. 
3.5 The outcome 
In the final analysis, therefore, the debenture-holder wins not so much because of 
any special feature of the relationship between himself and the receiver, but rather 
because, in the contest for the receiver's fealty, his interests are deemed more 
"' Law ofFiduciaries, supra n 127,23 1. 
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worthy of protection then the company's. With regard to this particular enquiry, it is 
his relationship with the company that matters. The ultimate arbiters, the courts, 
have made a value judgment as to how the receiver should carry out his task, and in 
locating the duty of loyalty with the debenture-holder, have simultaneously aborted 
the embryonic possibility of such being owed to the company. This explains to a 
significant degree the peculiarities of the receiver's agency. This deference to the 
welfare of the debenture-holder, emerging from policy, totally represses the 
fiduciary incidents of pure agency, so that the receiver's agency is only operative to 
the extent that it furthers the debenture-holder's cause. Strict legal principle, in this 
respect, yields to expediency, the balance of which is perceived to lie with the 
appointor. 
3.6 Receiver, debenture-holder, and the suitabilitE of the fiduciarv standard 
The above analysis has focused on the battle between debenture-holder and 
company for the receiver's allegiance, in which the former triumphs resoundingly. 
That he does so is largely a result of the courts' view of his relationship with the 
company rather than that with the receiver. Only one can lay claim to the duty of 
loyalty, and considerations of policy dictate that it comes to rest with the debenture- 
holder. However, it could be contended that this dissection puts the cart before the 
horse in that it proceeds from an assumption that the receiver is a fiduciary to one or 
other party when such is unestablished in law. Whilst the receiver is clearly duty 
bound to prefer the interests of the debenture-holder to those of the company, is this 
because he is in a fiduciary post in relation to the former or does the 'duty of 
loyalty' owed fall short of full fiduciary accountability? Certainly there are no cases 
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in which the fiduciary status of the receiver has been explained in any detail, and 
the nearest re Magadi Soda Co Ltd where Eve J stated: 
"The receiver not only fills a fiduciary position to the debenture-holders, but his 
appointment to an office of such responsibility presupposes that he will discharge his 
duties with punctilious rectitude. ""' 
More recent case law takes the same view, and without amplification"'. 
Behind this dearth of authority is the fact that the superior remedial opportunities 
that a fiduciary finding attracts have never been pursued in the courts by appointing 
debenture-holders. Should, however, the unthinkable occur and the receiver abuse 
his control of the charged assets to make an illicit profit from them, it seems apt that 
the courts' response would be to compel him to account for that profit to the 
debenture-holder. Such a result would be entirely apposite, and in harmony with 
various theories as to why the fiduciary standard of behaviour is imposed in certain 
circumstances. The hallmark of the fiduciary relationship, as identified by Finn, is: 
"... [a relationship] in which one party has in fact relaxed, or is justified in believing he 
can relax, his self-interested vigilance or independent judgment because, in the 
circumstances of the relationship, he reasonably believes or is entitled to assume that 
the other is acting or will act in his (or their joint) interests. ""' 
In the relationship between debenture-holder and receiver these conditions are met. 
The opportunity for self-interested exploitation is evidently available to the 
receiver, either through self-dealing or the making of a secret profit. The law's 
response to such activity, the ordering of an account of any such profit, serves to 
deter what is perceived to be undesirable behaviour on the part of the fiduciary. 
130 (1925) 94 U Ch 217,219. 
"' Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 27,29, per Fox U. 
132 Contract and the Fiduciary Principle [ 1989] UNSWLJ 76,94. 
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This retort has been lauded as economically efficient in that it counters agency costs 
deriving from the necessity to monitor closely the behaviour of the trusted party or 
to resort to elaborate and lengthy contractual terms to achieve the disgorgement of 
'secret' benefits 133 
. 
A further impetus towards fixing the receiver with fiduciary responsibility towards 
the debenture-holder is that such ought to afford indirect protection to the company 
itself. The same result would be achieved by allowing for a limited fiduciary status 
between receiver and company, giving rise the latter's right to call for an account of 
any secret profit made by the former if the debenture-holder chose to forego his 
34 
own right in that respect' 
. 
In any event, it is submitted that the 'no conflict' rule is 
a wholly befitting one as far as receivers are concerned, and that the courts, should 
they ever be called upon to apply it, would do so without hesitation. 
4. Contractual sources of duty. 
4.1. Introduction 
"... It is quite plain that a person appointed receiver and manager is concerned, not for 
the benefit of the company but for the benefit of the mortgagee bank, to realise the 
1,135 
security; that is the whole purpose of his appointment... 
in determining the duties of the receiver to both debenture-holder and company the 
courts have assiduously emphasised that behind every appointment there is a 
particular purpose. It is inherent that the charged assets at the disposal of the 
"'See, Flannigan, supran 115,289; Cooler and Freedman, supran 121,1053. 
I" Quaere whether the debenture-holder, by failing to pursue his receiver in such circumstances, 
breaches his own duty of good faith to the company? 
"I Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [ 195511 Ch 634,644, per Evershed MR. 
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receiver are to be deployed towards a specific end, the discharge of the company's 
indebtedness to the debenture-holder. To this extent, Evershed MR's statement 
rings resoundingly true: receivership signals an end to the debenture-holder's 
clemency towards the company, at least as far as the outstanding sum is concerned, 
and represents an intervention spurred by self-interest. The realisation of a security 
interest, by whatever means, is provoked by a recognition that a situation of conflict 
exists, and that if one set of interests is to be adequately protected then another will 
have to be prejudiced, or even entirely sacrificed. In the context of receivership, the 
protection of the debenture-holder's position is cardinal. 
An initial observation, then, is that those cases referring to the receiver's primary 
duty 136 towards the debenture-holder are doing no more than stating that which is 
inherent in the debenture contract. The power to appoint is a term inserted for the 
benefit of the debenture-holder and any appointment will be made on a similar 
understanding. 
What is frequently left tacit is the contractual origin of this primary duty. It does not 
spring into being independently of the agreement between debenture-holder and 
company, although given its notable absence as an express term of the debenture 
contract the casual observer might be forgiven for thinking that this is the case. 
Instead it falls to be implied from the commercial circumstances of receivership, 
which, acknowledging the secured creditor's contractual right to enforce his 
security, similarly admit of his power to do so in the manner which best promotes 
"'See, e. g., Latchford vBierne [1981] 3 All ER705,708, per Milmo J; RA Price Securities Ltd 
v Henderson [1989] NZLR 257,261-262, per Somers J; Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Homan 
[ 1986] 3 All ER 94,98, per Hoffmann J; Lathia v Dronsfield Bros. Ltd [ 1987] BCLC 321,324, 
per Sir Neil Lawson. 
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his economic well-being. Once that first right is established and endorsed, the 
second inexorably supervenes. 
In this respect the debenture agreement resembles a trust, with the company as 
settlor, the receiver as trustee and the debenture-holder as beneficiary. It is the 
company, via the debenture-holder's agency, that contracts with the receiver on 
terms contained in the original debenture deed, those terms comprising the express 
grant of a series of powers on the implicit cognisance that these will be exercised 
towards a given end. The trust analogy is fortified by the fact that it would at first 
appear that the debenture-holder never enters into contractual relations with his 
appointee at all"', and yet is able, as are beneficiaries, to enforce the terms of the 
'trust'. But the parallel is an imperfect one. The core of the trust concept is 
composed of a bilateral relationship, that which exists between trustee and 
beneficiary, whereas at the heart of receivership is the tripartite relationship, which 
allows that the company is something more than a bit-part player. 
The company has a vested and continuing interest in the receiver's actions. It is not 
concerned only that the debenture-holder/beneficiary profits by the exercise of the 
receiver/trustee's powers. On the contrary, too ardent a regard for the appointor's 
advantage could result in its total destruction. This suggests that the company, 
presupposing it contracts as a rational actor, would agree that the power to appoint 
is for the benefit of the debenture-holder, but would qualify the manner in which 
the appointee will subsequently pursue his end. It is one thing to accede to the 
primacy of a third party's interests over one's own, quite another to blithely accept 
137 This issue is examined immediately below. 
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that one's own interests are to be totally discounted at some future point. What 
follows attempts to unravel the contractual structure of the tripartite relationship, to 
illustrate how the demands of its parts dictate the effect of the whole, to chart a 
move from contract to status and, finally, to evaluate whether the outcome is 
justified in terms of legal principle and policy. 
4.2 The contractual foundation 
Contractual relations between receiver and company are created by the latter's 
appointment. There appears to be a minor dispute as to whether contractual 
relations are ever constituted between receiver and debenture-holder. Lightman and 
Moss suggest that: 
"The offer and acceptance of the appointment as receiver constitutes a contract 
between the appointor and the appointee. ""' 
This statement was approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R. A Price 
Securities v Henderson"'. Lange and Hartwig, however, affirm: 
"The appointment does not create contractual relations between administrative 
receiver and debenture-holder. The right of the debenture-holder to appoint a receiver 
arises from the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor. The creditor has, 
in making the appointment, acted as agent of the debtor. ""O 
For this, Bose v Harris"' is cited in support, although that case decides only that a 
debenture-holder has no cause of action against the company debtor for interference 
with a receiver who is agent of the company. The reasoning behind the decision is 
"' Supra n. 66,7-32. 
139 [ 1989] 2 NZLR 257,261 per Somers J. 
"' The Law and Practice ofAdministrative Receivership and Associated Remedies (1989: Sweet 
& Maxwell: London), para. 3.32. 
141 (1942) SJ 376. 
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unclear, the report being little more than a summary, but it would appear that the 
determinative consideration was not so much a want of contractual relations 
between debenture-holder and receiver as the fact of the agency for the company. It 
might be argued that an action in tort for interference with contractual relations was 
not available because, due to the agency, no contractual relations were in fact 
established, but, given the brevity of the report this would be a considerable leap. of 
faith. The aggrieved debenture-holder appears to have been seeking an injunction 
against the company, and the question of an action in tort was not argued. 
Notwithstanding the ambivalence of the Bose case, Lange and Hartwig's opinion is 
not without some force. It has already been noted that, as a general rule, an agent 
contracting for his principal does not become a party to the contract made. Thus, it 
is feasible to speculate that the appointment does no more than create contractual 
relations between receiver and company. On the other hand, it is similarly clear that 
the general rule is no more than a presumption, rebuttable by evidence that the 
parties intended the agent to be a party to the contract in question. Whether such a 
conclusion could be inferred from the standard form of appointment, which is 
succinct in the extreme, might be open to question. In any event, and as will be 
discussed later, the absence of contractual relations between debenture-holder and 
receiver is unlikely to be a source of any great anxiety for the former since the 
intervention of equity and tort provide him with more than adequate protection. 
4.3 Contractual terms as a dutE source 
The receiver's task of marshalling the charged assets of the company in order to 
satisfy the debt owed to the debenture-holder is referred to only concisely in 
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standard form debentures. Such documents, having catalogued the receiver's 
powers, go on to provide that: 
"All money received by the Bank or by any receiver appointed by the Bank in the 
exercise of any powers conferred by this Debenture shall be applied 
... 
in or towards 
satisfaction of such of the moneys obligations and liabilities hereby secured ... 11142 
The manner of the exercise of such powers is left entirely to the discretion of the 
receiver. Nowhere in this contract, which is the hub of the tripartite relationship, is 
the receiver given any guidance as to the foremost informant of the exercise of his 
discretion, namely, whose interests are to be prioritised, those of the company or 
those of the debenture-holder. Powers, rather than duties, are the focus of the 
debenture. 
It follows that the contract has nothing express to say about the manner of 
performance. One might select all manner of situations where such direction will be 
necessary. For example, the sale of a fixed charge asset will realise sufficient to pay 
off the debt, but will leave the company without the wherewithal to continue its 
business, whereas the sale of floating charge assets would leave a shortfall but 
would allow the company to keep up operations. A going concern sale might 
achieve the best of both worlds"', but will require additional finance and a lengthy 
period of trading and negotiation. The appropriate course, in these circumstances, is 
dictated by the accommodation of only one set of interests, and in the absence of 
categorical command some means of resolving potential conflicts must be discerned 
from the agreement between the parties. Enter the implied term. 
"' Lingard, Bank Security Documents, 3rd ed (1993 : Butterworths : London), 7.02. 
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albeit under new ownership. 
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The courts have been somewhat inconsistent in their explanations of the source of 
the duty hierarchy within the tripartite relationship. Frequently, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether they impute the duty in question to an implied term of the 
debenture contract, to the fact of the status of the receiver, or, indeed, whether they 
consider the two derivations to amount to the same thing. In the first case to 
consider the question of the receiver's duties to the company, though, the 
contractual context was explicitly afforded weight: 
"... a receiver and manager for debenture-holders is a person appointed by debenture- 
holders to whom the company has given powers of management pursuant to the 
contract ofloan constituted by the dehenture, and as a condition of obtaining the loan, 
to enable him to preserve and realise the assets comprised in the security for the 
benefit of the debenture-holders. The company gets the loan on ternis that the lenders 
shall be entitled, for the purpose of making their security effective, to appoint a 
receiver with powers of sale and of management pending sale, and with full discretion 
as to the exercise and mode of exercising those powers. The primary duty of the 
,, 144 receiver is to the debenture-holders and not to the company... 
This passage is instructive in two respects. First, it identifies the debenture contract 
as the root of the receiver's obligations and, secondly, it locates the beneficiary of 
the receiver's efforts, the party to whom he owes his primary duty. Considering 
these two elements together, and although Jenkins LJ did not expressly so state, it is 
clear that the duty to prefer the welfare of the debenture-holder is an implied term 
of the contract of loan. What remains ambiguous is the use of the term 'primary', in 
relation to the receiver's duty, indicating the existence of secondary duties. What Re 
144 Re B Johnson, supra n 135,661-662, per Jenkins U. 
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B Johnson omits to develop is the nature of any such residual duty and to whom it 
is owed, apart from an acknowledgement that the company may impeach an 
improper use of power or discretion by the receiver. 
Further examples of the use of implied terms in this respect have been documented 
earlier. For instance, a receiver's usurpation of the management powers of the 
company's board is explicable by reference to such a process. Likewise, it was held 
by Hoffmann J in Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Homan 145 that the company's right to 
demand and receive information from its receiver was subject to the receiver's 
determination that the divulgence of such would not prejudice the interests of the 
debenture-holder, and that this right arose as a matter of implication from the 
debenture contract. However, no case has satisfactorily explained the incidents of 
the elusive 'secondary duty', or at least not in the language of implied terms. The 
question of when it operates, and what it requires the receiver to actually do, 
remains a matter of conjecture, unless one has regard to another, probably separate 
source of obligation. 
4.4 Implied terms and the 'secondarv' A 
4.4.1 Terms implied in law and in fact 
That a receiver owes some form of obligation to the company over whose assets he 
is appointed is well established. The Gomba Holdings case appears to suggest that 
its origin is the debenture contract, and, more specifically, the implied terms of that 
contract. Where circumstances dictate that the debenture-holder's advantage can 
115 Supra n 13 6. 
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only be promoted by inevitably impairing that of the company, then there can be no 
question that the former must prevail. However, in less straightforward situations, 
implied term theory might lead to a different result. For example, where a receiver 
is presented with two possible courses of action, neither of which would be 
detrimental to the debenture-holder but one of which would be advantageous to the 
company, it seems unarguable that he should be duty bound to the company to look 
after its interests. One element of the secondary duty would require the receiver at 
all times to consider the effect of his decisions on the company and, wherever his 
primary duty to the debenture-holder allows, to act in a manner which best serves 
the company. 
A different situation is where a particular action would improve the company's 
prospects but would not represent a consummate advancement of the debenture- 
holder's. It may be that an immediate shut-down and forced sale would raise 
sufficient funds to discharge the debt, whereas continued trading would almost 
inevitably result in a going concern sale"' for a substantially larger amount, but 
would involve the debenture-holder waiting for his money. Having regard to the 
manner in which the courts have developed and utilised implied terms, what would 
be the result here? 
The difficulty with implying a term infact is that it is not immediately obvious that 
either party would accede to a particular outcome. Just as it is impossible to say that 
the debenture-holder would have intended, in such a situation, a degree of 
benevolence towards the company, it is similarly unfeasible to suggest that the 
"' it may be objected that such a sale is of no benefit to the company, since it will cease to own 
its 'enterprise'. Such a sale might, however, leave a surplus available to the company's owners. 
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company would expect its own stake in any surplus to be forfeited simply in order 
that the debenture-holder could be paid off a little earlier. The 'fact' test, in these 
circumstances, does not work, it does not yield of a justiciable norm. 
What of terms iniplicd in law? A significant distinction between these and terms 
implied in fact is that it is almost universally acknowledged that the courts' input 
here is to a greater or lesser extent policy driven, notwithstanding their insistence 
that the test is one of necessity. Treitel states that: 
"... in detennining what aniounts to necessity tile courts do not, in the present context, 
look for evidence of common intention. They determine the existence, scope and 
content of ternis implied in law rather by citation of authorities and by reference to 
general considerations of policy 
... 
In such cases tile courts are really laying down, as 
11147 a n1aucr of law, how the parties to the contract ought to behave... 
This approach, it is submitted, is both workable and appropriate as far as a 
determination of the receiver's duty to the company is concerned, not least because 
it allows the courts to horne in on the precise issue in hand. Where the test for 
implication of contractual ternis infact founders is at its focal point. It looks not to 
what the receii-er would consider he ought to do in any given situation but rather at 
what two parties with conflicting interests would assert he should do, and each will 
necessarily give a different answer. In short, no common can possibly exist. 
Further, it is critical to bear in mind the contextual background. A debenture 
contract is first and foremost an agreement for a loan, and, at least as far as the 
company is concerned, provisions relating to security and its potential enforcement 
are almost an irrelevance. It seems fair to postulate that the company only considers 
An Oulline o f the Law of Contract, 5th ed (1995 : Butterworths : London), 70 
-7 1. 
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them as a contingency against a remote possibility, and included as a 'comforter' 
for the bank. The company is hardly likely, at the point of execution of the 
debenture, to be contemplating its own failure so that receivership provisions and 
their potential effect are unlikely to be seriously adverted to. As Samwell puts it: 
"From the borrower's viewpoint the debenture is frequently executed without a full 
appreciation of the power that is being conveyed, or at least the possibility of a 
receiver being appointed is frequently considered to be so remote as to be disregarded 
for all intents and purposes. ""' 
Terms implied in fact are wholly unsuited to resolving the question of the receiver's 
obligations to the company in the situation detailed above. Terms implied in law are 
a different matter. Because they are not ascertained ýby reference to a common 
intention, there is a certain flexibility available to the courts in determining their 
existence. This allows them to scrutinise the circumstances rather. than the contract, 
and to propose a result which objectively accommodates both the expectations of 
each party and the demands of fairness and policy. Such an approach would allow 
for the gradual development of receivership law, in that it acknowledges the fact of 
the relationship between receiver and company as a singular yet constituent part of 
the tripartite relationship. 
in other words, it operates ex postfacto on an appointment being made and thus is 
better able to localise the substance of the question, namely, how far can the 
receiver go towards the attainment of his task without unjustifiably injuring the 
company. In reaching a conclusion the court can and should consider not only the 
commercial purpose of his appointment but also the extent to which this purpose 
Corporate Receiverships (1981 : ICAEW: London), 25. 
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calls for the subjugation of the company's welfare and the degree of subordination 
necessary if that purpose is not to be defeated. 
4.4.2. Implied terms 
-a model 
To recapitulate, Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Homan 149 establishes that the 
company's right to call upon the receiver to produce information relating to the 
receivership is subject to the proviso that he may decline production where, in his 
opinion, such would be prejudicial to the debenture-holder. This proposition can be 
broadened into one of more general application. Where a certain action would 
benefit the company but harm the debenture-holder the receiver must refrain from 
choosing that course. If faced with a straight choice between the interests of one or 
the other where that choice will inevitably result in injury to one, the receiver must 
favour his debenture-holder. 
Where, however, a particular action is result neutral for the debenture-holder, it is 
elementary that the receiver should act in a way which best protects or promotes the 
company. In either set of circumstances it is submitted that, as a bare minimum, the 
courts would, if asked, imply a term to the effect that the receiver should take into 
account the likely effect of his decisions on the company and strive to 
accommodate its interests wherever the commercial purpose of his appointment 
allows. 
What of the more contentious situation where a particular course would be 
beneficial to the company but would mean the debenture-holder receiving his 
money later rather then sooner? ýt this stage the enquiry becomes more complex in 
I" Supra n 136. 
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that the court, in formulating an implied term, would have to make an overt value 
judgment. However, the following considerations might foreseeably enter the 
equation. First, the commercial purpose of receivership would not be overthrown if 
the receiver were enabled (or even bound) to take a long-term view of 
circumstances. Assuming that it is virtually certain that a better level of realisations 
will accrue if a going concern sale is pursued, then a fortiori that purpose will be 
achieved. 
Secondly, one effect of receivership is the acceleration of repayment of the debt. 
Since the debenture-holder has contractually agreed to 'wait' for repayment, it 
would seem capricious to hold that his interest demands an immediate discharge"'. 
Thirdly, an increased level of realisations would inure to the benefit of those parties 
outside the tripartite relationship, in particular the company's unsecured and 
preferential creditors. Fourthly, should the receiver's judgment as to the value of 
delaying payment in order to trade on turn out to be misconceived, the debenture- 
holder will have a remedy against him, either in the tort of negligence or as a matter 
of contract. 
The above suggest that the weight of political and practical factors would be in 
favour of imPlying a term to the effect that a receiver may choose to solicit a 
potentially higher level of realisations even where the outcome is that the fulfilment 
of his function is deferred. The court would have to be convinced that the eventual 
discharge was a realistic prospect, but if that condition is satisfied there would seem 
to be no reason in principle or policy to incite it to shirk from such an implication. 
110 Although the precise timescale would have to be examined. A matter of a few weeks, or even 
months, of delay might seem justified whereas a much longer period would be less acceptable. 
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Very broadly, in terms of the receiver's duty to the company, one might expect to 
find that this encompasses an obligation to take the step most likely to maxiinise 
realisations where there is no (or a de minimis) perceived risk to the value of the 
security. This duty would be an ongoing one, unless the receiver or his debenture- 
holder could evidence that its fulfilment would result in an excessive delay in 
attaining the commercial purpose of the receivership. What would amount to 
excessive would probably be treated as a question of fact, and it ought not to be 
beyond the ability of the courts to reach a determination of that matter. 
The above rather reverses the content of the primary and secondary duties, in that it 
elevates the company's long-term interest in maximum realisations over the 
debenture-holder's short-term interest in immediate repayment, but this variation is 
only temporary, as the debenture-holder will get paid in the end. What of a more 
permanent deviation, where the company's interests are irreversibly preferred? 
Suppose, for example, the company operates from a valuable piece of land which 
could be sold for a sum adequate to discharge its debt, but that a going concern sale, 
perhaps to the company's own management, would ensure the continuation of its 
enterprise whilst leaving a small shortfall? Should the receiver's duty to the 
company prevail in such circumstances or should the orthodoxy that his primary 
duty is to the debenture-holder triumph? What sort of term would be implied in law 
to deal with this situation? 
In such circumstances it would always be open to the debenture-holder to sanction a 
course that would be superficially detrimental to his position. In some cases, and 
especially if the amount at risk is only small, he might prefer to forego its recovery 
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in the name of public relations or in order to retain a customer"'. In the face of the 
debenture-holder's objection, though, and bearing in mind that a term implied in 
law reflects the court's appraisal of how the parties ought to behave, what should be 
its response? Clearly the policy considerations in this scenario are distinct from 
those itemised in the 'short term/long term' situation dealt with above. There is an 
identifiable loss to the debenture-holder by the prioritising of the company's 
interests, so that requiring the receiver to prefer the latter precludes the full 
attainment of the commercial purpose of receivership. 
Further, its unsecured creditors will similarly suffer in that the possibility of a share 
in the surplus on the liquidation of the company will evaporate. On the other hand, 
the preferential creditors ought theoretically to be placed in a healthier position"', 
as they will receive nothing from the realisation of a fixed charge asset (the land) 
and so be left to chase the now inoperational company. Moreover, since the amount 
of their claim will now be determined by reference to the date of winding up"', it 
will usually be the case, especially in a non-trading receivership, that such an 
amount will have shrunk considerably. Preferential creditors, then, would do better 
out of a going concern sale, and this is likely to be at the expense of the debenture- 
holder. Finally, the company's employees, regardless of their status as preferential 
creditors, may stand a chance of keeping their jobs if the enterprise continues. 
The question of whether there are any circumstances in which a receiver is duty 
bound to prioritise interests in competition with those of the debenture-holder has 
See infra Chapter 5 
For a fuller exposition see Chapter 3. 
The 'relevant date'; s 387(3) IA 
. 
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never been comprehensively addressed by the courts. However, there are numerous 
indications that they would categorically decline to imply such a term into the 
debenture contract, no matter how small the potential loss to the charge holder, and, 
indeed, would be indisposed to examine the particular facts to see whether such 
would be politically expedient. There has been an express acknowledgement that 
this question of 'balance' is a legitimate one, particular in the context of the 
ubiquitous battle between a company's secured and unsecured creditors. The Cork 
Committee noted: 
"One of the most difficult questions to which we have tried to find a solution is how 
best to reconcile the legitimate safeguards to those who are required to provide 
adequate finance to commerce and industry, with justice to the ordinary unsecured 
trade creditor who is an involuntary supplier of goods, materials or services on 
credit. "'5' 
One of the Committee's 'solutions' to this problem, the "10%" fund, foundered at 
the Parliamentary stage. Interestingly though, in relation to receivership, it came 
close to suggesting that the welfare of the debenture-holder need not always be 
paramount in the receiver's deliberations, in the following passage 
"The receiver should have freedom to act in the best interests of all concerned, 
without having the necessity to look over his shoulder either at the holder of the 
charge or at other creditors 
........ 
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It would be overly ambitious to suggest that this amounts to a recommendation that, 
where the demands of the company or its other creditors are overwhelmingly more 
imperative than those of the debenture-holder, the former should take precedence. 
Supra n 75, para. I 10. 
Ibid, para. 453 (italics added). 
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Nonetheless, to the extent that it invites the courts to scrutinise more closely the 
overall effect of a particular course of conduct, it has been largely overlooked. 
Rather, they have tended to emphasise the social value in according the utmost 
deference to the position of institutional lenders. This 'policy' finds its inspiration 
in the perception that any move toward a redistributive goal in an insolvency 
situation would do more overall harm than overall good, and is perhaps most 
overtly expressed by Lowry J in Kernohan Estates Ltd v Boyd: 
"... one must always have regard to the terms on which large sums of money are 
borrowed in order to finance a business, and to the power of the lender to realise his 
security. It seems to me that is one weakens the confidence of lenders one may end up 
doing a great deal of harm commercially. " 156 
An assessment of the merits or otherwise of this solicitude towards secured lenders 
is left until later in the thesis, but for the moment it suffices to note its presence in 
the judicial consciousness. 
The inevitable conclusion must be that it would be a complete volteface, for a court 
to imply a term to the effect that a receiver is at liberty to, or should, contemplate 
the proportionate detriment to company and debenture-holder that a given course of 
action would cause, and then favour the company's cause if its loss would be 
tremendously unequal to that of the debenture-holder. In other words, if a monetary 
loss to the debenture-holder can be avoided it is the receiver's duty to so avoid it, 
regardless of the consequences to the company and those others interested in its 
prospects. Further, such an approach avoids the courts becoming embroiled in a 
156 [ 19671 NI 27,34. See, to similar effect, Jones v Afatthie (1847) 16 U Ch 405,407; Re Sobam 
BV (In Receivership) [ 1996] 1 BCLC 446,459, per Arden J; House of Lords Weekly Hansard 
No. 1276,4th-7th February 1985, col. 851, Lord Bruce of Donnington. 
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minute inquisition into the pros and cons of the entirety of the receiver's decisions 
and, perhaps even more importantly, thwarts the possibility of a glut of complex 
and expensive litigation embarked upon by the company at every turn. 
A final question relating to the'use of implied terms to elucidate the duty incidents 
of the tripartite relationship is whether the courts would imply an obligation on the 
part of the receiver, owed to the company, to exercise skill and care in the carrying 
out of his task. In the contractual nexus between receiver and company such a term 
is notable by its absence. It should be acknowledged that most of the cases have 
been argued not on the basis of a contractual duty of skill and care but rather on a 
tortious one' 57 
, 
but one might expect, if the'former existed, that the courts would 
have so averred before now. 
A duty of skill and care in the contractual context seems so obvious as to go 
without saying. Judges occasionally choose to articulate its presence, though: 
"It is however my understanding that by law in this country contracts for services do 
contain an implied promise to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of 
the relevant services... ""' 
Nevertheless, and assuming that the receiver's connection with the company could 
be described as a contract for services, no case has yet asserted that a receiver is 
contractually bound to exercise skill and care in the performance of his functions. 
This is so even though s 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
provides: 
As to which see the following section. 
Henderson v Merrpit Syndicates [1994] 3 All ER 506,532, per Lord Goff. 
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"In a contract for the supply of a service where the supplier is acting in the course of a 
business there is an implied term that the supplier will carry out the service with 
reasonable care and skill. " 
That an implied term to the above effect ought to be read into the receiver/company 
relationship would appear an inoffensive proposition, but it remains the case that 
there is no authority to this effect. The exegesis of this curious, and at first glance 
aberrant state of affairs lies in fact that whilst the question of a receiver's skill and 
care has been the subject of judicial attention, this debate has taken place largely 
outside the contractual arena. The next sections chart it more fully. 
5. The primacy of status as a duty determinant 
5.1. Status: an implied term bv anv other name? 
The incidents of 'status' have already been examined at some length in Chapter 
One in relation to the receiver's agency. Whilst status-based duties are treated 
separately here, it should be observed that the process by which they are attributed 
bears a marked resemblance to that by which the courts determine those contractual 
terms which are to be implied as a matter of law. In particular, in both contexts, 
regard is had to the nature of the relationship in question, its purpose (commercial 
or otherwise), the relevant policy issues raised and, to some extent, the legitimate 
expectations of the parties to it. One potential distinction between the two 
mechanisms may be the extent to which parties are able to vary particular incidents 
that would otherwise arise in relation to the connection between them. As far as 
implied terms are concerned, it is clear that the courts cannot, even as a matter of 
law, imply a term inconsistent with the content of the contract. Status-based 
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obligations, on the other hand, may override even the express terms of the contract, 
although the law remains obscure in this respect"'. 
In the preceding section an attempt was made to assemble a 'prototype' of implied 
terms which would apply to the receiver/company association if it were closely 
examined by the courts. What follows is an account of the outcome of the status- 
based approach that has actually prevailed in the vast majority of cases, and a 
comparison of that outcome with the theoretical model based on implied term 
theory. This exercise aims to illustrate, first, the intrinsic view of the courts as to the 
predominant thrust of receivership and, secondly, the problems of a process that 
relies too heavily on status as a short-cut to determining the appropriate duty 
construct. 
5.2.1 What status? 
Receivership law, it might be thought, should be built around the 'rank' of receiver. 
That status is sufficiently unique to demand that its legal consequences for all 
parties be settled by reference to a thorough appraisal of how the institution works 
and the goals and policies, as determined by the exigency of the times, to which 
receivers should have regard. Case law reveals that this approach has only partially 
been adopted, and that, more often, the courts assume that receivers work under the 
same constraints as their appointors. In short, most of the duties that receivers owe, 
both to the company and its outside participants, flow from the status of mortgagee. 
This identity of obligation has been expressly approved on numerous occasions 160 
. 
119 See the discussion in Chapter 1. 
"' The most authoritative versions of this view can be found in Re B Johnson, supra n 137,662, 
per Jenkins LJ; Expo International Pty Ltd v Chant [19791 2 NSWLR 820,834-835, per 
Needham J; Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [19931 AC 295, per Lord 
Templeman. 
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It is therefore necessary to consider those incidents that attach to the status of 
mortgagee. 
5.2 Duties of mortgggees owed to mortggZors: an overview. 
The law relating to the obligations owed by mortgagee to mortgagor has had a 
troubled history. A full exposition of its development is beyond the scope of this 
work, but for present purposes certain irrefutable duties can be identified, although 
their content is less easily discernible. In Expo International Pty Ltd v Chant"' 
Needham J described the duties of a receiver (which he considered identical to and 
derived from those of a mortgagee) as including: 
"... [a] duty to exercise his powers in good faith (including a duty not to sacrifice the 
mortgagor's interests recklessly); to act strictly within, and in accordance with, the 
conditions of his appointment; to account to the mortgagor after the mortgagee's 
security has been discharged, not only for surplus assets, but also for the conduct of 
the receivership. ""' 
A further duty, and one that has received prominence in the English courts, is to 
take reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value of the property on the 
exercise of a power of sale. Such was initially denied in Re B Johnson 161 
, 
but is now 
widely acknowledged to exist"'. In essence, up until very recently"', the sum of a 
mortgagee Is duties to a mortgagor is comprised of three, arguably independent, 
elements. Each warrants closer consideration. 
"' Supra n 160. 
162 Ibid. 834. 
Supra n 137,65 1, per Evershed MR. 
See, most notably, Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd V Mulual Finance Ltd [19711 Ch. 949,965, per 
Salmon U. 
16' An extremely interesting and welcome development in the law in this regard is discussed in 
the final section of this Chapter. 
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5.3 The duiv to act in Y-ood faith 
The content of a mortgagee's duty of good faith is elusive. Nevertheless, a degree 
of enlightenment is to be found in the cases. First, good faith encompasses an 
'absence of fraud or malafides"'. Further assistance is to be had from the House of 
Lords in Kennedy v De Trafford"', where Lord Herschell, having intimated that the 
case did not call for an "exhaustive definition of the duties of a mortgagee to a 
mortgagor""', went on to say: 
"Of course, if [the mortgagee] wittully and recklessly deals with the property in such a 
manner that the interests of the mortgagor are sacrificed, I should say that he had not 
been exercising his power of sale in good faith. ""' 
The wilful or reckless sacrifice of the mortgagor's interests, then, will be a breach 
of the duty to act in good faith. This much has been confirmed in more recent 
authorities, albeit expressed in slightly different terms"O. As to what amounts to a 
wilful or reckless sacrifice, the matter becomes opaque. It would seem that 
recklessness is to be distinguished from mere 'want of care and prudence"", but 
other than this the best that can be said is that a great deal will depend upon a 
particular court's view of the facts. Therefore there will always be a degree of 
uncertainty over whether a course of action will comply with the duty 
... Re B Johnson, supra n 13 5,662, per Jenkins U. 
167 1897] AC 180. 
161 1897] AC 180,185. 
"' Ibid. (italics added). 
171 E. g., Pendlebury v The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Lid (1912) 13 CLR 676 
('reckless disregard of the mortgagor's interests', 692, per Griffith CJ); Harde), v Humphris 
[1928] St. R. Qd 83 (mortgagee 'not at liberty to look after his own interests alone', 89 per 
Woolcock J); R. A. Price Securities Ltd v Henderson [ 1989] 2 NZLR 257 (receiver to carry out 
duties 'with the interests of the company, its creditors and its shareholders in mind', 262, per 
Somers J); Palk v Mortgage Services Funding p1c [19931 Ch 331 (mortgagee not entitled 'to 
conduct himself in a way which unfairly prejudices the mortgagor', 337, per Sir Donald Nicholls 
VC). 
171 Pendlebury's Case, supra n. 170,703, per Isaacs J. 
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A good example of this uncertainty is the Australian case of Forsyth v Blundell"' 
A mortgagee seeking to sell land had received a firm offer from one party and a 
tentative suggestion from another that he would pay a price higher than that offered 
were the property to go to auction. Wilson and Mason JJ considered that the failure 
to bring the two potential purchasers into competition represented a 'sacrifice' or a 
'reckless disregard' of the mortgagor's interests. Menzies J, dissenting, felt that the 
mortgagee should have been under no obligation to act in a manner which might 
jeopardise his chance to sell at a fair price"'. Judicial subjectivity, therefore, may 
play a substantial role in determining whether the mortgagor has been unfairly 
prejudiced. 
The duty to act in good faith has also spawned more precise obligations. It may 
account for the rather odd proposition that a receiver is under a duty to "protect the 
company against potential serious consequences to it", identified by Nourse LJ in 
Sargent v Commissioners of Customs and Excise"'. Admittedly, the learned judge 
was labouring in the face of a potentially severe lacuna in the law, which on its face 
would allow a non-administrative receiver to choose whether or not to pay over 
VAT collected by him during the receivership. His decision, therefore, may be no 
more than an ad hoc response to an unusual problem, and likely, in future, to be 
confined to its facts. 
A further aspect of the duty to have regard to the interests of the mortgagor is that it 
172 (1973) 129 CLR 477. 
"' one can sympathise with this view. It seems clear that the firm offer was of limited duration, 
and likely to be withdrawn if the mortgagee delayed long enough to bring about an auction. The 
second party's interest amounted to no more than a testing of the water. The majority's opinion 
that the mortgagee had determined to sell only to the first offieror rather overstates the case. 
174 [1995] 2 BCLC 34,42. 
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requires the mortgagee not to run up unreasonable costs, as articulated by Scott LJ 
in Gomba Holdings v Minories Finance (No 2)"'. This is an interesting 
development of the law, in that it seems to owe its existence to those cases relating 
to items of expenditure the mortgagee could add to his mortgage debt at the 
accounting stage, although Scott LJ did not expressly state this much. To the extent 
that it allows the company to challenge the receiver's remuneration under the guise 
of breach of duty, it introduces a novel dimension to receivership law"' 
As well as identifying positive facets of the duty of good faith it is possible to 
detect what it does not enjoin a mortgagee to do. First, the duty is not breached by a 
decision to sell any particular asset ahead of another, so that the order of realisation 
of the mortgagor's assets is at the discretion of a receiver. He is not duty bound to 
sell those assets crucial to the mortgagor's survival only as a last resort"' 
Moreover, the duty not to prejudice the mortgagee's interest has been held not to 
impose any "duty of care" on mortgagee or receiver in deciding whether to exercise 
a power of sale"'. The correctness of these two decisions must be doubted, 
though'". The latter seems to ignore previous authority to the effect that the 
mortgagee may not recklessly sacrifice the mortgagor's interests'80, and, in any 
175 [1993] BCLC 7,21. This would include the agreeing of excessive remuneration with a 
receiver (at 28). It might pertinently be added that receivership law owes a debt of gratitude to 
the proprietors of the Gomba Group for their zealous pursuit of litigation, much of which has 
proved illuminating. 
"' Quaere its compatibility with s 36 IA, which only envisages a challenge to the receiver's 
remuneration by a subsequent liquidator, and see the construction of this section by Hoffmann J 
in Re Potters Oil Ltd (No 2) [1986] 1 WLR 20 1. 
"I Consolidated Traders Ltd v Downes [ 198112 NZLR 247. 
... Routestone Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [ 1997] BCC 180,187, per Jacob J. 
179 Consolidated Traders was referred to in Sullivan v Darkin [1986] NZLR 214, where it was 
suggested that it did not decide the extent of a mortgagee's duty on the exercise of a power of 
sale. 
"" See the cases at n 170. 
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case, draws a specious distinction, especially where a receiver is concerned, 
between the exercise of a power of sale and the conduct leading up to it. It is 
submitted that at the very least, there is a duty to consider whether a sale is the most 
appropriate course of action. If the debenture-holder's interests can be served as 
effectively by some other method of realisation which would protect the 
mortgagor's interests, then that course should be taken. Otherwise the receiver is 
open to attack on the good faith ground, in that he has unfairly prejudiced the 
mortgagor. 
Finally, there remains the question of whether the duty to act in good faith may be 
qualified, or even excluded altogether. In Gomba Holdings (7Vo 2).. Scott LJ noted 
that if a mortgagee deed purported to allow a mortgagee to impose unreasonable 
costs on the mortgagor, the avoidance of which he regarded as a constituent of the 
duty of good faith, then "questions of public policy would arise""'. Lingard takes a 
similar view, but considers that equity, rather than public policy would deter such 
conduct: 
"The writer questions whether liability for breach of duty as mortgagee can 
effectively be limited by a clause in the debenture, because such a clause would be 
inequitable 
... 
The law has seen fit to impose certain duties on mortgagees and may 
well consider it unconscionable for a mortgagee to attempt to obtain a waiver of these 
duties or an indemnity from the company against the consequences of a mortgagee or 
receiver breaching the duties. imposed. " 183 
Supra n 175. 
Ibid. 2 1. 
Bank Securio, Docunients, supra n 144,11.26 See also Farrar, Recent Developments in the 
Law of Receivership, [ 1975] JBL 23,27, supporting the view that a duty of good faith may not 
be excluded for reasons of public policy. 
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These opinions may be contrasted with that of the Privy Council in Kelly v 
Cooper"' to the effect that equitable duties must take effect according to the terms 
of the contract. The issue therefore awaits further clarification. 
5.4 The duly to take reasonable steps to obtain a proper price 
This obligation is inextricably linked to the exercise of the mortgagee's power of 
sale. That its existence should have at one time have been doubted"' seems 
extraordinary, given equity's traditionally protective stance towards the equity of 
redemption. Indeed, Lindley LJ referred to the duty in precisely these terms in 
Farrar v Farrars Ltd' 86 
. 
It is now widely accepted as attaching to the power of sale 
as exercised by a mortgagee"' or by his receiver"'. It is generally treated by the 
courts as an independent duty, although some would look upon it as an element of 
the wider obligation of good faith"' 
5.4.1 A duty to delay sale? 
As with the duty of good faith, the content of this obligation is less than clear and 
has provoked certain discrepancies in the case law. The main dispute"' has centred 
on whether the duty affects when the mortgagee may exercise a power of sale. More 
specifically, the question is whether he is under any obligation to refrain from 
selling when he is aware of an imminent rise in the market or, conversely, whether 
194 [ 1993] AC 205. See Chapter 2 for a fuller commentary of this case. 
"' See Re B Johnson, supra n 136. 
186 (1888) 40 Ch. D 395,411, although see the earlier opinion of Kay J in Warner v Jacob (1882) 
20 Ch. D 220,224, which might be taken to militate against such a duty. 
"' McHugh v Union Bank of Canada [1913] AC 299 (PQ Cuckmere Brick v Mutual Finance, 
supra n 169; Alexandre v NZ Breweries Ltd [ 1974] 1 NZLR 497; Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit 
Sen [1983] 1 WLR 1349 (PC). 
"' Standard Chartered Bank v Walker, supra n 87; American Express v Hurley, supra n 86; 
McGowan v Gannas [ 1983] ILRM 516; Downsview Nominees v First City Corporation, supra n 
160. See also the view of the Cork Committee, supra n 75, para. 444. 
"9 Moritzson Properties Ltd v McLachlan [ 1994] 3 NZLR 250,255, per Fraser J. 
"' Apart from that relating to the jurisprudential source of the duty; see infra 185. 
163 
he should sell quickly if he knows that the value of the security is about to fall. The 
traditional view stems from the fact that a mortgagee is not a trustee of the power of 
sale, and holds that the timing of the sale is a matter entirely at his discretion and 
subject to no duty to have regard to the mortgagor's position: 
"But every mortgage confers upon a mortgagee the right to realise his security and 
find a purchaser if he can, and if in the exercise of his power he acts bona fide and 
takes reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price, the mortgagor has no redress, 
even though more might have been obtained for the property if the sale had been 
postponed. ""' 
This understanding was reaffirmed almost a century later by the Court of Appeal in 
the case that revived the underlying duty. In Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual 
Finance Ltd Salmon U stated: 
"Once the power [of sale] has accrued the mortgagee is entitled to exercise it for his 
own purposes whenever he chooses to do so. It matters not that the moment may be 
unpropitious and that by waiting a higher price could be obtained 
... 
if the 
mortgagee's interests, as he sees them, conflict with those of the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee can give preference to his own interests... ""' 
Nevertheless, the above has not escaped attempts at qualification. Lord Denning has 
suggested that a mortgagee may not be entitled to sell at "the worst possible 
time""', but this dictum must be doubted, not least because it locates the 
mortgagee's duties in tort, a position that has since been resoundingly rejected"'. In 
McGowan v Gannas9' Carrol J evinced some sympathy for the view that a receiver 
191 Farrar v Farrars Lid, supra n 186,411, per Lindley U. 
"I Supra n 164,965. 
19' Standard Chartered Bank Ltd v Walker, supra n 87,942. 
191 Infra 186-7. 
19' Supra n IS 8. 
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should avoid selling at a time when he knows the market is poor, although he 
expressed no decided opinion on the question. Doyle, whilst accepting the orthodox 
position, suggests that: 
"... the position will be different where it is clear that a higher price will be obtained 
following a delay, say where a prospective purchaser makes it clear that he is only 
able to complete the purchase on a stipulated date on funds becoming available to him 
particularly where the delay is relatively short and the price which may be obtained is 
significantly higher. " 196 
Such an approach appears fair and sensible, and one might cautiously propound that 
it would commend itself to the courts, should they be asked to determine the issue 
in these terms. On the other hand, it would seem to be at odds with the various 
judicial statements to the effect that no such obligation is owed, the clearest of 
which can be found in the judgment of Millett J in Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2): 
"A mortgagee is bound to have regard to the interests of the mortgagor, but he is 
entitled to give priority to his own interests and may insist on an immediate sale 
whether or not that is calculated to realise the hest price... ""' 
Delay or otherwise will only be an issue where the debenture-holder is over- 
secured. If he is under-secured then self-interest will dictate a delayed sale in the 
circumstances described by Doyle. Further, a receiver will be bound by his duty to 
the debenture-holder to delay. In the final analysis, one might question whether a 
mortgagee or receiver who ruthlessly pursues a less than advantageous sale when a 
short stay would result in higher realisations is guilty of a needless sacrifice of the 
"'Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 39,274. 
197 [ 1990] BCLC 760,775 (italics added). 
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mortgagor's interests. Without the benefit of authority no firm conclusion can be 
drawn, but it is hoped that the courts would baulk at sanctioning such conduct. 
5.4.2 Duty to pursue a quick sale? 
What of the situation where a mortgagee wishes to delay a sale of the property 
where such might be to the detriment of the mortgagor? In China & South Sea Bank 
Ltd v Tan Soon Gin 198 'Lord Templeman categorically denied the existence of any 
duty on the part of the mortgagee to realise his security in the face of its imminent 
decline in value, even if his inactivity would result in a guarantor of the secured 
debt becoming liable. The case was argued on the basis of a duty of care in 
negligence, something of a Me noire as far as Lord Templeman. is concerned, but 
he made no reference to the possible existence of any equitable duty in these 
circumstances. Recourse might be had to s 91(2) Law of Property Act 1925, by 
which the court may order a sale of mortgaged property at the suit of the mortgagor. 
In Palk v Mortgage Services Funding Ltd"' Sir Donald Nicholls VC exercised his 
discretion to order a sale where the mortgagee's proposed letting of the property, 
whilst awaiting a rise in the market, would result in a disproportionate increase in 
the interest owing. The mortgagor would remain liable under her personal covenant 
for this amount. Of more immediate interest are his general comments on the duties 
owed by a mortgagor: 
"... [the] mortgagee does owe some duties to the mortgagor 
... 
if he does take steps to 
exercise his rights over the security, common law and equity alike have set bounds to 
the extent to which he can look after himself and ignore the mortgagor's interests. In 
the exercise of his rights over his security a mortgagee must act fairly towards the 
1990) 1 AC 536. 
1993) Ch 33 1. 
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mortgagor 
... 
he can protect his own interest but he is not entitled to conduct himself 
in a way which unfairly prejudices the mortgagor. If lie takes possession lie might 
prefer to do nothing and bide his time, waiting indefinitely for an improvement in the 
market, with the property empty meanwhile. That he cannot do. He is accountable for 
his actual receipts from the property 
... 
I confess I have difficulty in seeing why a 
mortgagee's duties in and about the exercise of his powers of sale and lelling should 
be regarded as narrowly confined to these two duties. , 200 
Clearly his Lordship considered it unfair that a mortgagee should be allowed to 
speculate at the expense of the mortgagor. One might ask whether he would find it 
similarly unfair that a mortgagee should refuse to delay a sale when such would be 
of benefit to the mortgagor whilst presenting no threat to his own interests. Given 
the unmistakable tenor of his closing remarks, the answer is not far to seek. 
5.4.3 A proper price? 
The question of what amounts to a proper price would appear to be one of fact, and 
has been expressed in various terms. Salmon U, in Cuckmere Brick, used the 
phraseology "the true market value", and this must be taken to mean the value at the 
time when the mortgagee chooses to sell if it is not to impose a more onerous 
burden than that which the courts have identified. In ascertaining whether or not a 
proper price has been realised the courts are unlikely to conceive the duty breached 
unless there is evidence of a substantial undervalue. This is apparent from 
Cuckmere itself, where his Lordship remarked: 
"No doubt in deciding whether he has fallen short of that duty the facts must be 
looked at broadly, and he will not be adjudged to be in default unless he is plainly on 
the wrong side of the line. ""' 
" [19931 Ch 331,337 (italics added). 
"I Supra n 169,969. 
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This echoes the views of earlier courts"'. Moreover, as Butt puts it: 
"In any case, the value of real estate is largely a matter of opinion, and it is to be 
expected that the mortgagor may have an inflated value of its worth, while a buyer 
naturally takes a conservative view of the value of what he is buying. Indeed, what is 
alleged to be an undervalue may merely be a difference in opinion of several 
valuers. ""' 
The 'realistic' approach is afortiori to be used where what is sold is not a particular 
piece of land or machinery but rather the whole business. Going concern sales, it is 
submitted, are unlikely to be open to attack on undervalue grounds except in the 
most extreme circumstances and it would be an intrepid court that chose to 
scrutinise the terms of such a sale unless the receiver had sold to other than the 
highest offeror. The idea that the value of a. business in receivership is whatever is 
offered for it might well amount to an impenetrable defence to a charge that a 
proper price has not been obtained. 
5.4.4 Reasonable steps? 
A potentially more fruitful course for an aggrieved mortgagor is to allege that the 
mortgagee has not taken reasonable steps to obtain a proper price, as it is in this 
area that the courts have shown a certain willingness to scrutinise the latter's pre- 
sale conduct. Thus, the duty will be breached if the property in question is not 
accurately described in any advertising literature"', if it is advertised for sale 
inappropriatelY211, if specialist advice as to its value is not taken 206 
, 
or if an auction 
"'Colson v Williams (1889)58 LJCh 539,540, per KekewichJ. 
21' The Mortgagee's Duty on Sale (1979) 53 ALJ 172,181-182. 
204 Cuckmere Brick, supra n 164. 
2" American Express v Hurley, supra n 86 (specialist equipment should have been advertised in 
the music press). 
206 Ibid. 
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is poorly advertised or proceeded with in inclement conditions"'. In essence, these 
cases suggest that a mortgagee or receiver selling property should obtain 
independent valuations, should consider the nature of the property to be sold and 
advertise it appropriately and, perhaps, should at least have regard to the best mode 
of sale208. Doyle suggests that the duty extends to post-sale conduct, as where a 
mortgagee or receiver fails to collect or receive the agreed purchase price, and lists 
a number of terms that should properly be included in any contract for sale if 
liability is to be avoided"'. The conduct he describes would almost certainly 
amount to wilful default in any event"'. 
On occasion the courts have suggested that this duty demands a course of action 
involving a degree of risk to the mortgagee. In Holohan v Friends Provident and 
Century Life Office"' 6 Ddlaigh CJ, in the Supreme Court, considered that the 
mortgagees in question had breached the duty by refusing to consider whether a 
higher price would be obtained by a sale with vacant possession. In fairness, it is 
not clear whether he viewed the obligation as anything more than to reflect upon the 
possibility of such a sale"'. indeed, he made particular mention of the fact that the 
mortgagees had closed their minds to selling the property in anything other than its 
present state. Nonetheless, the tenor of his judgment is to the effect that the 
mortgagees should have taken steps to buy out the property's tenants in order to be 
207 Standard Chartered Bank v Walker, supra n 87. 
"' In Predeth v Castle Phillips Finance Co Ltd [1986] 2 EGLR 144, the Court of Appeal held 
that the forced sale basis on which charged property was realised did not amount to the taking of 
reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price. The property should, in the court's opinion, have 
been exposed to the market for a sensible period. C. f Bank of Cyprus v Gill [1980] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 5 1. 
1"9 The Receiver's Duties on a Sale of ChargedAssets (1997) 10 Insol. Intelligence 9,10. 
210 Mayer v Murray (18 7 8) 8 Ch D 424. 
"' [1966] IR 1. 
212 The mortgagees had been advised that such a sale would maximise the price obtained. 
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able to sell with vacant possession. Notably Budd J, at first instance, had felt this to 
be an unacceptable risk to expect the mortgagees to take. 
A further example of a more demanding approach to mortgagees is the case of 
Higton Enterprises Pty Ltd v BFC Finance Ltd2 13 
. 
Fitzgerald P found a breach of 
the statutory duty to "take reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at 
market value""' where the mortgagee entered into an "improvident" contract for 
sale. Completion of the contract in question never transpired, and in the 
(substantial) interim period the value of the property plummeted. 
It is questionable whether an English court would take quite so vigorous an 
approach to the question of whether reasonable precautions have or have not been 
taken. In AIB Finance Ltd v Debtors"' Camwath J identified an obligation to take 
account of the effect of a sale on the value of the goodwill of a business. He further 
considered that an attempt to maintain that goodwill (i. e., by continuing the 
business) was incumbent upon the mortgagee where such would result in the 
obtaining of a higher price. On appea1216 it was held that whilst a mortgagee might 
in certain circumstances come under a duty to co-operate with the mortgagor in 
selling the business as a going concern, no such duty arose prior to the taking of 
possessioný". The destruction of the goodwill of the business had occurred before 
the mortgagees entered possession, and Carnwath J's ruling was overturned on the 
facts. 
213 [199711 Qd R 168. 
Section 85 Property Law Act 1974. 
[1997] 2 BCLC 354. 
216 [ 1998] 1 BCLC 665. 
217 Nd. 674-675, per Nourse U. 
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The Court of Appeal's decision is of interest in that both Nourse and Mummery LJJ 
were prepared to countenance the notion of a mortgagee coming under a duty to 
18 
make attempts to preserve the goodwill of a business' 
. 
Such a duty was clearly not 
envisaged by Lord Templeman in Downsview: 
"The decisions of a receiver and manager whether to continue the business or close 
down the business and sell the assets chosen by him cannot be impeached if those 
decisions are taken in good faith while protecting the interests of the debenture-holder 
in recovering the moneys due under the debenture, even though the decisions of the 
receiver and manager may be disadvantageous for the company. 1ý211) 
On a note of caution, though, none of the judges in AIB Finance chose to describe 
the kinds of circumstances in which such a duty might arise. Lightman and Moss, 
addressing the question in terms of whether a duty to trade is owed, conclude that 
such should only arise where company funds are available, trading on will result in 
a going concern sale and a cessation of business would lead to a disadvantageous 
level of realisations"'. Their view seems to preclude any expectation on the part of 
the courts that a mortgagee should be willing to risk the chance of an immediate 
sale in the hope of achieving a higher price on a going concern sale. This seems 
entirely in accordance with authority, and it should be noted that the Court of 
Appeal in AIB Finance made no intimation that they were purporting to change the 
law. 
The duty to take reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price is easily stated but 
less easily demarcated. In particular, there is some scope for judicial inventiveness 
"' See also Rv Board of Trade, ex p. St Martins Preserving Co Ltd [ 1965] 1 QB 603,615, per 
Phillimore J. 
"' Supra n 160,312-313. 
... Supra n 66, para. 8.14. 
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in the determination of whether reasonable precautions have or have not been taken, 
and, since the standard is an objective one, and the 'reasonable man' in this context 
is inevitably going to be a judge, opinion and personality enter the equation. 
Mortgagors will therefore hope for, and mortgagees fear, a debtor friendly bench. 
5.5 The use of powers for their proper purpose 
5.5.1 The origins of the duty 
"In my opinion, the contractual powers arising under the charge are subject to an 
implied qualification 
... 
namely that they are exercisable only for the purpose of 
attaining the objectives for which the receiver was appointed. Those objectives, 
shortly stated, are the preservation, recovery and realisation of the assets subject to the 
charge in order to satisfy the debt secured by the charge. ""' 
This obligation is of uncertain origin. Grantham suggests it is an "application of the 
wider doctrine of fraud on a power, a doctrine concerned with defining the scope of 
the power, not with controlling the manner of its exercise. ý9222 This would seem a 
reasonable inference, were it not for the fact that the fraud on a power doctrine was 
developed almost exclusively in the context of trust powers. One should, therefore, 
perhaps question whether the doctrine has any application, in its pure form, to the 
powers of a receiver. If it has not, what is the explanation for a version of it being 
adopted by the courts in this domain? 
The mortgagee is not a trustee of his power of sale"', and, therefore, neither is a 
receiver appointed by him. The power of sale is not conferred upon a mortgagee for 
the benefit of the mortgagor and in this respect it differs to those powers that might 
221 Bank of New Zealand v Essington Developments Pty Ltd (1990) 9 ACLC 1039, per 
McClelland J. 
222 The Purpose of a Company Receiver's Powers [1993] Conv. 401,401. 
223 Farrar v Forrars Ltd, supra n 186; Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen, supra n 187. 
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properly be dubbed 'fiduciary' and to which the fraud on a power doctrine has been 
held to apply. Nonetheless the courts have frequently held that a power of sale may 
only be exercised for the 'purpose' for which it was granted, that purpose being to 
realise funds in order to satisfy the mortgage debt. In Downes v Grazebrook'14 Lord 
Eldon ruled that a mortgagee was, on construction of the mortgage deed in 
question, a trustee of the power of sale conferred upon him by that deed. Lord 
Cottenham, in Re Bloye'ý Trust"', appeared to consider that Lord Eldon's 
comments applied generally, and whether or not the mortgage deed constituted the 
mortgagee a trustee. Stuart VC, in Robertson v Norris 226 
, 
referred to Downes v 
Grazebrook and continued: 
"That expression [that a mortgagee is trustee of his power of sale] is to be understood 
in this sense, that, the power being given to enable him to recover the mortgage 
money, this Court requires that he shall exercise the power of sale in a provident way, 
with a due regard to the rights and interests of the mortgagor in the surplus money to 
be produced by the sale. The legitimate purpose being to secure repayment of his 
mortgage money, if he uses the power for 4nother. purpose 
- 
from any ill motive to 
effect other purposes of his own, or to serve the purposes of other individuals 
- 
the 
Court considers that to be a fraud in the exercise of the power, because it is using the 
power for purposes foreign to that for which it was intended. ""' 
The learned judge was not stating that a mortgagee is a trustee of his power of sale, 
rather he was refining that expression as leading to the application of the 'fraud on a 
power' doctrine. There is nothing particularly exorbitant about such an advance in 
"' (1817) 3 Mer 200. 
225 (1849) 1 Mac& G 48 8. 
226 (1858) 1 Giff 421. 
227 Aid. 424. 
173 
the law, yet in Nash v Eads... Sir George Jessel MR launched a scathing attack on 
Stuart VC's reasoning, rejecting unconditionally the existence of a trust concept and 
asserting that the mortgagee's "motives" for exercising his power of sale were 
immaterial. The denial of any form of trust was similarly maintained in Warner v 
Jacob 229 
. 
How, then, to explain the resurrection of the 'improper purposes' application to 
mortgagees and receivers in cases such as Re B Johnson and Downsview? None of 
the more recent decisions asserting that powers may only be so exercised have been 
concerned with a power of sale, focusing rather upon management powers of 
receivers. But to distinguish between these two types of power is nonsensical. Both 
are terms of the debenture contract and the improper exercise of both must surely be 
unacceptable on the same grounds, viz., that neither would have been conferred had 
its use for a purpose other than the discharge of the debt been envisaged. 
A better explanation is that the application of the doctrine is not reliant upon the 
power in question being a 'trust' or 'fiduciary' power. Rather, courts of equity have 
chosen to affix a principle originating in the law of trusts to the law of mortgages 
because of its suitability to the circumstances, and have done so in the exercise of 
their inherent jurisdiction to regulate mortgage transactions: 
"... a Court of Equity considers itself competent in this relation between mortgagor and 
mortgagee to go beyond the contract 
- 
to consider what is just and equitable between 
the parties standing in that relation. ""' 
228 (1880) 25 Sol Jo 95. 
229 (1882) 20 Ch D 220. See also Martinson v Clowes (1882) 21 Ch D 857; Belton v Bass, 
Ratcliffe and Gretton Ltd [ 1922] 2 Ch 449. 
I" Quarrell v Beckford (1816) 1 Madd 269,282, per Sir Thomas Plumer VC. 
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The application of the 'fraud on a power' doctrine to mortgage law stems at least in 
part from implied term theory, in that it seems clear that the courts recognise that 
the conferral of wide powers on a mortgagee or receiver cannot be taken to be 
unqualified. This is really no more than a symptom of equity's adherence to the 
predominance of substance in the domain of mortgages, its insistence that the 
transaction is one of security and that all its terms must similarly be treated as 
devised with that substance in mind. 
It comes down to this: the courts' insistence that a mortgagee or receiver may only 
use his powers with a view to discharging the secured debt does not necessarily 
stem from the fiduciary nature of those powers, but rather from equity's traditional 
scrutiny of mortgage transactions and its readiness to develop new principles, or 
apply established ones by analogy, as a means of policing the agreement. There is a 
similarity here with the manner in which the courts have cultivated safeguards 
against a mortgagee or receiver selling the mortgaged property to a connected party. 
Such conduct is scrutinised not because a trust power is being exercised but rather 
because the power itself is of such a nature that it may be abused by an 
unscrupulous mortgagee, and it is part of equity's vocation to forestall such abuse. 
5.5.2 The substance of the duty 
The duty to use powers for their proper purpose has been applied in a variety of 
situations. Examples include: the exercise of a power of sale in order that the 
mortgagee might gain de facto control of a mortgaged newspaper"'; a receiver 
exercising management powers to trade a company on, at the behest of his 
"' Robertson v Norris, supra n 226. 
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debenture-holder and the Crown, as part of an employment protection policy ;a 
mortgagee's holding of an auction in order to ascertain the highest price likely to be 
offered, and the subsequent exercise of its power of sale to a subsidiary for a 
marginally higher sum, that conduct actuated by the mortgagee's desire to maintain 
the mortgaged hotel as a part of its. own gro, UP233 
, 
and; the appointment of and 
subsequent exercise of management powers by a receiver in order to prevent a 
second mortgagee from enforcing its own security 
The remedial consequences of the improper exercise of a power of sale are 
primarily the setting aside of the impugned transaction, although this appears to be 
subject to the rights of third parties. The improper exercise of other powers may 
give rise to a remedy in damages, and this was the route taken by Lord Templeman 
in Downsview Nominees. Grantham, however, cogently questions his reasoning in 
this respect, pointing out that the doctrine to which his Lordship had recourse is 
concerned not with the manner of exercise of a power but rather with its scope. 
After a review of the authorities he states: 
"In essence, therefore, the fraud on a power doctrine is a manifestation of the same 
principle that underlies the rules in agency that deten-nine the scope of the agent's 
authority, and ultra vires in public law. ""' 
Thus one must distinguish between an excess of power and an abuse of it, the latter 
seeming to roughly correspond with a want of good faith and the former relating to 
an exercise for an improper purpose. The remedial consequences are dissimilar, an 
abuse of power giving rise to rescission or damages, an excess of power simply 
"' McKendrick Glass Co v Wilkinson [ 1965] NZLR 72 1. 
... Latec Investments Lid v Hotel Terrigal Pty (In Liquidation) (1965) 113 CLR 265. 
23' Downsview Nominees, supra n 188. 
235The Purpose of a Company Receiver's Powers, supra n 222,406. 
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rendering the exercise void"'. In the context of a mortgagee's use of power for an 
improper purpose the courts appear to have overlooked this potentially critical 
matter, their remedial response being an award of damages or the setting aside of 
the transaction in question. If Grantham is correct, and what the courts are applying 
here is the fraud on a power doctrine, it would therefore appear that they have done 
so imperfectly, and without due attention to the wider implications of the doctrine. 
It is submitted that this anomaly can best be explained by acknowledging that what 
is being applied is something less than the fraud on a power doctrine in its 
unadulterated form. Whilst this particular rule may owe its origin to that principle, 
the version in operation views an exercise of power for improper purposes as an 
abuse rather than an excess of power, ' with the consequence that the remedies 
available are those which would attach to the former rather than the latter. What the 
courts are applying is a rule of equity especially tailored to the control of the 
mortgagee/mortgagor relationship, which explicitly accepts that the mortgagee is 
not a trustee of his powers and that, as a corollary, it would be inappropriate that a 
tenet developed in relation to trust powers should take effect in its most stringent 
form. This distinctive principle treats an improper exercise of power as an abuse, so 
that the mortgagee's default gives rise to a remedy in recission or damages. 
A final observation about this particular component of a mortgagee's or his 
receiver's duties to the company should be made, and that is that it roots the 
institution of receivership firmly in the debt enforcement camp so that, if strictly 
implemented, it could be severely deleterious to any 'rescue' function. For instance, 
should a receiver pursue a going concern sale in order to save jobs, and in doing so 
236 Ibid. 408. 
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incur further debts on the company's behalf, it is at least theoretically possible that 
he has exercised his powers for an improper purpose. Should his strategy fail and 
leave the company in a worse position, the company can sue for breach of duty"'. 
Further, if the debenture-holder has sanctioned this conduct it may be that he too is 
indirectly liable, for whilst the agency status of the receiver would ostensibly 
protect him from vicarious liability, the possibility of the company suing in tort for 
his inducement of a breach of contract should not be ruled out. As yet this 
possibility has not been fully explored in the courts, and may have escaped the 
attention of both receivers and their appointors. To the extent that it represents a 
practical check on the potential for a rescue goal in receivership, it must surely be 
considered aberrant. 
5.6 Contract and status based duties 
- 
an evaluation. 
"Today, while it is necessary to look back before the Judicature Act to discover broad 
principles on which equity would grant relief, it may not be helpful to seek to find out 
from the cases what a Court of Equity would have done in a similar case. Application 
of that principle should be reached by a consideration of what today would be 
regarded as fair orj USt:, 238 
It is difficult to discern where contract ends and status begins in the courts' 
determination of the duty configuration in the tripartite relationship. Their frequent 
resort to status may reflect the fact that the contract in question is largely silent on 
the duties that are owed by receiver to company and that statute has omitted to fill 
the gaps. On those occasions where a contractual analysis has been employed, 
This was in effect what occurred McKendrick Glass Co v Wilkinson, supra n 237. 
British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Lid [1979] 2 All 
ER 1063,1076, per Forbes J. 
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implied term theory has had to be pressed into service, but more often the courts 
have preferred to invoke status as the conclusive factor. 
This would not be unsatisfactory if the status in question were that of receiver and 
if, as the institution demands, the courts were prepared. to conduct a detailed 
enquiry into the impact of receivership and the nature and varying modes of 
exercise of the receiver's powers. Such might well acknowledge the supremacy of 
the debenture-holder's claim but at the same time concede that there are occasions 
when policy demands that the interests of the company might expediently be 
served, even though this would not result in an out and out prioritisation of the 
debenture-holder. In the implied term model constructed above"' it was tentatively 
suggested that a duty framework based on an investigation of policy issues of 
receivership might result in the following: 
a) The receiver should at all times consider the impact of his choices and actions on 
the company. Where a particular course would benefit the company without 
prejudicing the debenture-holder the receiver is bound by his duty to the company 
to take that course; 
b) Where a particular strategy would maximise realisations without permanently 
jeopardising the interests of the debenture-holder the receiver is duty-bound to 
adopt that strategy; 
c) Where a particular strategy would result in a loss to the company excessively 
disproportionate to the debenture-holder's gain, the receiver's duty to the 
239 SUpra 149. 
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debenture-holder demands that he nevertheless adopt that strategy, unless the 
debenture-holder agrees otherwise; 
d) Whether the debenture-holder and company's interests conflict or coincide, the 
receiver is at all times under a duty to exercise skill and care in the carrying out of 
his task. 
The status based approach would appear to result in a different outcome. The duty 
of good faith would correspond to proposition a) above, in that a failure to look to 
the interests of the company in such circumstances would amount to a wilful, 
reckless, or needless sacrifice of those interests. Good faith would not impose upon 
the receiver any duty similar to that suggested by proposition b), however, for it is 
inherent in the good faith standard that the mortgagee, and so his receiver, may look 
to his own interests first, and if he considers them to be best served by immediate 
repayment he is entitled to pursue that goal. Nor would the duty to take reasonable 
steps to obtain a proper price demand a temporary elevation of the company's 
welfare. The overwhelming weight of the case law supports the proposition that a 
mortgagee is under no duty to refrain from exercising a power of sale in pursuance 
of this duty. Further, it may be that the 'duty' to exercise powers only for their 
proper purpose might be breached where maximum realisations are solicited in 
order to benefit the company rather than discharge the debt, as would be the case 
here, although this is only likely to be an issue if the receiver's scheme fails. 
Proposition c) is supported by a status based approach, as the latter is rooted in the 
understanding that the mortgagee's interests have priority notwithstanding that their 
prominence may result in the total disintegration of the mortgagor, and, again, the 
proper purpose qualification on the exercise of powers would militate against a 
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course of action that was not designed to achieve maximum repayment. In relation 
to proposition d), recent developments suggest that such a duty is indeed owed. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Medforth v Blake240 will be analysed in detail 
shortly. Prior to this decision, however, status made no allowance for a duty of skill 
and care, except to the extent that this was inherent in the duty to take reasonable 
steps to obtain a proper price. 
Status, then, produces a duty structure far less exacting than the implied term 
model. The essential difference between the two origins is that the former takes as 
its basis the status of mortgagee whereas the latter assumes that the courts would 
proceed from a policy and impact based appraisal of receivership. Here we return to 
the ostensible dichotomy between debt enforcement and rescue. A mortgagee's 
duties were imposed by equity on the express understanding that they related to 
powers which were essentially enforcement driven. They were directed at 
protecting the mortgagor's equity of redemption from an overly ruthless promotion 
of the mortgagee's right to be repaid, but at no time contemplated any erosion of 
that right. Fundamentally, they are concerned with a bilateral relationship and admit 
of no consideration of a wider focus than who has first call on property and to what 
extent he can exploit that superior privilege without taking account of the residual 
claimant. 
It is perhaps understandable that this approach should have been taken. The 
commercial purpose of receivership, a consideration to which the courts, rightly, 
have the utmost regard, is debt enforcement, the receiver's ultimate goal being 
precisely the same as that of the mortgagee entering into possession with a view to 
[1999] 3 All ER 97. 
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sale of the property or collection of the income from it. But it is there that the 
similarity ends. Mortgage law was developed and refined long before the limited 
liability company saw the light of day and equity conceived of the floating charge. 
Its foundation was predominantly concerned with transactions in land, and most 
often between individuals. The resemblance between the I Sth and 19th century 
mortgagor and the contemporary company is faint to say the least, so too that 
between the mortgagee of those times and today's banks, to whom lending is a 
finely-tuned business operation. 
Granted, the underlying concept is the same, but consider the manner in which 
mortgage law has been adapted to accommodate the needs of society in the context 
of home ownership. In this respect both the courts and the legislature have 
recognised and addressed the fact that expediency, in the form of social policy, 
demands that the legal approach of a century ago be discarded where such is clearly 
inappropriate to the calls of a more modern age. The Cork Report persistently 
emphasises that the wider questions raised by insolvency are no longer suitably 
solved by resort to the legislative response and judicial decisions of earlier times: 
"The answers given by English law today 
... 
do not seem to us, or to many of those 
who gave evidence to us, to be in tune with modem needs, but to be responses to 
economic conditions and attitudes prevalent over 100 years ago 
... 
We're convinced 
that the systems 
... 
no longer work satisfactorily. They do not accomplish what is 
required of them; moreover, they no longer accord with what the general public 
conceive to be the demands of fairness and justice to all in modem society. ""' 
"' The Cork Report, supra n 75, paras. 8-9. See also, to similar effect, paras. 24,25,110,195, 
212,777. 
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The Parliamentary rejoinder to that Report, in the Insolvency Act 1986, was the 
creation of the administrative receiver"', an entity so far removed from the latter- 
day mortgagee that it seems bizarre that a comparison such as the courts have made 
should be drawn. The administrative receiver is a professional and suitably 
qualified individual. He is given powers of management of such scope that he is 
able to expropriate those of the company's directors. He is required to deal with the 
company's unsecured creditors, its preferential creditors and its employees. He is 
under an obligation to investigate the conduct of the company's directors and given 
broad investigatory powers in this respect. He may demand utility supplies. He can 
potentially sell property subject to a prior security interest if such is likely to result 
in an enhanced level of realisations. Yet in terms of those duties he owes to the 
company, he is treated by the courts as a mortgagee. Little wonder that Hogan 
considers such a position "antiquated" and "ludicrous' Q43 
Receivership is an institution of such originality and import that it merits judicial 
consideration on its own terms, rather than by reference to mortgage law. This is 
especially the case after the Cork Report, with its emphasis on receivership as a 
potential rescue mechanism. The courts have done it a major disservice by viewing 
it in such narrow terms, and without regard to the rudimentary differences between 
a mortgagee selling a single piece of property to discharge a debt and a chargee 
appointing a professional as helmsman of a corporation. The two situations are 
incomparable. They should be treated as such. 
"I or, rather, the redesignation of the receiver and manager appointed under a floating charge. 
24' Receivers Revisited, (1996) 17 Co. Law 227,230. 
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6. Duties of skill and care: a step in the right direction? 
6 1. The legal backgroun& all roads lead to Downsview 
In Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd 244 the chairman of a company had the temerity 
to suggest that its receiver owed a duty to the company and its contributories to 
preserve its goodwill and business. This claim was peremptorily dismissed by the 
Court of Appeal: 
"In a word, in the absence of fraud or malafides 
... 
the company cannot complain of 
any act or ornission of the receiver and manager, provided that he does nothing that he 
is not empowered to do, and omits nothing that he is enjoined to do by the terms of 
his appointment. ""' 
These comments, albeit obiter, are unequivocal. The only duty owed by a receiver 
to the company over whose assets he is appointed are to act in good faith and to 
exercise his powers for a proper purpose, and the possibility of liability in the tort 
of negligence is implicitly rejected. 
Tortious duties were similarly ruled out in Expo International Ply Ltd v Chant"', 
and this time explicitly. Needham J condemned the illogicality of treating a 
receiver's duties as different depending upon whether powers of sale or 
management were being exercised, considered that the receiver's position was to be 
assimilated with that of a mortgagee and concluded: 
"... in the administration of the receivership, a receiver is not liable to answer to the 
mortgagor for losses caused by the negligent performance of bonafide acts. ""' 
By this time the English courts had identified the existence of a duty to take 
244 [1955] Ch 634. 
245 Ibid. 663, per Jenkins U. 
246 [ 1979) 2 NSWLR 820. 
247 Ibid 835. 
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reasonable steps to obtain a proper price incumbent upon a mortgagee when 
exercising his power of sale"'. Furthermore, they had seemingly sourced this duty 
in the tort of negligence. Salmon LJ's judgment in the Cuckmere case is particularly 
redolent of the language of negligence: 
"The mortgagor is vitally affected by the result of the sale but its preparation and 
conduct are left entirely in the hands of the mortgagee. The proximity between them 
could scarcely be closer. Surely they are "neighbours 
Some have questioned whether the Court of Appeal in this case were doing no more 
than reviving a component of the equitable duty of good faith"'. With respect, this 
seems untenable. Not only does the language of Salmon LJ smack unmistakably of 
tortious liability, but so does his formulation of the content of the obligation, that 
being to take reasonable steps to obtain a proper price. Moreover, the facts of the 
case support the proposition that the Court of Appeal envisaged liability being 
based on negligent conduct. The property was undersold because it had been 
inaccurately described in advertising material, and there is no hint in any of the 
judgments that this default was viewed as anything other than mere carelessness. 
Subsequent courts smoothly accepted the 'proper price' duty as tortious in origin. 
Furthermore, when the duties of a receiver to the company were in issue the same 
approach was adopted, both in relation to the exercise of sale and of management 
248 Cuckmere Brick, supra n 160. 
141 ]bid. 966 (italics added). 
250 See, especially, Bentley, The Mortgagee's Duties on Sale 
- 
No Placefor Tort? [1990] Conv. 
431. 
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powerS251 
.A note of dissent was, however, sounded in Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar 
Bankplc"'. Nourse LJ put the matter thus: 
"In my respectful opinion it is both unnecessary and confusing for the duties owed by 
a mortgagee to a mortgagor and surety 
... 
to be expressed in terms of the tort of tý Zý 
negligence 
... 
the duty owed by a mortgagee to a mortgagor was recognised by equity 
as arising out of the particular relationship between them... ""' 
Considerable emphasis has since been placed upon this case, more, it is submitted, 
than it actually warrants. The somewhat neglected judgment of Purchas U can be 
read as at least partially supportive of tortious liability, albeit that such should be 
imported only after adequate regard to the contractual background. The learned 
judge certainly did not expressly rule out a duty of care between mortgagee and 
mortgagor, and made no determination upon whether the contractual basis of that 
relationship admitted of any such duty. Nevertheless, the approach of Nourse U 
was vigorously endorsed by Lord Ternpleman in Downsview Nominees v First City 
Corporation 254 
Downsview is, with respect, a troublesome decision. Briefly, the facts concerned the 
receivership of a motor dealer, the receiver in question engineering his own 
appointment by persuading an associate (Downsview) to take over a first debenture 
and so remove from office the receivers of a subsequent debenture-holder. The 
I" it is not proposed to chronicle these developments in any detail. Support for negligence 
liability as concerns both mortgagees and receivers can be found in Duke v Robson [1973] 1 
WLR 267; Johnson v Ribbins (1975) 235 EG 757; Alexandre v NZ Breweries [1974] 1 NZLR 
497; Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd v Gill [ 1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 5 1; Standard Chartered Bank v 
Walker, supra n 87; American Express v Hurley, supra n 86; Predeth v Castle Phillips Finance 
Co Ltd [1986] 2 EGLR 144; Bishop v Bonham [1988] 1 WLR 742 (holding that negligence 
liability may be excluded in the mortgage deed); Palk v Mortgage Services, supra n. 204; 
RottenbergvMonjack [19931 BCLC 374; KnightvLawrence [1993] BCLC 215. 
252 [1990] 3 WLR 767. 
253 Ibid. 773. 
254 [ 1993] AC 295. 
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second defendant, now receiver, then proceeded with his scheme to trade the 
dealership out of its financial difficulties, a strategy that had been predetermined 
and was the motive behind the entire project. It failed spectacularly, the receiver 
running up trading debts to such a degree that the potential realisation value of the 
charged assets was easily outstripped by the amount owing on the first debenture. 
Not surprisingly, the second debenture-holder sued. In the New Zealand courts, 
both at first instance and on appeal, it was held that the second defendant was liable 
to the second mortgagee in negligence, in that he had failed to exercise reasonable 
care in his conduct of the receivership. The Privy Council raised no objection to the 
outcome, but Lord Templeman, entirely of his own volition, chose to realign the 
duties owed by receiver to company with the framework proposed for mortgagees 
by Nourse LJ in Parker-Tweeddle. He did so in the following terms: 
"The general duty of care said to be owed by a mortgagee to subsequent 
encumbrancers and the mortgagor in negligence is entirely inconsistent with the right 
of a mortgagee and the duties which courts applying equitable principles have 
imposed on a mortgagee 
... 
a receiver exercising his power of sale also owes the same 
specific duties as a mortgagee. But, that apart, the general duty of a receiver and 
manager appointed by a debenture-holder 
... 
leaves no room for the imposition of a 
general duty to use reasonable care in dealing with the assets of the company. The 
duties imposed by equity on a mortgagee and on a receiver and manager would be 
quite unnecessary if there existed a general duty of care in negligence to take 
reasonable care in the exercise of powers and to take reasonable care in dealing with 
the assets of the mortgagor company. ""' 
255 [19931 AC 295,315. 
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Whilst the decision may not be binding on an English court, and whilst Lord 
Templeman's comments are wholly obiter 256 
, 
Downsvieu, has been followed in New 
Zealand in Moritzson Properties Ltd v McLachlan 
6 2. Downsview and downsides: reactions 
Downsview has been variously described as 'amazing' 258 
, 
"a remarkable departure 
from the position recognised in previous authoritieS"251, "flawed"211 , and "The most 
retrograde step in recent times... 9261 
. 
Considering the force with which Lord 
Templeman delivered his opinion, his determination to focus on an issue that had 
not been raised in the pleadings, and his complete disregard of recent authority to 
the opposite effect, one might be forgiven for thinking that he had an agenda of his 
own. His reliance on Re B Johnson for the proposition that a receiver owes no duty 
other than that of good faith and to act for proper purposes seems odd when one 
reflects upon the tenor of the Cork Report to the effect that administrative receivers 
should be qualified and called upon to act competentl Y262 
one analysis of Downsview is that Lord Templeman's ruling was directed less at 
the appropriateness of the imposition of liability on receivers for failing to exercise 
skill and care, and rather more at restraining the expansion of negligence as a cause 
of action per se. As Hogan puts it: 
"... the chief justifications for the [decision] 
... 
are clearly grounded in policy. It is part 
of the general retreat from grounding liability in the tort of negligence that has 
"6 Liability attached to the receiver as a result of his exercise of power for an improper purpose. 
257 [ 1994] 3 NZLR 250. 
258 Milroy, Receivers'Negligence [1993] NZLJ 88,88. 
"' Doyle, supra n 35 9,27 1. 
260 Lightman and Moss, supra n 66, para. 7.13. 
16 ' Lightman J, The Challenges Ahead: Address to the Insolvency Lawyers Association [1996] 
JBL 113,119. 
262 See the Cork Report, supra n 75, para. 788(b). 
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occurred over the last decade and from allowing an action in tort when it is believed 
that there is a perfectly adequate remedy in some other cause of action. ""' 
There is some force in this contention. Certainly the case was decided at a time 
when the negligence 'backlash' would have still been fresh in the judicial memory, 
and Lord Templeman himself had evinced a healthy distaste for extensive tortious 
liability in relation to the liability of a mortgagee to a guarantor only three years 
earlier 
His Lordship, however, catalogued other basic objections to the imposition of 
tortious liability upon receivers. The first was that liability in negligence would 
result in detrimentally defensive practice on the part of receivers: 
"A receiver and manager liable in negligence will be tempted to sell assets as speedily 
91265 
as possible for the purpose of repaying the mortgage debt... 
Secondly, he appeared to have recourse to a 'fusion-fallacy' argument: in essence, 
given that equity has defined the incidents of the mortgagee/mortgagor elationship, 
the super-imposition of common law principles would be both unnecessary and 
unwarranted: 
"The general duty of care said to be owed by a mortgagee 
... 
in negligence is entirely 
inconsistent with the right of a mortgagee and the duties which courts applying 
equitable principles have imposed on a mortgagee... ""' 
Thirdly, Lord Templeman clearly considered that tortious liability would 
compromise the receiver's primary obligation to the debenture-holder 267 
. 
Finally, he 
suggested that, in any event, adequate alternative remedies existed, and that an 
"' Developments After Downsview (1996) 12 Insol. Law and Practice 182,183. 
161 China v South Sea Bank Lid v Tan Soon Gin [1990] 1 AC 191. 
265 [ 199311 AC 295,316. 
266 lhid. 315 
261 Ibid. and see Lightman and Moss, supra n 66,7.13. 
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administration order would mitigate the "possible harsh consequences to a company 
of receivership. ""' 
A number of rebuttals could be made to all four of these points. Confines of space 
do not allow for them to be propounded here. In fact, a more detailed analysis of 
Lord Templeman's reasoning is rendered unnecessary, as a recent decision of the 
Court of Appeal has 'rewritten the receivership manual' as it were, and, it is 
submitted, gone some way to redressing the potential injustices Downsview 
engendered. It is considered in the next section. 
63 MedLorth v Blake and the equitable dutE ofskill and care 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Following Downsview, it appeared established that a receiver who was careless in 
his management of the charged assets could not be held to account by the company. 
That Mr Medforth chose to challenge the conduct of the receivership of his pig farm 
might therefore be viewed as surprising. It is certainly fortuitous, as the outcome of 
that challenge is the imposition of an equitable duty of skill and care on receivers, 
and, indeed, on mortgagees in the unlikely event that they take possession of the 
mortgaged property. 
In Medforth v Blake... the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the 
forfeiture of discounts on pig feed by receivers appointed over the farm in question 
amounted to a breach of duty on their part to the mortgagor/farmer. Whilst 
concurring with Lord Templeman's view in Downsview that receivers owe 
... [199311 AC 295,316. 
269 [1999] 3 All ER 97 (hereinafter Medforth). 
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equitable rather than tortious duties, Scott VC, giving the only judgment 
concluded that a duty to manage charged property with due diligence is owed. This 
duty was later expressed in terms of an equitable duty of care. 
The judgment of Scott VC is interesting in several respects"'. Firstly, it resurrects 
the seemingly superannuated principle of wilful default liability... and applies it to 
receivers. This is notable in that it is consistent with the tendency of the courts to 
attribute the status-based duties of a mortgagee to a receiver, but, in this instance, 
Scott VC displayed admirable regard to the context in which the dispute arose. 
Secondly, the learned judge displayed some impatience with Lord Templeman's 
insistence on an adherence to the mantra that the regulation of the mortgage 
transaction is the sole territory of equity, whilst at the same time locating the 
receiver's duty in that very source. Thirdly, the judgment is commendable in that it 
strikes a balance between the primacy of the debenture-holder in the receiver's 
deliberations and the right of the company to see its affairs conducted with 
competence during the course of the receivership. 
6.3.2 Determining duties with regard to context 
"The proposition that, in managing and carrying on the mortgaged business, the 
receiver owes the mortgagor no duty other than that of good faith offends, in my 
opinion, commercial sense 
... 
if [the receiver] does decide to carry on the business 
why should he not be expected to do so with reasonable competence? ""' 
This rhetorical question underpins Scott VC's entire judgment, and, it is submitted, 
is an appropriately concise expression of the central difficulty with the position 
Swinton Thomas and Tuckey LJJ concurring. 
See, generally, Frisby, Making a Silk Purse out ofa Pig's Ear (2000) 63 MLR 413. 
See Chapter 1,16 
273 Medforth, supra n 75,103, per Scott VC. 
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enunciated in Downsview. A number of commentators have made the same enquiry 
in different terms"', and the fact that a company in receivership would have no 
remedy against its receiver's incompetence is surely the basic flaw of Lord 
Templeman's judgment. 
Essentially, Scott VC's question answers itself. there is no good reason why a 
receiver should not be expected to exercise skill and care in his administration of 
the company's estate. Much of the reasoning upon which Downsview is based falls 
by the wayside on close analysis. The idea that receivers would be detrimentally 
defensive in their actions in order to avoid liability is countered by an assertion that 
they already owe a duty of care to their appointors, as noted by Scott VC211. In 
other words, if careless conduct results in a reduced level of realisations that same 
conduct would be actionable at the suit of the debenture-holder. 'Shutting up shop' 
in order to avoid liability, as envisaged in Downsview, would be equally actionable 
to the extent that continuing the business would have resulted in a greater 
proportion of the secured debt being discharged. 
Moreover, the supremacy of equity in the realm of mortgage law was vindicated by 
Scott VC's equation of the position of a receiver with that of a mortgagee. Thus, he 
was able to import the notion of liability for wilful default: 
"... a mortgagee in possession would be accountable to the mortgagor on the footing 
of wilful default 
- 
that is to say the mortgagee must be treated as having received 
sums that he would have received had he managed the property with due diligence. ""' 
274 See. e. g., Rajak, Can a Receiver he Negligent? in Rider (ed), The Corporate Dimension (1998 
Jordans : Bristol), 142-143; Lightman and Moss, supra n 66,7-13; Goode, supra n 7,242. 
"' Supra n 269,102. 
276 Jbid 102. 
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The learned judge went on, with inexorable logic, to invoke Lord Templeman's 
assertion in Downsview that a receiver owes the same specific duties as a mortgagee 
to endorse the former's liability for wilful default. Support for this proposition 
could be found in Knight v Lawrence"', where conduct which would have 
amounted to wilful default by a mortgagee in possession resulted in a receiver being 
held liable, albeit mistakenly in negligence. 
Thus a pristine doctrine is maintained, in that equity continues to be the sole 
regulator of a status-based relationship, only the relationship in question is that of 
receiver1con7pany rather than mortgagee/mortgagor. In any event, Scott VC showed 
little concern for the purist attitude: 
"I do not, for my part, think it matters one jot whether [the receiver's] duty is 
expressed as a common law duty or as a duty in equity. The result is the same. The 
origin of the receiver's duty, like the mortgagee's duty, lies, however, in equity and 
we might as well continue to refer to it as a duty in equity. ""' 
Moreover, the Medforth duty is in no way inconsistent with the receiver's cardinal 
obligation to promote his appointor's welfare. A duty, whether equitable or tortious, 
to exercise skill and care should not have any such effect. It does not enjoin a 
receiver to prefer the interests of the company to those of the appointor, it merely 
requires decisions to be competently taken. What is targeted is careless behaviour, 
rather than a deliberate course of conduct that will benefit the appointor whilst 
inevitably damaging the company. Medforth does not purport to alter the balance of 
power between debtor companies and debenture-holders. 
277 [1991] BCC 411. 
171 Supra n 269,111. 
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Scott VC had nothing to say on Lord Templeman's opinion in Downsview that 
adequate remedies existed to protect the debtor company. As far as proffering 
administration as such is concerned, Lightman and Moss pointedly observe that an 
administration order is not an option once a receiver has been appointed"'. 
Moreover, the Cork Committee's recommendation that administrative receivers be 
suitably qualified and authorised... was prompted partly by a recognition that the 
company, and its constituents, may be vitally affected by the receiver's competence 
or otherwise"'. Requiring a practitioner to attain a high level of proficiency and 
then absolving him from the consequences of failing to utilise it is aberrant. 
Medforth neutralises this anomaly admirably. 
6.3.3 The law according to Medforth 
According to Scott VC, principle and authority supported the following 
propositions as regards the duties owed by a receiver to the company/mortgagor: 
"(1) A receiver managing mortgaged property owes duties to the mortgagor and 
anyone with an interest in the equity of redemption. 
(2) The duties include, but are not necessarily confined to, a duty of good faith. 
(3) The extent and scope of any duty additional to that of good faith will depend upon 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
(4) In exercising his powers of management the primary duty of the receiver is to try 
and bring about a situation in which interest on the secured debt can be paid and the 
debt itself repaid. 
(5) Subject to that primary duty, the receiver owes a duty to manage the property with 
due diligence. 
Supra n 66,7-13. 
Subsequently enacted in Part XIII Insolvency Act. 
Cork Report, supra n 75, para. 189. 
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(6) Due diligence does not oblige the receiver to carry on the business on the 
mortgaged premises previously carried on by the mortgagor. 
(7) If the receiver does carry on a business on the mortgaged premises, due diligence 
requires reasonable steps to be taken in order to try and do so profitab ly.,, 282 
How far does this statement of the law differ from those pronounced in earlier 
courts? Clearly, the most striking 'development' is the identification of what 
amounts to a tortious duty of care in all but name. A further, less conspicuous shift 
in emphasis relates to the duty of good faith. It was suggested earlier that the 
content of this duty cannot be stated with precision, and that much will depend 
upon the facts of the case, and the judicial view of those facts. Scott VC's remarks 
on this duty merit attention, not least because they would appear to 'narrow' the 
scope of the good faith duty to a considerable extent: 
"I do not think that the concept of good faith should be diluted by treating it as 
capable of being breached by conduct that is not dishonest or otherwise tainted by bad 
faith 
... 
In my judgment, the breach of a duty of good faith should, in this area as in 
all others, require some dishonesty or improper motive, some element of bad faith, to 
be established. 11283 
This is interesting, not least because, on the facts pleaded, the receivers in Medforth 
might, under the previous law, have been found to be in breach of their undoubted 
duty of good faith. They were aware of the possibility of discounts being available 
on the pig feed they ordered, but chose not to seek them: this smacks of 
crecklessness', or a 'wilful sacrifice of the mortgagor's interests"". The conduct 
was, however, characterised as a breach of the equitable duty of diligence, or skill 
282 [1999] 3 All ER 97,110. 
283 [ 1999] 3 All ER 97,112. 
294 See Kennedy v De Trafford [ 1897] AC 180. 
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and care, rather than good faith. The critical point is that the very identification of 
the former duty means that the scope of the latter need not be artificially extended 
in order to penalise conduct that would otherwise escape sanction. This is, it is 
submitted, a further advantage of the Medforth decision, in that it clearly 
demarcates two types of illegitimate action, dishonesty and carelessness, and, in 
delineating the good faith standard, will hopefully ensure that its integrity is 
maintained in future. 
6.3.4 The equitable duty: some final thoughts 
Perhaps the only weakness in the Medforth judgment is its failure to state with 
precision the substantive content of the equitable duty of skill and care. Scott VC 
stated that its extent and scope would depend upon the facts of a given case, and it 
is therefore difficult to predict the level of care required to discharge it. A 
comparison in this regard might be made with the duty to take reasonable steps to 
obtain a proper price on the sale of mortgaged assets"'. Receivers taking over and 
running a mortgaged business might therefore be expected to familiarise themselves 
with the basic operations of that business, and to take advice where necessary, in 
much the same way as a 'selling' receiver is expected to investigate the value of and 
appropriate market for the property in question. 
Beyond that it is difficult to second guess the kind of circumstances in which the 
equitable duty will be breached. It therefore has the benefit of flexibility but the 
affiliated drawback of uncertainty. The danger is that the identification of this 'new' 
"' See supra 168. 
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duty will prompt its beneficiaries to test its limits through hopeless and expensive 
litigation which will serve only to further deplete an already overstretched estate 
This potential problem can be countered by a robust and pragmatic approach by 
future courts asked to apply the Medforth principle, and if a clearly defined 
obligation can be constructed through case law, then all parties will benefit. 
Receivers will be subjected to a practical duty that will not interfere with their 
business judgment, and those affected by receivership will be protected against 
obviously careless conduct, whilst not having their expectations elevated to a 
commercially unrealistic level. 
In the final analysis, Medforth represents a major progressive step in 'receivership' 
law. Cases such as Newhart Developments Ltd v Co-operative Commercial Bank 
and American Express International Banking Corp. v Hurley... address questions 
arising during receivership by reference to the nature of the institution. The 
formulaic application of technical rules of property or mortgage law underpinning, 
but no longer strictly relevant to, receivership is discarded in favour of a recognition 
that the regime is unique, and that its utility has outstripped its origins in recent 
times. Bespoke solutions are called for, and delivered, in Newhart and Hurley. 
Medforth proceeds in the same spirit, and Scott VC's judgment is to be commended 
on that basis alone. 
it updates a useful but outmoded doctrine, that of wilful default liability, and 
fashions it into an obligation which should, if handled with care, achieve a 
"I Although it should be recalled that directors commencing actions may be required to give an 
indemnity against costs; see supra 105. 
287 [1978] 2 WLR 636. 
288 [1985] 3 All ER 564. 
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justifiable level of protection for companies in receivership whilst maintaining its 
commercial attractiveness for financial institutions. In this regard, if not in others, 
receivership is finally delivered into the twenty first century. 
The Tripartite Relationship 
- 
Final Thoughts 
The foregoing sections have attempted to illustrate the manner in which the courts 
have approached the question of the duty construct within the tripartite relationship. 
What emerges is an unfortunate preoccupation with the 'wrong' status 
- 
that of 
mortgagee 
- 
rather than a robust and policy driven attempt to reconcile the tensions 
produced by the relationship itself The Insolvency Act was, at least in part, an 
attempt to take receivership law out of the nineteenth century, but one is left with 
the impression that nineteenth century law has yet to be taken out of receivership. 
As an institution, it is still viewed as a debt enforcement mechanism. This is 
inevitable. The Insolvency Act itself contains no provisions that might persuade a 
court to pursue a more 'rescue propelled' approach when determining what duties 
the receiver owes to the company. Even the Cork Committee, who clearly 
envisaged the possibility of a 'rescue' role for receivership, hesitated at 
recommending any express erosion of the receiver's 'primary' duty to his appointor 
in order to achieve a more global apportionment of the receiver's obligations. 
it is implicit in their Report that within the tripartite relationship the debenture- 
holder remains supreme in the receiver's deliberations. Nonetheless, that 
precedence need not always demand that the company's interests are of no 
consequence, and it is only in situations of obvious and irreconcilable conflict that 
they become irrelevant. 
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In the end, the categorisation of the receiver's duties as 'primary' and 'secondary' 
(as owed, respectively, to debenture-holder and company) is perhaps a little 
misleading, to the extent that it suggests the latter only operates when the former is 
not being pursued. It is more accurate to affirm that the receiver owes concurrent 
duties to both parties, but that the scope and content of his duty to the company is 
dependent upon and circumscribed by that owed to the debenture-holder. This is, 
roughly, the approach the courts have taken. What the receiver must do when 
pursuing his goal of discharging the secured debt is decided by reference to that 
goal, and his duty to preserve the welfare of the company cannot ever take 
precedence over it. Rescue, therefore, remains an incidental result of the main focus 
of receivership, and the courts have sanctioned this conclusion consistently enough 
to suggest that a change in emphasis in future is unlikely without legislative 
intervention 
This is unobjectionable, given the clear signal of the Cork Report and the 
Insolvency Act itself that the rights of secured creditors were not to be lightly 
interfered with. What is unsatisfactory with the present law is that it fails to explore, 
on a principled basis, the possibility of a receiver owing duties to the company 
which would require him to promote its interests where those of the debenture- 
holder are not, or are only marginally threatened. Thus it remains the law that he 
would appear to be under no obligation to pursue a going concern sale rather than 
an asset sale, even where the former would result in a better level of realisations, if 
the debenture-holder can be paid off by the latter. Similarly, he can pick and choose 
assets to sell without reference to their value to the company, and notwithstanding 
"' As to which see Chapter 5. 
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that the sale of several non-essential assets would realise sufficient to discharge the 
secured debt and allow the company to continue trading afterwards. 
This position is surely untenable in today's economic climate. It is one thing for the 
law to uphold the rights of secured creditors in priority to those of debtor 
companies, quite another to make no attempt to ensure that such is achieved in a 
proportionate manner. The professional acumen of the modem receiver should at 
least be required to be utilised to best effect, given that his capacity to influence the 
outcome of a receivership impacts upon so many parties. Receivers have the skills, 
the knowledge and the expertise to achieve more than the law appears to require of 
them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECEIVERS AND THIRD PARTIES: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION 
Introduction 
The preceding two Chapters consider the 'internal' aspects of receivership. The 
agency relationship between receiver and company, and the tripartite relationship 
comprising receiver, company and debenture-holder, have as their basis a 
contractual foundation from which the courts, having regard to the purpose of that 
contract, have assembled a duty structure designed to aid the accomplishment of 
that purpose. 
It emerges therefrom that the receiver's cardinal concern is the advantage of his 
appointor, and to the extent that the pursuit of this advantage necessitates 
impairment of the company as an economic entity the law's response is "so be it". 
This position is unqualified by considerations of the proportionate detriment and 
benefit to company and debenture-holder of a particular course of action. in any 
competition between company and appointor for the receiver's allegiance, the latter 
triumphs uncompromisingly. 
There is perhaps a certain rough justice in this position. Receivership is, after all, a 
symptom of the company's failure to meet its obligations to the debenture-holder, 
obligations it freely incurred in an arm's length arrangement. To expect a solicitous 
response from either the law or the lender in these circumstances is unrealistic. 
Banks are commercial enterprises' and it is not the function of the courts to force 
'See National Westminster Bankple v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821,825, per Lord Scan-nan. 
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them to behave otherwise, as to do so might have deleterious effects on the 
availability and cost of loan capital to non-defaulting companies, and so to the UK 
e conomy as a whole. Implicit in the jurisprudence of this area is a recognition that 
any erosion in the ability of lenders to recover money owed to them, especially if 
inspired by judicial tenderness towards the debtor, has repercussions outside the 
immediate transaction in question. The Cork Committee were resolute in this 
regard: 
"A sound banking and financial system is essential for the prosperity of the nation. It 
facilitates the exchange of goods and services and enables the most efficient use to be 
made of human and material resources. The provision of credit for trade and industry 
stimulates production and encourages enterprise as well as helping individuals and 
businesses over difficult economic times. These factors must in turn be matched by an 
acceptance by all involved that the sanctity of contract is fundamental to the existence 
of business relations and that unless businessmen maintain a sense of financial 
responsibility and integrity, trading will be drastically curtailed and the economy 
suffer according ly.,, 2 
Moreover, there is a sense that defaulting borrowers, when left to the mercy of a 
receiver, get no more than their just desserts: 
"The foundation of the whole credit world and the maintenance of respect for tile 
legal structure surrounding it, rests upon a belief in tile sanctity of contract; the parties 
involved, as borrower, as guarantor, or in any other capacity, must clearly understand 
that a failure to repay can result in the application of some form of effective 
sanction. "' 
Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee Crnnd. 8558, (1982 : HMSO 
London), para. 20 (hereinafter the Cork Report). 
I Ibid. para. 21. 
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This deference to the contractual arrangements of company and debenture-holder 
provides an ostensibly credible rejoinder to the charge that receivership is 'unfair' 
to the former, since it is, in law, taken to have accepted the appointment of a 
receiver as a consequence of its failure to meet its obligations. Furthermore, the 
general good demands the primacy of the lender be upheld if other borrowers are 
not to find their access to finance impaired. Both on a microcosmic and a 
macrocosmic level, the debenture-holder has the "legal high ground"'. 
The apparent imbalance of the tripartite relationship at the core of receivership can 
be partially explained in the above manner. But that relationship, central as it may 
be, is not the entirety of receivership law. It is axiomatic that a company deals with 
a wide variety of parties. Clearly receivership, or more accurately the manner in 
which the receiver goes about achieving his aim of discharging the debt owed to his 
appointor, will have ramifications for those outside of the immediate 
receiver/company/debenture-holder nucleus. The initial contract between company 
and lender, once consummated by an appointment, has external effects. 
it is with these that this Chapter and the next are concerned. Their focus is the 
extent to which the receiver can single-mindedly pursue his appointor's welfare, 
and whether or not the law circumscribes his freedom of action in this regard. It is 
unarguably the case that, as against the company, the debenture-holder's interests 
are prioritised, but can the same be said where they conflict with the interests of 
others, third parties whose subordination cannot be justified as a matter of contract? 
Or, as a corollary, in what circumstances does the law ordain that the welfare of a 
third party should take precedence to that of the debenture-holder, and on what 
'Receivers Revisited, Andrew Hogan (1996) Co Law 226,228. 
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political basis? This fascinating and abstruse pocket of law warrants close attention. 
It provides an insight into the policy considerations that have driven the 
development of 'receivership law' and, ironically, how frequently developments 
have occurred haphazardly and without reference to a unified conception of 
receivership. 
1. Dramatis Personae 
"Often 
... 
[in receivership] 
... 
the interests of secured creditors, general creditors and 
shareholders do not coincide. For example, the debenture-holders might be better 
served by an immediate sale of the company's plant and equipment; on the other 
hand, the unsecured creditors and shareholders might prefer the company to retain this 
property with a view to the later sale of the business as a going concern. "' 
O'Donovan identifies the company's unsecured creditors and shareholders as two 
groups invariably sensitive to the conduct of the receivership. Others include the 
company's directors, employees, preferential creditors, customers, and those 
secured creditors both junior and senior to the appointing debenture-holder. He also 
identifies the classic case in which debenture-holder and others come into conflict, 
namely where the former is over-secured so that his receiver need not strive to 
maximise realisations from the assets under his control. It should be noted, though, 
that where the external dimension of receivership is concerned, the above 
classification of participants is simplistic in the extreme, and the archetypal conflict 
situation by no means the only one which may arise. 
' 0' Donovan, The Duties of a Receiver and Manager Appointed Out of Court (1979) 12 MULR 52. 
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First, some stakeholderS6 may occupy a sort of 'dual status' in a receivership 
situation. Employees, for example, may be preferential creditors, 
. -unsecured 
creditors or even, if a share ownership scheme is in force, shareholders. So too its 
directors, if the company is small, will very likely have a sizeable equity 
investment. They may also have executed personal guarantees of the company's 
debts with the appointing debenture-holder', placing them in a doubly precarious 
position if the receiver, for whatever reason, fails to realise sufficient from the 
charged assets to pay off his appointor. 
Further, conflicts of interest do not only arise between the debenture-holder and 
external stakeholders. Where the latter are concerned, conflicts inter se are equally 
prevalent, the most obvious emerging from the legal priority afforded to preferential 
claimants, which inevitably diverts assets from the general body of creditors. This 
might be termed an organic conflict, inherent in the insolvency regime as a whole 
and separate from and unaffected by the receiver's strategy. More subtle are those 
conflicts spawned by his tactics during receivership, where one stakeholder benefits 
from a particular deployment decision at the expense of another. This outcome is 
particularly manifest where employees are concerned'. The point in question here is 
how, or whether the law provides guidance to the receiver on the resolution of such 
conflicts, whether they are between debenture-holder and other stakeholders, or 
between particular stakeholder subsets. 
6This convenient term is used henceforth to denote those parties or groups, other than the debenture- 
holder, with a financial interest in the conduct of the receivership. 
A likely scenario in the case of the small, owner-managed company. 
See Chapter 4. 
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1.2 The debenture-holder and extemal stakeholders: the basic position 
1.2.1 Proprietary prioribý 
The debenture's security confers upon him two separate but complementary 
'rights'. First, his superior entitlement to the secured property, where this exists, 
confers upon him proprietary priority. Where a formal insolvency regime' is 
instituted, that priority accords him 'first' claim upon the assets or their proceeds, 
unless he agrees to forego that entitlement. The standard 'global' security package 
extends to the entirety of the company's undertaking, subjecting every asset to 
either a fixed or a floating charge. Thus the debenture-holder's position is 
ostensibly favourable to that of external stakeholders. 
Proprietary priority, however, may not extend over the entirety of the undertaking. 
There may exist senior secured creditors, whose claim on a particular asset ranks 
ahead of that of the debenture-holder because it is prior in time or because the 
senior chargee and debenture-holder have negotiated to this effect. Moreover, 
statute intervenes to allocate a proportion of the asset pool to preferential creditors. 
Finally, the company may be in possession of assets which are not comprised in the 
debenture-holder's security, in that they are the subject of a valid retention of title 
clause or a hire-purchase or leasing arrangement. 
1.2.2 Deploment decision prioritv 
Where a receiver is appointed by the debenture-holder, the question arises as to 
whether, in devising a strategy, that receiver must prefer the interests of his 
' In this context receivership, administration or liquidation. 
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appointor over those of extemal stakeholders. Theoretically, where the debenture- 
holder enjoys proprietary priority he should also enjoy deployment decision 
priority. Given that he has first claim upon the assets in question, his receiver 
should be able to make decisions as to how they are to be marshalled solely in the 
appointor's interests. As a corollary, where proprietary priority rests with another 
party, the question arises as to whether the receiver should prefer that party's 
interests by deploying the assets in question in a manner best designed to advance 
that party's welfare. This latter question will only be of practical importance if the 
interests of the external stakeholder and the appointor are in conflict. 
In this Chapter, three stakeholder groups will be considered, namely the company's 
preferential creditors, its secured creditors (other then the appointing debenture- 
holder) and its guarantors, and its unsecured creditors. The treatment of employees 
is left to the next Chapter, largely because of the singular dilemmas their position 
raises and the possibility of amendments to the existing law. Within each group, the 
central question is the extent to which a receiver is compelled to modify a strategy 
he would otherwise have adopted in his appointor's interests. 
This involves, in some cases, an explanation of the historical development of the 
law, and an exposition of the rationale behind the legal position. It then remains to 
determine whether the prioritisation of the stakeholder in question is justified from 
a contemporary policy perspective. 
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Preferential Creditors" 
1. introduction 
Preferential creditors are not a group exclusive to receivership, but represent a 
feature of the insolvency law regime of considerable vintage. They comprise a body 
of creditors afforded 'special treatment' by an elevation of their claims above those 
of the general body of creditors and, to the extent that his claim relates to floating 
charge assets, the debenture-holder. One explanation of this favoured status is that, 
for the most part, preferential creditors are involuntary. Whilst the composition of 
this clique has altered over the years, a consistent member has been the Crown, in 
the form of various Revenue authorities, who have no choice but to extend credit to 
a trading company". The same cannot be said, at least in theory, of other of the 
company's trading partners. Nor can it be said, again theoretically, of the 
company's employees, but their unpaid wages and salary have featured as a 
category of preferential debts since their inception. 
1.2 Preferential Debts: Historical Overview 
Preferential debts have marked the insolvency map since 1888 and the Preferential 
Payments in Bankruptcy Act of that year. Originally they were only payable in a 
winding UP12 
, 
and comprised certain claims for parochial rates and taxes 
13 
and for 
unpaid wages and salaries". Such claims were, and remain, subject to the "costs of 
10 it is not proposed to embark upon a complete narration of the law in this area. This section focuses 
instead on how the existence of preferential creditors might influence the course of a receivership. 
For the simple reason that taxes are payable in arrears. 
Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888 s l(l). 
Ibid. s l(l)(a). 
"ibid. sI (1)(b)(c). 
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the administration" of the insolvent estate". Although there is little documentation 
regarding the thinking behind this statute, it is easily inferred that it was a response 
to the recognition by the Court of Chancery of the floating charge 16 
, 
with its 
propensity to attach to future property of the debtor company, so leaving all other 
creditors, including the Crown and employees, behind the debenture-holder. As a 
means of ensuring that the favoured debts were paid, the 1888 Act was deficient in 
that it took no account of receivership, and this state of affairs was remedied by the 
Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897, which applied to both winding up 
and receivership situations". 
As species of taxation and worker protection evolved, a series of Companies Acts 
embodied each new form as a category of preferential debt. The preferred mode was 
to enact the basic duty of the receiver to make payment in one section, and then to 
catalogue the relevant debts in another. The Insolvency Act 1986 saw a sharp volte 
face in this tendency towards the augmentation of categories of preferential debts. 
This was largely due to the deliberations of the Cork Committee and its recognition 
that traditional justifications for preferential status required reappraisal. The 
Committee's chief anxiety was the diversion of funds from unsecured to 
preferential creditors inherent in the regime", which was seen to 64militate against 
the principle of pari passu", and to operate "to the detriment of ordinary unsecured 
creditors"'9: 
" Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888 s 1(3). 
16 18 years earlier in Re Panama, New Zealand and. 4usiralian Royal Mail Co (1870) 10 Ch App 318. 
11 Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897 ss. 2,3. This Act repeated its predecessor's 
categories of claimant. 
" By s 40(3) IA and its predecessors, preferential payments can be recouped out of "assets of the 
company available for payment of general creditors. " 
" The Cork Report, supra n 2, para. 1398. 
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"We have received a considerable volume of evidence on this subject, most of it 
critical of the present law, and much of it deeply hostile to the retention of any system 
of preferential debts. We are left in no doubt that the elaborate system of priorities 
accorded by the present law is the cause of much public dissatisfaction, and that there 
is a widespread demand for a significant reduction, and even the complete 
elimination, of the categories of debts which are accorded priority in an insolvency. "" 
Whilst the Committee's sympathy seems obviously directed towards unsecured 
creditors, lending institutions similarly had a vested interest in the redistributional 
effects of the preferential regime" and, indeed, contributed vociferously to the 
debate at the consultation stage. In the face of such overwhelming opprobrium it 
should come as no surprise that the Crown's" priority position took something of a 
body blow in the Cork Report. 
The Committee proceeded upon the basis that any priority should be justified "by 
reference to principles of fairness and equity which would be likely to command 
general public acceptance"". Secondly, the fact that the Crown was an involuntary 
creditor in respect of unpaid taxes did not amount to sufficient justification for 
preferential status, largely because of the generous arsenal of remedies afforded 
revenue authorities by the State". Thirdly, the Committee considered that no 
distinction should be drawn between the Crown's involuntariness and the de facto 
Supra n 2, para. 1397. 
Floating charge assets being available to preferential creditors; supra 213. 
No brave soul appears to have suggested that employee's preferential status be modified. 
Supra n 2, para. 1398. 
24 Ihid. para. 1413. 
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involuntariness of trade creditors: 
"Many suppliers of goods and services are constrained to extend credit facilities in 
accordance with the custom of the trade. In a practical sense they have no real choice 
in the matter, and are sometimes unable to exercise credit control. "" 
Finally, the abrogation of the Crown's preferential status would not produce a 
significant net loss. Tax would be at least partially recouped from those unsecured 
creditors expected to receive an enhanced dividend in insolvency, thus allowing for 
a net decrease in the amount of bad debts written-off against profits". 
However, the preference accorded to taxes collected by the company` escaped the 
general recommendation for abolition: 
"We cannot think it right that statutory provisions enacted for the more convenient 
collection of revenue should enure to the benefit of private creditors. It would be 
commercially impractical to treat moneys collected for the Crown as impressed with a 
trust, and in these special circumstances we have formed the view that the retention 
of a measure of Crown preference is justified. "" 
The Committee was evidently following its own collective inclination, as well as 
acceding to the weight of the evidence presented to it, in recommending the 
abolition of Crown preferential status for. all but collected taxes. But this proposal 
had yet to clear the Parliamentary hurdle, and some might have predicted a marked 
disinclination on the part of the Government to accept a measure that would strip, 
rather than line its pockets. As Goode elegantly observes: 
Supra n 2, para. 1414. 
Ibid. para. 1416. The Committee's confidence that unsecured creditors would be the beneficiaries of 
an abolition of Crown preferences was perhaps misplaced, given the likely presence of a voracious 
floating charge. 
11 PAYE, National Insurance contributions and VAT: these categories reflect not so much the 
company's tax liability as that of someone else. 
28 Supra n 2, para. 1418. 
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"The priority of taxes has become so enshrined in the consciousness of tax authorities 
and their political masters that no amount of reasoning, however cogent, and no 
appeal on behalf of unsecured creditors, however compelling, seems to have the 
slightest effect upon those who rule over us. "" 
On this occasion, however, finding itself backed into a political corner, the 
executive relinquished its previous priority to the extent of the Committee's 
recommendations. The present law is to be found in Schedule 6 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986. The subset of 'collected taxes' continues to enjoy preferential status, as 
do employees' remuneration and certain of their pension scheme rights. Other 
cescapees' are car tax and betting and bingo duty". Ironically, additions to the 1986 
catalogue have arisen in the form of insurance premium tax, excise duty, lottery 
duty, air passenger duty and levies on coal and steel production". 
To complete the picture, it should be noted that preferential claims have always 
been subject to certain limits either in time or amount, so that a claimant falling into 
a relevant category might not be able to call for the entire amount of any debt due. 
It should further be noted that the status of preferential creditor is only germane in 
relation to debts incurred by the company prior to the appointment of a receiver. 
" Is the Law too Favourahle to Secured Creditors? (1983 
- 
1984) 8 Can. Bus. U 53,75. 
30 insolvency Act 1986, Schedule 6, paras. 4 and 5 respectively (hereinafter 'IA'). Quaere on what 
basis these items evaded abolition, since they appear not to be 'collected' taxes? 
31 Ibid. paras. 3A, 5A, 5B, 5C and I SA respectively. 
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2. Preferential debts 
- 
the basics of the law 
"In view of the fact that the priority of preferential debts over floating charges has 
been a feature of corporate insolvency law for almost one hundred years, and the 
practical significance of that priority, it is surprising that s. 40 [Insolvency Act 1986] 
and its predecessors have not given rise to more litigation. "" 
Anderson's surprise is not misplaced. He ascribes the relative paucity of case law 
on the matter to the fact that preferential creditors may lack information on which to 
base an action against a defaulting receiver and the liquidator's lack of locus standi 
under s 40. Given that elements of its operation remain unclear, it is only possible 
to state the law with certainty to a very limited extent. The ensuing propositions 
seem to be clearly established, and serve as a framework for the investigation that 
follows. 
2.1 Assets available to meet preferential claims 
Preferential creditors have priority over the company's unsecured creditors, and, to 
the extent that he is secured by a floating charge, the appointing debenture-holder. 
In spite of the wording of s 40 and its predecessors", it is unequivocally established 
that this priority is only conferred overfloating charge assets. In Re Lewis Merthyr 
Consolidated Collieries Ltd 34 Tomlin J held that the proceeds of any fixed charge 
assets were unavailable to preferential creditors under s 78 Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908, rationalising the position thus: 
" Hamish Anderson, Receivership Preferential Creditors: Prior Floating Charges, Trading Receipts, 
Work in Progress andAllocation ofFees and Expenses (1994) 15 Co Law 195. 
" Preferential debts to be paid in priority to any claim for principal or interest. 
34 [1929] 1 Ch 498. 
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I quite understand that in regard to a floating charge there may be a reason for giving 
the priority, because until the receiver is appointed or possession is taken, the charge 
does not crystallise, and it may well be said that this particular class of debts, which 
may perhaps have contributed to produce the very assets upon which the floating 
charge will crystallise, are proper to be paid out of those assets before the debenture- 
holder takes his principal and interest out of them. That seems to me to be a perfectly 
intelligible reason for the legislation... "" 
Gough, citing the remarks to similar effect of Barwick CJ and Kitto J in Stein v 
Saywell", dubs this "value-added reasoning" and considers that: 
"... [it] may have had some relevance in the context of employee remuneration but it 
hardly applied in relation to taxation and rating liabilities. "" 
With respect, it is submitted that the notion that unpaid taxes or rates add to the 
overall value of the floating charge in fact stands up to scrutiny. Just as the (unpaid) 
labour of the company's employees goes to produce benefit, so too does the amount 
of monies that should have been forwarded to the relevant revenue authority. In 
other words, the company may have been spending sums that should have been set 
aside for tax payments on assets that go to swell the floating charge. 
A more persuasive objection to the "value-added" reasoning is that preferential 
debts do not include claims of trade creditors who have supplied floating charge 
assets to the company on credit, thus adding value, but who remain unsecured in a 
receivership. This seeming anomaly is in turn explained by the special 'involuntary' 
nature of those debts owing to taxation authorities, and the policy of employee 
protection favoured by successive legislatures. 
35 [ 1929] 1 Ch 498,508. Tomlin J's judgment was upheld in the Court of Appeal. 
36 (1969) 121 CLR 529. 
37 WJ Gough, Company Charges (1996: Butterworths : London), 988. 
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2.1.1 'Clawing back' assets through contract 
The past twenty five years or so have seen a marked erosion of the categories of 
assets that can be mustered under the 'floating' epithet. Preferential debts represent 
an overt assault on the ability of a lender to cordon off a company's property 
against outsiders in the event of insolvency. Perhaps not surprisingly, banks and 
other lenders have countered the consequences of the preferential regime by 
recourse to a number of contractual devices designed to defeat it. 
One such contrivance was the 'automatic crystallisation clause"', whereby a 
floating charge would crystallise on the happening of a specified event, that event 
envisaged to take place before the appointment of a receiver. Upon that 
appointment, therefore, all the company's assets would be subject to a fixed charge 
and so unavailable to preferential creditors". Whilst such clauses have been 
judicially recognised as effective 40 their usefulness in this regard has been largely 
neutralised by s 40(l) Insolvency Act 1986, which directs payment to be made out 
of assets subject to a charge "which, as created, was a floating charge"". 
A more potent method of avoiding the devaluation of security inherent in the 
preferential regime is to subject as many 'asset groups' as possible to a fixed 
charge, thus reducing the overall proportion of the security to which preferential 
claimants may have recourse. This manoeuvre is most visible with regard to the 
practice of taking a fixed charge over the book debts of a company". Book debts, as 
" This matter is covered only briefly here. For a fuller treatment see Farrar (1976) 40 Conv. (N. S. ) 
397; Boyle [1979] JBL 231; Lingard, Bank Security Documents, 3rd ed. (1993 : Butterworths 
London), paras. 9.20 
- 
9.3 1. 
39 See, e. g., In re Griffin Hotel Co Ltd [ 194 11 Ch 129; Re Brightlife Ltd [ 1987] Ch 200. 
4' Re Brighilifie Ltd [19871 Ch 200,212 per Hoffmann J. 
11 italics added. 
42 See Siebe Gorman & Co v Barclays Bank [ 1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 142. 
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a genus of property, ostensibly sit most comfortably under the 'floating charge' 
head, in that they display the three characteristics identified by Romer LJ in Re 
Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd4' as indicative of such a security. They are 
a) a class of assets of a company present or future, which b) will change from time 
to time in the ordinary course of business, and which c) the company may, until 
intervention, use in the ordinary course of business. 
By compromising the ability of the company to deal with its book debts freely, 
lenders have been able to subject a remarkably fruitful species of property to a 
security invulnerable to preferential creditors. This position is largely achieved by 
the imposition of restrictions on the use to which book debts and their proceeds 
may be put by the debtor company. This in practice entails the lender requiring the 
company "to pay the proceeds of the book debts into a bank account either with or 
in the name of or to the order of or in trust for the chargee"". 
The courts have upheld this stratagem, notwithstanding that it was concocted 
simply in order to divert assets away from those creditors the legislature had seen fit 
to accord priority. Indeed, in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd", the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the parties' ability to subject 'book debts' to a fixed charge and their 
proceeds to a floating charge, thus removing the need to provide for the payment of 
book debts into a special account in order to preserve their fixed charge status". 
It is arguable that the law has taken a wrong turn in this regard, and that the ease 
" [190312 Ch 284,295. 
" Lightman and Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies, 2nd ed. (1994 : Sweet & Maxwell 
London), (hereinafter Lightman & Moss), para. 3-11. 
45 [1994] BCC 36. 
46 This case has prompted some stimulating academic debate, most notably Goode and Berg's 
exchange; see (1994) 110 LQR 592; [1995] JBL 433. 
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with which the parties to the original debenture can structure their contract 
deliberately to avoid the executively conferred rights of strangers to that contract is 
unfortunate. The likely reality is that contractual restraints on dealing with book 
debts are little more than window dressing, those restraints being lifted as soon as 
proceeds are paid into the designated account, thus allowing fixed charge assets to 
be treated by both lender and creditor as floating charge assets. Form masters 
substance blatantly in this area of law. 
The courts willingness to allow lenders to draft their way out of a statutory 
initiative is perhaps symptomatic of the general aversion to which the entire system 
of preferential payments has been subject. However, unless and until the legislature 
sees fit to abolish them" it is reasonable to question how far this contractual 
freedom should be allowed to develop, and whether the present position is 
expedient. A brief survey of any standard form debenture reveals that freehold and 
leasehold property, fixtures, plant, machinery, vehicles, computers, office 
equipment, stocks, shares, bonds, other securities, book debts, uncalled capital, 
goodwill, patents, trademarks, copyrights and licenses all stand subject to a fixed 
charge 
48 
. 
It would be interesting to compare the proportions of fixed and floating charge 
assets in such a document to those in debentures from 1929, when Re Lewis 
Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd49 was decided. If, as Tomlin J suggests, 
"value-added reasoning" explains the preferential regime, that policy is severely 
undermined by permitting fixed charges to be taken over book debts, those debts 
As to which see Chapter 5. 
See, e. g., Lingard, supra n 38,348. 
Supra n 34. 
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themselves being a product, at least in part, of floating charge assets. In the final 
analysis, given the continued existence of preferential debts, judicial affirmation 
that no questions of public policy are raised by such contractual machinations" 
must surely be dubious. 
2.2 The receiver's duty to make preferential pavments 
Whilst endorsing the ability of chargees to drain the asset pool out of which 
preferential creditors are to be paid, the courts have remained resolute in their 
determination that a receiver has a positive duty to meet preferential claims. Thus a 
receiver will be liable in the tort of breach of statutory duty if he uses floating 
charge assets to pay other creditors ahead of preferential creditors". The position is 
summed up by Danckwerts J in Westminster Corp. v Haste: 
"To my mind [s. 264(l) Companies Act 1929] is not simply a negative provision 
which means that the receiver is protected if he simply does not pay the debenture- 
holders: it is a provision which requires him to pay the preferential creditors out of 
any assets coming to the hands of him as receiver. Therefore, it seems to me that, if he 
has had any assets out of which this payment could have been made, he is under a 
liability in tort to the plaintiffs. "" 
Further, a receiver, on being removed from office, cannot hand over the proceeds of 
floating charge assets to his successor without accounting to the preferential 
creditors". Goode suggests, correctly it is submitted, that a receiver who wrongfully 
pays his appointing debenture-holder will be entitled to an indemnity to the extent 
" See, e. g., Re Brightfife Lid, supra n 39; Re New Bullas Trading Ltd, supra n 45. 
"Woods v Winskill[1913]2 Ch303; Westminster City Council v Treby[193612 All ER21. 
52 [195011 Ch442,447. 
11 IRCv Goldblatt [1972] Ch 498,505, per Goff J. 
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of the payment, and that the preferential creditors in such a case can sue the 
debenture-holder directly for procuring a breach of statutory duty or attempt to 
render him liable as constructive trustee". It has also been held that the company 
can maintain an action against a receiver who fails to pay preferential debts". 
In summary, therefore, the law prescribes that a receiver is under a statutory duty to 
discharge the claims of the company's preferential creditors out of assets the subject 
of a floating charge created as such, the quantum of those claims being determined 
at the date of appointment". This seemingly plain proposition will now be 
examined in greater depth in an attempt to identify elements of its operation that 
remain unclear. 
3. Assets available to meet preferential claims: further questions 
3.1 The prior floating charge problem 
There remains some doubt as to whether a receiver appointed under a junior 
floating charge may use assets subject to a senior floating charge to pay those 
preferential debts arising on his appointment. In Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank p1c" 
Morritt J held that such were unavailable to preferential creditors, since the 
receiver's s 40 duty conferred priority only in respect of floating charge assets 
comprised in those debentures under which he was appointed. Anderson notes that 
a literal interpretation of the wording of s 40 appears to produce this result, but 
adds: 
54 Some Aspects ofReceivership Law [1981] JBL 473,476-477. 
15 Westminster Corp. v Chapman [ 1916] 1 Ch 16 1. 
" Schedule 6 IA. 
57 [1994] 1 WLR 1427. 
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"... it must be acknowledged that such an interpretation would not be entirely 
consistent with what is ostensibly the scheme of the legislation. "" 
Furthermore, citing In re Glyncorrwg Colliery Co Ltd" and Re Christonette 
International Ltd", he notes that the scheme of payment of preferential debts in a 
receivership should equate to that in a liquidation, a principle from which the 
Griffiths case departs. 
Anderson's misgivings were shared by Neuberger J in Re H&K (Medway) Ltd", 
and to such an extent that he declined to follow Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank p1c, 
preferring a purposive approach to s 40. The learned judge appeared especially 
concerned at the likelihood of collusive avoidance techniques being adopted by 
secured creditors in order to thwart preferential claims: 
"... a well-advised chargee or prospective chargee could effectively avoid the 
consequences of s 40 with ease 
... 
an actual or prospective chargee [could require] the 
borrower to execute a second floating charge in favour of a nominee of the chargee, 
with a view to any receiver then being appointed by the nominee 
... 
Further, in a case 
where the company is in difficulties and there are a number of chargees falling within 
s 40(l), those chargees would be able to get together and ensure that it is tile lowest 
ranking chargee who appoints a receiver, so that the rest of the chargees are free from 
s40. )ý62 
He therefore held that any assets subject to a floating charge were available to meet 
preferential claims, whether or not there existed floating charges prior to that under 
which the receiver was appointed. 
" Receivership Preferential Creditors supra n 32,196. 
19 [1926] Ch 95 1. 
60 [ 1982] 3 All ER 225. 
61 [ 1997] Ch 32 1. 
62 Ihid, 3326. 
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It is submitted that the reasoning in Re H&K (Medway) Ltd is to be preferred. In 
IRC v Goldblatt" a scheme to avoid making payment of preferential debts whereby 
one receiver was replaced by another was frustrated by Goff J, who considered such 
collaboration contrary to legislative intent. A pre-receivership stratagem designed 
to achieve the same effect should be treated similarly. However, given two 
conflicting first instance decisions and no higher authority on this matter an element 
of uncertainty must persist, and one which might cause receivers concern in future. 
If the Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank approach is correct a receiver paying over senior 
floating charge assets to preferential creditors might be open to an action in the tort 
of conversion by senior chargees. On the other hand, if a receiver pays the senior 
floating chargee on the authority of Griffiths, and if Re H&K Medway is preferred, 
the possibility of an action in the tort of breach of statutory duty at the behest of 
preferential creditors cannot be discounted. A resolution of this question from the 
Court of Appeal would be desirable. 
3.2 The trading decision problem 
"... it is essential that the receiver earmarks funds for preferential claims as early as 
possible. He will then be able to consider what funds are available to him should he 
decide to trade on. ý164 
A perennial quandary faced by receivers is the extent to which they may utilise 
assets subject to a floating charge in trading activities designed to enhance 
realisations. The Insolvency Act gives no guidance on this point, the precise content 
" Supra n 53. 
' Samwell, Corporate Receiverships (1981 : ICAEW : London), 68. 
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of the s 40 duty to pay preferential creditors remaining obscure. Anderson, in his 
accomplished article Receivership Preferential Creditors", identifies several 
unanswered questions raised by s 40 and is frequently compelled to second-guess 
the approach of the courts. Since the decision whether to trade or not is likely to be 
critical to the outcome of any receivership, the fact that the repercussions of s 40 on 
such decision have yet to be fully elucidated is something of an eccentricity in the 
receivership realm. 
In the first place, it is necessary to decide whether a receiver is legally entitled to 
utilise floating charge assets in trading at all. In other words, does the s 40 duty 
require him to pay preferential claims immediately he is appointed, and so to realise 
any assets available for such claims without delay? Prior to the enactment of s 
264(l) Companies Act 1929 a receiver was directed to make payment "forthwith", 
which might suggest that any use of floating charge assets other than in discharge of 
preferential debts was prohibited. The subsequent omission of the word "forthwith" 
may denote that immediate payment is no longer called for, thus offering the 
receiver some scope for the employment of such assets in trading activities. To the 
extent that the value of those assets" is depreciated by any dealings, the receiver 
would be personally liable to make up the difference" but the potential benefits of 
trading on might be assessed as neutralising such a risk. 
Lightman and Moss, in considering whether a receiver may utilise stock and work 
in progress, offer the following: 
" Supra n 32. 
66 As determined at the date of appointment. 
61 Woods v Winskill, supra n51; Westminster Corporation v Haste, supra n 52. 
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"The preferential creditors have first call on their realisable value. But their value if 
the receiver decides not to trade is likely to be very low indeed, and trading inay be 
essential if any beneficial realisation is to be achieved. If the receiver decides that he 
should prudently trade on, he will inevitably use such assets, and this method of 
realisation should not ordinarily expose the receiver to liability if tile initial decision 
can reasonably be justified in the interests of the preferential creditors, even if in fact 
(notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable diligence and expertise) the endeavour 
fails to produce additional funds for them. "" 
This seems in principle correct, especially as preferential creditors are protected by 
the receiver's personal liability should trading diminish the assets available to them. 
It must also be open to a receiver to agree with such creditors that he will be able to 
conduct trading activities with 'their' assets, and such an agreement would surely 
shield him from any personal liability that might arise in the circumstances 
Lightman and Moss describe. 
A closely linked question is whether a receiver is under any duty to realise floating 
charge assets at all if such a course is not necessary to discharge the debt due to the 
debenture-holder. If, for example, that debt can be repaid from fixed charge 
realisations, should the receiver nonetheless sell floating charge assets in order to 
satisfy preferential claims? Hatton and Cooke regard this matter as unclear 69 
, 
but 
since s 40(2) Insolvency Act refers to "assets coming to the hands of the receiver", 
rather than "the proceeds" of any such assets it must be implicit in the legislation 
that they are to be realised, whether the debenture-holder requires such realisations 
or not. This reasoning is supported by the decision of Carnwath J in Re Pearl 
"Supra n 44, para. 8-08. 
" Fixed Charge Surplus 
- 
The Argument is Over f 198511 L&P, 137,139. 
223 
Maintenance Services Ltdo, where the leamed judge held that receivers should pay 
over book debts of the company collected after repayment of the appointing 
debenture-holder. 
Finally, if a trading receivership is decided upon, it seems unarguable that any 
assets of a floating charge nature acquired post-appointment will be available to 
preferential creditors. Goode puts the matter thus: 
"It seems that all assets potentially within the scope of a floating charge are brought 
within s. 94 [Companies Act 1948] on the appointment of a receiver, even though 
those assets do not come into existence until after the charge has crystallised. So the 
appointment of a receiver or the occurrence of any earlier crystallising event does not 
limit the scope of s. 94 to assets in which the company then has an interest; future 
assets picked up under an after-acquired property clause are also caught, even though 
as to these the charge is fixed ab initio. "' 
If this correctly reflects the position under s 94 Companies Act 1948, as it surely 
does, then the reasoning applies a fortiori to s, 40 Insolvency Act, which directs 
payment out of assets subject to a charge which as created was a floating charge". 
In effect, therefore, should a receiver buy in stock such acquisitions will be 
available to pay preferential creditors. 
3.3 The apportionment problem 
As noted above, costs, expenses and remuneration of the receiver in general rank 
ahead of both debenture-holder and preferential debtS7' These may be substantial 74 
70 [ 1995] BCC 657. 
71 Some Aspects ofReceivership Law, supra n 54,475. 
72 Anderson reaches the same conclusion, supra n 32,196-197. 
73 In re Glyncorrwg Colliery Co Ltd [ 1926] Ch 95 1. 
74 For example, the secured debt in Re GL Saunders [1986] BCLC 40 amounted to E302,000, 
receivership costs weighing in at E270,000. 
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It would obviously be in the interests of the debenture-holder that such costs be 
satisfied out of floating charge assets as far as possible, but the perceived wisdom is 
that they should be taken rateably out of both classes of assee'. 
A further 'apportioment' question relates to the value to be attributed to different 
classes of assets by the receiver. Doyle notes that: 
"It is of significant practical importance 
... 
that an accurate and true allocation is 
made by the administrative receiver of the extent to which expenses of the 
receivership are to be met as between fixed and floating charges, since the greater the 
degree to which they are to be borne by any floating charge assets the less the amount 
available for discharging preferential debts. "" 
Where assets are sold on a break-up basis no problems should arise for preferential 
creditors, but a going concern sale represents a greater danger. It is feasible that the 
receiver's duty to take reasonable steps to obtain the true market value of property 
sold" will be discharged if the price for the business is viewed as realistic by the 
court. If a purchaser 'haggles' over stock and persuades the receiver to accept a 
lower than cost price, but nonetheless pays a sensible amount for the enterprise as a 
whole it must be arguable that no breach of duty occurs. In any event, it is unlikely 
that this particular duty is owed to preferential creditors as a group, the courts 
having confined its application to the comPany/mortgagor and those parties 
interested in the equity of redemption, a collection that does not readily admit of 
preferential creditors. 
'5 Lightman and Moss, supra n 44, para. 21-20 (conceding that the point is not free from doubt); 
Anderson, supra n 32,202. 
76 Doyle, Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice (1995 : FT Law and Tax : London), 286- 
287. 
" See Chapter 2. 
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A striking example of 'creative apportionment' can be seen from the facts of Re The 
Real Meat Co Ltd (In Receivership): 
"The consideration of E61,817 was apportioned to the assets purchased by RMP as follows: (i) 
goodwill 
- 
fl, (ii) plant, machinery and office equipment 
- 
E3,999, (iii) stock (comprising meat in 
the course of delivery) 
- 
El, (iv) book debts 
- 
F, 57,815, (v) completed sales, customer records and all 
f other assets 
- '1 .,, 
78 
Preferential creditors were in this case owed L10,792. If the company's book debts, 
goodwill and plant were subject to a fixed charge (as is usually the case), they 
would receive the princely sum of E2. 
It is inordinately difficult to see how preferential creditors might attack such an 
allotment of consideration, especially if, as postulated above, a receiver owes them 
no duty in relation to the price obtained on a sale. The nature of the market for 
receivership companies is such that it will be the purchaser who is in a position to 
dictate terms, and a demand for such items as stock at a 'knock-down' price may be 
common. It is hardly realistic to expect a receiver to attempt to realise them 
separately, since the expense of such a strategy may not justify it being adopted, 
and, in any case, may jeopardise the sale of the business itself if the potential 
purchaser stands his ground. 
Perhaps the best that can be said here is that the receiver should at least try to 
negotiate the price of floating charge assets upwards. To the extent that he does so, 
in the absence of fraud (which it is not suggested would be a serious proposition in 
these circumstances), he ought not to come under any liability to disappointed 
preferential creditors. The point remains undecided by the courts and so the 
78 [1996] BCC 254,257, per Chadwick J. 
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legitimacy or otherwise of this procedure cannot be stated with any confidence. It 
may be the case that preferential creditors have hitherto been somewhat relaxed in 
their scrutiny of the allocation of going concern consideration. A more searching 
investigation on their part might in future give rise to some illuminating litigation. 
4. The effect of preferential debts on receivership: proprietary and deployment 
decision priority 
1 Proprietary priori 
The interests of preferential creditors may clearly influence the conduct of a 
receivership. Their proprietary priority over a certain class of assets has the 
potential to prejudice the appointor to the extent that assets to which he could have 
recourse are redirected to such claimants. That priority, though, may be effectively 
corroded by pre-receivership contractual devices, such as subjecting as many asset 
groups as possible to a fixed charge invulnerable to the demands of preferential 
debts. 
Moreover, a well-advised chargee considering the appointment of a receiver will 
pay close attention to the content of each class of his security, and may time any 
appointment to coincide with the moment when the fixed charge element is gravid 
with assets and the floating charge element correspondingly barren. This will most 
obviously be possible where the company in question has a seasonal factor to its 
production. To take a (perhaps) extreme example, the assets of a fireworks 
manufacturer will, from summer to autumn, be comprised largely of stock and work 
in progress (floating charge constituents), whereas after November 5th will chiefly 
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consist of book debts (fixed charge constituents)". Such tactical appointments are, 
from a legal point of view, unassailable. 
The debenture-holder himself may therefore act to protect his security from being 
ravaged by preferential claims, but it would seem that a receiver may not. This is 
largely a result of his personal liability to the extent that he pays away or exhausts 
floating charge assets which were, on his appointment, notionally available to meet 
preferential debts. The s 40 duty is unqualified by the best interests of the 
debenture-holder in this respect. Proprietary priority remains with the preferential 
creditors and, whilst pre-receivership devices may serve to diminish it the receiver 
himself may not employ similar tactics, such as using floating charge assets for 
trading purposes, without running the risk of attracting personal liability. 
4.2 Deployment decision priori 
Deployment decision priority is a different matter. The preceding discussion 
suggests that the promotion of the best interests of the preferential creditors does 
not form part of the s 40 duty. Certainly, where the debenture-holder's welfare 
decrees a disposal of fixed charge assets only, whilst the receiver will arguably be 
under a duty to realise floating charge assets for the benefit of the preferential 
creditors, it is submitted that that duty does not enjoin him to maxiniise any 
realisations. In other words, he can dispose of such property as quickly as possible 
by the most convenient means and need not take the kind of trouble, or exercise the 
" The author cannot take credit for this splendid example, which was provided by an insolvency 
practitioner with considerable experience of the timing of appointments. 
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professional expertise usually associated with his dealings in relation to assets being 
disposed of for the benefit of the debenture-holder. 
It is doubtful whether the duty to take reasonable steps to obtain the true market 
value of the property is owed to preferential creditors, and in any event, on the 
authority of Cuckmere Brick Co v Mutual Finance", the receiver will be free to 
choose the appropriate mode of sale. 
Further, there is the possibility that a going concern sale in the debenture-holder's 
interests may operate detrimentally to preferential creditors, in that the sum realised 
in relation to floating charge assets may be less than that which could be obtained if 
such were sold singly. Again, it is submitted that the selection of such a course 
ought not to subject the receiver to any personal liability. If asked to decide the 
point, the courts should have due regard to the market constraints under which 
receivers operate and the special nature of the sale in question. To require him to 
choose between the advantage of his appointor and that of preferential creditors, is 
simply untenable. Only the most blatant examples of false apportionment (for 
instance, where it can be shown that the receiver himself, without any prompting by 
the purchaser, has allocated a risibly low portion of the overall consideration to 
floating charge assets) should attract the attention of the courts, although on what 
basis remains unclear". 
It should be acknowledged that the receiver's personal liability to preferential 
creditors may, in practice, have some bearing on deployment decision priority. In 
[1971] Ch 949. 
Quaere whether the offence of cheating the public revenue would be committed here? See 
Ormerod, Cheating the Public Revenue [ 1998] Crim. LR 627. 
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the consultation process preceding the Cork Report the following observation was 
made: 
"... it seems unduly onerous that [a receiver] should be personally liable to pay 
preferential debts to the extent that assets had been available to pay thern. The 
practical result is that the receiver sometimes decides to close the business, 
abandoning the possibility of selling it as a going concern, merely to protect himself 
against claims by preferential creditors. "" 
Such detrimentally defensive practice is most likely to be adopted where a trading 
strategy is viewed as being more than usually speculative. There is no empirical 
evidence that this is a widespread problem", and, indeed, may be resolved by 
agreement between receiver and debenture-holder that an indemnity will be 
provided against the former's personal liability should a scheme to trade on turn out 
badly. With respect, given that the completion and sale of work in progress will 
almost invariably enhance value, this predicament is probably more imagined than 
real, and the modern, professionally qualified receiver is more than capable of 
taking justified risks and deciding against unjustified ones. Personal liability, it is 
suggested, remains justified, if only as a brake on the arrogation of foolhardy tactics 
that may prejudice not only the company's preferential creditors but also all other 
stakeholders". 
11 Memorandum by the Joint Working Party of the Law Reform Committees of the Senate of the Inns 
of Court and the Bar and the Law Society on Insolvency: The Law of Receivership, 15. 
To the contrary, trading on seems to be the norm; see Chapter 5. 
in this respect it resembles liability for wrongful trading: see IA s 214. 
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The position of chargees senior to the appointing debenture-holder 
1. Potential prejudice to productive reeeiverships'? 
"... a sale by a mortgagee under a charge by way of legal mortgage overreaches the 
equity of redemption and all rights subsisting in the equity... "" 
The rights subsisting in the equity of redemption are transferred into any surplus 
from the proceeds of such a sale. Thus a sale executed by a debenture-holder" will 
operate to transfer the property to a purchaser free of any junior mortgages. A 
mortgagee cannot overreach securities senior to his own in like manner. By s 
104(l) Law of Property Act 1925 a mortgagee has power to convey the property 
sold free from all interests over which he has priority, but "-subject to all estates, 
interests, and rights which have priority to the mortgage". 
The power to overreach junior secured creditors is eminently convenient in the 
context of enforcement of security. It allows a sale of charged property to take place 
without the need for the chargee to seek out holders of inferior charges and obtain a 
release of the property from those charges. It renders the property itself more 
attractive to a potential purchaser, who may acquire it safe in the knowledge that no 
hidden encumbrancer will later emerge to challenge his title. The inverse 
proposition is that the inability to overreach senior chargees is extremely 
bothersome. This is particularly so in a receivership situation, where it is sought to 
sell the business as a going concern and a strategic asset of that business is subject 
to a prior-ranking charge. 
Duke v Robson [ 197311 WLR 267,272 per Plowman J. 
But not, semble, a receiver: see infra 234. 
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The Cork Committee were alive to this predicament, and addressed it in the 
following terms: 
"The fragmentation of security 
... 
occasioned by the creation of a number of charges 
over different assets of the debtor in favour of several different creditors, makes it 
difficult and sometimes impossible for an insolvent's assets to be realised to their best 
advantage... "" 
The Committee's response was as follows: 
"The introduction of necessary powers to stay and, if required, override the rights of 
certain secured creditors in appropriate circumstances and for a strictly limited period, 
is essential if our objective is to be attained. "" 
Interestingly, receivership and the newly conceived administration order procedure 
were treated in tandem, the Committee making the same recommendations in 
relation to both regimes. These were that: 
a) for twelve months after the appointment of an administrator or an administrative 
receiver it should be unlawful for a secured creditor to seek to enforce his security 
without the officer's consent or leave of the court; and 
b) both administrative receivers and administrators should be empowered, with the 
leave of the court and on such terms as the court saw fit, to dispose of the property 
of the company free from security. The owner of the charge would be entitled to the 
proceeds of such a sale, and, to the extent that they fell short of the court's valuation 
of the property, an amount necessary to make up that deficit". 
Evidently these two powers were viewed as complementary, and their application in 
The Cork Report, supra n 2, para. 1506 
]bid. para. 1507. 
Ibid. paras. 1508-1512. 
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receivership as a testament to that institution's potential as a corporate rescue 
mechanism. 
2. The Government's response: s 43 Insolvency Act 1986. 
In relation to receivers, only the second of the Cork Committee's 'package' of 
proposals was accepted by the GoverrimentAn the. rather compact White Paper that 
succeeded the Cork Report the recommendation for a moratorium on enforcement 
proceedings was tersely rejected: 
"These proposals are not acceptable. The Government believes that only a court- 
appointed official, the administrator, whose duty will be to act in the interests of all 
creditors and shareholders, should enjoy such temporary protection. "" 
The recommendation that an administrative receiver" should potentially be able to 
dispose of property subject to a prior-ranking security was enacted in s 43 
Insolvency Act 1986, which reads as follows: 
"Where, on an application by the administrative receiver, the court is satisfied that the 
disposal (with or without other assets) of any relevant property which is subject to a 
security would be likely to promote a more advantageous realisation of the company's 
assets than would otherwise be effected, the court may by order authorise the 
administrative receiver to dispose of the property as if it were not subject to the 
security. "" 
Section 43(l) applies only to securities held by persons other than the receiver's 
appointor, and only to securities senior to that of the appointor". Doyle has argued 
that it also applies in relation to junior charges, notwithstanding, as he concedes, 
"A Revised Frameworkfor Insolvency Law (1984 : HMSO: London), para. 34. 
Non-administrative receivers do not enjoy the s. 43 power. 
1A s 43(l). 
ibid. s. 43(2). 
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the clear wording of s 43(2), since otherwise a receiver has no means of disposing 
of such property without the co-operation of the chargee or his own debenture- 
holder'94. Whilst such a construction would eliminate a minor inconvenience 
associated with receivership sales, it is submitted that the decision of Chadwick J in 
Re the Real Meat Co Ltd (in receivership) controverts it9'. The proceeds of a 
disposal under s. 43(l) are to be applied towards the discharge of sums previously 
secured, and to the extent that those proceeds are less than the open market value of 
the property, as determined by the court, the deficiency is to be made good, 
presumably out of sums that would otherwise go to the debenture-holder". 
The enactment of what was arguably one half of a rescue orientated whole is 
intriguing, the only clue to the Government's perspective on this matter being that 
an administrator, to whom the benefit of a stay on enforcement proceedings was 
granted, was said to be under a duty to act in the interests of all creditors and 
shareholders, It is therefore possible to infer that an enforcement embargo during 
receivership, where no such duty inures, was perceived as one step too far in favour 
of chargeholders. A fascinating insight into the executive's perception of 
receivership as a rescue mechanism is to be found tucked away in the White Paper: 
"It is hoped 
... 
that the new insolvency mechanism, the administration procedure 
will go some way to replacing receivership where there is a reasonable prospect of a 
company, or part of a company, being maintained as a going concern. "" 
The enforcement prohibition exclusive to administration might, therefore, have 
been intended as bait to financial institutions understandably reluctant to cede the 
94 Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 76,237. 
11 [ 19961 BCC 254,262-263. 
" IA s 43(3)(a)(b) 
97 Supra n 90, para. 24. 
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undoubted advantages of receivership. The extent to which the bait has been taken 
18 is examined later 
. 
3. The operation of s 43: guesswor 
The ability of an administrative receiver, with the sanction of the court, to override 
a senior secured creditor appears ostensibly attractive to a number of parties, most 
notably the appointor. Doyle remarks: 
"Potentially and practically, this power 
... 
is an extremely useful one to an 
administrative receiver who is faced with an unco-operative prior-ranking charge 
holder. Section 43 also robs a prior-ranking chargee of the important rights of timing 
and conduct of the realisation of the prior-charged assets. "" 
The power might have been more useful still had it been coextensive with that of an 
administrator, whose disposal entitlement extends to hire-purchase agreements, 
which in turn comprise property subject to conditional sale agreements, chattel 
leasing agreements and retention of title agreements"'. It seems that the additional 
empowerment of the administrator was intended as a 'selling point' for the 
administration regime. If this is correct, that object has been somewhat frustrated by 
judicial intervention which has the effect of assimilating, in this context, 
receivership with administration'o' 
In the event, s 43 turns out to be something of a damp squib, there being no 
reported cases on it. Its most obvious utility would appear to be in circumstances 
where an administrative receiver is contemplating a going concern sale of the 
See Chapter 5. 
Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 76,28-29. 
IA s 15(l), (2)(b), (9). 
See infra 295. 
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company's entire under-taking, to which a senior chargee is opposed because of the 
possibility of a rising market in the property secured by his charge. Without the 
benefit of judicial consideration of s 43 it is difficult to predict how a court might 
approach a receiver's application. 
The similar, but wider power of an administrator contained in s 15 Insolvency Act 
02 
1986 was considered by Knox J in Re AR V Aviation Ltd' where a secured creditor 
disputed the administrator's valuation of the property. Whilst the case is not 
precisely germane to the present discussion, some notable obiter observations were 
forthcoming. In relation to s 15(5) Knox J had this to say: 
"I accept that the intention of subs. (5) should be assumed to be the protection to the 
maximum practicable extent of the rights of the secured creditor and, without 
necessarily deciding the point 
... 
it does seem to me that it was not the intention of s. 
15(5)(b) to introduce as a figure for the amount which would be realised on a sale of 
the property in an open market by a willing vendor, anything which was significantly 
less than what one would anticipate the secured creditor could himself realise. That 
would seem to me to be an intention that it would be capricious to attribute to 
Parliament which, a priori, would not he anxious to dilute the rights and security of a 
secured creditor. 1)103 
Further, his Lordship noted that: 
...... it appears to me that the court has to make a balancing exercise between the 
prejudice that would be felt by the secured creditor if the order is made against the 
prejudice that would be felt by those interested in the promotion of the purposes 
specified in the administration order. ""' 
102 (1988) 4 BCC 708. 
101 ]bid 712 (italics added). 
104 Ibid, 713. 
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Finally, it was suggested that valuation evidence should be presented by an 
administrator before a court would be willing to exercise its discretion under the 
section. "' 
Knox J's deference to the position of secured creditors may have some predictive 
value as far as a similar application by a receiver under s 43 is concerned. Whilst ss 
15 and 43 both have the potential to 'overreach' senior chargees, the former 
specifies the circumstances in which an order favourable to the administrator may 
be made as being where such "would be likely to promote the purpose or one or 
more of the purposes specified in the administration order. "' 06 The "purpose" or 
"purposes" for which an administration order may be granted are those in s 8(3) 
Insolvency Act. By contrast, s 43 directs that authorisation for a disposal of secured 
property may be granted where such "would be likely to promote a more 
advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would otherwise be 
effected... ""'. The 'protective' provisions of ss 15(5) and 43(3), however, are 
identically worded. 
It is submitted that the pre-requisite for authorisation under s 43 will invariably be 
satisfied on any application. There would be no point in an administrative receiver 
seeking an order if the disposal of property subject to a prior-ranking security 
would not result in a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets. The 
question, then, would appear to be whether the words "a more advantageous 
realisation" should be qualified, so as to denote a more advantageous realisationfor 
all concerned. In other words, is it necessary for an administrative receiver to show 
101 (1988) 4 BCC 708,713. 
IA s 15(2) 
Ibid. s 43(l). 
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that the benefit of a disposal will accrue to parties other than his appointor? This 
might not always turn out to be the case. If the debenture-holder is under-secured, 
the added value from a going concern sale would inure to his advantage, with other 
creditors being unaffected. The outcome would be that the priority position of two 
secured creditors would be effectively modified by as 43 order. 
The safeguard ostensibly provided by s 43(3) in such circumstances as these is, it is 
submitted, illusory if the senior creditor's concern is that the property is being sold 
at an inopportune time. To the extent that the consideration received is less than the 
amount secured, s 43(3)(b) appears to make no allowance for any extra deficiency 
resulting from a disposal at a time when the market is depressed. The critical 
question is therefore whether or not the courts would sanction a disposal by an 
administrative receiver which disturbed the senior creditor's prima facie claim to 
control of the property. 
To return to Knox Fs remarks in Re ARVAviation Ltd"', if the correct approach to 
s 15 Insolvency Act is to strike a balance between two courses potentially 
prejudicial to two different parties, and if the rights of secured creditors (or, in this 
case, a senior secured creditor) are not to be lightly impaired, there must be a 
presumption, where s 43 is concerned, that priorities are to be preserved. The Court 
of Appeal, in Re Atlantic Computer Systems p1c", took this approach in relation to 
s 11 Insolvency Act 1986. It was noted there that where a secured creditor in an 
administration seeks to enforce his security a similar balancing procedure was 
appropriate, with proprietary rights being accorded great weight"'. If such rights are 
Supra n 102. 
[1992] Ch 505. 
111 Ibid. 542. 
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to be treated sensitively in an administration, where a wider range of interests tend 
to be considered than in receivership, a fortiori they should emerge ascendant 
where a receiver is in office and seeking only to further the interests of his 
appointor who, by definition, is a junior security holder. 
Where the only de facto beneficiary of a going concern sale requiring the disposal 
of property subject to a senior charge is the appointor, the question is whether, if the 
senior chargee can show prejudice to his interests to more than a de minimis degree, 
discretion should be exercised in favour of an administrative receiver's s 43 
application. The imperative element for that section's operation will exist, in that 
such a sale will promote a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets, 
but can it be utilised in so as to defeat a superior interest in order to inflate the 
monetary value of an inferior one? Quite what the courts will make of as 43 
application, if one ever comes before them, will make fascinating reading. 
4. Tactical avoidance of the loss of deployment decision priority 
Senior chargees have proprietary priority in a receivership. S 43 Insolvency Act 
strips them of deployment decision priority, in that an administrative receiver may, 
potentially, deal with 'their' charged property in a manner adverse to their interests. 
There are, though, certain manoeuvres open to a senior chargee which might render 
s 43 ineffective. Lingard suggests that: 
"... a chargee might decide to defeat s. 43 by procuring a rival offer for the asset with a 
view to buying it in for the full amount owing to him. If a receiver has an offer to buy 
in the asset at a price higher than the market value, his position will be far from easy 
... 
A chargee might not only challenge valuations produced by the receiver or make a 
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rival offer, but also exercise the power of sale in his charge and sell the property at a 
higher price to a vehicle company formed for the purpose 
...... 
Lightman and Moss also note this problem, but suggest that the resolution lies with 
the courts: 
"it may fairly be said that the open market value should reflect the premium value of 
the property to any particular purchaser willing to pay the price. But the premium 
value in this case does not reflect what the security-holder is willing to pay, but what 
he is willing to give credit for against a debt whose repayment is at least questionable. 
it is suggested that the court can discount such an offer as in substance an offer of 
credit rather than outright payment. It may also be possible to discount such offers, 
whether made by the security-holder or anyone else, as ransom demands which it is 
the scheme and policy of the Act to preclude: the security-holder is to be justly 
compensated, not unjustly enriched, for a loss of a security impeding an advantageous 
realisation. " 112 
This may be the correct approach when a senior chargee is opportunistically aiming 
to inflate the value of his -security, but where there is a genuine prospect of a rise in 
the market which will not be reflected in a payment under s 43(3)(a), one might 
equally dub the debenture-holder "unjustly enriched" if the chargee's offer is 
discounted. 
Another ploy would be to reassert control over the asset by taking possession or 
appointing a fixed charge receiver. This revests deployment decision priority in the 
senior chargee. Quite how effective such a move would be is debatable. Taking 
possession, or the appointment of such a receiver, is usually a preliminary to sale. 
Installing a receiver simply to 'sit' on the charged property whilst the market 
Corporate Rescues and Insolvencies, 2nd ed. (1989 : Butterworths : London), paras. 6.39-6.40. 
Supra n 44, para. 14-03. 
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improves might be frowned upon by the courts, particularly if, in the meantime, a 
rescue scheme has to be abandoned. 
It might also be possible for junior and senior creditors to agree, ex ante, that any 
administrative receiver appointed will forego the use of the s 43 power, perhaps as a 
condition of the senior creditor injecting further cash into the company. Oditah 
suggests that such an arrangement is impermissible: 
"First, parties cannot contract out of s. 43 because that provision does not deal with 
private rights alone; it embodies the all-important policy of integrating administrative 
receivership into the mainstream of insolvency proceedings. Secondly, since an 
administrative receiver is an office-holder, any contract which excludes his s. 43 
power is an attempt to fetter his discretion and on that basis contrary to the policy of 
the Insolvency Act. Put differently, the s. 43 power is not a result of contractual 
negotiations, but is incident to the receiver's status. So it cannot be excluded 
. 
11 ,, 3 
With respect, the first proposition is not altogether convincing. Contracting around, 
if not out of, statutory provisions and the general law is ajudicially accepted feature 
of this area of jurisprudence. As noted earlier, it is legislative policy that 
preferential creditors are to be paid out of floating charge assets ahead of the 
debenture-holder, and whilst s 40 Insolvency Act 1986 is mandatory, contractual 
devices to elude its repercussions have proved effective. If company and debenture- 
holder can contract in such a way as to prejudice third parties, it seems eccentric 
that that latter cannot agree with a senior chargee to waive his receiver's entitlement 
to utilise the s 43 power. Further, if s 43 represents an attempt to "integrate 
administrative receivership into the mainstream of insolvency proceedings" it is at 
113 Lightweight Floating Charges [ 199 1] JBL 49,56. 
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best a half-hearted endeavour. Receivership, in this regard, is a notably less potent 
institution than administration. 
Oditah's second overture is more persuasive. In the first place, it is not entirely 
clear that a debenture-holder could prospectively bind a future appointee by means 
of an agreement with a senior chargee. Whilst it appears possible to confer the 
benefit of an exclusion clause in a debenture contract on a receiver"', to restrict his 
freedom of action by the same method must be problematic. To the extent that the 
appointor attempts ex post facto to prevent his receiver having recourse to s 43 he 
can be viewed as interfering in the receivership, and so falling foul of the American 
Express v Hurley principle"'. Given the policy of the Insolvency Act to champion 
the independence of administrative receivers, it is submitted that Oditah's analysis 
is probably correct, and that contracting out of s 43 is not feasible. 
In conclusion s 43 is, perhaps, something of a misfit, an attempt to give a debt- 
enforcement regime the flavour of a rescue mechanism, but encumbered by the 
want of any device to prevent enforcement-based machinations that could rob it of 
its proficiency. It might be the case that receivers are able to come to acceptable 
compromises in this area without recourse to the section at all. Whatever the 
explanation for its neglect, it would be edifying to view how the forensic process 
deals with the balancing of competing interests inherent in as 43 application. 
See Lightman and Moss, sipra n 44, para. 7-15. 
See Chapter 2. 
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The position of chargees junior to the debenture-holder 
1. Introduction 
In practice, a junior chargee's interests will be best served by the receiver adopting 
a strategy designed to achieve maximum realisations from the company's assets. To 
the extent that this approach is successful enough to pay off both debenture-holder 
and preferential creditors, he will then have first call on the surplus. Where such 
tactics are unnecessary, because the appointor's interests are best served by a swift 
realisation programme, the junior chargee's position ordinarily languishes. 
The developments in the law relating to a receiver's equitable duties of skill and 
care towards the company' 
16 Will inevitably protect a junior chargee, not least 
because in Medforth v Blake"' Scott VC expressly stated that the receiver's duties 
were owed to the mortgagor and "anyone else with an interest in the equity of 
redemption. ""' It might be questioned why a junior chargee should be 'lumped 
together' with the company in assessing the duties receiver's owe to external 
stakeholders, and this question is investigated in the following section. 
in the event, since Medforth, the question is somewhat academic. The real prejudice 
to a junior chargee will stem not so much from a receiver's carelessness as his 
decision to realise the charged property expeditiously on a break-up basis, rather 
than seeking to maximise its value. The law in this area is therefore evaluated also. 
III See Chapter 2. 
117 [1999] 3 All ER 97. 
"' Ibid. I 11. 
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2. Receivers and Junior chargees: status-based duties 
"[A receiver] must exercise his powers in good faith and for the purpose of obtaining 
repayment of the debt owing to his mortgagee. A receiver and manager owes these 
duties to the mortgagor and to all subsequent encumbrancers in whose favour the 
mortgaged property has been charged. ""' 
There appears to be some doctrinal justification for his Lordship's conception that 
the same set of duties are owed to both mortgagor and junior encumbrancer by a 
mortgagee, and so a receiver. This theme will be explored first. Whether the 
position is politically vindicated is treated as a separate question. 
2.1 Equitable intervention 
Equity's prerogative over the mortgage transaction is of considerable vintage. Its 
cardinal protective apparatus, the equity of redemption, was designed to mitigate 
the asperity of the common law, which viewed a mortgagee as the outright owner of 
the mortgaged property. By the eighteenth century multiple mortgages over the 
same estate 120 were common, and since a junior mortgagee's interest was in effect 
in the mortgagor's equity of redemption it is hardly surprising that the Court of 
Chancery laid claim to the regulation of relations between senior and junior 
encumbrancer. It did so by extending those duties owed by a mortgagee to his 
mortgagor to subsequent mortgagees also. 
The primary liability of such a mortgagee was to account: 
"' Downsview Nonfinees Lid v First City Corporation [1993] AC 295,312 per Lord Templeman. 
Scott VC did not depart from this position in Medforih v Blake. 
"' Invariably land or reversionary interests in trust property. 
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"A mortgagee who enters into possession of, and sells part of the mortgaged property, 
and receives rents and purchase money, becomes liable to account to all persons 
11121 
entitled to the equity of redemption... 
As in the case of a mortgagee in possession, the account was taken on the footing of 
wilful default, this principle being established from at least the end of the 
seventeenth century 122 
. 
Thus, where a mortgagee entered into possession of the 
mortgaged property, allowed the mortgagor to receive the profits and prevented 
subsequent encumbrancers from entering, he was held liable to account to those 
encumbrancers on a wilful default footing 123 
. 
Similarly, a mortgagee allowing the 
bankrupt mortgagor to remain in possession of the mortgaged property and resisting 
an ejectment brought by assignees was charged with the profits from that property 
as from the time of the ejectment"'. On a puisne incumbrancer's suit for 
redemption, Sir John Stuart VC stated that: 
"The true doctrine of this Court is that a mortgagee in possession of the mortgagor's 
property is bound to use it as carefully as if it were his own. 11125 
The Court of Appeal confirmed this proposition in In re Stockton Iron Furnace 
126 Con7pany 
, 
where James LJ noted that: 
"They were mortgagees in possession liable to account in respect of this ESOOO a year 
as against any second mortgagee or incumbrancer for what they had received or, but 
for their wilful default, might have received. ""' 
"I Hinde v Blake (1841) 11 U Ch 26, per Knight Bruce VC. 
122 See, e. g., Maddocks v Wren (1680) 2 Rep Ch 209. 
"I Coppring v Cooke (1684) 1 Vern. 270. 
124 Chapman v Tanner (1684) 1 Vern. 267. 
"I Cocks v Gray (1857) 1 Giff. 77,80. 
126 (1878) 10 Ch 335. 
127 Ibid. 357. 
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Historically, therefore, equity has assimilated the position of a junior mortgagee 
with that of the mortgagor because the former has the same interest as the latter in 
the protection of the equity of redemption. By entering into possession and dealing 
with the mortgaged property the senior mortgagee was in a position to devalue that 
equity, and both mortgagor and junior encumbrancer would be financially damaged 
to precisely the same extent. Hence, logic dictates, the senior mortgagee should be 
co-extensively liable to both. It should be noted that this liability only extends to 
those third parties with a proprietary interest in the equity of redemption"'. Thus it 
would not appear to extend to unsecured creditors, and in Parker-Tweeddle v 
Dunbar Bank 
'PIC129 the Court of Appeal held that a mortgagee's equitable duties 
were not owed to a beneficiary under a trust of the equity of redemption. Berg 
questions the authenticity of this approach, remarking that: 
"If Parker-Tweedale 
... 
can be supported, this can only be done on the basis of the 
technical (but not inflexible) rule that the primary right to redeem is in the trustee, and 
can only be exercised by the beneficiary if the trustee improperly refuses to do so. "110 
With respect, subtlety of approach in this area has not proved aforte of the courts, 
their predilection for a broad-brush approach being all too conspicuous in the case 
law. This inclination has persisted into modem times. 
I" See Bentley, Mortgagee's Duties on Sale 
- 
No Place for Tort? [1990] Conv. 431,434-435; 
Lightman and Moss, supra n 44,111 fn. 3. 
" [1991] Ch 12. 
13'Duties ofaMortgagee anda Receiver [19911 JBL 230,233. 
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2.2 The rise and fall of tort 
The application of tortious liability to the relationship of mortgagee and mortgagor 
was discussed in Chapter 2. No authority prior to Downsview ever considered 
whether the Cuckmere Brick principle applied to the senior/junior encumbrancer 
connection. The potential for such an application is, however, implicit in the case of 
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd v Walker"'. Lord Denning identified the appropriate 
test for the existence of a duty of care in negligence as "proximity' 132 
, 
and, in his 
usual tantalising style, hinted that that test might be satisfied in relation to general 
creditors of the company 133 
. 
In New Zealand, Smellie J cited Standard Chartered 
Bank as authority for the proposition that: 
"The existence of a duty [owed by the mortgagee to subsequent encumbrancers] rests 
upon a straightforward application of the neighbour principle, the same approach 
having been taken on other occasions t6mortgagors and guarantor's. ""' 
The same approach was taken in Downsview at first instance, and by Richardson J 
in the New Zealand Court of Appeal: 
"It is implicit [in the earlier case law] that the legal duties resting on a receiver and 
manager are not owed exclusively to the holder of the debenture under which the 
receiver was appointed. Inevitably, there are other interests involved. As agent for the 
company the receiver has some obligations to it. He cannot be oblivious to the 
interests of other secured creditors and even unsecured creditors who are directly 
affected by the commercial decisions he makes in receivership. ""' 
131 [ 1982] 3 All ER 938. 
132 Ihid. 942. 
133 Ihid. 943. 
134 National Westminster Finance Ltdv UnifedFinance andSecurities Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 226,234. 
135 [ 1990] 3 NZLR 265,274. 
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Prior to the Privy Council's deliberations in Downsview, then, negligence liability 
to a junior encumbrancer was orthodox law. In Knight v Lawrence Browne- 
Wilkinson VC considered the law to be as follows: 
"Though [a receiver] may be appointed by one party his function is to look after the 
property of which he is receiverfor the benefit of all those interested in it. 11136 
In that case the receiver had failed to serve rent review notices on tenants of the 
mortgagor, resulting in the property yielding a lower rental value than might 
otherwise have been obtained. As noted in the previous Chapter, Downsview 
effectively ruled out a duty on the part of a receiver to exercise skill and care. 
Medforth reinstates it, locates it in equity, and confirms that it is owed to all those 
interested in the equity of redemption. The assimilation of junior chargee and 
company has, however, been attacked as illegitimate: 
"There is a conceptual gap between deciding that a first mortgagee owes a limited 
duty to the mortgagor in equity, that they owe a duty to a subsequent encumbrancer 
and, thus, the nature of the duty ought to be the same, limited equitable one. ""' 
Hogan attacks the reasoning of the Downsview decision on the ground that it fails to 
distinguish between the differing interests of a mortgagor and a junior 
encumbrancer in the proper performance of a receiver's functions. At first instance 
in that case, Gault J similarly perceived a theoretical variance between a receiver's 
obligations to these two parties. Commenting on the question of a receiver's duties 
to the company, he observed: 
It is sufficient to say that [Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd] was concerned with 
duties owed to a company in receivership. Statements made with reference to those 
136 [1993] BCLC 215,223 (italics added). 
"'Andrew Hogan, Receivers Revisited (1996) 17 Co Law 226,227 (written prior to Medforth). 
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duties do not necessarily apply to duties owed by a receiver to subsequent secured or 
unsecured creditors. " 
138 
Hogan's robust piece goes on to question Lord Templeman's "blithe assumption" 
that a receiver owes the same equitable duties to both mortgagor and junior 
encumbrancer by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tomlin v 
Luce"9. That case was, like Downsview, concerned with the question of a 
mortgagee's duties to a second mortgagee, and the court found the former liable to 
compensate the latter when a sale of the mortgaged property realised less than it 
might have done. Hogan notes that: 
"Nowhere in this very brief judgment is men tion made of an equitable duty between 
two mortgagees. ""' 
He further considers that the liability of the mortgagee in Tomlin could be explained 
by reference to tortious principles in that "it focuses on loss traceable to the fault of 
the first mortgagee ...... A close perusal of the judgment of Cotton LJ, though, 
reveals that this is not the case. His Lordship based the finding of liability on the 
pleadings, which aver that the first in ortgagees were answerable to the second for 
loss occasioned by wiýful default 142 
. 
Far from providing authority for the principle 
that a senior mortgagee is liable in negligence to a junior mortgagee, as Hogan 
suggests, Tomlin v Luce simply reasserts the proposition that the former party must 
account on the footing of wilful default to anyone interested in the equity of 
138 [ 1989] 3 NZLR 710,739. 
139 (1890) 43 Ch D 19 1. 
140 Supra n 137,228. 
141 Ibid. 
142 (1890) 43 Ch D 191,194-195. 
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redemption. If it extends the law at all, it is through applying wilful default liability 
to the conduct of a sale 
143 
. 
Tomlin v Luce was cited in Downsview as authority for the proposition that a 
mortgagee owes a duty in equity to junior encumbrancers. Lord Templeman's 
interpretation of the case is, it is submitted, entirely correct in this respect. It has 
always been the position that a mortgagee in possession is under a duty to account 
on the footing of wilful default to all those parties having an interest in the equity of 
redemption, and Cotton LJ's judgment in Tomlin does no more than apply orthodox 
law. Confusion has arisen largely as a result of the reclassification of the 
mortgagee's duty to account as one of good faith seen in Kennedy v de Tra 144 fford 
, 
and the disunion of duties relating to sale and management of the mortgaged 
property. 
Wilful default liability arguably applies to both activities, as evidenced by Hinde v 
Blake and Tomlin v Luce, the duty of good faith originally pertinent only to the 
former, but now occupying the entire field. But, in any event, it has always been the 
case that any liability or duty owed by a mortgagee is owed to both mortgagor and 
junior encumbrancer to precisely the same extent. Downsview does not introduce a 
new anomaly by assimilating the position of mortgagee and junior encumbrancer, it 
simply applies law that is three centuries old. 
"I This point seems to have escaped Lord Templeman in Downsview, who mentioned wilful default 
only in relation to the amount received by way of rent. Hinde v Blake, supra n 121, may apply the 
principle in relation to a sale. 
144 [ 1897] AC 180. 
250 
2.3 The case for limited deployment decision prioritE 
The authorities dealing with the duty of a receiver to a junior encumbrancer 
converge almost exclusively on breach of duty situations, viz., those occasions 
where the receiver has in some way damaged the position of the subsequent 
mortgagee. The courts have not been called upon to decide whether, in certain 
circumstances, a receiver should perform his task in a manner designed to promote 
the interests of secondary creditors. Such advancement may come about entirely 
serendipitously as a result of the receiver's efforts to maximise retums to his 
appointor. Where realisation maximisation is unnecessary, and sufficient can be 
raised by the sale of assets on a breakdown basis, as long as the receiver takes 
reasonable steps to obtain a proper price for individual assets he commits no breach 
of duty to junior creditors, notwithstanding that a going concern sale was both a 
practical proposition and would have appreciated the sums raised significantly. 
The same point arises where delaying sale of one or more assets would enhance 
realisations, but is not obligatory in the interests of the debenture-holder. The issue 
is a temporal one, the crux of the matter being to what extent a receiver should be 
able to temporarily sideline the welfare of his appointor in order to advance that of 
some other party or parties. Where the only beneficiary of such an agenda would be 
the company, the implied term model proposed in Chapter 2 suggests that the courts 
could, or should, nonetheless sanction a transient displacement of deployment 
decision priority in favour of the company. A fortiori where a junior encumbrancer 
stands to benefit. 
There is no contractual foundation for the unqualified subordination of a second to 
a first chargee. Indeed, in functional terms, the two are identifiable. Both have a 
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4moral' claim to protection by reason of their provision of finance to a commercial 
entity, and the mere fact that the former is prepared to lend money on an inherently 
more hazardous security suggests that his interests warrant at least some 
consideration. Where the only disadvantage to the senior creditor of the pursuit of a 
going concern sale, or a delay in disposal, would be that his debt would be 
discharged later rather than sooner, it makes eminent commercial sense that a 
receiver should be duty bound to prefer that course. 
There is a powerful argument for allowing a junior encumbrancer deployment 
decision priority over the debenture-holder in the circumstances described above. 
Whether the courts would embrace it is a matter of speculation, and likely to remain 
so, since neither creditors nor receivers seem anxious to place the matter before a 
tribunal. The tenor of the Downsview judgment, though, is generally unsympathetic, 
with its emphasis on self-help remedies available to junior encumbrancers, such as 
their undoubted ability to redeem the first mortgage. If Downsview militates against 
the view that there is room, in defined circumstances, for a second mortgagee to 
enjoy limited deployment decision priority then it does such a creditor, and, indeed 
receivership, a notable disservice. 
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The position of guarantors of the company's indebtedness 
1. Introduction 
A receiver owes precisely the same duties to a guarantor of the company's 
indebtedness as are owed to the company itself, and to junior encumbrancers. He 
must exercise his powers in good faith and for proper purposes, he must take 
reasonable steps to obtain a proper price on any sale of the mortgaged property, 
and, under Medforth, exercise management functions with due care. According to 
China and South Sea Bank Ltd v Tan Soon Gin"', no tortious duty of care is owed 
by mortgagee to guarantor, that relationship being regulated wholly by equity. 
it was suggested above that a junior creditor has more in common with the 
appointing debenture-holder than with the company. A guarantor, on the other 
hand, may be aligned more comfortably with the latter. In the first place, there will 
be a contractual association between debenture-holder and guarantor springing 
directly from that between debenture-holder and company. Further: 
"The most important aspect of the nature of a guarantor's liability as a secondary 
liability is that it is co-extensive with the liability of the principal. ""' 
Moreover, in the majority of cases where a guarantee of the company's debts is 
given, the surety will be director or owner (or both) of the enterprise. He may also 
have secured any potential liability under the guarantee by granting a mortgage over 
his personal assets, including his home. His 'profile', in this context, is rather more 
(contingent) debtor of the debenture-holder than creditor of the company, as is the 
case of a junior mortgagee. 
145 [1990] 1 AC 536. 
146 Law of Guarantees, Andrews and Millett, 2nd ed. (1995 FT Law and Tax : London), para. 6,2 
(hereinafter Law of Guarantees). 
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It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that in terms of the debenture-holder's 
obligations to each, company and guarantor should be considered as one. On the 
other hand their liabilities to the debenture-holder arise out of separate contracts, 
and it should also be noted that the law of guarantees forms a separate body to that 
of the law of mortgages, (although there is an unmistakable element of cross- 
pollination as regards the two). The appropriateness of the analogy of surety and 
company is hence debatable 
For the most part a guarantor, like a junior mortgagee, will be protected by the 
receiver's duties to the company, especially now that Medforth introduces what 
amounts to a duty of care. There remains, however, one particular hazard for 
guarantors, that being where a receiver decides, quite deliberately, to 6speculate' on 
the value of the secured property. In these circumstances, should the speculation 
prove unsuccessful and the value of the Property fall rather than rise, a guarantor is 
in an unfortunate position. It is this situation with which the following section is 
concerned. 
2. Failing to safeguard the security: no remedy? 
In China & South Seas Bank Ltd v Tan Soon Gin 14' Lord Templeman seized the 
opportunity to reassert the primacy of equitable duties as between creditor and 
guarantor. The guarantor's complaint was that the mortgagee bank had failed to 
realise a security, namely shares held by the company/principal debtor, at a time 
when a disposal would have raised enough to pay off the secured debt. Lord 
"1 [1990] AC 536. 
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Templeman was adamant that these facts disclosed no breach of duty on the part of 
the bank. More precisely, he insisted that it was for the mortgagee to decide, in his 
own interests, if and when to exercise a power of sale: 
"The creditor had three sources of repayment. The creditor could sue the debtor, sell 
the mortgage securities or sue the surety. All these remedies could be exercised at any 
time or times simultaneously or contemporaneously or not at all. If the creditor chose 
to sue the surety and not pursue any other remedy, the creditor on being paid in full 
was bound to assign the mortgaged securities to the surety. If the creditor chose to 
exercise a power of sale over the mortgaged security he must sell for the current 
market value but the creditor must decide in his own interest if and when he should 
sell 
... 
The creditor is not obliged to do anything... ""' 
The right of a mortgagee to decide upon the timing of the exercise of his remedies 
has been a consistent feature of mortgage law. Lord Templeman's judgment in Tan 
Soon Gin transplants that right into the law of guarantees, in what is arguably a 
novel move. It should be noted that the basic principle governing the guarantor's 
right to call upon a security held by the creditor was stated by Stuart VC as follows: 
"It is perfectly established in this court, that if through any neglect on the part of the 
creditor, a security to the benefit of which the surety's entitled is lost, or is not 
properly perfected, the surety is discharged. ""' 
This passage was cited with approval by Quain J in Wuff v Jay"', a case which 
Lord Templeman cited in support of his decision, and which prompted him to 
remark: 
148 Supra n 146,545. 
149 Strange v Fooks ?4 Giff. 412 (italics added). 
I" (1872) 7 LR QB 756,766. 
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"In the present case the security was neither surrendered nor lost nor imperfect nor 
altered in condition by reason of what was done by the creditor. ""' 
His Lordship's choice of Wuff v Jay to illustrate his point is somewhat unfortunate. 
In that case creditors held security over a business owned by the principal debtor, 
that security taking the form of a bill of sale which the creditors failed to register. 
Aware of the impending bankruptcy of the debtor they failed to take possession of 
the business, so that it fell into the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy. Cockburn Ci 
had this to say: 
"Now I think there was twofold ]aches on the plaintiffs part 
- 
laches in the first place 
in not registering the bill of sale. If they had registered it the effect would have been 
that the fixtures would have been protected 
... 
But then there was laches if possible of 
a more serious description affecting not only the moveables but the fixtures also. The 
plaintiffs might have entered and taken possession upon the interest not being paid at 
the time when it became due. Instead of doing this, however, they allow the 
mortgagors; to remain in possession when they see that bankruptcy is impending and 
imminent. I cannot doubt myself that their intention was, that, being creditors ultra the 
amount thus secured, the goods in question should be available as assets under the 
bankruptcy, while they had the security of the defendant to come upon in order to get 
paid the debt of E300 secured by the bill of sale. I think looking at all the 
circumstances, it is impossible to say that the plaintiffs did what they ought to have 
done to realise the security they possessed. "'" 
In effect, therefore, it would seem that the creditors in Wulff v Jay were penalised 
for failing to have recourse to one of their remedies. In Tan Soon Gin, however, 
Lord Templeman categorically denies that any such 'duty' exists. One might 
"Supra n 146,545. 
112 (1872) 7 LR QB 756,762 (italics added). 
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justifiably enquire whether there is any conceptual difference between a failure to 
take possession of securities and a failure to exercise a power of sale expeditiously. 
Granted, the depreciation of the value of the shares in Tan Soon Gin was not the 
result of the mortgagee's conduct, but nor was the assumption of possession by a 
trustee in bankruptcy in Wulff In neither case was the security lost due to the 
creditors' laches, but in both cases the benefit of that security became unavailable. 
In this respect the two cases are factually on all fours, yet the legal outcome of each 
is diametrically opposed. 
It is submitted that if Tan Soon Gin is authority for the proposition that a 
creditor/mortgagee may sit back and observe the value of a perfectly sufficient 
security decline, safe in the knowledge that a guarantee will cover his indebtedness, 
then it is bad law and ought to be reassessed. Lord Templeman placed some 
emphasis on a surety's 'self-help' remedies, claiming that in such circumstances he 
could request the creditor to sell the security or pay off the debt and sell it himself. 
No such course of action recommended itself to the court in Wuff v Jay, and it is 
difficult to see why the onus to act should be placed on a surety, rather than a 
mortgagee, in such a situation. If nothing else, Tan Soon Gin represents an 
inefficient result in economic terms, in that valuable resources are to be allowed to 
become sterile. It also militates against fairness to a guarantor who may stand to 
lose his entire personal wealth through the capriciousness of a creditor. 
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3. The position of a receiver 
"A receiver, unlike the mortgagee, has no right to remain passive, even if so directed 
by his appointor. He owes duties to be active in the protection and preservation of the 
security over which he is appointed. ""' 
At first sight, a guarantor should have little to fear once a receiver has been 
appointed, for his duty to the appointing debenture-holder would be breached were 
he to allow the value of a secured asset to deteriorate when a sale would be the 
expedient action. If the facts of Tan Soon Gin arose in a receivership, whether the 
benefit of the security was lost due to negligence or a calculated risk on the part of 
the receiver, it is incontestable that he would be liable to his appointor for the 
amount lost. Thus the debenture-holder could recover from his appointee, and the 
guarantor would be in no worse position and incur no increased liability. Or so the 
theory goes. 
In practice, a guarantor may be at risk in two situations. The first is where the 
debenture-holder fails to pursue the errant receiver and instead falls back on the 
guarantee to discharge the debt. There appears to be nothing in the way of authority 
to suggest that this would not be a legitimate course. In Tan Soon Gin Lord 
Templeman affirmed that a mortgagee may exercise whichever of his remedies he 
deems appropriate, and in whatever order he deems appropriate, and that his choice 
can be informed purely by reference to his own interests. It is not entirely clear that 
this statement would encompass a remedy against a receiver, rather than a 
mortgagor or guarantor. Nonetheless, it would be far more convenient, and less 
expensive, to simply call in a guarantee than commence an action against a receiver, 
"' Lightman and Moss, supra n 44, para. 7.04. 
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and such a strategy would clearly have much to recommend it to a debenture- 
holder, both in financial and commercial terms. 
If the omission to realise the property is due to pure carelessness the equitable duty 
to behave diligently protects the guarantor. If, however, the receiver reasonably 
believes he is acting in the best interests of the debenture-holder by holding on to 
the property in question he will, it is submitted, have a complete defence to any 
allegation of breach of duty. Thus, the second case in which a guarantor is under 
threat is where a receiver is predisposed to gamble on the chance of a rise in the 
market for the security. It may well be in his appointor's interests to do so, and, 
indeed, the debenture-holder himself may approve of such a scheme. A mortgagee's 
ability to speculate at the expense of a mortgagor was tentatively doubted by Sir 
Donald Nichols VC in Palk v Mortgage Services Funding p1c, the learned judge 
observing: 
"Whether, in that situation, a mortgagee is at liberty to exercise his rights of leasing 
and sale in a way that in all likelihood will substantially increase the burden on tile 
borrower or guarantor beyond what would otherwise be the case is not a question I 
need decide on this appeal 
... 
That he can act in such a cavalier fashion is not a 
proposition I find attractive... ""' 
The Palk case was concerned with an application under s 91(2) Law of Property 
Act 1925, which enables the mortgagee or "any person interested either in the 
mortgage money or in the right of redemption" to ask the court to "direct a sale of 
the mortgaged property, on such terms as it thinks fit 
...... 
Nichols VC's observation 
was made with reference to the general law, apart from s 91(2), and would appear to 
"' [19931 Ch 331,338. 
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fit the circumstances outlined above. 
However, the mortgagor in Palk was faced with the prospect of a mortgagee leasing 
the mortgaged property at a rent that would not cover the interest accruing in the 
interim. Where a receiver or debenture-holder agrees that interest shall cease to 
arise... during the receivership period it might be argued that Palk becomes 
distinguishable, and that a decision to postpone sale does not "increase the burden 
on borrower or guarantor beyond what would otherwise be the case. " In other 
words, the mortgage debt itself is not getting any larger, although the guarantor's 
contingent liability may in fact increase. 
As to s 91(2), it would appear that a guarantor could have recourse to that section, 
56 
as a person interested in the right of redemption' 
. 
In Palk it was asserted that s 
91(2) gave rise to a wide equitable jurisdiction on the part of the court to make 
whatever order justice required, and that all the circumstances should be considered 
in this respect. On the facts, Sir Donald Nichols VC was especially concerned that 
the mortgagee in question was in effect speculating at the expense of the mortgagor, 
but at the same time acknowledged that there was no duty to exercise rights at any 
particular time"'. Sir Michael Kerr, citing Tan Soon Gin, echoed this sentiment: 
"... the decision whether or not to realise his security by sale is undoubtedly the 
mortgagee's unfettered discretion, both in contract and in tort... "158 
Whilst this discretion may be confined by the courts ordering a sale of the 
"' Agreements of this kind are not uncommon. 
156 Quaere whether a surety is entitled to redeem? Swire v Redman (1876) 1 QBD establishes the 
right to pay off the creditor and sue the principal debtor, and the right of a surety to marshalling is 
similarly clear; see Law of Guarantees, supra n 147, para. 11.15. The right of subrogation arises ex 
post (ibid para. 11.17 et seq. ), but it might be argued that in its embryonic form (i. e. before payment 
by the guarantor) it confers a right to redeem. 
157 Supra n 154,3 3 7. 
I" Ibid. 343. 
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mortgaged property, the s 91(2) jurisdiction will only be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances. Whether a court would be amenable to the petition of a guarantor 
faced with a receiver proposing to delay sale in the hope of a rise in the market, 
where such a delay would not increase the mortgage debt itself, is debatable. If 
speculation per se is objectionable then one might conjecture that a sale would be 
ordered"'. If the substantive misgiving is that delay imposes a greater overall 
burden on both mortgagor and guarantor, any incursion on a mortgagee's 
indisputable right to deal with the security in his own interests might appear 
unwarranted. 
4. Conclusion 
It appears a guarantor of the company's obligations enjoys no deployment decision 
priority, and is protected only to the same extent as the company itself The sole 
qualification to this proposition may lie in the operation of s 91(2) Law of Property 
Act 1925. The courts thereunder could possibly override a plan of action that is in 
the best interests of the debenture-holder, viz., a delay in the exercise of a power of 
sale, where such would potentially prejudice a guarantor. Without the benefit of 
authority directly in point, it is difficult to predict whether a court would be 
prepared to subjugate the potential advancement of a mortgagee out of clemency to 
a guarantor, who, after all, has contractually accepted that he may be made liable 
for the mortgagor's debt. 
"' Perhaps with a rider that the mortgagee be allowed to buy the mortgaged property, as was ordered 
in Palk. 
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Where the depreciation of the value of secured property is explicable by 
dilatoriness, to the extent that this increases the guarantor's liability a receiver 
should be accountable, notwithstanding Tan Soon Gin. Such responsibility, if the 
orthodox view is followed, should arise out of an equitable duty to exercise 
diligence in the management of the mortgaged property"O. Negligence apart, it is 
submitted that the Tan Soon Gin statement of the responsibilities of a mortgagee to 
a guarantor is unappealing. Whilst a guarantor may be identified with the company, 
in practice there is a separate interest to be considered. For a mortgagee, or receiver, 
to be able to make inefficient use of a security interest, without suffering any 
detriment because of the availability of a guarantee, seems aberrant. This is 
especially the case when one considers the typical profile of a surety in this context, 
who will usually be a director or owner of the company, and who will invariably 
have charged much of his personal wealth to secure his contingent liability. The 
enforcement of the guarantee, made necessary by carelessness or speculation, may 
tip the surety into bankruptcy. In Tan Soon Gin Lord Templeman sternly warned 
that: 
"No creditor could carry on the business of lending if he could become liable to the 
mortgagor and to the surety or to either of them for a decline in value of the 
mortgaged property, unless the creditor was personally responsible for the decline. ""' 
One might add that no surety could confidently guarantee his company's debts if 
the law allows opportunism on the part of a mortgagee or receiver to effectively 
threaten his livelihood. The rout of the latter's interest in this regard goes too far. 
Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97. 
Supra n 146,545. 
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The position of the company's unsecured creditors 
Introduction 
"The law provides creditors with remedies, although it is a matter of everyday 
experience that in many cases creditors find the remedies yield no fruit. That, 
unhappily, is the creditors' misfortune: the law cannot produce money where none 
exists. ""' 
The very fact of insolvency means that certain parties, having had dealings with the 
insolvent company, will be prejudiced. One class of constituents which invariably 
finds itself at the 'sharp end' is the company's unsecured creditors. It is no 
coincidence that this group has minimal proprietary priority, standing only one step 
ahead of the company's shareholders:. indeed, that very deficit of security seals its 
fate under the current law, preoccupied as it is with property rights as a means of 
determining hierarchy over limited assets. 
Unsecured creditors, as a class, usually comprise those parties who have entered 
into a trading relationship with the insolvent company. They will usually be its 
suppliers, delivering goods or providing services on credit terms, or its customers, 
paying in advance for goods to be delivered at a later date. It will usually be 
impracticable for such parties to bargain for a recognised security interest in any of 
the company's property 163 
, 
so that upon the crystallisation of a floating charge, 
usually on the appointment of a receiver, they are irrevocably located behind the 
holder of the charge in terms of their entitlement to the company's assets. If those 
assets prove insufficient to discharge both the debenture-holder's and preferential 
debts, the unsecured creditors will receive nothing. 
"'Re Kentish Homes Ltd[ 1993] BCLC 1375,138 1, per Sir Donald Nicholls VC. 
163 Although see infra 287. 
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It should be noted at the outset that this predicament is not a product of receivership 
per se, but rather the law's recognition of the floating charge as an effective security 
interest. This monopoly of security, coupled with a similar monopoly of 
enforcement rights in the form of receivership, has inspired trenchant judicial 
comment for over a century. Remarking upon the ability of a debenture-holder to 
appoint a receiver and lay claim to the entirety of the company's property, Buckley 
J concluded, in 1905: 
"It is an injustice arising from the nature as defined by the authorities of a floating 
security. The mischief arises from the fact that the law allows a charge upon all future 
property. The subject, however, is one which, I think, urgently requires attention. It is 
not for me to say whether the matter requires the attention of the legislature. ""' 
The learned judge's veiled solicitation of legislative intervention went unheeded in 
1905. It was repeated, and accompanied by a cognate censure of the law, in 1977 by 
none other than Templeman J. His impatience with a system that consigns the 
interests of unsecured creditors to the back of the queue is transparent in the 
following passage, which is worth reproducing at length: 
"BCL's assets are about El million 
... 
the preferential creditors take their fill of 
E300,000. The debenture-holders take the rest, about E700,000, in part discharge of 
bank loans, consisting no doubt of capital and interest at the crippling rates of between 
10% and 20% which banks assert they are compelled to charge all and sundry. The 
trade creditors who perforce extended some credit to BCL in the ordinary course of 
business and other unsecured creditors claiming in all some 0 millions will get 
nothing. The question whether in this day and age it is necessary and desirable to 
permit the Crown and holders of future floating charges the totality of priorities which 
" In re London Pressed Hinge Co Ltd [ 1905] 1 Ch 576,5 8 1. 
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can be exercised under the existing law is not the subject of debate in this court, 
although I am inclined to think that' it is at least debatable elsewhere 
. 
11165 ZD 
The debate called for by Templeman J was not long in coming. The Cork 
Committee, concerned at the inequities arising from the floating charge, remarked 
that its origin in a Court of Equity was "the matter for wonder"166 
, 
and continued: 
"In a great number of cases, insolvency results in the distribution of assets arnong 
preferential creditors 
... 
and the holders of floating charges (often though not 
invariably the banks) with little if anything for the ordinary unsecured creditors. We 
have received widespread complaints on this score. We have been left in no doubt 
that, as a result, there is a general disenchantment with the existing law of insolvency, 
and in the commercial community a feeling of anger at the barrenness of insolvency 
proceedings so far as the great majority of creditors are concerned. We believe that 
these criticisms are fully justified. Measures are urgently required to redress the 
balance before the whole system falls into even greater disrepute. ""'
Similar comments were made in the Parliamentary debates that followed the Cork 
Report: 
"The unsecured creditor almost always loses out because he is left with what remains 
after the holder of a floating charge has recovered his money, after preferential 
creditors such as the Government have taken their share, and after professional 
expenses have been paid. What is left to the unsecured creditor as a consequence is, in 
most cases, nothing. " 168 
"I Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [ 1977] 1 WLR 578,580. The learned judge 
expressed the identical sentiment more laconically in Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products 
[ 198 1] Ch 25,42, where he described unsecured creditors as getting "a raw deal". 
166 The Cork Report, supra n 2, para. 107. 
117 ibid. para. 233. 
"I Hansard (House of Commons), Vol. 78,30 April 1985, col. 153, Mr Brian Gould. 
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Both Cork and Parliament observed that this injustice was perceived as exacerbated 
by the institution of receivership, the Review Committee reporting: 
"Another widely felt grievance is the belief that a receiver has too much regard for the 
interests of the holder of the charge, and that insufficient attention is paid to the 
interests of other creditors and shareholders. ""' 
In the House of Lords the position was stated even more strongly: 
"Complaints were laid, and complaints continue, that very often receivers for 
debenture-holders apply themselves quite ruthlessly to the realisation of the assets in 
order to satisfy the charge comprising the debenture with, in some cases, scant regard 
either to the future of the business itself or even the plight in which creditors further 
down the line might find themselves... " 170 
The impetus for an overhaul of insolvency law in general, and receivership in 
particular, in favour of unsecured creditors was pronounced during this period. The 
quandary for the Cork Committee and the Goverm-nent was the extent to which the 
balance between secured and unsecured creditors could be redressed without overly 
prejudicing the commercial well-being of the former. That the promotion of one 
group's cause would of necessity involve a subordination of the other's was 
acknowledged by Cork from the outset: 
"One of the most difficult questions to which we have tried to find a solution is how 
best to reconcile the legitimate safeguards of those who are required to provide 
adequate finance to commerce and industry, with justice to the ordinary unsecured 
creditor who is an involuntary supplier of goods, materials or services on credit 
...... 
Supra n 2, para. 438. See also, to similar effect, para. 436. 
Hansard (House of Lords), Vol. 1276,4 Feb 
-7 Feb 1985, col. 85 1, Lord Bruce of Donington. 
I Supra n 2, para. I 10. 
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Nonetheless, the Committee made a vigorous attempt to resolve the conflict with a 
package of proposals that, in some measure, was almost radical. The following 
section describes its eventual fate. 
2. What might have been: Cork's recommendations and Parliament's response 
1A financial stake for unsecured creditors 
The Committee identified two fundamental objections to the floating charge holders 
dominion in a receivership, the first, most obvious, being that it resulted in 
unsecured creditors benefiting not all from a receiver's management of the 
company and its assets. Having commented on the abundance of complaints to this 
effect, it concluded that: 
"We are convinced that no complete answer to the criticisms that have been levelled 
at the nature of a receiver's obligations can be made until unsecured creditors can be 
certain of having a financial interest in the proceeds of the receiver's real isations. " I" 
This "financial interest" was to take the form of an entitlement to share in the "10% 
Fund""'. In essence, this fund was to consist of 10% of the net realisations from 
floating charge assets and would be divided pari passu between the debenture- 
holder, junior and senior floating charge holders and the company's unsecured 
creditors. The recommendation was of a clearly redistributive nature, and the 
Committee went to great pains to justify what it recognised was a controversial 
proposal. In the first place, it pointed out that the enactment of its recommendations 
in their entirety would offset any financial disadvantage suffered by the charge 
Supra n 2, para. 438. 
it is not proposed to consider the workings of the 10% Fund in detail. For a fuller exposition the 
reader is directed to Chapter 36 of the Cork Report. 
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holder by reason of the Fund. The reduction in the number and amount of 
preferential debts and the imposition of a temporary stay on enforcement 
proceedings were cited in this regard' 74 
. 
The Committee might have added that the 
'downgrading' of the rights of utility suppliers'" and the ability of a receiver to 
dispose of senior secured property would have a similar maximising effect on 
realisations. Given these cumulative gains to the debenture-holder: 
"It is neither inappropriate nor unfair to insist upon some concession in return for the 
benefit of the general body of creditors, particularly as former preferential creditors 
will be numbered among them. ""' 
Whether or not the Government considered the extraction of such a compromise 
"inappropriate or unfair" is an unanswered question. The mechanics by which it 
was to be wrested, viz., the 10% Fund, failed rather more because the executive 
were not convinced of its practical value, noting that chargees could avoid it simply 
by increasing the amount of fixed charge security taken: 
"Even if the proportion of the sums realised to be set aside for the unsecured 
creditors' fund were substantially greater than the proposed 10 per cent, this would 
serve only to reduce the value of the security conveyed by a floating charge and lead 
to additional reliance on fixed charges. " 177 
No alternative initiative was advanced to counter the injustice perceived by the 
Review Committee. No doubt the Government, had they put their minds to it, might 
have addressed the problem in a variety of ways, one being to include in the 10% 
Fund realisations from fixed charge assets, or even just book debts. 
Supra n 2, para. 153 1. 
Ibid. Chapter 33. 
Ibid. para. 153 1. 
A Revised Frameworkfor Insolvency Law (1984: HMSO : London), para. 26. 
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A more likely explanation for the Government's inaction is its sensitivity to 
pressure exerted by bankers during the consultative process. In a fascinating insight 
into the passage of the Insolvency Act 1986, Carruthers and Halliday describe the 
fierce lobbying of both the Cork Committee and the government by the banking 
institutions 178 
. 
Individual clearing banks, the British Bankers Association, and the 
Committee of London Clearing Banks were all heavily involved, defending the 
floating charge in the face of criticism from such prominent contributors as Sir 
Peter Millett, Alfred Goldman, and Richie Penny"', and, inevitably, opposing the 
introduction of the 10% Fund"'. Given their ability to mobilise an extraordinarily 
potent lobbying machine, in terms of coherence and speed, and given the 
corresponding inability of unsecured creditors to put their case collectively through 
a representative organ, it is not surprising that charge holders emerged victorious in 
this particular debate. As Carruthers and Halliday put it: 
"With their considerable political resources, and their good relationship with the Tory 
party, banks successfully defeated what would have been a major blow to one of their 
preferred financial devices. ""' 
How far the 10% Fund would have had a significant effect on returns to unsecured 
creditors in insolvency is a matter of conjecture. The Government's rationale for 
it's rejection as a concept is, frankly, unconvincing, and, with respect, appears to be 
a red herring. Even if the Fund would, as anticipated by the Government, comprise 
only a very small sum, a couple of pence in the pound is better than nothing. A 
Fund constituted over the entirety of the assets would have addressed that particular 
Rescuing Business, (199 8: Clarendon Press : Oxford), 194 
-2 10. 
Ibid. 199. 
Of which they knew "well before" the publication of the Cork Report; ibid. 20 1. 
Ibid. 203. 
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shortcoming in any event. Lord Denning, during Parliamentary Debates in the 
House of Lords, noted the prestige of banking institutions in the Government's 
eyes, and took a side-swipe at their position: 
"I am afraid that the Government must have been much-influenced by those big 
bankers 
... 
the banking community want every penny. They want the last 10%. As the 
Committee know, they always want their interest, right to the very top rate. The 
banking community do not need this 10% 
... 
They ought to allow the unsecured 
creditors a little bit, just 10%, that is all. ""' 
In the Commons, Mr Brian Gould described the maximisation of returns for 
unsecured creditors as "a light motif' (sic. ) of the Cork Report"', and his protest 
that the Bill in front of Parliament contained no reference to the 10% Fund was 
greeted by the retort that that fund: 
"... was intended as a fighting fund for the liquidator and not a dividend reserved for 
unsecured creditors, which would be a paltry sum in most cases. " 184 
This seems a remarkable assertion, considering the Cork Committee's insistence 
that unsecured creditors should be offered the prospect of at least some financial 
return in insolvency. In the final analysis, one is left with the impression that a 
reasoned debate into the merits or otherwise of the 10% Fund was conspicuously 
absent during the legislative process, and that this was largely as a result of the 
executive's bias towards providers of debt capital. Whether this tacit partiality was 
justified in the political and economic climate of the time is an altogether separate 
question, and one on which the Government seemed notably reluctant to entertain 
discussion. The overall result, however, is that one of only two recommendations in 
Supra n 17 1, col. 122 8. 
Supra n 169, col. 157. 
]bid. col. 158, Mr Alex Fletcher. 
270 
the Cork Report directed towards improving the position of unsecured creditors was 
abandoned with the minimum of formality. 
2.2 The provision of information and particýpation righ 
"The most frequent complaint which we have received is the lack of information once 
a receiver has been appointed. This is a complaint which we have received, not only 
from creditors, but also from shareholders. ""' 
The Cork Committee addressed this problem by recommending that a receiver 
should be under a statutory duty to call a meeting of creditors, to prepare a report to 
be presented to creditors, and to appoint a 'receivership committee' 116 
. 
These 
proposals were made with a view to "creating a relationship of accountability 
between the receiver and the unsecured creditors""', and their procedural operation 
described in some detail in Chapter 19 of the Cork Report. They were accepted by 
the Government and enacted in ss 48 and 49 Insolvency Act 1986. 
By s 48, a receiver has three months to prepare and send to the company's creditors 
a report, detailing the events leading up to his appointment, the disposal of property 
or the carrying on 
-of the business by him, the amounts payable to preferential 
creditors and to the debenture-holder, and the amount likely to be available for 
payment of other creditors. Further, and also within three months, a receiver is 
obliged to lay a copy of his report "before a meeting of the company's unsecured 
creditors summoned for the purpose on not less than 14 days' notice""'. It is open 
to a receiver to apply to the court for a direction that the calling of a meeting may 
Cork Report, supra n 2, para. 43 8. 
ibid. paras. 477 
- 
48 1. 
Ibid. para. 48 1. 
IA s 48(2) 
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be dispensed with"'. If the meeting is in fact called, it may establish a creditors' 
committee which may call upon the receiver to attend before it and provide it with 
"such information relating to the carrying out by him of his functions as it may 
reasonably require"'9' 
The procedural aspects of ss. 48 and 49 are contained in the Insolvency Rules 
1986'91. It is not proposed to reproduce them here, except to note that they deal with 
such matters as venue, timing, chairman, voting rights, admission and rejection of 
claims, quorum, adjournment, and resolutions and minutes of the creditors 
meeting"', and the constitution, establishment, functions and membership of the 
creditors' committee"'. The function of the creditors' committee is to "assist the 
administrative receiver in discharging his functions, and act in relation to him in 
such manner as may be agreed from time to time"' 94 
. 
This final sentence is 
illuminating, in that it makes clear that the committee has no formal powers as 
against the receiver, and that its practical input into receivership will be entirely a 
matter of agreement. 
The impressive construction of a set of procedural safeguards becomes somewhat 
less impressive when one considers the lack of any substantive capacity to direct 
the course of a receivership. Voting rights are all very well, but of little moment 
when what can be voted on is decided by the receiver himself. With respect, the 
Cork Committee's recommendations were well-meaning, but do little to improve 
"' IA s 48(2)(3). 
190 ibid. s 49(l)(2). 
191 Si 1986/1925, Part 3, Chapters 3 and 4. 
192 insolvency Rules 1986, rr 3.9-3.15. 
191 ibid. rr 3.16-3.30A. 
194 ibid. r 3.18(l). 
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the position of unsecured creditors in receivership. There seems little point in an 
administrative receiver gathering together creditors in order to tell them what they 
had already worked out for themselves, namely that their debts are unlikely to be 
satisfied. In any event, Stewart notes that ss 48 and 49 are hardly revolutionary: 
"The new legislation has 
... 
given force of law to what was formerly merely good 
practice. A responsible receiver generally kept creditors of a company which was in 
receivership reasonably well informed. " 195 
Doyle suggests that the requirement of a report to be provided to unsecured 
creditors does no more than pay "lip service to the idea of improving the position of 
unsecured creditors""', and suggests in many cases a receiver will propose 
dispensing with the creditors' meeting"'. Further, and to emphasise the lack of teeth 
inherent in the s 49 regime, he contrasts the powers of the administrative receiver's 
committee with those of a liquidation committee, the latter being entitled to refuse 
to sanction the exercise of certain of the liquidator's powers 
it appears, therefore, that a receiver's involvement with unsecured creditors, via the 
mediums of a meeting and a committee, is of a cosmetic nature only. As Grier 
perceptively remarks: 
"... the creditors' committee (unlike a liquidation committee) appears to be merely 
advisory although some receivers who have practised for many years without such a 
committee might regard it as something of a statutory nuisance. ""' 
"'Administrative Receivers and Administrators (1987 : CCH Edns Ltd) T421. 
Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 76,330. 
Ibid. 332. 
]bid. 337. Consider also the power of a meeting of creditors to disapprove the proposals of an 
administrator; IA s 24. 
119 Voluntaty Liquidation and Receivership, 3rd ed (1991 : Longman : London), 184. 
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It would appear that the Cork Committee's aspiration to improve the lot of 
unsecured creditors in receivership was thwarted by the Government's refusal to 
enact its proposal for a 10% Fund, and by its own choice to leave the creditors' 
organs in receivership with no substantive powers. Any betterment of their position 
of unsecured creditors therefore required positive action by the courts or the 
development of self-help techniques. The following section examines the extent to 
which such initiatives have materialised. 
3. The law's contribution to the position of unsecured creditors 
3.1 A dutE to have reg-ard to the interests of unsecured creditors 
"... I doubt if as the law stands a receiver has any specific duties to pre-receivership 
unsecured creditors. If they are dissatisfied with his actions they have the remedy at 
any time of applying to the court to put the company into liquidation. "" 
Stevenson goes on to note that, in practice, most receivers will be "conscious of the 
interests of unsecured creditors", but the courts have confirmed that receivers are 
under no obligation to take account of those interests, let alone act to further them. 
This particular issue has not received much in the way of judicial attention, no 
doubt because its solution appears so obvious as to be not worth litigating. In any 
contest between debenture-holder and unsecured creditors for the receiver's 
allegiance, there can only be one winner. This was accepted without question by 
Goff J in In re Northern Development (Holdings) Ltd": 
"It was argued, perfectly rightly, that the receivers are in duty bound to study the 
mortgagees, on whose behalf they were appointed, and that were they to delay sale or 
110 WRD Stevenson, Receivers (1973) 47 ALJ 43 8,442. 
"I Unreported (1977) 
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refuse an offer good enough from the point of view of the debenture-holders, in the 
hope of getting something better for the unsecured creditors, they would incur 
personal liability. " 
Nor is the position any different once liquidation intervenes, as was pointed out in 
the same case by the Court of Appeal: 
"No liquidator could compel receivers, in their realisation of assets, to have regard to 
the interests of unsecured creditors. 1ý202 
It should, however, be emphasised that unsecured creditors may be protected by the 
receiver's duty to maximise realisations for the benefit of the debenture-holder. The 
point bears repeating that it is only when the appointor's debt can be discharged 
without recourse to such a strategy that junior creditors are prejudiced by 
receivership. In such a situation it is abundantly clear that their welfare may not 
inform a receiver's decisions. 
More recent case law fails to advance the cause of unsecured creditors, and, indeed, 
is notably meagre. Only one decided case addresses the issue of a receiver's 
relationship with unsecured creditors head on, and categorically dismisses the 
notion that he might he might be under any obligation to take account of their 
interests: 
"It is clear on the authorities, and no authority has been cited to the contrary, that 
receivers do not owe a duty to the general creditors of the company or to 
contributors. 
11203 
In the face of such an uncompromising statement, it is hardly surprising that the 
matter has not been litigated further. The question, therefore, of whether a receiver 
... (1978) 128 NLJ 86. 
103 Lathia vDronsfield Bros. [1987] BCLC 321,324, per Sir Neil Lawson. 
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is under a duty to safeguard unsecured creditors where to do so would involve no 
prejudice to the debenture-holder remains unanswered. 
In Re Joshua Shaw & Sons Ltd.. Hoffmann J was asked whether a company's 
directors had breached their duty to its unsecured creditors by failing to advise 
them to petition for a winding up to shelter their entitlement to a dividend from the 
operation of the Limitation Act 1980. The receivers had conducted their 
receivership immaculately, turning a potential deficit to the debenture-holder into a 
surplus for all creditors, but this had taken them nine years, during which each 
unsecured creditor's debt became time-barred. Hoffman J, albeit reluctantly, 
concluded that the company's directors had been under no duty to protect its 
creditors via the provision of advice that might have prevented the eventual 
outcome. No argument was advanced to the effect that the receivers were subject to 
any such duty, and it is likely that it would have failed in any event. It has been held 
in relation to an administrator that the office holder owes no duty to advise a 
secured creditor on how best to protect his position"'. The same conclusion would, 
it is submitted, be reached in the case of a receiver, who, unlike an administrator, 
owes no duty to consider the interests of the general body of creditors. 
204 (1989) 5 BCC 188. 
"' Re Sabre International Products Ltd [19911 BCC 694. Harman J, with splendid bluntness, 
asserted that an administrator could not be expected to "hold the hand" of the creditor. 
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3.2 Unsecured creditors and the duty of care 
The case of Medforth v Blake unequivocally improves the position of unsecured 
creditors. If an equitable duty to take reasonable care is owed to the company, the 
company's unsecured creditors are indirectly protected to the extent that a 
receiver's want of diligence causes financial loss. If the company sues, any 
damages will go to swell its estate"'. If the company, for whatever reason, chooses 
not to pursue the receiver, and is subsequently wound up, the aggrieved creditors 
are protected by statute. By s 212 Insolvency Act 1986, a court may penalise, inter 
alia, an administrative receiver who has been guilty of "any misfeasance or breach 
of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to the company""". The court may order a 
defaulting receiver to make a contribution to the company's assets in whatever 
amount the court thinks just'" 
Berg suggests that s 212 was originally enacted on the assumption that a tortious 
duty of care was owed by receiver to company209. Medforth does not disturb the 
Downsview position that only equitable duties are owed, but it clearly offers scope 
to both company and unsecured creditors, the latter via s 212, to challenge careless 
conduct. It might, therefore, be a purely academic exercise to attempt to ascribe a 
tortious duty of care, owed by a receiver directly to the company's unsecured 
creditors. It is submitted, however, that there may be circumstances when such 
creditors would argue that that duty is owed to them. 
... Although such an award would have to be applied firstly in discharge of an unsatisfied floating 
charge. 
207 IA s 212(l) (italics added). An administrative receiver falls within s 212(l)(b). 
101 ]bid. s 212(3)(b). 
'09 Duties ofa Mortgagee anda Receiver [19911 JBL 230,233. 
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The utility of s 212 may, for instance, be circumscribed by an exclusion clause in 
the original debenture contract. Whether the equitable duty described in Medforth 
can be successfully excluded by contract has yet to be decided, as, indeed, has the 
question of whether such a clause would be subject to the provisions of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977"'. To the extent that it can, recourse to s 212 becomes 
unavailable to both a liquidator and unsecured creditors, since the entire section is 
grounded in duties owed to the company. Further, s 212 only operates in the event 
of a winding up. Liquidation almost invariably succeeds receivership, but one can 
imagine circumstances where it might not. If, for example, sufficient is realised to 
repay the debenture-holder in full, and the residue is handed back to the company in 
circumstances where it can continue trading, a winding up may not take place. If the 
receiver has conducted the realisation process without due care, but the company, 
for whatever reason, is reluctant to pursue the receiver the unsecured creditors' 
would appear to be without a remedy unless they can point to an obligation owed 
directly to them. The obvious candidate is the tortious duty of care. Does the law, 
though, admit of such a remedy? 
The short answer appears to be that it does not, although no principled rationale for 
this position has ever been advanced. Both Downsview and Medforth locate a 
receiver's duties in equity rather than tort, but it has consistently been asserted that 
the equitable duty is owed to those interested in the equity of redemption. Thus a 
junior mortgagee and, it would appear, a guarantor of the company's debts are 
entitled to enforce the equitable duty, but an unsecured creditor is not, because he 
... It is suggested that it can: see Frisby, Making a Silk Purse out of a Pig's Ear (2000) 63 MLR 413, 
421-422. 
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has no proprielwy interest in the mortgagor's equity of redemption. One of the 
objections to negligence liability advanced by Lord Templeman in Downsview was 
that the relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee was already regulated by 
equity. Equity, though, has never occupied the field as far as the relationship 
between mortgagee and unsecured creditors of the mortgagor is concerned. The 
field is therefore ostensibly clear for the common law to make a dramatic entrance. 
This contention is seductively simple, and, indeed, overly so. First, prior to 
Medforth, the equitable duty owed by receivers was clearly inferior to a tortious 
duty of care. For a court to hold, therefore, that a receiver could be liable to 
unsecured creditors in negligence would have left them better protected than, say, a 
junior encumbrancer. Such a position would be outlandish, given the deference 
accorded to property rights in insolvency, and the implicit precept that superior 
property rights attract superior protection. Thus the law's internal logic dictates that 
no tortious duty of care subsists as between receiver and unsecured creditors. 
Secondly, it is by no means clear that the law of tort would apply to the 
receiver/unsecured creditor nexus. The main objection to the imPortation of a duty 
of care is that the latter suffers pure economic loss as a result of the fon-ner's 
carelessness. A full analysis of the stringent approach to this form of damage 
adoPted in recent years is beyond this work, but a few observations may be made. 
Before recovery for pure economic loss will be countenanced the plaintiff must 
establish that he was a foreseeable and proximate victim of the defendant's 
negligence, and that it would be fair, just and reasonable that liability be imposed"'. 
211 See, e. g., Marc Rich &- Cov Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd[ 1996] AC211' 235e, per Lord Steyn. 
279 
Unsecured creditors are clearly foreseeable, but can they be said to be 'proximate' 
to a receiver? This term admits of no precise definition, and its meaning varies 
according to the context in which it is used. As far as economic loss is concerned, it 
appears that if a claimant can point to an assumption of responsibility on the part of 
the tortfeasor, and his own reliance on said tortfeasor, then he will be a sufficiently 
proximate victim"'. Hogan, discussing the duties of a receiver, proposes the 
following: 
"It is submitted that by taking the role of receiver, a receiver is assuming 
responsibility to a degree necessary for the level of protection commensurate with 
tortious negligence to be applicable, however that is labelled, whether explicitly as 
tortious or in a reformulated equitable duty. "" 3 
Hogan cites Hendersen v Merrett Syndicates Ltd in support of this contention, but it 
is difficult to see how unsecured creditors can be said to rely upon a receiver in the 
sense that the Lloyds 'Names' in that case relied upon the managing agents 
interposed between themselves and the syndicate managers. Certainly, unsecured 
creditors do not authorise a receiver to act on their behalf or in their interests, and, 
indeed, have no choice in the matter of his management of assets in which they are 
residually interested. 
In Caparo v Dicknian'" the House of Lords held that an auditor of a company owed 
no duty of care to its creditors, on the ground that the creditors were not sufficiently 
proximate victims of the carelessness in question, and it is at least arguable that the 
case of receiver and unsecured creditors is more analogous to this relationship than 
"'Henderson vMerreuSyndicales Lid [1995] 2 AC 145,182, per Lord Goff. 
21 ' Developments. 
-Ifter Downsview [ 1996] Insolvency Law and Practice 182,187. 
214 [ 1990] 2 AC 605. 
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to that in the Henderson case. 
On the other hand, Caparo is nowadays seen as the high water mark of the trend 
towards a restriction of negligence liability, and might be considered passi. Those 
wishing to impose tortious duties on a receiver could certainly cite more recent, less 
prohibitive House of Lords authority ostensibly supportive of their case. If reliance 
was considered important in Henderson, it was, as an element, relegated in White v 
Jones"', where a solicitor who delayed in preparing a new will was found liable to 
the beneficiaries under that will. Clearly there was no de facto reliance in that case, 
and it arguably extends the scope of the interpretation of 'proximity' established in 
Henderson"'. 
Further possible support for the proposition that unsecured creditors are proximate 
victims of a receiver's negligence is the case of Spring v Guardian Assurance p1c", 
where a referee who provided a carelessly prepared and misleading reference was 
held liable to its subject. It might be maintained by analogy that a receiver acting 
primarily for a third party (the debenture-holder) is in a relationship of proximity to 
those who fie foresees will be affected by the manner in which he performs his task, 
although the parallel is far from perfect. 
Quite how the courts would decide this matter is uncommonly difficult to second 
guess. A further complication is the fact that questions of fairness, reasonableness 
and justice are routinely stated to be of relevance in the determination of whether 
tortious liability should be imposed. In this regard, Mackenzie states: 
"' [ 1995] 2 AC 207. 
"'As pointed out by Lord Mustill in his dissenting judgment in White v Jones at 291. 
217 [ 199512 AC 296. 
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"The extension of a general liability in negligence to all creditors would be 
undesirable, particularly since it might lead to a multiplicity of actions and a difficulty 
in finding receivers prepared to serve. "' 18 
This manifestation of the familiar 'floodgates' argument has some force in the 
receivership context, where a company's unsecured creditors might amount to a 
substantial number of individuals, all anxious to sue. The problem might be 
addressed at the legislative level by a provision that any action would take the form 
of a 'class action"". This would not, however, address the problem of the costs run 
up by creditors prosecuting, and receivers defending actions, funds which can 
scarcely be spared out of an insolvent estate. 
It is tentatively submitted that, if asked to decide the question, the courts would 
refuse to hold that a receiver owes a tortious duty of care to the company's 
unsecured creditors. On balance, this is probably the better approach, especially 
since Medforth now imposes an appropriately constructed equitable duty on a 
receiver. In those exceptional cases where unsecured creditors will not benefit from 
that duty it would seem that the only remedy available to unsecured creditors will 
be to petition the court for the removal of the receiver under s 45 Insolvency Act 
1986. Both Doyle"' and Berg"' question whether a court would entertain such a 
petition, and conclude that in all likelihood it would be summarily dismissed. 
Duties Owed 1)), Receivers to Third Parties, (1982) 3 Co Law 80,83. 
Analogous to those brought under exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
221 Administrative Receivership: Law and Practice, supra n 76,343. 
22 ' Duties of a Aforýqagee and a Receiver, supra n 210,23 1. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
Whilst unsecured creditors are indirectly protected against the carelessness of a 
receiver by Mec#-orth, they remain disenfranchised in terms of their ability to 
influence the course of a receivership in any meaningful manner. No specific cause 
of action exists by which they might argue their case outside of winding up, and the 
value of their ability to participate in receivership via attendance of a creditors' 
meeting, or membership of a creditors' committee is dubious to say the least. Given 
the Cork Committee's anxiety that unsecured creditors should be given a greater 
stake in receivership, tile position is open to criticism. 
It can be contrasted with the position of creditors in an administration, who may, by 
s 27(l) Insolvency Act 1986, petition the court on the grounds that the 
administrator is carrying out his functions "in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of 
... 
creditors or members generally... ". In Ireland, s 
316 of the Companies Act 1963 222 allows a creditor of the company to apply to the 
court for directions "in relation to any matter in connection with the performance or 
otherwise by a receiver of his functionS"223, such an application to be supported by 
evidence of unfairly prejudicial condUCt224 
. 
This would appear to reproduce the 
position during administration under UK law. 
As it is, the existing law offers little comfort to unsecured creditors. Their lack of 
proprietary priority results in their interests being relegated to little more than an 
afterthought, and this impotence is exacerbated by the want of any meaningful 
participation rights in the receivership process. Little wonder that they have 
222 As amended by s 171 Companies (Aniendinent) Act 1990. 
223 Ibid. s 316(l)(a)(v). 
221 Ibid. s 316(l A). 
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responded by devising contractual solutions to their predicament, which have 
proved only partially successful but which serve nonetheless to make receivership 
law a more colourful and complex study. The following section considers the 
manner in which unsecured creditors have struggled to attain some level of 
protection against insolvency and receivership, and the extent to which they have 
prevailed. 
4. Unsecured creditors in practice: wresting concessions during receivership 
4.1 Infroduclion 
The plight of unsecured creditors is usually represented by the fact that they are 
owed money which they are unlikely to receive. They are portrayed as having a 
4one-off' interest in receivership, viz., their only concern is whether or not they will 
be paid. In practice their interest is just as likely to be of a 'continuing' nature, in 
that it will extend to the company's trading activities during receivership and, 
indeed, its eventual fate. Iredale and Hughes explain the situation thus: 
"Despite the fact that they will not receive payment of past debts, an administrative 
receiver's dealings with trade creditors can often be relatively harmonious. If they co- 
operate, they may share in an increased realisation, and they can also hope to retain an 
outlet for their products through the new company. ""' 
A receiver will often find himself called upon to harness the goodwill of unsecured 
creditors in order to pursue his appointor's advantage. In circumstances where the 
maximisation of assets can only be achieved by a period of trading and a going 
concern sale of the business, he will be dependent, to a greater or lesser 
225 Tolleys Receivership Ahinual, 3rd ed. (1987 : Tolleys : London), para. 11.2. 
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degree, on parties to whom the company owes money and who sense the 
opportunity to extract an advantage. On the other hand, such parties may be happy 
to cut their losses from pre-receivership contracts in the hope of securing orders 
during receivership trading. The circumstances of receivership give rise to a subtle 
and highly complex interaction between receiver and unsecured creditor, the 
outcome of which will often be decided by circumstances that are purely fortuitous. 
4.2 Legal proteclion for receivership trading partners 
"The administrative receiver of a company 
- 
is personally liable on any contract entered into by him in the carrying out of his 
functions (except in so far as the contract otherwise provides) and... 
is entitled in respect of that liability to an indemnity out of the assets of the 
company. " 
To the extent that a receiver orders supplies during receivership he is personally 
liable to pay for them, but is himself protected by his underlying indemnity. This 
provision has the effect of conferring upon post-receivership trading partners of the 
company a form of 'super-priority', in that a receiver's indemnity ranks for 
payment ahead of his appointor's security, whether fixed or floating"'. Unsecured 
creditors whose products or services are not required in a trading receivership slip 
down a place in the payment 'league table' by reason of the fact that the receiver 
chooses to continue trading and incurring post-appointment liabilities. It appears, 
therefore, that both the debenture-holder and certain of the company's creditors are 
compelled to subsidisc a trading strategy, but that only the former's interests dictate 
IA s 44(l)(b)(c). 
Ibid. s 45(3)(b). 
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whether such should be adopted. Further, to the extent that the eventual level of 
realisations is insufficient to discharge the whole of the secured debt, only the 
debenture-holder will reap any benefit from this 'investment'. 
This does not mean that unsecured creditors are prejudiced to a greater extent by a 
trading receivership. Such will only be embarked upon if the debenture-holder's 
interests demand it, and this will only be the case where an immediate asset sale 
will result in a deficit for him. This being so, unsecured creditors would receive 
nothing anyway. The real risk-bearer in these circumstances is the debenture- 
holder, who, should the trading programme prove unsuccessful and ultimately 
realise less than an immediate sale would have done, will see the monetary value of 
his security diverted, via the receiver's indemnity, to parties who ostensibly rank 
below him in priority terms. Such an outcome seems unavoidable under the 
legislation, unless the super-priority position of receivership creditors can be 
avoided. 
4.2.1 Contracting out of personal liability 
in principle there is nothing objectionable about contracting out of s 44(l), since the 
section expressly provides for that possibility. If the receiver's personal liability is 
excluded, the practical effect is that the risk of post-appointment trading shifts from 
debenture-holder to contracting partners of the company. By contracting on such 
terms, the third part), can be seen to consent to this displacement and so effectively 
waive his right to the protection offered by s 44. Lightman J suggested, in Re 
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Leyland DA F Lid (Aro 2); Re Ferranti International p1c"', that a receiver might, in 
certain circumstances, be liable for fraudulent trading under s 213 Insolvency Act 
1986. The circumstances he there described might be said to fit the case of a 
receivership contract entered into without personal liability. It is surely 
inconceivable that a contract consensually excluding such liability should expose a 
receiver to such strong sanction. 
5. Unsecured creditors and self-help 
1 Playing- the hailaining, c ips 
If post-appointment trading is contemplated, it will be because the welfare of the 
debenture-holder Nvill be improved via the enhancement of realisations that such 
activities tend to generate. Thus a receiver will employ assets to generate income, 
or to render the company's business more saleable, and that decision will be 
informed by his appohitor's requirements. If unsecured creditors benefit through the 
achievement of a surphis it will be by happy accident rather than design. 
Nonetheless, the fact that trading is necessary may prove advantageous to them by 
other routes. It may, in fortuitous circumstances, lead to the payment of pre- 
receivership (and so unsecured) debts, ahead of both debenture-holder and other 
unsecured creditors. 
This is most likely to be the case where a pre-receivership supplier of the company 
is in a monopoly position. If the company cannot continue in business without his 
goods or services, such a party can refuse to furnish it further unless all 
indebtedness is discharged. This will even be the case where an instalment contract 
228 [1994] 2 13CI-C 760. 
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envisages the supply of goods on credit but the company/buyer defaults before the 
contract is complete. In such circumstances the seller can simply refuse to perform 
his outstanding obligations 
A graphic illustration of this tactic is provided by the case of Leyland DAF Ltd v 
Automotive Products p1c"'. The continuation of Leyland DAF's business was 
impossible without Automotive's parts. Automotive were happily aware of this, and 
refused to fulfil outstanding supply contracts until they were paid for pre- 
appointment supplies. Leyland's administrative receivers, desperate to keep the 
business going, mounted a novel challenge, based in part on Art. 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome"', which fell on stony ground both at first instance and in the Court of 
Appeal. Sir Donald Nicholls VC had this to say: 
"When an administrative receiver is appointed by a debenture-h older, and he seeks to 
carry on the customer's business with a view to selling it as a going concern, the 
person who primarily stands to benefit is the debenture-holder. There is no obvious 
reason why a supplier of goods should be expected to bear, for the benefit of the 
debenture-holder, the burden of an unpaid pre-receivership debt. ""' 
This may be contrasted with the position of utility suppliers. Their ability to hold a 
receiver to ransom in this manner was circumscribed by s 233 if the Insolvency Act 
1986, which entitles, inter alia, an administrative receiver to request a supply of 
gas, water, electricity or telecommunication services. Such supply may be made 
conditional upon the receiver personally guaranteeing charges in respect of that 
supply, but not conditional upon the discharge of pre-appointment liabilities"'. 
22' Re Edwards, ex parle Chalmers (1873) 8 Ch App 289, per Mellish U at p. 29 1. 
230 (1994] 1 BCLC 245. 
231 Proscribing abuse of a dominant position in the marketplace. 
232 [1994] 1 BCLC 245,250-25 1. 
233 IA s 233(2)(a)(b). 
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Prior to the Insolvency Act 1986 a supplier was statutorily entitled to cut off a 
supply for non-payment. A receiver, as agent of the company, was not a new 
coccupier' similarly authorised to call for a new SUPPIY234. In practice, the only 
means by which power, water or communications services could be obtained was 
by the receiver discharging both pre- and post-appointment debts 
it is not surprising that statutory bodies, upon whom a statutory monopoly had been 
conferred in terms of utility supplies, should find their de facto power to obtain 
payment of an unsecured debt removed. Sir Kenneth Cork himself, during the 
consultation period preceding the Insolvency Act, described his own experience as 
receiver of a glass works, and his inability to persuade a power supplier not to cut 
off the supply, the result of which was the loss of valuable materialS236. Carruthers 
and Halliday note: 
"If tile Cork Committee had limited sympathy for any type of preference, it had none 
for these powerful utilities that impeded company rescue and muscled aside weaker 
creditors. ""' 
Nonetheless, the might of the utility companies was uniquely vulnerable to the 
control of Government. In this regard, s 233 Insolvency Act is unusual in that it 
prevents one creditor from exercising the kind of commercial muscle that others are 
still perfectly free to employ. 
This would appear to represent one of the very few disadvantages of the receiver's agency position. 
See, e. g., Paterson v Gas, Light and Coke Co, [ 1896] 2 Ch 476; Peat Marwick Ltd v Consumers' 
Gas Co (1977) 83 DLR (3 d) 16 1. 
236 Rescuing Business, supra n 179,23 5. 
237 Ibid. 
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5.2 Contractual lienees 
An unsecured trading partner of the company may escape the consequences of 
unsecured status by strength of bargaining power. Except in the case of utility 
suppliers, the law sanctions such tactics, and quite rightly. The debenture-holder's 
elevated position emanates from his own commercial strength, allowing him to 
extract advantageous property rights from the company. Many trading partners of 
the same company will be in no position to bargain for the kind of proprietary 
priority the debenture-holder enjoys. The tendency to survey unsecured creditors as 
a homogeneous group is, however, inappropriate in this context, as particular sub- 
species of the genus can escape the disadvantages of their status. 
one such group is contractual lienees, having possession of property of the 
company and entitled to assert a contractual right to possession as defeating the 
debenture-holder's seemingly superior property rights. In George Barker 
(Transport) Ltd v Eynon 238 the Court of Appeal upheld the contractual right of a 
carrier to retain possession of the company's goods, notwithstanding that 
possession had been obtained after the appointment of a receiver. Farrar observes: 
"This seems to create new law. Formerly it was regarded as axiomatic that possession 
was essential to constitute a legal lien. The Barker case seems to distinguish between 
a legal lien and a contractual lien in a legal lien type of situation, possession being 
essential to the existence of the first but merely "preliminary to the exercise of the 
right claimed" in the case of the second 
. 
91239 
238 [1974] 1 WLR 462. 
239 Recent Developments in the Lau, ofReceivers, [ 1975) JBL 23,32. 
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The Barker case, although unorthodox, was followed in relation to an equitable lien 
in Re Diesels Components Pty Ltd"'. The principle also found favour in Northern 
Ireland, in the case of De Lorean Motor Cars Ltd (In Receivership) v Northern 
Ireland Carriers Ltd 241 
. 
Whether the Barker decision survives the enactment of ss 234 and 236 Insolvency 
Act 1986 is an interesting and as yet unanswered question. The former provision 
allows an administrative receiver, as office-holder, to apply for a court order 
requiring any person who has possession or control of the company's property to 
surrender such to the administrative receiver2". The latter applies in circumstances 
where an office-holder is inquiring into the company's dealings, and gives the court 
power to require the production of "any books, papers or other records" relating to 
the company. 
In Re Aveling Barford Ltd243 Hoffman J ordered the production, under s 236, of 
documents of the company in the possession of its solicitor, notwithstanding that 
the solicitor had a lien over the documents in question. According to the learned 
judge, s 236 conferred a kind of "third party status" upon an administrative 
receiver2", which meant that he was, in this context, in a different position to the 
company itself and so not subject to those 'equities' which bound the company. The 
outcome of an order for production was that the lien, whilst still enforceable"', 
became virtually valueless. 
... (1985) 9 ACLR 225. 
[1982]NI 163, and see Bell, The Priority of General Liens, (1986)7 Co Law 164. 
IA s 234(2). 
243 [1989] 1 WLR360. 
244 Ibid. 364-365. 
24' An administrative receiver cannot use s 246 Insolvency Act, which, in the case of administration or 
liquidation, renders a lien unenforceable. 
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The critical question is whether the "third party status" described by Hoffmann J is 
similarly conferred by s 234. If it is, then it is arguable that the Barker case is no 
longer good law, since it is implicit in that decisions, and essential to the judgment, 
that a contractual lien binds a receiver to precisely the same extent as it binds the 
company. 
No case has decided this question, and it is perhaps odd that no administrative 
receiver has attempted to invoke s 234 in order to defeat a contractual lien. The 
section applies, as does s 236, only in relation to "office-holders". It is submitted, 
however, that s 236 has an entirely different emphasis to s 234, and to such an 
extent that decisions relating to the former are of no relevance to the latter. As its 
heading suggests, s 236 is concerned to ensure that an administrative receiver's 
investigation of the company's affairs and dealings may be conducted effectively. It 
serves to facilitate what is essentially a public service, and one which is entirely 
separate from a receiver's enforcement function. 
No such element is present in s 234. Third party status may be considered necessary 
and justifiable in order to promote the policy initiative inherent in s 236, not so 
where its only effect is to destroy what the courts have already decided is a valid 
use of contractual rights, and to the advantage only of the debenture-holder. No 
guidance as to the manner in which the courts' s 234 power is to be exercised is 
given in the section itself It is suggested that it should be used sparingly, and with 
the same deference to the rights of lienees as evinced in the Barker case. Their 
Possessory rights are, in reality, conceptually similar to the debenture-holder's 
proprietary priority, in that both stem from contract. A contractual lienee is no less 
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morally justified in asserting a judiciously bargained-for entitlement than is a 
debenture-holder. 
5.3 Judicial inp_, enuitE in the receivership cause: retention of title creditors 
5.3.1 Ownership rights and the problems they ereate 
The emergence of the retention of title clause in trading contracts is symptomatic of 
the disenchantment of ordinary trade creditors with a system of property and 
insolvency law that allows for the creation of a floating charge. By contractually 
retaining title to goods supplied to the company, such remain the property of the 
supplier and so are not caught by a floating charge. It is beyond the scope of this 
work to recount the chequered history of the retention of title clause"'. It suffices to 
note here that before a retention of title clause will have the desired effect it must be 
validly incorporated into the contract of supply, it must not constitute an 
unregistered charge, and goods in the possession of the company must be shown to 
be the subject of that clause. 
In the (perhaps unlikely) event that he is able to accomplish the above, a retention 
of title supplier should be fully protected against the crystallisation of a floating 
charge and the appointment of a receiver. Because the receiver only has jurisdiction 
over property covered by the charge he will have no power to deploy retention of 
title assets in his management of the company's business. If he wishes to use such 
assets he can always pay for them, but otherwise he may risk liability in conversion 
or trespass. 
"' See Gough, Company Charges, szipra n 37. 
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Some protection in this regard might be offered by s 234(3) and (4) Insolvency Act 
1986, which provides that a receiver will not be liable for any loss or damage 
arising from the disposal of property which he reasonably believes he is entitled to 
dispose of But this provision does not divest the retention of title creditor of his 
ownership of the property, and so his entitlement to any proceeds of disposal. Nor, 
it is submitted, will a receiver be able to show that he had reasonable grounds for 
believing that he was entitled to dispose of such property. He will, as a matter of 
routine, have taken an inventory of goods in the possession of the company at the 
time of his appointment, and so become aware of the retention of title clause in the 
contract of supply. It is arguable that if a receiver remains blissfully unaware of the 
fact that goods are the subject of a retention of title clause and disposes of them in a 
manner causing loss or damage, he cannot claim the protection of s 234(4) by 
reason of his own negligence 
Prima facie, therefore, a retention of title creditor can assert his undoubted 
proprietary priority over the debenture-holder by simply repossessing his goods and 
an administrative receiver can do nothing to prevent this. This may cause particular 
problems where the goods in question are an essential part of a receiver's trading 
strategy. In extreme cases, the retention of title creditor may seriously jeopardise an 
attempt to sell the company as a going concern, or, indeed, an even more overt 
rescue plan. In the event, however, the position is less problematic than it might at 
first seem. 
"' See IA s 234(4)(a). 
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5.3.2 Taking the rescue initiative: Lipe v Leyland DAF 
It was suggested earlier that the Government of the day, in enacting the Insolvency 
Act 1986, chose not to confer a moratorium and disposal powers on administrative 
receivers in order to 'sell' the more rescue-orientated administration procedure to 
financial institutions. If this is correct, they reckoned without the intervention of the 
courts, or, more accurately, the remarkable judgment of Hoffmann LJ in the case of 
Lipe Ltd v Leyland DAF Ltd"'. The Leyland DAF receivership was one of the 
largest, and most economically significant of its time. Lipe was one of over 400 
retention of title claimants demanding the return of its goods. The administrative 
receivers, who were continuing to fulfil the company's contracts and realising 
E300,000 to E400,000 per day in the process, refused to hand over those goods, 
offering instead their personal assurance that all valid claims would be met in due 
course"9. Lipe commenced proceedings for possession and sought an injunction 
against the receivers. In the Court of Appeal, Hoffman LJ refused to grant one, 
applying the 'balance of convenience test' from American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon 
Dd"'. He said this: 
"If an injunction is granted, and in particular if others asserting an arguable claim to 
retention of title are encouraged to adopt similar tactics, the goods in question will be 
frozen and there will be a substantial risk of damaging the business which the 
receivers are trying to sell. The practical consequences are likely to be that the 
receivers will be forced to abandon their challenge to the retention of title clauses and 
pay suppliers immediately on the sale of the goods in dispute. To force a party to 
248 [1993] BCC 385. 
249 The validity of the clauses in question was being challenged by the receivers. 
250 [19751 AC 396. 
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abandon a bona fide defence by this kind of commercial pressure seems to me an 
injustice which outweighs any risk which will have to be borne by Lipe. ""' 
Lipe had argued that the risk to them that the receivers, faced with the possibility of 
having to meet many hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of claims and being 
unable to do so, outweighed that to the company. This contention was dismissed 
unceremoniously by Hoffmann J: 
"... receivers, as sensible professional men, will not lightly risk personal bankruptcy 
and will therefore not incur liabilities unless they are satisfied that there are sufficient 
assets to enable those liabilities, to say nothing of the receiver's personal expenses and 
remuneration, to be paid in full. ""' 
This is a pioneering decision"'. Its practical effect is to import into receivership a 
power similar to that in administration under s 15(2) Insolvency Act, entitling an 
administrator to apply to court for an order allowing the disposal of property subject 
to a retention of title clause. In practice, it may go further than the s 15(2) power. 
To the extent that a personal assurance is given by a receiver, and to the extent that 
Lipe is routinely followed, there will be little point in a retention of title claimant 
applying for an injunction to prevent disposal of the property in question. The 
principle of the case has since been applied in Mayflower Foods Ltd v Barnard 
Bros. "', Judge Hegarty QC... lifting an injunction granted against receivers in 
relation to leased equipment which they claimed had become fixtures on the 
251 [1993] BCC 385,387-388. 
252 Ibid. 387. 
253 Swashbuckling almost! 
... Unreported, 9 August 1996. 
155 Who, ironically, argued the case for Lipe in Lipe v Leyland DAF. 
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receivership company's premises. Again, the fact that a going concern sale was the 
receivers' ultimate objective was clearly influential to the eventual outcome 256 
. 
The Lipe judgment was, it is suggested, driven to a great extent by Hoffmann LJ's 
desire to see an overall beneficial outcome in what was evidently an important 
receivership. There is also at least a hint of his disapproval at the 'tactics' adopted 
by Lipe, which contrasts sharply with the amenability of the Court of Appeal in 
Leyland DAF v Automotive Products Ltd" to the exertion of commercial Pressure 
in the very same receivershiP. 
The end result probably justifies the means by which the learned judge in Lipe 
managed to forestall what might otherwise have been a perfectly legitimate 
invocation of proprietary priority on the part of the retention of title claimants. 
Certainly, they stood to lose nothing if their claims turned out to be valid, as long as 
the receivers were able to back up their personal assurances with hard cash. On the 
other hand, it is arguable that receivers themselves might resort to opportunistic 
behaviour in the wake of the decision. Faced with a recalcitrant retention of title 
supplier, it would be expedient to challenge his clause, give the requisite personal 
assurance, and hope that he will agree to settle for a payment of less than the 
invoice value of the goods in question. Thus a seemingly utilitarian judgment may 
simply switch the opportunity to rely on bargaining power from one party to the 
other. 
It is not clear from Lipe whether the suppliers could have framed their action purely 
in conversion, on the grounds that a demand for delivery up of the goods had been 
256 See (1997) 14(l) Building Law Monthly for a fuller treatment of the case. 
257 Supra n 23 1. 
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consistently ignored 25', and succeeded in that way. The remedy for conversion takes 
the form of a "forced judicial sale" of the property, and the practical effect of the 
Lipe case is precisely the same"', except that payment would be delayed whilst the 
validity of the clauses was determined. It therefore appears that, in 'rescue policy' 
terms, retention of title claimants have nothing to lose, and other creditors 
everything to gain from the adoption of the decision in most cases. If, though, it 
appears that a useful bargaining chip has simply changed hands, and that valid 
claims are compromised out of an understandable desire to avoid litigation, there is 
something to be said for future courts treating the Lipe approach with caution. 
5.4 Hire purchase and leasing transactions 
Hire purchase contracts invariably contain a term conferring a right of repossession 
in the event of receivership. An administrator can apply to the courts for an order 
allowing him to dispose of property subject to a hire purchase agreement"', and, 
further, repossession under such an agreement is subject to the permission of the 
administrator or the leave of the court"'. Neither of these provisions operates in a 
receivership. 
It will frequently be a matter of negotiation between receiver and hire purchase 
... See Bridge, Personal Property Law, 2nd Ed. (1996 : Blackstone Press Ltd: London), 47 
- 
48. 
259 On the enforcement of the personal assurances, the suppliers would have received the invoice price 
of the goods in question, rather then their market value at the date of conversion: General & Finance 
Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644. It is submitted that the fon-ner is the more 
appropriate amount in the circumstances, since a retention of title creditor can hardly expect to receive 
more than he has contracted for. 
260 IA s 15(2)(b). 
161 Ibid s 11(3)(c). 
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supplier as to whether the former can use or dispose of such assets. One problem 
encountered may be that the latter may be at a considerable bargaining advantage, 
being able to repossess goods the market value of which is well above the 
outstanding instalments due on the hire purchase contract. This will usually be the 
case towards the end of the hiring term, but a receiver is not altogether powerless to 
resist such commercial power. In Transag Haulage Ltd v Leyland DAF Finance 
pIc... Knox J held that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to award relief against 
forfeiture under a hire purchase contract in circumstances where the company was 
in receivership and the contract had terminated. He contemplated that such 
jurisdiction would be exercised sparingly, and only in circumstances where a failure 
to do so would confer an unwarranted windfall on the owner. On the facts before 
him he was influenced by the receiver's offer to meet all outstanding instalments, 
by the prospect of a 30% windfall to the owner of the goods, and, notably, by the 
fact that "refusal of relief from forfeiture may cause significant loss to the 
company""'. Cumulatively, these considerations led him to believe that a grant of 
relief from forfeiture was appropriate in the circumstances"'. 
A salutary warning to receivers to apply for relief expeditiously can be found in the 
case of Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd v Royscot Trust PIC265 
. 
Assets were provided on hire 
purchase terms to the plaintiff company, the contract containing a term allowing for 
repossession on the appointment of an administrative receiver. Shortly before such 
appointment, the owner informed the company that the outstanding balance 
"' [1994] BCC 356; an interesting example of the boot being on the other foot as far as Leyland DAF 
were concerned. 
263 Ihid. 367-368. 
264 See also On Demand Information plc v Michael Gerson (Finance) p1c, Unreported, 31 July 2000. 
265 Unreported, 15 March 1999. 
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amounted to E34,386. The receivers failed to apply for relief from forfeiture on their 
appointment, although they did request a statement of the outstanding balance on 
the hire purchase contracts. An offer for the business was made and the agreement 
was promptly terminated. The owner then offered to discharge its interest in the 
assets for a payment of E82,000, which the receivers agreed to pay when the 
owner's agents turned up to repossess the assets. After making this payment, and 
after the sale of the business, the company sought to recover the extra E47,613 
payment as made under duress of goods. 
HHJ Rich, sitting as a High Court Judge, dismissed the claim, on the ground that, 
although the payment was clearly an involuntary one, the threat to repossess was 
not wrongful purely because it was taking advantage of the receivers' failure to 
apply for relief from forfeiture. The subsequent negotiation of a price for release of 
the assets over double what had originally been due was not, according to the 
learned judge, obtained via the exertion of illegitimate pressure. Whether this 
decision accurately reflects what does, or should, constitute "illegitimate pressure" 
for the purposes of the law of economic duress is debatable. The owner, after all, 
obtained a windfall at the expense of the debenture-holder and, perhaps, the 
company's unsecured creditors, and it is submitted that the circumstances should 
have been examined in a rather more global manner. Nonetheless, to the extent that 
the case is good law, it behoves a receiver to examine all hire purchase contracts of 
the company immediately upon his appointment, and to make the appropriate 
applications for relief as soon after as possible. 
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Receivers and the company's contracts: opportunistic breach and its limits 
I- Introduction 
"One of the critically important powers of a receiver is his ability effectively to 
repudiate pre-receivership contracts in the interests of a better realisation of the charge 
on the property. ""' 
The nature of this power is best illustrated by example. Suppose Company X enters 
into a contract with Company Y. Prior to its performance, a receiver is appointed 
over Company Y's assets. He considers that he can make better use of the assets 
required for the performance of the contract with Company X and refuses to 
perform it. The receiver, as agent of Company Y, is not a party to the contract and 
cannot be personally liable on it. By causing Company Y to repudiate the contract 
he renders it liable in damages, but a damages award will represent an unsecured 
claim against Company Y, and is therefore unlikely to be me t267 
. 
This section 
examines the extent to which the law protects Company Y in these circumstances, 
and, as a corollary, the extent to which it should circumscribe a receiver's freedom 
to consign a contracting partner of the company to unsecured status simply in order 
to benefit his debenture-holder. 
2. Pursuit-af- the receiver in tort 
A receiver will not be personally liable on a pre-receivership contract, but by 
causing the company to repudiate such an obligation it might be thought that he 
could be made liable in the tort of interference with contractual rights. The tort in 
266 Moss and Segal, 2rading by Administrative Receivers and Administrators (1994) 7 Insolvency Intelligence 49. 
267 See Oditah, Financing Trade Credit: Welsh Development Agency v Erfinco [1992] JBL 541. 
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question is often described as an 'economic tort', and its actus reus is described 
thus: 
"Knowingly to procure, or as it is often put, to induce a third party to break his 
contract to the damage of the other contracting party without reasonable justification 
or excuse is a tort. 
11268 
Where a receiver refuses to utilise the company's assets to perform a pre- 
receivership contract it would seem that the elements of the above tort are made 
OUt269. The reality, however, is that a receiver is effectively immune from such 
tortious liability when his repudiation of a contractual obligation of the company is 
carried out as agent of the company"O. 
This position originates in the case of Said v Buti"'. The judgment of McCardie J 
was to the effect that an agent can never be liable in the tort of interference with 
contractual relations when the contract in question is one made between a third 
party and his principal. The learned judge's reasoning was based on the conceptual 
difficulty caused by the fact that an agent is his principal's alter ego, and a principal 
cannot be made liable for inducing or procuring his own breach of contract. Such 
syllogism is simplistic in the extreme, and has attracted cogent criticism, not least 
from the authors of Bowstead on Agency, who point out that an agent is 
concurrently liable with his principal for his (the agent's) own tortious actS272 
.A 
"'Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 17th Ed, (1995 : Sweet& Maxwell: London), para. 23-09. 
2" The defence of reasonable excuse or-justification is discussed infra at 318-319. 
"' The loss of agency status on liquidation will, it is submitted, remove this immunity; see infra 320. 
271 [ 1920] 2 KB 497. 
271 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 16th Ed (1996 : Sweet & Maxwell : London), para 9-115. See 
also Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270,289, where Dillon U 
confessed that he would find "no conceptual difficulty" in holding an agent liable in the tort of 
wrongful interference. 
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further objection to its application in a receivership situation is the technicality and 
artificiality of the receiver's agency for the company 
The question of the pertinence of the Said v Butt principle to receivership has only 
recently been authoritatively decided. In Re Bolibol (Deceased)"' Evershed J was 
prepared to contemplate that a court-appointed receiver might be liable in the tort 
of interference, but such a receiver has an independent status, is not an agent, and so 
an essential element of the Said v Butt reasoning was absent in that case. The first 
case to canvass the possibility of a contractual receiver's acts attracting tortious 
liability was Telemetrix plc v Modern Engineers of Bristol (Holdings) plC27'. Peter 
Gibson J, without deciding the point, expressed strong doubts as to the relevance of 
Said v Butt to the agency of a privately appointed receiver. In Lathia v Dronsfield 
Bros. Ltd, however, Sir Neil Lawson had no such reservations: 
"The next point I have taken from the textbooks and authorities. A receiver can adopt 
or decline to adopt a contract which the company has entered into and which is 
unexecuted. it follows from this, and the agency clause, that an agent is personally 
immune from a claim for damages for a breach of contract or the procurement of a 
breach of contract. An agent has immunity from a claim for inducing a breach of 
contract unless he has not acted bona fide or acted outside the scope of his authority, 
i. e., had not acted as agent. ""' 
The Court of Appeal confirmed this position in the case of Welsh Development 
Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd"'. In spite of expressing some dissatisfaction with 
... See Chapter 2. 
"' f 194711 All ER 26. 
275 [ 1985] BCLC 213. 
276 [1987] BCLC 321,324. 
177 [ 19921 BCC 270. 
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the Said v Butt principle, Dillon LJ found himself constrained to apply it to a 
contractual receiver: 
"But the reasonings and conclusions of McCardie J have stood for so long and been so 
widely accepted that it is not for this court, in my judgment, to interfere with that. ""' 
The law is therefore indisputably that a receiver, whilst his agency subsists, will be 
exempt from liability in the tort of interference with contractual relations. 
3. The alternative remedies: injunctive relief and specific performance 
3.1 Court-al2pointed receivers 
In In re Newdigate Colliery Ltd.. the Court of Appeal considered the question of 
whether a receiver appointed by the Court should be authorised to breach pre- 
receivership forward supply contracts entered into by the colliery company. The 
price for coal had risen sharply and the receiver wished to take advantage of that 
rise by seeking new purchasers at a higher price. All three Lords Justices... were 
adamant that authorisation should be withheld. This case, although clearly correctly 
decided, has befuddled the law on this question insofar as a contractual receiver is 
concerned, and its spectre continues to haunt the reasoning of judges asked to 
determine his freedom of action in the sphere of pre-receivership contracts. 
Several factors may be identified which suggest that the Newdigate case should 
have no relevance to that of an administrative receiver. First, the receiver in 
question was compelled to seek a court order permitting him to breach the forward 
contracts, a position that a private receiver will not find himself in. Secondly, the 
278 1992] BCC 270,2 90. 
279 1912] 1 Ch 468. 
280 Cozens-Hardy MR and Buckley and Fletcher Moulton LJJ. 
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Court of Appeal correctly saw the receiver's obligations as being owed to two 
classes of constituent, the creditors and the mortgagor company. 281 It is axiomatic 
that a contractual receiver may, in his management of the company's assets, 
disregard the interests of the company in order to promote those of the debenture- 
holder. Such a requirement of even-handedness as is seen in relation to a court- 
appointed receiver is totally absent where privately appointed receivers are 
concerned. 
Thirdly, Cozens-Hardy MR reached his conclusion on the basis that the receiver in 
question was under a duty to preserve the goodwill of the company. Again, it is 
clear that a contractual receiver owes no duty to preserve the goodwill of the 
business for the benefit of the mortgagor, except, perhaps, to the extent that he 
ought not to Wilfully or carelessly sacrifice it. These three features of the Newdigate 
judgments are sufficient to suggest that the case is of little relevance to the question 
of when an administrative receiver should be free to repudiate pre-receivership 
contracts of the company. 
Only two later decisions addressed the question of when a court-appointed receiver 
will be authorised by the court to disregard a contract. The Privy Council, in 
Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada"', accepted without question that such a 
receiver was able to refuse to fulfil a pre-receivership contract. In In re Great Cobar 
Ltd.. Warrington J focused on whether or not such a refusal would affect the value 
of the company's. goodwill. Distinguishing the Newdigate case on the facts, he 
See Buckley U, [1912] 1 Ch 468,478. 
292 [ 1913 ] AC 160. 
283 [191511 Ch 682. 
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granted an order that the receiver should be at liberty to breach the agency 
agreement in question. 
The institution of private receivership has proved much more attractive to 
debenture-holders in the years following Newdigate, and cases involving court- 
appointed receivers are now an endangered species. It remains the case, however, 
that that decision has influenced those on the same question in the private 
receivership arena, and one must question whether this is appropriate or helpful. 
3.2 Contractual receivers: the cases 
In Ardmore Studios (Ireland) Ltd v Lynch 2" a union representative sought an 
injunction to prevent a contractual receiver from repudiating an agreement that his 
members would provide services to the plaintiff company. With very little 
discussion of the principles involved, McLoughlin J concluded that the receiver was 
free to breach the agreement. It is clear from his judgment that he was influenced by 
the fact that the agreement in question was so disadvantageous to the company that 
it had precipitated the receivership"'. Nonetheless he did observe that: 
"As agent for the Company, the Company is made fully responsible for [the 
receiver's] acts but it is not a corollary to this that he is bound by all company 
contracts and agreements entered into by the Company before the date of his 
appointment... ""' 
Lowry J, in Kernohan Estates Ltd v Boyd, explained the position by reference to 
authority and in a little more detail: 
284 [1965] IR 1. 
2111 Ibid. 40. 
286 ibid. 
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I think the key to the Newdigate case is that here was a receiver appointed who was 
seeking a special power which he could not exercise without leave, and who, in order 
to exercise the power, had to disregard existing obligations. I also consider that in the 
Newdigate case, unlike the [Re B] Johnson case, the court took the view 
... 
that the 
mortgagor had a very definite interest in the future, and, I might say, the immediate 
future of the company. 15297 
Newdigate was clearly considered relevant here, and particularly salient in the 
learned judge's view was the likelihood or otherwise of the mortgagor company 
having a realistic interest in the equity of redemption. It was this fact, and not any 
distinction between the duties of court-appointed and private receivers, that 
separated Newdigate from the case of Re B Johnson (Builders) Ltd". 
The first opportunity for the Court of Chancery to consider the question was in the 
case of Airlines Airspares Ltd v Handley Page Ltd"9. An enlightening insight into 
the background to this decision was candidly provided by Lightman J in 1996: 
"I recall well in 1969 arguing the case of [Airspares] 
... 
1, on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
applied for an injunction to restrain a receiver from proceeding with a sale on the 
ground that by doing so he would be procuring a breach of contract by Handley Page 
- 
he would be disabling Handley Page from selling aircraft and the Plaintiff from 
earning a Commission. The decision in the case was correct 
- 
my application was 
refused 
- 
but no credit due to any of those participating in the decision-making. The 
argument of counsel and reasoning in the judgment in that case were all vitiated by a 
failure to appreciate the fundamental difference in the role, responsibilities and 
powers of receivers appointed by the Court and of receivers appointed by debenture- 
holders. I was totally new to the law of receivership, and so I would suspect was my 
287 [ 1967] NI 27,33 (italics added). 
288 [1955] Ch 634. It will be recalled that the Johnson case was not concerned with whether a receiver 
was legally able to breach company contracts. 
... [19701 Ch 193 (hereinafter Airspares). 
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opponent (though he is now a judge of the Chancery Division). The Law Reporter 
discretely omitted counsels' argument from the report. As regards the judge, need I 
say more than that he was a pure specialist patent judge unpolluted by any 
acquaintance with insolvency. We were all sleepwalkers in the dark - no light was 
shed on anything relevant by the only textbook available, namely Kerr on 
Receivers. ""' 
The learned judge's self-deprecation is both humorous and, it is submitted, to some 
extent undeserved. The law of contractual receivership was, in 1969, in its infancy 
and no authority on the question in hand existed. Moreover, little in the way of 
principle was available. Nonetheless, Graham J, in Airspares, made a valiant 
attempt, phrasing the central question thus: 
"... is a receiver and manager, appointed by debenture-holders, in a stronger position, 
from a legal point of view, than the company itself in respect of contracts between 
unsecured creditors and the company? "' 
Again, the question of whether the company could expect to re-assert control over 
the equity of redemption in any practical sense was considered germane. The 
learned judge also identified another relevant consideration, namely that if a 
receiver was compelled to perform pre-receivership contracts, "almost any 
unsecured creditor would be able to improve his position and prevent the receiver 
from carrying out, or at any rate carrying out as sensibly and as equitably as 
possible, the purpose for which he was appointed""'. 
This is a perceptive observation, and, it is submitted, more relevant than any 
... The Challenges Ahead: Address to the Insolvency Lawyers' Association [1996] JBL 113,114 
- 
115. 
291 [1970] Ch 193,198. 
... lbid. 199. 
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contemplation of the company's activities post-receivership. Unfortunately, 
Graham J did not elaborate further, preferring instead to answer his own question 
by reference to a passage in Buckley on the Companies A CtS293, that passage reciting 
the position as regards court-appointed receivers and stressing the relevance of the 
effect of a repudiation on the goodwill of the company. In effect, therefore, 
Airspares departs hardly at all from the case law on court-appointed receivers, and 
proceeds on the basis that precisely the same considerations are determinative in the 
case of a contractual receiver. This is understandable, but nevertheless unfortunate 
in that it sets an inappropriate benchmark for following cases. 
4. Developments after Airspares 
- 
towards a principled approach? 
The academic commentary following Airspares was largely supportive 294 
. 
O'Donovan, however, took a different view: 
"In retrospect it appears that his Lordship 
... 
allowed the receiver and manager 
considerable latitude in attending to the interests of the secured creditor. By contrast, 
the interests of the unsecured creditors received scant attention. Moreover, while it 
could not be said that the appointee acted in bad faith, it seems that he spared little 
thought for the debtor company. ""' 
The courts, when presented with the opportunity to apply the Airspares principle, 
chose instead to qualify it, and, in the Commonwealth, to do so almost out of 
existence. In Schering Pty Ltd v Forrest Pharmaceutical Co Pty Ltd, Helsham CJ 
was blunt: 
213 13th ed. (1957 : Butterworths : London), p. 244. 
294 See Henchman, Remedies ofthe Secured Creditor (1971-1972), 10 UWALR 20. 
"'The Duties and Liabilities ofa Receiver and Manager (1979) 12 MULR 52,58. 
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"If [Airspares] purports to be a decision asserting a general principle such as is stated 
in the headnote 
... 
then I think it is plainly wrong. What that would amount to is an 
assertion of principle that a receiver is entitled to avoid onerous contracts... "296 
Having concluded that Airspares decided no such thing, he proceeded to infer that 
the Courts would, and should, be prepared to grant an injunction to prevent the 
company, by its servants and agents, acting in breach of an express negative 
stipulation in a contract. This case therefore contemplates that equitable remedies 
will be available against a company in receivership, the most obvious being an 
injunction or an order of specific performance. 
This was confirmed in the case of Re Diesels & Components Pty Lid"'. McPherson 
J cited Schering as authority for the proposition that, where damages would be an 
inadequate remedy, the company's contracting partner "... may be entitled to either 
specific performance or an injunction that has the effect of obliging the company, 
and through it the receivers and chargee, to adhere to and to perform a pre- 
5298 
receivership contract' 
. 
A consideration of equitable remedies, or rather their free availability to prevent a 
breach of a pre-receivership contract, appear to be very much de rigeuer in this 
respect. The first UK decision to embrace equitable intervention does so 
wholeheartedly. In Freevale Ltd v Metrostore (Holdings) Ltd.. Judge Rattee, QC 
set out his stall from the outset: 
296 [ 1982] 1 NSWLR 286,29 1. 
297 (1985) 9 ACLR 825. 
... Ibid. 829. 
'9' [ 1984] 1 Ch 199. 
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"Now, the first thing to note about the facts of [Airspares] is that the contract 
concerned was not one of which the court would, apart from receivership, grant 
specific performance. ""' 
Having identified grounds upon which to distinguish Airspares, and having noted 
that the entry into a valid contract for the sale of land conferred upon the 
prospective purchaser an equitable interest in that land, the learned judge asked 
himself whether the appointment of a receiver somehow destroyed that equitable 
interest"'. The focus of the enquiry, therefore, shifts from the rights of the 
debenture-holder and company inter se, as seen in Newdigate and A irspares, to the 
rights of the third party contractor, as espoused by the Australian cases noted above. 
Having reviewed existing authority and found it of no assistance, Judge Rattee 
chose instead to follow the approach of the courts to the similar question in a series 
of bankruptcy cases"', and inferred from those decisions that the answer to the 
question he had earlier asked was "No". That being so: 
"... it seems to me quite clear that the court ought to perfect the interests of the 
purchaser by calling upon the companies to transfer that legal estate in perfection of 
the equitable interest already vested in the plaintiff. ""' 
Freevale was distinguished in the Irish case of Tullow Engineering (Holdings) 
Ltd304, where one company in a group granted a floating charge over its 
shareholding in another company in the same group. It then granted an irrevocable 
option to purchase those shares to a third company in that group. A receiver was 
300 [1984] 1 Ch 199,202. 
301 Ibid. p. 203. 
302 Pearce v Bastahle's Trustee in Bankruptcy [ 1901] 2 Ch 122; In re Bastable, Ex parle the Trustee [1901] 2 KB 518. 
303 [ 1984) 1 Ch 199,2 10. 
304 [1990] 1 IR452. 
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appointed and the third company purported to exercise its option. Blayney J held 
that in these circumstances the receiver was free to refuse to transfer the shares to 
the third company. Freevale concerned a contract for sale rather than an option to 
purchase, and so was distinguishable. 
With respect, this reasoning is less than convincing. The existence of a contractfor 
sale was only critical to the Freevale case because it served to create an equitable 
interest in the prospective purchaser. If Freevale was considered authoritative, as it 
must have been since the learned judge chose to distinguish it, he should instead 
have determined whether the grant of an irrevocable option to purchase shares 
creates a similar equitable interest. It is not clear whether such an option, where 
shares are concerned, does create in rem rights. In the case of land, an option to 
purchase has been held to confer a proprietary interest for the purposes of 
establishing an overriding interest under s. 70(l) Land Registration Act 1925 311. It 
might, however, be argued that such cases have no relevance to options other then 
in relation to land. 
Whilst ignoring the question of the third company's equitable interest (or 
otherwise), in the shares in question, Blayney J gave full consideration to the nature 
of the debenture-holder's rights. He considered these, by reason of the 
crystallisation of the floating charge, to amount to equitable ownership. That being 
so, the company was in no position to enter into a contract for sale in fulfilment of 
the option to purchase'06 
. 
This only partially addresses the real issue, viz., where 
two parties are claiming the right to have property deployed in a particular manner, 
... Webb v Pollmount [1966] Ch 584; Kling v Keston Properties Lid (1989) 49 P& CR. 212; 
Ferrishurst v Wallcite Properties [199911 All ER 977. 
306 [1990] IR 452,458. 
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which should prevail? In the event, it appears that the learned judge was especially 
influenced by the fact that the third company, if entitled to exercise its option, 
would be able to obtain the shares in question at roughly a third of their true value. 
Whilst this may be relevant in determining whether the equitable remedy of specific 
performance is available, it is submitted that it is an insufficient ground of, itself on 
which to base a judgment. 
A case expressly appreciating the importance of what resembles a contest between 
competing equities is Astor Chemicals Ltd v Synthetic Technology Ltd"'. Vinelott J 
said this: 
"The question is one of priority. So a receiver will be restrained from acting in breach 
of an obligation entered into by the company if the consequences would be to deprive 
the plaintiff of an equitable interest ranking ahead of the debenture 
... 
or, I think, any 
other proprietary or contractual right binding on the debenture-holder. , 308 
This, it is submitted, accurately identifies the essence of the enquiry. The learned 
judge, however, suggested that the Newdigate case was of continued relevance: 
"It does not follow that a receiver can otherwise act in disregard of contractual 
obligations binding on the company. He may not be entitled to do so if, for instance, 
there is a doubt as to whether there will be a surplus of assets available to tile 
company and other creditors after meeting the debt due to the mortgagee and if the 
breach might seriously damage the reputation of the company and impair its goodwill, 
or if the charge does not extend to all the assets of the company and the breach might 
affect the ability of the company to continue to trade with its other assets. "309 
It appears from this that Vinelott J was not prepared to discount the question of the 
307 [1990] BCLC 1. 
"'Ibid. II (italics added). 
309 Ibid. 
313 
company's interest in deciding the point in question. 
A further circumstance in which a court has been prepared to grant injunctive relief 
against a receivership company is where damages for breach of contract will be an 
inadequate remedy. Harman J, in a judgment that threatens to reverse the location 
of deployment decision priority altogether, made the following observation: 
"It is quite true that this contract [to grant a right of pre-emption over machinery] does 
not bind any third party, it is quite true that it does not give any equitable interest in 
the property, but it does not to my mind follow that there is no power in the court to 
grant any remedy or relief in respect of it other than damages. The prime remedy for 
breach of contract is, no doubt, damages, but a threatened breach of contract may be 
restrained by injunction even though there be no property rights arising under tile 
contract. "'O 
The learned judge upheld a pre-existing injunction against the breach of contract 
but varied it. The plaintiff was not to disclose his right of pre-emption, was to 
match any other offers made for the mach inery, and was to accept or refuse the 
receiver's offer to sell to him promptly. This variation would ensure that the 
debenture-holder would not lose financially by his receiver's inability to sell the 
property other than to the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the judgment goes far further in 
favour of pre-receivership contracting partners of the company than any preceding 
it. It is unclear upon what principle it is based, other than a rather vaguely expressed 
inherent equitable jurisdiction to grant relief where damages would be an 
inadequate remedy"'. 
"' Ash & Newman Ltd v Creative Devices Research Ltd [ 199 1] BCLC 403,406. 
311 Which will virtually always be the case. 
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5. The breach of pre-receivership contracts :a coherent approach? 
5.1 The cuniulative effect of the authorities 
From the preceding discussion it appears that the courts have identified several 
considerations relevant to the question of when a receiver may be restrained from 
disregarding pre-receivership obligations of the company. These include the effect 
of the breach on the company and/or its goodwill, the nature of the contracting 
partner's rights, the nature of the debenture-holder's rights, the adequacy of a 
damages remedy, and the elevation of an unsecured creditor over the debenture- 
holder and other unsecured creditors. Oditah, in reviewing the cases up until 1990, 
analyses the nature of the problem in great detail and concludes that the authorities 
go too far. In particular he notes that: 
"... the proposition deducible from [Airspares and AsIor Chemicals] that a receiver 
appointed out of court cannot repudiate or refuse to perforrn the company's current 
contracts where there is a doubt whether there will be a surplus of assets for payment 
of other claims or where this will seriously affect the company's trading prospects or 
its goodwill is much too widely stated to be accepted as law. Secondly, the limitation 
suggested by the Schering case goes much too far and lacks grounding either in 
principle or precedent. "' 12 
To the extent that Oditah considers the position of the company as irrelevant to the 
enquiry, it is submitted that he is entirely correct. This particular consideration is no 
more than a judicial hangover from Newdigate, and should be dispensed with 
altogether as a factor which warrants attention. It is unconditionally established that 
deployment decision priority is located with the debenture-holder, so to suddenly 
"' Financing Trade Credit: Welsh Development Agency v ExfInco [ 1992] JBL 541,563. 
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afford the company reflection where a receiver proposes, in the interests of the 
debenture-holder, to repudiate a pre-receivership contract belies existing law. 
This proposition extends to a breach of contract that will effect a company's ability 
to trade with its free assets. Oditah suggests that: 
"... it cannot seriously be doubted that, as a receiver's powers are limited to charged 
assets, he must be careful not to allow a repudiation of contract to impair the 
company's ability to continue to trade with what are, at least so far as tile receiver is 
concerned, the company's free assets. ""' 
With respect, it is not immediately obvious why this should appear so self-evident. 
In practice, such a situation is unlikely in receivership, where a global floating 
charge will usually preclude the possibility of the company having free assets at all. 
But to the extent that it does, why should a receiver eschew the advantage that 
breaching a contractual obligation will give his appointor simply because the 
company may be prejudiced? This would appear to amount to a principle that a 
debenture-holder, through his receiver, may only exercise his rights over the 
charged assets in a reasonable way, a wholly novel overture as regards contract law. 
Oditah's criticism of the Schering Pty decision is wholly warranted, and applies to 
that in Ash & Newman. Damages will always be an inadequate remedy for the party 
on the receiving end of a breach of contract. To apply this principle routinely would 
amount to a blanket ban on the repudiation of pre-receivership contracts and have 
the effect of giving deployment decision priority to an unsecured creditor. This 
cannot be seriously contemplated. 
"' [1992] JBL 541,563. 
316 
5.2 Breaching, compam, contracts: the preferred approach 
It bears repeating that the real issue here is a contest between the debenture-holder 
and the contracting partner of the company. A comparison of their respective rights, 
therefore, is wholly appropriate, and the approach of Vinelott J in Astor Chemicals 
is to be commendcd in this regard. If the third party is able to assert an 
equitable/proprietary interest in the property required to fulfil the contract in 
question, it is in accordance with the proprietary basis of receivership law as a 
whole that deployinerit decisiori priority should rest with him. One foreseeable 
problem here is in determining which of two equitable interests is the cardinal 
interest. 
If the third party's equitable interest is in an asset which, prior to appointment of a 
receiver, was the subject of a floating charge, does the debenture-holder's temporal 
ascendancy give him the advantage"'? Or does the 'freedom to deal' with floating 
charge assets inevitably render the debenture-holder's interest of a subordinate 
nature to that of the third party? In practice it is difficult to conceive of 
circumstances where such a determination would have to be made, since it is 
unlikely, given the nature of floating charge assets, that a third party would be able 
to acquire an), proprietary interest of his own in them. 
A further point to recommend this approach is that it answers the apparent injustice 
created by the receiver's immunity in the tort of interference with contractual 
relations. By iveighing the relative rights of debenture-holder and third party, a 
court will effectively ask the question whether, had the debenture-holder caused the 
"' Under the principle that where equities are equal the first in time prevails. 
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company to breach its obligation, he would have been justified in doing so. The 
defence of justification is an effective answer to an allegation of a tortious 
interference with contractual relations. Whilst the scope and operation of this 
defence are far from transparenels, the court may have regard to: 
"... the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the 
grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the 
person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract; and 
... 
the object 
of the person in procuring the breach. ""' 
Such an overview would, it is submitted, allow a court to take account of the result 
of any breach, and to assess whether the overall gain, in the form of enhanced 
realisations, is a sufficient answer to the plaintiff s loss. In Edwin Hill & Partners v 
First National Finance Corp. "', a case very much in point, the Court of Appeal 
considered a debenture-holder's interference as justified because the interference in 
question was prompted by a desire to protect the debenture-holder's security"'. It is 
equally feasible that a court could have regard to the likelihood of the breach 
releasing property that could be more profitably employed elsewhere, perhaps in 
pursuit of a going concern sale that might maximise realisations to such an extent 
that the company's unsecured creditors would benefit. 
To the extent that the receiver's agency alone protects him from liability in tort, it 
seems assured that the onset of liquidation will remove that protection, since 
liquidation puts an end to the agency status"'. In such circumstances a receiver will 
... S66 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts: "... it is impossible to lay down any general rule about the nature 
of the defence. "; supra n 268, para. 23-09. 
3" Glamorgan Coal Co v South Wales Miners'Federation [ 1903] 2 KB 545,573, per Romer U. 
317 [1989] BCLC 89. 
3" For an incisive and interesting critique of this decision, see 0' Dair, Justifying an Interference with 
Contractual Rights (199 1) 11 OJLS 227. 
319 See Doyle, supra n 76,309. 
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presumably be vulnerable to an allegation of tortious interference with contractual 
relations, and will have to rely upon a defence of justification. That this should be 
the case only after liquidation seems artificial, and no good policy reason exists to 
explain why one particular unsecured creditor is better protected after liquidation, 
which is a collective procedure, than before it. 
The Astor Chemicals approach is, it is submitted, the preferred one, to the extent 
that it focuses on the respective rights of debenture-holder and contracting partner. 
Considerations of the company's rights are superfluous, and the courts should avoid 
such. One final issue is whether an injunction restraining a threatened breach, or a 
decree of specific performance, should be denied when it would have the effect of 
elevating the party seeking the injunction or decree to a position above that of 
creditors who have no such opportunity. In other words, should the fact that one 
party has the benefit of a contract which confers upon him rights prior to those of 
the debenture-holder be sufficient to allow him to assert those rights to the 
detriment of creditors who are unsecured by reason of the fact that they have not 
been paid? 
As seen earlier in relation to contractual lienees, the law on occasion allows one 
potentially unsecured creditor to steal a march upon both debenture-holder and 
other unsecured creditors via the assertion of contractual and quasi-proprietary 
rights. The likelihood of this position having a substantial effect on other unsecured 
creditors is probably very small, given that few creditors of the company will be in 
a position to assert possessory rights, and that their claims will be relatively small. 
Where a contracting partner is concerned, though, there may be circumstances 
where his right to have the contract performed will have a disastrous effect upon the 
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level of realisations achievable. If the contract in question is for the sale of property 
central to the company's operations, and if a much higher price could be obtained 
for it if it were sold in a going concern sale, that difference will, potentially, be 
borne by the unsecured creditors. Moreover, without the asset in question a going 
concern sale may be unattainable. 
In these circumstances it is arguable that the court should have regard to the 
question of proportionality. Whilst the third party may have rights superior to the 
debenture-holder, the exercise of those rights, where they will have a 
disproportionately detrimental effect on all other creditors, ought perhaps to be 
subordinated in pursuit of an optimal outcome for all concerned. As the law stands 
it is doubtful that such an approach could be sanctioned. If the question was framed 
in terms of a receiver's liability in tort, he might be able to invoke a justification 
defence"', but under the present law tortious liability does not become an issue 
until liquidation. 
In the final analysis, this entire area is in need of clarification. As the authorities 
stand, a discontented third party threatened with a repudiation of his contract by a 
receiver has every incentive to embark upon expensive litigation in the hope of 
obtaining injunctive relief or a decree of specific performance. This cannot be an 
acceptable state of affair. Insolvency litigation tends to benefit only insolvency 
lawyers. What is required, therefore, is a principled and policy driven discussion 
that takes in all the issues and attempts to find a solution based on the most 
advantageous outcome for all concerned. 
See O'Dair's useful discussion of the proportionality question, supra n 318,243. 
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The external dimension 
- 
some conclusions 
The impact of third party rights forms an important part of receivership law. The 
position of external 'stakeholders' cannot be explained by reference to contract, and 
the courts have had to struggle to achieve a balance in an area where the debt 
enforcement function has traditionally been viewed as principal. For the most part, 
they have worked very much in the dark, falling back on the debenture-holder's 
proprietary priority position to explain some of the more overt disparities 
highlighted by receivership. 
Clearly, the receiver's primary duty to the debenture-holder results in the demotion 
of the interests of third parties. Preferential creditors have proprietary priority over 
floating charge assets, but if the debenture-holder's advantage is best promoted by a 
course that does not involve the deployment of such assets, the receiver is duty 
bound to follow that course. Senior secured creditors may find their proprietary 
priority imperilled by as 43 Insolvency Act application to court, made by an 
administrative receiver with his appointor's welfare in mind, although it is unclear 
how the court would respond to such an application. Junior secured creditors and 
guarantors have no place in the receiver's deliberations, except to the extent that he 
may not prejudice their position by failing to conduct his sale and management 
activities with due diligence. Unsecured creditors have even less of a stake in 
receivership, the law at present compelling them to wait until liquidation before 
mounting a challenge against a receiver, and even then such a challenge is 
dependent upon there having been a breach of duty owed to the company. 
If the above seems to paint a bleak picture, it must always be borne in mind that, in 
certain circumstances, the receiver's duty to the debenture-holder will inure to the 
321 
benefit of all of the above. Whenever he is compelled to deploy the company's 
assets to achieve maximum realisations, usually by attempting to sell the 
company's business as a going concern, there will always be a chance, albeit remote 
in some cases, of a surplus over the amount owed on the debenture. Receivership 
does not per se operate to the detriment of all but the debenture-holder; only where 
he is over-secured does the potential for this effect come into being. In those 
circumstances there is at least an argument that regard should be had to external 
stakeholders, at least where the only disadvantage to the appointor is temporal in 
nature. 
It should also be noted that the case law on occasion reveals some ambivalence 
towards the supremacy of the debenture-holder. This is especially evident where 
contractual or quasi-proprietary rights have been held to take precedence over the 
appointor, notwithstanding that his proprietary priority is established. The 
contractual lienee authorities are a case in point, and perhaps are symptomatic of a 
certain judicial distaste for the plight of unsecured creditors in insolvency. In other 
areas, though, self-help techniques have been treated less gently, even where, 
ostensibly at least, proprietary priority rests with a third party. The decision in Lipe 
v Leyland DAF"' is a good example of a court being prepared to elevate a cause, in 
this case the maximisation of realisations, over and above the immediate rights of a 
third party to property in the possession of the company. On its facts Lipe is a 
courageous, if unorthodox, decision. Whether it should be followed at every 
opportunity is debatable. 
"' Supra n 248. 
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In the final analysis, the courts appear to have achieved a workable balance with 
few legislative tools to hand. The majority of their decisions have been informed by 
the debeiiture-holder's proprietary priority over the charged property, and, in the 
absence of a clear executive policy of promoting the interests of other stakeholders, 
this is botli understandable and legitimate. The clear rejection of the Cork 
Committee's proposals directed at awarding unsecured creditors a financial stake in 
receivership situations signals, if anything, Parliamentary acceptance that the 
debenture-holder remains the party deserving of primacy, and the courts have not 
departed from this position to any great extent. 
The developmeilt of the law as regards the rights of third parties in receivership has 
been patchy and uninformed by any over-arching policy. This deficiency cannot be 
attributed to any laxity or lack of imagination on the part of the courts, but rather to 
the executive's inability to make up its mind over what the focal point of 
receivership should be. As far as external stakeholders are concerned, a more 
rescue-orientated regime for receivership, with less emphasis on the welfare of the 
debenture-holder, would ostensibly be preferable to the rather 'cut and paste' 
system that emerged from the Government's treatment of the Cork Report. 
The final Chapter of this work will attempt to assess the overall performance of 
receivership as a regime, and the question of third party rights will be readdressed 
in the light of an evaluation of practice, as opposed to law. First, however, it is 
necessary to examine the impact on receivership law of one particular interest 
group, namely the company's employees. 
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